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The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the 
cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues 
of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian 
crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” 
countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities 
and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and 
strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin 
American, southern African and Asian countries.
This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security 
studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not 
to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and 
politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because 
it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capita selecta of case studies and 
dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert 
practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from 
comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance 
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International relations have since the earliest of  times reflected many dimensions. At 
some point, mostly due to Western academic influence, the term “international politics” 
dominated the scene and became the framework of  analysis with the term “nation” as 
a core assumption. The term international politics brings to mind power to influence 
or coerce either through soft measures such as policy and dialogue (diplomacy) or hard 
measures such as the projection of  military power. The notion of  nation as broadly 
understood today is seen as having some classic roots. The notion of  the Greek city states 
is frequently mentioned whether in terms of  cooperation or war. The Greek city states 
Sparta and Athens went to war as an example of  a power struggle, but also cooperated 
with other Greek city states when necessary to defend themselves against contending 
powers such as the Persian Empire. 
In Europe, the feudal state and an era of  monarchs and rule by the royalty were gradually 
replaced by the formation of  the nation-state. The transition to the nation-state frequently 
took place through the mobilisation for and enactment of  internal wars in Europe. 
Consider the rise of  Prussia (later Germany), France and the torturous unification of  Italy 
in the 19th century. Though conflict played an important role, attempts at some minimal 
consensus and mutual accommodation to minimise war and its negative consequences 
were also seen. In this regard, the Treaty of  Westphalia (1648) as an early attempt to restrict 
war in Europe is notable. The treaty set about a process with long-term consequences. 
The notion of  national sovereignty was born and this idea and practice were to spread far. 
The notion of  nation-building and the use of  military as instrument of  the state is a close 
and traditional one, ever since the beginnings of  the Greek city state. In different forms, 
even if  they were ancient kingdoms, i.e. in Africa, the same applies. The holders of  power, 
for example the King or Chieftains in order to maintain security for their own collective, 
and dominance over others if  deemed necessary, are closely linked to military capacity 
either as a threat or direct tool. Ancient Egypt is one example.
Early attempts at nation-building were to spread the concept and its material outcomes 
outside Europe through (violent) colonisation and later empire-building by Western 
powers of  large areas and communities outside Europe were to experience the results. 
To a large extent, the European outlook imposed on the former colonies an artificial 
nationhood, as previously colonised communities were grouped together mostly along 
the lines of  the geographical territories as dominated by colonial powers such as The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Germany, (then) Great Britain, France and Italy. 
The winds of  change in Asia and Africa during the late 1950s and 1960s saw the Asian and 
African countries becoming independent. In the case of  Africa, the newly independent 
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states followed the previous borders as defined and decided on in Europe during the 
Berlin Conference (1884/1885) in which Bismarck played a leading role to formalise the 
colonisation of  Africa by Western powers. In the case of  Asia, the Dutch, French and 
the British withdrew in the face of  independence movements and their own financial 
limitations of  being able to hold on to the empires. In South Asia, the process began in 
the late 1940s with the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent followed by the 
Dutch and the French from Southeast Asia in the 1950s.
In the East, areas ruled by the Dutch were clustered together during colonial rule. India 
became independent in 1947 after years of  struggle against British colonialism. Britain, as 
an alleged “Empire on which the sun never sets” dominated India from 1757 to 1947. Ever 
since the Indian Mutiny during 1857/1858 the Indian people fought for their independence; 
a struggle that succeeded in 1947 with the declaration of  independence. India’s struggle 
set a historic example. It was a struggle marked by the important role that mass passive 
resistance (under Mahatma Gandhi’s influence) could play in achieving national liberation 
and establishing a democracy that still lasts. The former British India was to split into India 
and Pakistan, the latter a Muslim majority state which later was to see a military coup 
d’état. Since 1947, a long-lasting conflict over the Kashmir began which still lasts today 
and recently heated up again. 
China after a period of  relative disruptive Western colonial intervention returned to what 
perhaps can be called the geographical space of  a perceived “greater” China as many ages 
before. While China became a republic in 1912 under Sun Yat-sen it was to experience 
a wide-ranging and destructive Japanese invasion before World War II and a civil war 
between communists and nationalists that was to end with the defeated nationalists 
establishing a nationalist government in exile in 1949 on the island of  Taiwan (the latter 
seen by the Chinese government as an errant province). In a sense then, the European 
model of  nationalism (or in cases a paradigm widely accepted in current discourse) had 
long-term consequences, some of  which we still see today. Actions by major global actors 
involve elements of  national interests and touches foreign policy conceptualisation, 
making and executing. In tandem, defence diplomacy as interconnected to foreign policy 
plays an important role. A broader look at this stands as one rationale of  this edited work. 
In the case here, the cases under discussion were all earlier seen as the “Third World”, with 
perhaps China more befitting the term “Second World”.
International political frameworks or theories built around the nation as a central construct 
brought in theoretical approaches (or paradigms, if  you wish) such as realism (later revised 
and refined to include neorealism), the liberal institutional approach, dependency theory 
and developmental theories (call it a critical sociological approach to world or global 
politics) and in later years, gender and environment orientated frameworks. In terms of 
international politics, a shift occurred from international relations or politics to what can 
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best be described today as global politics. Numerous actors other than the state became 
part of  the global socio-political and economic setting; a process partly facilitated by 
what some describe as globalisation. Much of  this historical evolution – in cases even an 
evolution-revolution – to borrow a term from Thomas Hanna, made the study of  global 
politics much more interesting, but also more complex (especially if  one assumes that we 
live in a world that some observers choose to call a post-truth society). No single approach 
dominates any longer and many more actors than the state (or nation-state) have entered 
real developments and theoretical discourse. In the case of  this work, the notion of  the 
state or nation as entity remains part of  our analysis.
Contemporary political and military developments are much more convoluted, 
consistently interactive and multilayered – in short – more complex. Due to globalisation 
and the spread of  liberal capitalism, many more actors became involved such as civil-
society groups, multinational companies, trans-national business interests, international 
organisations and non-governmental groups, global interactive networks united on an 
issue-related consensus (i.e. ecology, deep ecology, nature conservation, human rights, 
gender rights, climate change). Today, it makes more sense to talk about global politics, 
whatever one may wish to understand under the term in the context of  both nation-state 
and non-state actors as participants in the world order – or perhaps more cynical, increasing 
global disorder.
Simultaneously, the idea of  larger, medium and smaller national actors, including nation-
states, has remained. We still see “national clashes” of  interest. The cold war era debates 
still revolve around issues of  national interests, but are also closely coupled with different 
ideological angular optics and a social practice – i.e. capitalism versus communism or 
socialism (the latter broken up into many socialisms such as democratic socialism, socialist 
and communist parties that participated in national democratic politics, i.e. Euro-socialism). 
Or consider African socialism and other models of  socialism, i.e. Marxism-Leninism, Mao 
Zedong or Giap’s interpretation of  communism in Vietnam that played a role, in many 
cases the ruling ideologies still vexed around national or geographical interests. In various 
countries communist parties still exist but now abide by the parliamentary rules of  law. 
Think about India, South Africa, Russia, Italy, and Portugal in this regard. In others such as 
North Korea, the old approach still holds while China is evolving along the lines of  what 
perhaps can be called socialism of  a special type. 
In Latin America, the Republic of  Cuba stands between the choices of  losing past gains 
in socialist terms in favour of  (vulgar) capitalism or finding a pathway in between. In the 
case of  Cuba – a country still faced by an aggressive neighbour that, since 1959, keeps its 
grudges against a smaller country that chose its own historical trajectory; and in doing 
so kicked far above its political weight in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the 
1970/1980s and on the continent of  Africa. Cuba’s foreign policy and astute use of  politico-
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military projection played an important role to bring about Namibian independence in 
1990 and indirectly contributed to end apartheid, despite covert support from various 
Western states for the regime in Pretoria.
The Cold War (a term that originated in the West and is mostly used in the West and should 
perhaps be called the “Cold War syndrome”) saw what was viewed as a bipolar world. 
Whether it was bipolar in the real sense of  the word is a different question. At the time, 
China under Mao followed its own pathway to communism and the country having had 
numerous internal development challenges enacted through various plans and from time-
to-time radically revised or streamlined plans, was somewhat less involved in international 
conflicts (there were exceptions such as brief  support for liberation movements and the 
building of  the railway line between Tanzania and Zambia during the late 1970s). Chinese 
involvement at the time did bother apartheid Pretoria’s leaders as it was viewed as an 
additional “Red Threat” apart from Moscow’s Marxism-Leninism (USSR).
India, the world’s largest democracy established early during the decolonisation period is 
notable in the Global South. In many respects, India set an example of  choosing its own 
international pathway while interacting with the Western economies, even cooperating 
with the former coloniser, Britain, within the framework of  the Commonwealth of  Nations; 
yet acted independently along with the other newly independent states. During the Cold 
War, India also chose to work closely with the Soviet Union in terms of  economic deals, 
especially where the acquisition of  arms was concerned and so maintained a balanced 
course between dependency on only one power block or another. As independent state, 
India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the 1970s and 1980s is 
another example.
In China, the efforts put into the four modernisations project since the 1980s detracted 
from a unified international foreign policy and a unique defence diplomacy with the 
exception of  some minimal military support for African countries’ liberation movements 
during the 1970s, yet also entertaining exchanges with the USA during Mao’s era of 
“ping-pong” diplomacy.
The Cold War had a wider influence. The Soviet Union and its allies supported liberation 
movements in their anti-colonial struggles. Africa is one example and so are various other 
so-called “Third World” countries. Africa was liberating itself  and throwing off  the shackles 
of  colonialism. Given Africa’s experience of  colonialism and the effects of  what Africans 
and others saw as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, namely a Western/USA-driven 
post-World War II world order of  the “free market”, the IMF and World Bank and GATT 
which kept the core states of  the world (the USA and Western Europe) commanding the 
heights of  the global economy, African states faced various choices, none of  these easy. 
After World War II, the USSR, Eastern Europe and China followed a different model, 
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namely various experiments with socialism. Within this complex international scene, 
African countries had to choose between economic pathways for the future and where 
they stood in the “East-West conflict”.
Various experiments and approaches followed. These were based on the socio-political, 
developmental conditions, economic strengths or weaknesses, leadership styles and 
pragmatic ideological choices. This phase saw the growth of  regionalism in Asia and 
Africa. India had hosted the first Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947 to promote 
a sense of  regionalism. The Asian Relations Conference brought together many leaders 
of  the independence movements in Asia. This conference is looked at as the beginning of 
the attempt to create a sense of  regionalism in Asia. This was followed by the Bandung 
conference of  1955 in Indonesia. This was the first Afro-Asian conference that sought 
to provide a broader base for the concept of  regionalism to include the countries of 
Africa. The Bandung Conference was a historic event. It tried to spread the concept of 
regionalism to Asia and Africa. Unfortunately, Bandung was the first and the last Afro-
Asian conference to take place.
The end of  the Korean War saw the beginning of  cold war alliances in Asia. The 
fundamentals of  regionalism – independent understanding of  world affairs and peace 
approaches came under stress due to the alliance system. Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, 
Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand and Australia became part of  the American 
system of  alliances, while China, Mongolia, the Indo-Chinese states and North Korea 
became pro-Soviet. Further, the countries of  Asia were not able to overcome their intra-
state conflicts despite the umbrella of  regionalism. The period from Bandung of  1955 
to Belgrade of  1961 was a period that saw a movement away from regionalism towards 
nonalignment. 
The spirit of  regionalism did, however, continue to grow in the Southeast Asian region. It 
saw the formulation of  Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia (MAPHILINDO) and the Association 
of  Southeast Asia (ASA) that went on to merge in a successful regional organisation 
Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Middle East saw the continuing rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union play 
its part in the Arab-Israel dispute. African states, for example, had to choose whether 
to support the liberation struggles of  the long-oppressed Palestinian people. In such 
conditions a choice for Palestinian liberation was bound to stir tensions – then and now. 
The majority of  African states tried to steer clear (at least in policy-speak) from the 
Western-dominated capitalist pathway. One saw a focus in Africa on African socialism, 
mixed economies as elsewhere; a choice to steer between the West-East conflicts. 
These “Third World” countries, as they were pejoratively called in Western political 
and economic (as well as academic) circles, stood together as countries mostly from the 
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southern hemisphere (today more accurately perhaps referred to as the Global South). 
They had to find a way in the middle. But most of  them had fought or were fighting 
Western colonialism and its aftermath. The imposition of  the Washington consensus and 
with it liberal capitalism brought deep divisions and kick-started a rich-poor gap that was 
to increase during the decades thereafter and up till today ensconced in the glib mantra 
of  globalisation. Coupled with this, the much spoken about development theory and 
modernisation theory benefitted only some. 
The “trickle-down” effect of  modernisation and the spread of  capitalism was not to 
benefit all. In Asia the Asian tigers rose and saw benefits. So did Japan during the Cold 
War. Today some would argue that Japan became a “silent giant”. In Africa and Latin 
America, others struggled and were in fact on the receiving end of  global capitalist 
exploitation which in cases bordered on economic destabilisation. In the case of  Cuba, a 
long-term vendetta by the USA followed that still lasts. Non-core or peripheral economies 
found themselves bound into economic prisons from which escape seemed remote. Latin-
America represents a different trajectory while some similarities to other developments 
on the globe can be discerned.
Latin American and Caribbean nations had become independent in the early 19th century. 
Only Cuba remained a Spanish colony until 1898 and was then “liberated” by American 
marines. European military missions (by Germany, France and Great Britain) had shaped 
and strongly influenced Latin-American armed forces. After World War II, US hegemony 
in political, financial and defence matters of  Latin America and the Caribbean became 
clear, sometimes underlined by direct military interventions, the last one in Panama in 
1989 (in 1903 the US had created the latter country, previously a part of  Colombia). The 
Organization of  American States and the Inter-American Defense Latin America structure 
were instruments of  political and military control, reinforced by multiple dictatorships 
of  the “National Security Governments”. Following Brazil’s coup in 1984, ten similar 
dictatorships emerged in the region. The only exceptions were the nationalist-progressive 
military governments in Peru and Panama in the 1970s. The Cuban Revolution (1959) 
favoured many efforts of  establishing “socialist revolutions”. With the exception of 
Nicaragua (1970), all efforts failed. Only between 2000 and 2015, did the major Latin 
American nations take their distance from their powerful northern neighbour, but at 
present (2019/2020), neoliberal presidents in the larger nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru) seek stronger political and military ties with the United States.
The phenomenon of  security regimes (or rule by reactionary military juntas) during the 
Cold War had peculiar, though cynical outcomes. During the 1970s and even the 1980s, 
Latin American authoritarian regimes drifted closer together under the tutelage of  the 
US. The case of  Chile under Pinochet and Argentina under various juntas are examples. 
In following a zealous anti-communist war, these countries extensively oppressed their 
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own civilian populations with a mass murder of  perceived left-wingers – a common 
phenomenon (in Latin-American political literature, these internal war of  state oppression 
(rather state terrorism) was frequently referred to as a guerra sucia or dirty war). 
Elsewhere, the state of  Israel cooperated with the apartheid regime in terms of  offensive 
nuclear research as well as arms production. For strategic reasons, Israel even briefly 
cooperated with a brutal dictator on African soil, Idi Amin Dada of  Uganda, before 
relationships soured. The Latin-American military regimes and Israel were not the only 
ones to cooperate with apartheid South Africa. The nationalist Chinese government on 
the island of  Formosa (Taiwan) in turn also cooperated with South Africa in more than 
cordial ways. The Pretoria regime developed close relations with military regimes in 
Argentina and Chile and authoritarian states such as Uruguay and Paraguay, all of  them 
with dismal human rights records. On African soil, South Africa, France and the USA 
worked with their favourite dictators such as Mobutu of  Zaire and even Hastings Banda 
of  Malawi, if  needed, including military and arms exchanges. The exchange of  arms and 
arms-related research frequently took place between these states. Uganda under Amin, 
mentioned above, was an interesting case of  falling in and out of  favour with the West and 
some Middle East countries, including Israel.
The end of  the cold war brought in new challenges. It saw the rise of  ethnic nationalism 
based right on self-determination. This concept was to give legitimacy to the newly 
created states of  Europe and the newly emergent states such as East Timor, Eritrea, and 
South Sudan. It also saw the growth of  asymmetric warfare in form of  the events of  9/11 
and its escalating aftermath where states that were seen as non-pliant to the West were 
toppled at will by the USA and its “coalition of  the willing”. While there was an apparent 
switch to a unipolar world order, the eventual emergence of  China, resurgent Russia and 
the post-Maastricht European Union perhaps brought in a sense of  multipolarity.
The hegemonic interests, especially of  the United States, saw interference in the politics of 
other countries (as many times earlier on, during the Cold War). The Middle East became 
especially prone to military intervention by the US under the concept, “coalition of  the 
willing”. Compare interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq or take note of  the role of  the 
French, the UK and the USA in the intervention in Libya to topple and kill Gadaffi in 2011.
In the case of  Libya, regime change was imposed under the guise of  the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P). Libya apparently was a different case to others in North Africa. In Tunisia, 
very little Western interference occurred – at least not in military terms. The Arab spring 
in Tunisia and Egypt brought “regime-change” (in fact only a change of  the leader) and 
no fundamental transition. There was no military interference by a show of  Western 
military force projection in the case of  Egypt. In Egypt, regime change took place, but 
after elections the military returned to power (assuming that the military released the 
levers of  power at all).
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The fluidity of  global politics can bring about rapid change with (unforeseen) outcomes. 
Karl Popper’s notion of  unintended consequences is relevant here. Libya was apparently 
an exceptional case. There was no inclination from France, the UK and the USA to solve 
the matter diplomatically or through a negotiated settlement, despite the fact that the 
African Union (AU), Turkey and Russia proposed a negotiated regime change. These 
initiatives were briskly sidelined. We will not discuss it for long but an independent Libya, 
economically stable and growing in stature in Africa and its eccentric leader became an 
increasing irritant as a pivot of  influence. Gadaffi had to be toppled and the demonstrations 
against the Gadaffi regime provided a perfect pretext for intervention and the killing of 
Gadaffi. Libya was not a pliant state in terms of  US/Western hegemony. It was a stable 
state and not in debt with the World Bank. Moreover, Libya’s international profile and 
economic influence was on the rise in Africa and southern Europe. All this played a role to 
enforce regime change. Today Libya is a failed state in all respects with consequences still 
felt in northern Africa (SAHEL), Europe and the Middle East – a situation unlikely to be 
resolved or turning for the better in the decade to come. Whether it was intended to create 
a failed state by those that intervened is a moot point. Anyone with some political-military 
foresight could have predicted the future of  a failed state in Northern Africa. Exactly for 
this reason the African Union, Turkey and Russia proposed a different approach.
The death of  Gadaffi did not bring more peace and stability; not in North or West Africa, not 
in the Middle East and not more political-economic certainty in Europe. On the contrary, 
conflict (potential) increased sharply. This all to serve as demonstration that international 
relations (or in its broader sense, global politics) did not become less complicated. In 
fact, it may have become cloudier if  not outright stormy. The war against terror that 
is waged by the US (with France and the UK and to an extent The Netherlands as loyal 
junior followers) is pestered by stereotypes; much like under apartheid, all resistors to the 
system are labelled terrorists. Violent actions are countered by state action. Some may 
say terrorist actions are countered by the state-terror of  strong (self-perceived) hegemons. 
There is little to be seen about defence diplomacy derived from a peace-driven foreign 
policy approach by the USA and its coalition of  the willing. This spells no good for the 
future. Asymmetric warfare (though different in content from context to context) arises 
and may increase. Notions of  specific communities’ aspirations (i.e. the Kurdish question) 
and their contextual struggles, but also contestation for scarce resources on the globe and 
wars of  greed play an important role. In cases, major powers exploit age old conflicts 
and grudges as proxy forces, reminding one about old-style divide and rule or divide and 
gain political leverage for own interest. Again the situation of  the Kurds in the Middle 
East comes to mind. Globalisation has a down-side, another face of  Janus. With greater 
integration, implosion of  time and space and international flow of  goods and capital 
comes a greater rich-poor gap, fragmentation, alienation and conflict, the latter frequently 
transformed into violence on multilayered levels; violence best to be analysed without 
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falling for glib mantras and stereotypes, not to mention the pragmatic fabrication of  “facts” 
to justify military intervention. In this regard, the recent killing of  a senior military leader 
of  Iran by a US drone attack is one example of  how conflict can be escalated virtually 
overnight. There seems to be little of  an understanding that all conflicts are not “terrorist” 
or religiously inspired. Too little analysis is taking place of  conflicts that arise because of 
greed, control over scarce resources, intervention by states outside relevant regions, water 
security or the maintenance of  trade routes (especially in northern Africa) and grudges 
held by minorities over years, if  not centuries. Likewise, the role of  increasing poverty 
within and between states and its violent side effects are massively under-researched and 
deserve much more attention by theorists and policymakers.
Against the above complex global collage, this edited volume looks at the defence 
diplomacy of  various countries in the Global South on a capita selecta basis. The work 
is compiled in times when global politics are cloudy, if  not warped; one sees permanent 
flux with new crises arising with a context of  revolutions in warfare and the countering 
of  resistance by the aggressive projection/export of  state terror. State terror or foreign 
military intervention even in cases not announced or not on the radar of  Western media, 
such as French actions in West Africa and regular drone attacks by the USA in East-Africa 
spring to mind here.
A note of  caution is perhaps necessary here. This edited work does not explicitly address 
religious conflict or conflict around scarce resources under the cloak of  religious 
justification. The fog and dust of  regionalised war and the stereotyping of  enemies under 
one class, namely that of  Political Islamic terrorists is but one complicating factor. Another 
complicating factor is the salient but persistent role of  Political Christianity that is driving 
the so-called war against terror making for a seemingly self-fulfilling prophecy as end 
game. The term Political Christianity is seldom discussed or analysed. Is it not recognised 
due to ignorance, manipulative politics or through strategic silence? The latter questions 
are important and necessary – if  not crucial – debates and strongly advisable for future 
research. While this point is not addressed by our contributors in this work, we suggest 
that the link between Political Christianity and the legacy thereof  with the aggressive 
projection of  military power by hegemonic states be analysed.
The term Political Christianity certainly deserves to be brought into the political discourse 
and thoroughly analysed in terms of  its ongoing contribution to current global conflict, 
its effect on foreign policy and projection of  power and in turn its effect on defence 
diplomacy in a global political-military context in permanent flux.
This project started during 2017 as result of  an exchange of  ideas between the editors 
that are from different continents but with an interest in the global history of  conflict, 
defence, national security strategies and defence diplomacy or lack of  it. In our case Asia, 
Africa and Latin-America became of  particular interest. Contributors were identified and 
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approached. The contributors are from countries that we here broadly call the “Global 
South”. Theorists, analysts and expert practitioners that contributed are all well versed in 
their fields of  interest. The work recognises a need for a clearer analysis of  global politics, 
specifically through a focused discussion on the defence diplomacy of  various countries 
in the South, from the large to the small. The context differs from country to country 
and from continent to continent as well as political system to political system against 
the background of  sometimes a shared collective historical experience and memory, in 
other cases some contrasting experiences. It speaks for itself  that not all countries could 
be included. In some cases, expert potential participants that were approached could not 
contribute. The nature of  the work also does not allow for a wide-ranging case-to-case 
and inter-case comparative perspectives between the continents of  the Global South. Both 
time and funding were limitations here and such research will have to remain for the 
future. Hence, the extent to which this specific study represents broader casing as known in 
qualitative research is limited. 
The aim here is to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on global politics, especially as 
they relate to defence diplomacies of  countries in the Global South on various continents. 
While the contributors are not addressing foreign policy per se, the reader will be able 
to deduct a lot around this from the readings here as foreign policy and defence policies 
including defence diplomacy have a lot in common. In other cases, some enlightening 
notes are made around strategic resource management and national security strategies 
and the evolvement of  such strategies.
In terms of  the structuring of  the work, the reader will see three parts. The first part 
is dedicated to Latin-America, the second part to cases on the African continent, more 
particularly southern Africa, and the last part to China and India (the “Far East”). In the 
case of  Africa, originally six potential contributors including two countries from Western 
Africa were approached. However, only three chapters were finally included. In the case 
of  larger and potentially more influential actors such as India more than one chapter 
is included. As editors, we decided to include three chapters on India as experts were 
available to contribute. South Africa, despite numerous internal challenges and economic 
woes, for the moment is a large and relatively influential state on the African continent, 
the only African state to form part of  BRICS – at least until overtaken by Nigeria or other 
contenders such as Angola. In the case of  South Africa, experts were also available with 
an interest in related but different areas and two chapters on South Africa are included.
The perspectives brought together in this volume are shared with the reader at a time in 
history where there is clearly no end of  history in sight. The notion of  a so-called clash 
of  civilisations vested in vast generalisations mostly based on the lack of  knowledge and 
emotional intelligence about intricate global socio-political dynamics, cultural specifics 
and the effect of  deepening poverty and a struggle for scarce resources undermines 
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current analytical thinking and problem-solving approaches rather than contribute to 
them. The quasi-ideology of  civilisations in conflict is followed by many political scientists 
with a north-bound gaze. On the converse, others argue that there is an urgent need 
for a critical and constructive dialogue between “civilisations” (historical communities 
and social identity groups), “nations” and within nations or communities of  self-chosen 
citizens. Instead of  a much debated “clash of  civilisations” – to such an extent that the 
term clash between civilisations has become a near mantra – what is needed globally, is a 
dialogue between civilisations and nations. Should such a dialogue not be prioritised, it 
would be for the worse.
The work appears at a time where some argue that we see the decline of  a hegemonic 
power (the US) which will for the most part lead to less predictable and likely more 
aggressive responses by the declining power. With reference to the US, such a decline 
is taking place on a historical continuum that slides on a scale from a global policeman 
mentality to a dangerous international rogue as Gwynne Dyer argues. Others suggest that 
we are about to enter the change from one hegemony to be replaced by another, in this 
case China taking the place of  the US.
Simultaneously, other large powers are rising. In the case of  India, a strong international 
actor is rising and holds international sway and significant military power. India seems to 
be an apologetic hegemon, or at least has no pronounced wish to project military power 
aggressively outside its immediate interests, though relations with Pakistan remain a 
thorny issue, perhaps likely to become thornier. Japan is a silent giant. Brazil prepares 
to sway significant political-military power by deploying soft power. What will happen 
in the future? Russia, after having been pushed back by an encroaching European Union 
(EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the 1990s, is returning to the 
international arena. For Russia, feeling more and more beleaguered since 1993, such a 
“return” is both logic and necessary – understandably so. Some theorists foresee a return 
to multipolarity and perhaps with good outcomes for a relatively more peaceful globe. 
Others see new hegemonies arising. There are more such as the academician Vladimir 
Shubin, who asks: Hegemony? Which hegemony? Which hegemon? Whose hegemony? 
Hegemony so perceived by whom for what purposes? 
The work cannot provide all answers. And it raises many questions. It can contribute 
however, we trust as editors, to a better understanding of  the current state of  defence 
diplomacies (and within a broader collage perhaps foreign policy and the national security 
strategies – the latter coupled to “national” interests). In this sense, the work aims to assist 
in clarifying some issues and we trust will encourage a more open and deeper dialogue 
about the multilayered complexities of  international politics, defence, “national security” 
and defence diplomacy within an ever changing – and perhaps less predictable – framework 
of  global politics.
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In cases, more questions are raised than answered by this edited volume. This is a good thing 
because such questions call for more RE‑search, RE‑flection and new searches for clarity and 
solutions and serious dialogue based on solving or preventing localised and global conflict. 
Are we into hegemonic struggles? Is so‑called “terrorism” the only danger to the global 
community? Can one define terrorism at all without keeping numerous other variables 
in mind? What are the consequences of  a hegemonic state or state‑centred terrorism and 
the export or maintenance of  state terror? Think about (apartheid) Israel or the USA. 
And, if  so, of  what nature are these terrorisms and can they be solved or countered? What 
role for defence diplomacy, if  any? What are the links between national security strategy 
and defence policy? What do the management of  strategic resources and the writing of 
national security strategies have in common in the South? Can national security strategies 
in tandem with well thought‑through defence diplomacies break the increasing rich‑poor 
gap, state abuse and the common development problems of  smaller and marginalised 
communities within states that hold conflict potential? Are defence policies supplementary 
or contrary to national foreign policy? Against which background is defence diplomacy 
changing? Is it changing against a background of  national interests or the flexibilities and 
complexities of  global politics, rather than just international relations between states but 
also influenced by other major non‑state actors, movements and organisations? Are we 
going to experience another era of  one‑sided hegemony and the decline of  it? If  we are, 
where are we going? Are the power infused clandestine and military interventions by the 
US and European states that play along as the coalition of  the willing, giving rise to new 
alienation, fragmentation, struggles in the Middle East and Africa? What can the Global 
South do about it? Can all terrorists be glibly classified as one and the same? In fact, what is 
terrorism and what not? What exactly constitutes resistance – on various levels and within 
geospatial territories – to the negative effects of  globalisation? Can all such resistance be 
discredited by using the term terrorist as bogeyman?
It is the view of  the editors that this volume may become one building block for fruitful 
future discussion. As editors, we trust that such dialogue on defence diplomacy will 
facilitate more peace and less violence on a globe desperately in need of  human security, 
development, growth and the closing of  the rich‑poor gap and racial tensions on multiple 
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Abstract
This chapter examines Brazil’s policies for the protection of its strategic resources. The new agenda on security and defence 
is reshaping the Armed Forces missions at the domestic level (which includes support for natural disasters and constabulary 
missions), and at international level, characterised by asymmetric conflicts and non‑traditional threats, such as international 
terrorism, and arms, human and drug trafficking. The transnational character of these threats has been boosting the 
countries to search for shared resolutions. In this context, the process of horizontalisation of diplomacy and the increasing 
involvement of the military in non‑coercive activities has raised questions regarding the limits placed on the armed forces 
in the international arena, and has shed light on the prospect of using the military apparatus as a peaceful instrument of 
foreign policy. Discussing how these issues materialised in Brazilian defence policies, and how the defence sector is acting to 
provide national development and protection to the national strategic resources through deterrence and cooperation, are the 
central themes of this chapter. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first session present Brazil’s defence documents 
and show the country’s main objectives in this field, as well as the role of defence diplomacy in achieving them. The second 
section describes the main defence diplomacy activities developed by Brazil in South America, while the third section details 
the strategic projects that the country has been developing in order to guarantee its sovereignty, national treasures and 
territorial integrity. For this chapter, we consulted academic literature on Brazilian defence policy and the governmental 
documents related to the subject.
Introduction 
The complementary relationship between diplomacy and war, as described from a 
realist point of  view by Aron (1962), has returned to the centre of  academic debate in 
recent decades. The horizontalisation of  diplomacy and the increasing involvement of 
the military in non‑coercive activities has raised questions about the limits placed on the 
armed forces in the international arena, while also shedding light on the use of  military 
apparatus as a peaceful instrument of  foreign policy.
Parag Khanna (2011) postulates that diplomacy has never been more important, yet its 
scope, agents and modus operandi differ greatly from those advocated by the authors 
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of  classical realism during the Cold War. Ministries of  foreign affairs no longer have the 
monopoly on diplomatic activities, as members of  other ministries and representatives 
of  subnational governments, as well as organised sectors of  civil society, develop and 
negotiate their agendas in the international arena without interfering with states’ foreign 
policy. The systematisation of  this practice has minimised the negative image that the 
concept of  paradiplomacy inspired.
The end of  the East‑West conflict also had significant consequences for the military 
apparatus. Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in participation by the armed forces 
in cooperative activities (humanitarian aid, natural disaster support, exchanges in teaching 
and technical‑professional areas, support for security and development activities, etc.) at 
both the international and regional level, and as part of  bilateral agreements. The process 
of  diplomatic decentralisation, coupled with the expansion of  the military’s non‑coercive 
activities, has ignited the debate on diplomatic actions carried out by the defence sector.
Some authors frame this phenomenon in the context of  the transformations that the 
United States (US) and Western European armed forces underwent after the end of  the 
Cold War. Farrell, Rynning, and Teriff  (2013) show that the armies of  the US, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and France were generally restructured as expeditionary forces between 
the early 1990s and the late 2000s. In the case of  the UK and France, this restructuring 
involved the development of  a new doctrine that would enable forces to operate in a 
more dispersed and holistic, and less lethal way to achieve strategic objectives. Meanwhile, 
Cottey and Forster (2004) note that since the 1990s, NATO countries have conducted 
military exercises with their former enemies, and the US has established bilateral military 
cooperation relations with China and India, and initiated understandings in the defence 
field with the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).
According to the constructivist perspective on international relations, defence diplomacy 
seeks to mitigate the behaviour of  the state through a focus on conflict and war. The 
main difference between this perspective and the realist view is the use of  cooperation, 
or cooperative and non‑coercive military power. In this way, defence diplomacy is part of 
a wider diplomatic context, related to the construction of  the image of  both the Armed 
Forces and of  the country itself, and can be considered an extension of  the country’s 
public diplomacy. It is essentially a set of  activities and initiatives that are followed by the 
armed forces, in conjunction with regular diplomacy, particularly with reference to the 
foreign armed forces in peacetime (Singh, 2011). 
According to the constructivist view, the objective of  defence diplomacy is the achievement 
of  security and external defence. In the context of  global and regional strategic engagement, 
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this creates sustainable cooperative relationships by building trust and facilitating conflict 
prevention, introducing transparency in defence relations, reinforcing perceptions of 
common interest, changing the fixed mindset of  partners, and improving cooperation in 
other areas (Muthana, 2011:3).
As will be shown in this chapter, Brazil fits into the constructivist perspective, as its defence 
diplomacy seeks cooperation as a means of  creating trust and integration. This position 
was made explicit in the documents produced by the Defence sector from the 1990s and 
constitutes a central part of  the objectives set out in the National Defence Policy (PND). 
In its turn, the National Defence Strategy (END) states that Brazil will promote neither 
hegemony nor domination, as the Brazilian people are not willing to exert their power on 
other nations, preferring to grow without coercing others (Brazil, 2008). 
This statement, besides reinforcing the Brazilian tradition of  peaceful coexistence with its 
neighbours, makes explicit another fundamental principle of  Brazil’s foreign policy, which 
is its desire to become a major power. The military have played an important role in this, 
and since the founding of  the Superior War College (ESG in Portuguese) in 1949, they 
have supported the idea that the Brazilian government needs to articulate the political, 
economic, social and military sectors in order to guarantee the security and development 
of  the country.
Golbery do Couto e Silva, one of  the main exponents of  Brazilian geopolitical thought 
and founder of  ESG, saw Brazil as an underdeveloped country, incapable of  achieving 
the same level of  technology as developed countries. In order to overcome this, the 
author suggested that Brazil accept the tutelage of  a great power that could give it the 
technology and capital necessary to develop economically. Couto e Silva believed that 
Brazil should become the “privileged satellite” of  the US in Latin America which, in the 
author’s view, would bring mutual benefits: the US would receive raw materials, while 
Brazil would gain technology and the know‑how to generate a robust production system 
to enable it to export to other underdeveloped countries. Since then, the idea that security 
and development are linked has crystallised in the imagination of  Brazil’s foreign and 
defence policymakers.
Since the 1970s, Brazil has abandoned the idea that automatic alignment with the US is 
the best way to become a power, and instead has sought strategic autonomy in concert 
with other developing countries. After the redemocratisation of  the country in the 1980s, 
the process of  Brazilian approximation with other South American countries in the 
political and military fields intensified (Marques, 2003). Along with this, the idea that 
Brazil would grow without using coercion over others arose in its defence diplomacy in 
a more articulated way during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidency (1994‑2002). 
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This chapter will discuss Brazil’s policies of  deterrence and cooperation for the protection 
of  its strategic resources, and is divided into three sections: the first section discusses 
Brazil’s defence documents, showing the country’s main objectives in this field, as well as 
the role of  defence diplomacy in achieving these goals. The second section describes the 
main defence diplomacy activities developed by Brazil in South America, while the third 
section details the country’s strategies for guaranteeing its sovereignty, national treasures 
and territorial integrity. 
Brazil’s defence documents
Although Brazil does not have a National Security Strategy, it does have documents in the 
Defence sector that guide policy and strategy in this area, namely: the National Defence 
Policy, the National Defence Strategy, and the White Paper on National Defence. In 1996, 
during Cardoso’s presidency, the first Brazilian defence document was enacted to provide 
a conceptual and normative description of  Brazil’s place in the international system (Cepik 
& Bertol, 2016). 
The National Defence Policy (PDN), ‘which is aimed at threats from abroad, has as its 
primary purpose to establish the objectives for the defence of  the Nation’s capabilities 
at every level and every sphere of  power, with the involvement of  the military and the 
civilian sectors’ (Brazil, 1998:5). In addition, the PDN follows the principles of  Brazilian 
foreign policy in the search for a ‘peaceful resolution of  disputes, with the resort to the use 
of  force only for self-defence’ (Brazil, 1998:9). As we can see, the main legal framework for 
national defence focuses on external threats, respecting the sovereignty of  other peoples, 
and using force only as a last resort for self-defence.
In 1999, the organisational structure of  the Armed Forces was modified (Brazil, 1999). Prior 
to this, the Armed Forces were headed by the Ministers of  State of  the Navy, the Army, the 
Air Force, and the General Staff  of  the Armed Forces. On 10 June 1999, with the creation 
of  the Ministry of  Defence (MOD), a new architecture for the national defence sector 
was established.1 The MOD is a key institution for consolidating the political direction of 
the military (Oliveira, 2005), and its creation meant it was necessary to reformulate the 
National Defence Policy; however, this would only happen in 2005. 
The new version of  the PND maintained its main purpose, with a slight difference, that 
the National Defence Policy ‘aimed mainly towards external threats is the conditioning 
document of  the highest level of  defense planning’ (Brazil, 2005:2). By stating that the 
PND was aimed mainly towards external threats, the Brazilian government sought to 
align its defence policy with the United Nation’s (UN) extended concept of  security, and 
to regulate the traditional internal role of  the Brazilian Armed Forces in reducing internal 
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vulnerabilities. Because the PND is the highest level of  defence planning, the MOD was 
able to review and prioritise the documents being formulated by the three branches of  the 
Brazilian Armed Forces.
Another important milestone was the first National Defence Strategy (END in Portuguese), 
published in 2008 (Brazil, 2008). The END was designed by an inter‑ministerial committee 
chaired by the MOD and coordinated by the Minister‑in‑Chief  of  the Secretary for 
Strategic Affairs, and consisting of  the Minister of  Planning, Budget and Management; 
the Minister of  Finance; and the Minister of  Science and Technology, assisted by the Navy, 
Army and Air Force Commanders. 
Despite the absence of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in the committee that prepared 
the END, and some discrepancies between their normative propositions, pointed out by 
analysts, the PND and the END can be seen as related stages in the evolution of  Brazilian 
defence policy (Oliveira, 2007; Cepik & Bertol, 2016). The END focuses on middle‑ 
and long‑term strategic actions, and aims to modernise the national defence structure 
through three primary processes: reorganisation of  the Armed Forces, the restructuring 
of  the Brazilian defence industry, and the troop requirements policy for the Armed Forces 
(Brazil, 2008). As one aspect of  the END, each of  the Armed Forces were responsible for 
drawing up their Equipment and Deployment Plans, redefining their territorial structures, 
and developing new procurement programmes for materials, equipment and armaments 
(Brazil, 2008).
In 2010, Complementary Law 136 (Brazil, 2010) was passed, resulting in the restructuring 
of  the MOD with the creation of  the Armed Forces Joint Staff. Its primary mission is to 
promote the concept of  unity amongst the service branches in order to optimise military 
resources for national defence and border security, as well as rescue and humanitarian 
operations. The creation of  this new structure within the MOD placed the Chief  of  the 
Joint Staff  at the same hierarchical level as the Commanders of  the three branches of 
the Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Air Force), all of  whom, together with the MOD, 
comprise the Military Defence Council, the highest level adviser to the President of  the 
Republic regarding the use of  military resources (Brazil, 2012b).
The new legislation extended policing power to the Navy and the Air Force (Brazil, 2010), 
enabling the three branches of  the Armed Forces to act in support of  the Public Security 
Forces and in the frontier areas. Another important factor defined in Complementary 
Law 136 was the determination that, from 2012 onwards, the three main documents of 
the Defence sector would be reviewed and approved by the National Congress every 
four years.
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Complementary Law 136 also stipulated that the PND and END be updated in 2012 (Brazil 
2008, 2012c), the year in which the National Defence White Paper (LBDN in Portuguese) 
was drawn up, a document about defence-related activities in Brazil. In addition to 
providing internal and external transparency on how the Brazilian Armed Forces are used, 
the LBDN helped deepen society’s pool of  knowledge on the military field (Brazil, 2012b). 
According to this new legal framework, the strategic projects of  the three branches of 
the Armed Forces had a new impetus, along with the defence industry, which received 
fiscal incentives through the new legislation that defined terms such as ‘Defence Material, 
Strategic Material, Defence System and Strategic Defence Company’,2 enabling a 
resurgence of  the defence industrial base (Brazil, 2012a, 2013a, 2013b).
In 2016, 20 years after the first Brazilian defence document, the PND, END and LBDN 
were updated and forwarded to the National Congress for consideration. The National 
Defence Objectives (ODN in Portuguese) have remained relatively stable in all PND 
versions, regardless of  the political party spectrum of  the Brazilian government, and 
the constant ministerial changes. It is worth noting that Brazil had 11 Defence Ministers 
during the 19 years of  existence of  the Ministry.3 The stability of  NDOs over the years can 
be observed in Table 1.1.
TABLE 1.1 Comparison of national defence objectives in PND
1996 2005 2012 2016
Guarantee sovereignty, 











Guarantee rule of law and 
democratic institutions
  
Maintain national cohesion 
and unity
Contribute to preservation 
of cohesion and national 
unity 
Contribute to preservation 
of cohesion and national 
unity 
Contribute to preservation 
of cohesion and national 
unity 
Promote regional stability Contribute to regional 
stability Contribute to regional 
stability, international peace 
and security 
Contribute to maintenance 
of international peace and 
security
Contribute to maintenance 
of peace and international 
security 
Contribute to international 
peace and security 
Protect individuals, goods, 
resources that are Brazilian/
under Brazilian jurisdiction
Defend national interests, 
Brazilian citizens’ assets 
and resources abroad
Defend national interests, 
Brazilian citizens’ assets 
and resources abroad
Protect individuals, goods, 
resources and national 
interests abroadAchieve and maintain 
Brazilian interests abroad
Give Brazil significant role 
in international affairs, 
greater role in international 
decision-making process
Participation of Brazil in 
community of nations, and 
broader role in international 
decision-making processes 
Intensify Brazil’s 
participation in community 
of nations, and international 
decisions 
Increase Brazil’s 
participation in community 
of nations and role in 
international decision-
making processes
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1996 2005 2012 2016
Maintain Armed Forces 
that are modern, joint, 
well-trained, balanced, 
professional, adequately 
deployed throughout the 
national territory
Assure the capability 
of defence for 
accomplishment of 
the Armed Forces 
constitutional missions
Structure Armed Forces 
around capabilities, provide 
personnel and material in 
accordance with strategic 
and operational planning
Develop Defence Industrial 
Base to ensure autonomy in 
vital technologies Promote productive and 
technological autonomy in 
Defence areaDevelop potential for 
defence logistics and 
national mobilisation
Raise awareness amongst 
Brazilian people about the 
importance of defence 
matters for the country
Expand involvement of 
Brazilian society in National 
Defence matters
SOURCE: Adapted by Marques and Maia Neto, from: Brazil (1998), (2005), (2012c), (2016b)
The slight changes in the ODN reflect the domestic and international political context 
in which the different versions of  the PND were drafted. In the 1996 version, there was 
explicit reference to the commitment of  the Brazilian Armed Forces to the maintenance 
of  democratic institutions. This objective is not included in later versions of  the PDN and 
has been replaced by the promotion of  regional stability and commitment to international 
peace and security.
In the 2012 version, one objective was removed and five were added to the PND, raising 
the total ODN to eleven. Elaborated after the publication of  the first END (2008), and 
concurrent with the public debate that guided the preparation of  the LBDN, the 2012 
PND explained in more detail all the contexts in which the need to structure the defence 
sector was conceived.
In the 2016 version, the documents sought a more integrated vision with other sectors of 
government, and adopted a more simplified structure, as explained by ODN. In line with 
Chancellor Celso Amorim’s thesis that Brazil should adopt a grand strategy combining 
foreign policy and defence policy (Amorim, 2015), the PND established national defence 
capabilities that should be sought by the various sectors of  the government structure. 
These national capabilities will result in the military capabilities that will guide the 
processes of  transformation of  the Armed Forces, especially those processes directed to 
the strategic projects of  each branch. The projection of  national power is another point 
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detailed in the 2014 PND, as for the first time the document highlights the need to set up 
expeditionary forces to support the country’s commitments to international organisations, 
and conventions, treaties and agreements of  which Brazil is a signatory (Brazil, 2016b).
South‑South relations are well‑defined in the defence documents, particularly the PND, 
when establishing as priority areas of  Defence interest, ‘the Brazilian strategic environ‑
ment, which includes South America, the South Atlantic, the countries of  the coast’ 
(Brazil, 2016b:6), emphasising ‘integration with South American countries’ and ‘seeking 
to maintain the South Atlantic as a zone of  peace and cooperation’ (Brazil, 2016b:11).
The regional level also remains a main focus of  the defence sector in the END, as can 
be seen in the strategies for achieving the ODN of  contributing to regional stability and 
to international peace and security. The END states that, in order to promote regional 
integration, it must ‘encourage the development of  a South American identity’ and 
‘intensify strategic partnerships, cooperation and military exchange with the Armed 
Forces from Union of  South American Nations countries (UNASUL in Portuguese)’ 
(Brazil, 2016b:39).
Brazil’s defence diplomacy
The Brazilian military has played a prominent role in South America, especially in foreign 
policy and international relations. According to Garcia (1997), the connection between 
the military and international politics was more profound during the Military Regime 
(1964‑1984), but there were historical antecedents of  the military, and particularly the Army, 
playing a role in politics. In contrast, greater participation in domestic affairs increased 
interest in foreign policy, since domestic decisions reflected the country’s international 
participation options and vice versa (Garcia, 1997:21).
Felix Martin (2001) extends this hypothesis to all countries in South America. According 
to the author, the interconnection between military participation in domestic affairs and 
perceptions of  the regional security environment explains the external‑peace/internal‑
violence paradox in South America. From this perspective, the decrease in South American 
military campaigns since the end of  the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay 
(1932‑1935) is rooted in an evolutionary social process, where the militaries developed 
common socioeconomic values, beliefs, principles, and objectives. This fostered the 
Brazilian armed force’s increasing identification with the interests, progress and success of 
the transnational and national dimensions of  other military institutions in the region. The 
increasingly transnational identity of  the militaries transformed their traditional missions, 
as protectors of  the state from external threats, to national political players and guardians 
of  the state from internal political foes in their respective polities (Martin, 2001).
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The lack of  military campaigns between South American nations since the 20th century has 
contributed to increased cooperation between the armed forces of  the region, especially 
since the 1990s when the process of  regional integration in the Southern Cone of  South 
America intensified due to the economic and political agreements that arose from the 
institutionalisation of  the Southern Common Market (MERCUSUL in Portuguese). 
The sense of  transnational identity and solidarity constructed between militaries during 
state‑building processes also played an important role in this matter. An illustrative 
example of  this is the cooperation between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear field, a case 
where the attempt at reconciliation between two authoritarian rivals came before political 
democratisation or social and economic interdependence. These countries started inching 
towards a stable peace under the scrutiny of  the military dictators in charge, and while 
the international press was reporting that Argentina and Brazil were moving towards 
nuclear weaponisation due to mutual suspicion, officials were actually engaging in quiet 
diplomatic attempts to establish the terms of  a bilateral nuclear engagement (Mallea, 
Spektor & Wheeler, 2015).
Under democratic regimes, Brazil and Argentina have adopted mechanisms of  transparency 
and mutual trust, benefiting from what was already practised by the military in terms of 
exchanges and cooperation. In the Brazilian case, this helped the MOD to achieve the 
ODN of  contributing to regional stability and to international peace and security. 
This sense of  transnational identity and shared perception of  security and defence issues 
in South America also helps to explain why the Brazilian proposal to create a Defence 
Council within UNASUL was so well‑received by the other countries in the organisation. 
In a set of  interviews carried out in 2009 with military members of  the Amazon 
Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) countries, one year after Colombia bombed a 
camp of  the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia (FARC) in Ecuador, one could see 
that this diplomatic incident had not changed the decision of  the Amazonian countries to 
cooperate in matters involving protection of  the region’s natural resources. In this sense, 
it is interesting to note that the perception that the natural treasures of  the Amazon are 
coveted by the rich countries of  the North is shared by the militaries of  all the ACTO 
countries, regardless of  the degree of  exchange that these countries have with the armed 
forces of  the United States (the case of  Colombia is remarkable), the United Kingdom 
(which maintains close cooperation with Guyana and Suriname) or Russia (which seeks 
to replace the United States as the main military reference in Venezuela) (Marques, 2010). 
This shared perception is expressed in the first version of  the END (Brazil, 2008). The 
document emphasises that the country will reject any attempt at external imposition on 
its decisions regarding the preservation, development and defence of  the Amazon region. 
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It will not allow organisations or individuals to serve as instruments for foreign interests, 
political or economic, that are aiming to weaken Brazilian sovereignty (Brazil, 2008). This 
served as a primary motivation for the increase in Brazilian defence diplomacy in the 
Amazon region in the last decade.
The Guidelines for the Activities of  the Brazilian Army in the International Area (DAEBAI 
in Portuguese), published in 2013, convey what Brazil and its Army consider defence 
diplomacy activities: (1) permanent missions abroad with diplomatic representatives, 
military organisations of  education or instruction, international organisations, 
commissions and others; (2) permanent missions of  foreign military personnel in Brazil 
in the military sector; (3) conferences and meetings, bilateral or multilateral, with the 
participation of  Army representatives in Brazil or abroad; (4) courses, internships and 
visits, both by Brazilian military officers abroad and by foreign authorities and military 
personnel in Brazil, in order to deal with matters of  interest to the Army; (5) cooperation 
and military exchanges of  various natures; (6) exercises with foreign troops in Brazil and 
abroad; (7) participation in peace missions; (8) participation in humanitarian missions in 
Brazil and abroad; (9) sales and purchase of  Defence Materials (PRODE in Portuguese), 
its components and raw materials; (10) signature of  agreements, covenants, additive terms, 
technical arrangements, letters of  intent and related documents; and (11) other occasional 
missions (Brazil, 2013c:13‑14).
According to DAEBAI, these activities would aim to: (a) maintain a regular dialogue 
on bilateral and multilateral issues of  mutual interest in the fields of  defence, fostering 
cooperation, integration and mutual trust with the armies of  other countries; (b) contribute 
to maintaining a stable global order through participation in humanitarian aid and peace 
operations under the aegis of  international and regional organisations; (c) support and 
contribute to the structural consolidation efforts of  the armies of  friendly countries; 
(d) facilitate the achievement of  a legal framework that regulates the development, within 
the Defence environment, of  bilateral and multilateral relations; and (e) strengthen the 
national defence industry in order to reduce technological dependency and overcome 
unilateral restrictions on access to sensitive technologies (Brazil, 2013c:20‑21).
Based on this framework, the tables below show the international agreements involving 
military diplomacy signed between Brazil and other South American countries during the 
Cardoso and Lula presidencies.
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TABLE 1.2  Summary of Brazil’s international agreements on defence issues with South 
American countries from 2003 to 2010
Country Bilateral agreement
Argentina   Memorandum of Understanding on Consultation and Coordination between the MOD and MRE 
of the two countries, as well as follow-up on defence issues of mutual interest (1997)
  Catalogue Agreement (1997)
  Creation Statement of Bilateral Defence Working Group (2000)
  Joint Declaration agreeing to develop Cooperative and Mutual Support Activities in areas of 
Human Resources, Logistics, Operational Training, Technical Assistance and other (2001)
Bolivia   Creation Statement of Bilateral Defence Working Group (2000)
Colombia   No defence agreement was signed in the period
Chile   Creation Statement of Bilateral Defence Working Group (2000)
Ecuador   Declaration of Peace Agreement between Ecuador and Peru by the Armed Forces of the 
Guaranteeing Countries (1996)
  Agreement on Provision and Support to Military Observers Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPin 
Portuguese) (1998)
  Joint Declaration Establishing Bilateral Defence Working Group (2002)
Guyana   No defence agreement was signed in the period
Paraguay   Military Cooperation Agreement (1995)
Peru   Joint Declaration Establishing Bilateral Defence Working Group (2002)
  Plan for Provision and Support to MOMEP (1998)
  Action Plan Brazil-Peru (1999)
Suriname   Declaration of Interest on Military Cooperation (1995) 
Uruguay   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2010)
Venezuela   Joint Declaration on Military Cooperation (1998)
  Joint Declaration Agreeing to Develop Cooperation and Mutual Support Activities in Areas of 
Common Interest (2000)
SOURCE: Landim (2015)
TABLE 1.3  Summary of Brazil’s international agreements with South American countries from 
2003 to 2010 in defence issues
Country Bilateral agreement
Argentina   Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Defence Fields (2005)
  Adjustment to Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation in the Military 
Technology Area GAÚCHO Vehicle (2005) 
  Brazil-Argentina Joint Declaration (2008)
  Supplementary Protocol to the Cooperation Agreement (2008)
Bolivia   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007)
Colombia   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2008)
  Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Combating the Illicit Manufacturing  
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Accessories, Explosives, and Other Related 
Materials (2008)
Chile   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007)
Ecuador   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007)
Guyana   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2009)
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Country Bilateral agreement
Paraguay   Memorandum of Understanding for the sending of a Marine Squad to the Brazilian Armed 
Forces (2006)
  Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007)
  Technical arrangement relating to Cooperation in the Maintenance of Military Armoured 
Vehicles (2007)
  Joint Statement creating the 2 + 2 Mechanism for Strategic Consultation and Evaluation 
involving the MD and MRE of the two countries (2007)
Peru   Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Protection and Surveillance of the  
Amazon (2003)
  Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2006)
  Statement creating MRE + MD Consultation Mechanism (2006)
  Declaration of Cooperation on Protection and Surveillance of the Amazon (2006)
Suriname   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2008)
Uruguay   Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2010)
Venezuela   No defence agreement was signed in the period
SOURCE: Landim (2015)
Under Cardoso’s administration, Brazil signed security and defence agreements with all 
South American countries, except Colombia and Guyana. However, according to Landim 
(2015), even without these agreements, the Brazilian Army maintained its international 
activities, carrying out various acts of  military diplomacy. It is noteworthy that during 
Cardoso’s administration, the MOD was still embryonic and service branches still managed 
their own priorities, even in matters affecting the international area (Marques, 2004).
Similarly, under Lula’s administration, the Brazilian government also concluded security 
and defence agreements with all the countries of  South America, except Hugo Chávez’s 
Venezuela. However, regardless of  agreements signed at the governmental level, the Army 
maintained its diplomatic links with all South American armies, including Venezuela’s, 
whose absolute numbers in terms of  exchanges and vacancies for courses and internships 
in the military were behind only Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador (Landim, 2015). Under 
Lula’s government, the MOD became stronger and began to jointly lead projects of  the 
three service branches. This is well‑illustrated by the MOD’s initiative, through Minister 
Nelson Jobim, of  creating the South American Defence Council of  UNASUL.
Another important aspect is that Brazil’s defence diplomacy in the region is predominantly 
through activities that do not require many resources or investments, such as exchanges, 
meetings and education, even though South America has been a priority for foreign policy 
in both Cardoso and Lula’s governments. Despite this, Brazil’s defence diplomacy has 
supported continued cooperation between the armed forces of  the region, and thus its 
“good neighbour policy”, contributing to the increase of  mutual trust amongst South 
American countries. 
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Dilma Rousseff ’s administration has continued the defence diplomacy initiatives of  its 
predecessors, and some indicators relating to the Army have drawn particular attention.
TABLE 1.4  Summary of Brazilian Army’s international activities with South American countries 













Argentina 289 25 98 42 23
Bolivia 72 14 14 0 10
Colombia 110 28 72 13 19
Chile 106 27 81 12 6
Ecuador 96 10 28 1 9
Guyana 83 10 17 1 5
Paraguay 117 25 87 3 20
Peru 131 15 48 7 13
Suriname 39 8 27 2 2
Uruguay 123 19 38 3 6
Venezuela 98 11 4 0 14
SOURCE: Adapted by Marques and Maia Neto from data provided by Brazilian Army Staff
Throughout Rousseff ’s administration, there has been a significant increase in participation 
by the Army in international activities in South America, in spite of  the economic and 
political crisis that Brazil has been undergoing since 2015. Compared with data from 
previous periods, the Army increased its presence in several countries in the region, 
particularly Colombia and Peru. Since the peace agreements in Colombia between the 
government and FARC, the Colombian Army has been studying the structures of  the 
Brazilian Army, which is considered to be a model for the reorganisation of  the armed 
forces in a country.
If  Brazil’s defence relationship with South American countries has been improving in 
recent years, Venezuela is the exception to this trend. The Brazilian Army has significantly 
reduced the number of  its military personnel in that country, and sent a single colonel 
to attend a course there during 2017. In contrast, Venezuela has increased the number of 
Venezuelan military personnel attending courses in Brazil. The impeachment of  Rousseff 
and the worsening political crisis in Venezuela have contributed to a growing gap between 
the two countries, culminating in the cancellation of  scheduled bilateral meetings.
26 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The strategic projects of Brazilian armed forces
Since the enactment of  the END in 2008, three strategic areas for the defence sector have 
been outlined: nuclear (coordinated by the Navy); cybernetic (managed by the Army); 
and space (under the responsibility of  the Air Force). The priority in these areas is to seek 
a growing nationalisation of  the scientific‑technological field, and the development of 
civilian and military human resources (Brazil, 2016a). 
Together with the above‑mentioned strategic sectors, and seeking to support the medium‑ 
and long‑term strategic goals in the END (Brazil, 2008, 2012c, 2016b), the military has 
laid out plans to enable the Armed Forces to meet the defence challenges that may arise 
from the development of  the country. The services’ strategic projects have sought to 
re‑establish their operational capabilities, as well as reduce the technological gap with 
developed countries. Through the Defence Deployment and Equipment Plan (PAED in 
Portuguese), the MOD seeks to consolidate these projects, support the Forces’ demands 
for equipment, and enable them to act within the national territory.
With a focus on the Defence – Development nexus, the projects were developed not only 
to support the services’ needs, but also to increase the defence industrial base, either 
through new legislation to regulate defence products and fiscal incentives to the sector, or 
by the nationalisation of  the technology used in these products.
All three services have projects that aim at Obtaining Full Operational Capacity (OCOP 
in Portuguese), that is, they seek to revitalise the existing structure by ‘recovering the 
strategic and operational levels of  subsistence supplies, stewardship, fuels and lubricants, 
ammunition and supplies, critical parts and spares’ (Brazil, 2016a:146).
Several projects already existed before the implementation of  the END. However, it was 
from these guidelines that the strategic repositioning of  these and subsequent projects 
occurred, allowing the country to develop capacities for defence of  its sovereignty and its 
interests in a manner more integrated and aligned with the ONDs. The 2016 END defines 
the term ‘national defence capabilities’, which in turn supports the elaboration of  a new 
PAED, with possible revisions of  the current strategic plans of  the Armed Forces. The 
main projects of  the Forces are explained in the National Defence White Paper:
Navy 
	Construction of Naval Power Nucleus, which aims to expand the operational 
capacity of the Navy. This includes the Submarine Development Programme (PROSUB 
in Portuguese), whose objective is the construction of four new conventional submarines 
and one nuclear‑propelled submarine, in addition to a shipyard and submarine base to 
support these units, and the acquisition of surface means (PROSUPER‑1) to develop the 
ability in Brazil to design and build five escort vessels, five ocean patrol vessels, and one 
logistical support vessel.
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	Naval Nuclear Programme (PNM in Portuguese), which initially aimed to dominate 
the nuclear fuel production cycle achieved in 2012. The PNM is now seeking the 
construction of a prototype pressurised water reactor, as the basis for the reactor in the 
first Brazilian Submarine with Nuclear Propulsion (SNBR). The PNM and the PROSUB 
are closely linked, with the success of the PROSUB depending on the development of the 
nuclear propulsion system through the Naval Nuclear Programme.
	The Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAz in Portuguese),4 a system that will 
allow monitoring and control of the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, increased efficiency 
in inspection and search and rescue operations in the Blue Amazon, and more efficient 
interagency operations (Federal Police, Brazilian Institute of the Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources, etc.).
Army 
	The Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) is based on border monitoring, 
control, mobility and presence. It will allow the Army to monitor national borders and 
promptly respond to any aggression or threat. The system will contribute to unified 
socioeconomic initiatives which promote the sustainable development of the country’s 
border regions. The system will be interlinked with similar systems of the other Armed 
Forces, of the MOD, and of other federal agencies. 
	The Guarani Project covers the implementation of the New Family of Armoured 
Wheeled Vehicles (NFBR in Portuguese) of the Brazilian Army. The Project intends 
to provide mechanised units with new armoured vehicles which incorporate the most 
recent trends and technological developments. The Project calls for the acquisition of 
2,044 Brazilian-designed Guarani armoured personnel carriers over a period of 20 years.
	ASTROS 2020, a defence system that aims to provide the Army with elevated fire 
support capacity through the national development of a missile with a range of up to 
300 km. The Army will have two groups of missile and rocket launchers. 
Air Force 
	Recovery of Operational Capacity, a process of performance evaluation and selection 
of alternatives to replace, modernise, develop or revitalise aircraft and their systems, 
in order to strengthen and maintain the operational capacity of the Air Force. This 
project involves training and instruction of pilots, replenishment of weapons stocks, and 
technological upgrading of aircraft including: the fighters AMX and F-5 (projects A-1M 
and F5-M), maritime patrol P-95 (Project P-3-BR), transportation and refueling (projects 
KC-130 and C-95M), reconnaissance (Project R-99), and airborne early warning and 
control (Project E-99). 
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	Reinforcing the integration of the aerospace and defence industry with the MOD. 
It also aims to contribute to the competitiveness of products offered by that sector in 
internal and foreign markets. This project is nationally oriented, and the development 
and production of a National Aircraft for Transportation and Refueling (KC‑390) is 
therefore noteworthy.
	The Space Systems Strategic Programme, which aims to develop and acquire the 
means to launch space platforms, and the construction of the relevant infrastructure. 
An important phase was the launch of the 2016 Geostationary Defence and Strategic 
Communications Satellite (SGDC in Portuguese), which will allow access to broadband 
internet throughout the country, as well as encrypted communications throughout 
South America.
Since the 2008 version of  END, the Brazilian defence sector has strived to create an 
integrated monitoring and control system, including airspace, boundaries, jurisdictional 
waters and, with the launch of  the SGDC the Portuguese acronym for its Geostationary 
Defence and Strategic Communications Satellite System), the space environment. To this 
end, structures are being created to enable this integration in the medium‑ and long‑term.
With this focus on system integration, the Strategic Space Systems Programme will provide 
infrastructure for the operation of  several strategic projects, amongst them the systems 
that focus on monitoring and control, such as SISGAAz, SISFRON (the Portuguese 
acronym for the Border Monitoring System), the Brazilian Aerospace Defence System 
(SISDABRA in Portuguese), and the Amazon Protection System (SIPAM in Portuguese). 
This will enable national system integration, serving to support both the defence of 
the territory and aspects such as public security, and fight against transnational crimes 
(Brazil, 2016a:60). 
Strategic projects are the most visible face of  national defence objectives and their 
respective strategies, enabling the integration of  the Defence–Development nexus, which 
is the main scope of  defence documents.
Final remarks
Brazil’s National Defence Strategy is aligned with the country’s development and the place 
it intends to occupy in the international arena. Since the 1970s, Brazil has pursued strategic 
autonomy and, in order to achieve this objective, has sought to intensify cooperation 
with the countries within its strategic environment, encompassing the countries of  South 
America and coast of  the South Atlantic.
Since Cardoso’s presidency, Brazil’s diplomatic actions concerning defence cooperation 
have been conducted by the MOD in accordance with the principles advocated by the 
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Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. The military has an essential role in this process and, as has 
been outlined in this chapter, has aimed to establish a cooperative relationship with their 
counterparts since the beginning of  the 20th century. 
Establishing cooperative relations with South American Armed Forces at the regional level 
allows Brazil to peacefully project power and secure support for the achievement of  its 
main national defence objectives: sovereignty, national treasures, and territorial integrity. 
These cooperative relationships also contribute to national development, as Brazil assumes 
that South American countries represent an important market for their defence materials. 
Therefore, the country has attempted to regionalise some of  its strategic projects, such as 
SIPAM, SISFRON and the SGDC.
Finally, it is important to note the stability and continuity of  Brazil’s defence diplomacy 
efforts in South America, from the presidencies of  Cardoso to Rousseff. Throughout this 
period, Brazil played a fundamental role as mediator of  conflicts and inducer of  integration 
processes in the region. The recent diplomatic impasse between Brazil and Venezuela is 
a new stage in the decades‑old dynamics established between the militaries of  the two 
countries, and will require the attention of  analysts in the coming years. Nevertheless, 
based on the normative documents that guide the activities of  the Armed Forces, defence 
diplomacy will continue to play a central role in Brazil’s defence strategy.
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Notes
1 According to President Cardoso, the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence in Brazil had as main 
objective to rationalise the preparation and the use of  the Brazilian Armed Forces, through a greater 
strategic and operational integration of  the three branches of  the Armed Forces (Marques, 2004).
2 Law 12,598 of  21 March 2012, established that: 
– Defence Material (PRODE) is any goods, service, work or information, including weapons, 
ammunition, means of  transport and communications, uniforms and materials for individual 
and collective use in the defence activities, with the exception of  those that are assigned for 
administrative use; 
– Strategic Materials (PED) are all defence products that are of  strategic importance for national 
defence, due to their technological content, scarcity or indispensability; 
– Defence System (SD) is the interrelated or interactive set of  PRODE that serves a specific 
purpose;and 
– Strategic Defence Company (EED) is any legal entity accredited by the Ministry of  Defence. 
These companies will have access to special tax schemes and funding for programmes, projects 
and activities related to national defence goods and defence strategic products, in accordance 
with law (Brazil, 2012a).
3 The defence ministers were (in this order): Elcio Álvares (from the Liberal Front Party), Geraldo 
Magela da Cruz Quintão (no party affiliation), José Viegas Filho (diplomat), José Alencar Gomes da 
Silva (from the Liberal Party), Francisco Waldir Pires de Sousa (from the Workers’ Party), Nelson 
Azevedo Jobim (from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim 
(diplomat affiliated to the Workers’ Party), Jaques Wagner (from the Workers’ Party), José Aldo 
Rebelo Figueiredo (from the Communist Party of  Brazil), Raul Belens Jungmann Pinto (from the 
Popular Socialist Party) and Joaquim de Silva e Luna (retired military).
4 Brazil’s jurisdictional waters are the South Atlantic region over which Brazil has territorial rights and 
other exploration and control prerogatives is the country’s jurisdictional waters. These waters have 
recently been named the Blue Amazon, and are roughly equal, in geographic area, to the Brazilian 
Amazon (Brazil, 2012b:21). 
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Chilean Defence Policy 
Moving forward
Andrés Villar and Francisco Rojas
Abstract
In this chapter, we review Chile’s perspective on some of the matters most relevant to its defence policy, particularly those 
related to Latin America and international security. We present the challenges that emerge in these environments, and the 
contribution Chile can make to them.
Chilean foreign policy aims to be global and balanced. Based on the interdependent nature of the globalisation process, Chile 
performs at the global level according to their strategic capabilities and expectations. However, above all, Chile has built its 
reputation on its immediate priority, which is its role in Latin America, and South America in particular. That is Chilean identity, 
and where the root of Chilean security lies.
It is from this standpoint that Chile seeks to realise and contribute to a community that assists in building a more peaceful, 
more democratic, more prosperous, fairer and more sustainable global community in the 21st century. That is why, in order 
to understand the Chilean defence policy construct, it is fundamental to first explain the dynamics of international security in 
the Latin American region and, from there, to analyse past and current events. 
Introduction 
Given the current era of  interdependence, political and strategic realities affect all 
countries and regions. We are going through a period of  uncertainty, where the order and 
architecture that previously existed in international security have begun to show signs of 
important changes. Current scenarios, including risks and threats, are complex in nature 
and variable in time. No country or region is exempt from this level of  uncertainty, which 
has three dimensions: the erratic signals of  great powers, the structure of  international 
security, and the international security agenda.
The signals from the great powers are confusing, making it difficult to develop a coherent 
agenda of  priorities and strategic response. Extreme nationalism, terrorist attacks, and 
inability to cope with global challenges such as immigration, cyber-attacks and global 
warming have hit the legitimacy of  international political actors. In this context of 
international confusion, some national leaders have begun looking for populist and 
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short-term solutions to complex global challenges. Uncoordinated international actions 
and analytic errors undoubtedly prevent accurate strategic defence planning, thereby 
affecting international security. 
This is partly because the traditional international security institutions, created more than 
50 years ago to prevent, contain and confront crises and conflicts, have been delegitimised 
or surpassed, or are incapable of  solving new international security phenomena. As a direct 
consequence, some countries have opted for unilateral strategies of  conflict resolution. 
The paradox of  this trend is that threats to peace and security are mostly regional or 
global in nature. 
Regional security complex in South America 
The regional goal of  South America is to achieve a Zone of  Peace, and this is the starting 
point of  our contributions to the international security order. However, despite Latin 
America being an interstate zone of  peace, it is also the most violent region in the world 
in terms of  intentional homicides. Thus, non-state threats, such as organised crime, have 
a major impact. 
Latin America, and South America in particular, exhibits the fewest conflicts in the 
world in terms of  regional security. In part, this is because it has a culture of  peaceful 
settlement of  disputes, which has proven to be very effective. It is not that there have been 
no conflicts, but since the late 19th century, with only two or three exceptions during the 
20th century, the region has built a normative political paradigm that has allowed it to 
maintain interstate peace.
How do we explain these evolving patterns of interstate security? 
The goal of  regional security has been the major frame of  reference for management and 
resolution of  territorial disputes amongst the Latin American states. Although the region 
is part of  the International American System, security concerns have first and foremost 
been referred to the immediate neighbourhood, rather than to the extra-regional or global 
contexts (Hurrell, 1999; Mares, 2001; Kacowicz, 2003:125). 
While the sources of  interstate violence have changed since the independence period, it is 
possible to find some trends. Violence in the region has predominantly arisen from four 
causes: (a) boundaries and territorial disputes; (b) competition for resources; (c) imperial 
and other power disputes; and (d) ideological competition (Atkins, 1999; Kacowicz, 2003). 
In this context, South America has a unique profile. Like other regions of  the world, it 
has suffered a relatively high incidence of  internal wars, but there have been no wars 
of  secession. More remarkably, there has been only one war between South American 
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states since 1941, between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 (Holsti, 1996). In this sense, scholars 
agree that South America constitutes a distinct international system that contains its own 
unique properties and dynamic (Burr, 1965; Atkins, 1999; Hurrell, 1999). This is what 
Buzan has called ‘regional security complexes’ (1991:210). 
19th century: A balance of power model
In less than 100 years, six wars were formally declared in the region in the 19th century. 
According to most scholars, the most devastating and significant were between Paraguay 
and Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil (1865-1870), and the War of  the Pacific between Peru, 
Bolivia and Chile (1879-1884), with consequences lasting into the 20th century. There were 
also five major armed invasions and interventions, resulting in a total of  44 militarised 
disputes between 1816 and 1900. Central America and the Caribbean was also the region 
where the United States (US) developed military intervention policies, although these 
were limited in South America, and virtually non-existent in the Southern Cone (Hensel, 
1994, Holsti, 1996; Hurrell, 1999; Mares, 2001; Kacowicz, 2003:125). 
The rivalry between Argentina and Brazil for control of  the Rio de la Plata region, 
which centred on Uruguay in the early 19th century, influenced the behaviour of  South 
American countries and the characteristics of  the period. Both countries sought control 
of  the zone, but after several bilateral disputes and the intervention of  Britain, they signed 
the Treaty of  Montevideo (1828), in which both countries agreed to recognise Uruguayan 
independence so as to create a buffer state between them. However, in 1851 Brazil forced a 
treaty in which Uruguay gave up almost half  its territory along the northern frontier, and 
the Paraguayan War (1865-1870), known as the War of  the Triple Alliance, resulted from 
the alliance between the Uruguayan Colorados (political faction), Argentina and Brazil 
against the Paraguayan dictator, Francisco Solano López. After five years of  war, Paraguay 
was completely destroyed, most of  its male population was killed, and Argentina and 
Brazil took portions of  its territory (Atkins, 1999:320-321). 
Prior to 1914, and with few exceptions, the leading states in the international context were 
successful at managing challenges to the established order and attempts at expansion by 
emerging states were generally put down. Europe was predominantly committed to the 
status quo, and this included the maintenance of  state boundaries in Europe. Acquisition 
of  territory by using military force generally took place at the periphery of  the system, 
such as the War of  the Pacific between Bolivia, Peru and Chile (Goertz & Diehl, 1992:98). 
Indeed, this was the last important war of  the 19th century in South America. 
The War of  the Pacific was an economic war, and the commercialisation and exportation 
of  nitrate through Bolivian coastline by Chilean companies was the source of  the conflict. 
The rise of  taxes was the reason given to start to a war over control of  the economic 
strategic zone, but when the Chilean government attacked in the Bolivian desert, Peru 
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entered the war on the side of  Bolivia. Major actions were fought at sea, where Chile had 
supremacy over Peru, and the Chilean army invaded Peru and occupied Lima. The US 
and European countries unsuccessfully attempted to mediate a truce, and Chile finally 
defeated the Peru-Bolivian alliance (Atkins, 1999).
Through this brief  description of  the main war in the South Cone, we highlight the 
characteristics of  the region during this period. Looking at 19th-century South America, 
we find patterns of  peace and war, intervention, territorial predation, alliances, arms 
races and power balancing quite similar to those found in 18th-century Europe. On 
one hand, this reaffirms the political-diplomatic influence of  European ideas, and that 
South American countries were still under the aegis of  the Pax Britannica, so it is not a 
coincidence that Great Britain was nominated the permanent arbitrator between them 
(Ferrari, 1969 quoted by Kacowicz, 2005:138). On the other hand, South America was also 
embedded in the international society, meaning that their practices and behaviours were 
not so different to the policies of  the great powers during the Pax Britannica. According 
to Holsti, this lends support to neorealist, structural characterisations of  international 
politics as a game of  conflict, war, struggle and survival (1996:152). 
20th‑century South America: A no‑war zone
Latin America has seen war relatively infrequently since the late 19th century. Anchored 
in successful deterrence, the balance-of-power system was developed in South America 
during the second half  of  the 19th century and first part of  the 20th. The ententes 
between Brazil and Chile on the one hand, and Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru on the other, 
were the basis of  this balance-of-power system. States assessed their relative capabilities 
effectively, interacting with and deterring one another. This system provides one important 
explanation for the low incidence of  warfare amongst South American states (Burr, 1967; 
Dominguez, 2003:18). 
As Dominguez highlights (2003), South America saw only five wars during the last 70 
years of  the 20th century. Three of  these broke out in the 1930s, as Bolivia and Paraguay 
fought over the Chaco area, Peru and Colombia over the Leticia region, and Peru and 
Ecuador over the Zarumilla region. Argentina and the United Kingdom went to war in 
1982, and Ecuador and Peru again in 1995. The number of  casualties was characteristically 
between 500 and 1,500 battlefield deaths, except for the war over the Chaco, with about 
100,000 deaths. The duration of  these wars was typically measured in weeks, except for 
the much longer Chaco War and the 1939-41 Ecuador-Peru war (Dominguez, 2003:18). 
How do we explain these evolving patterns of  interstate security? Scholars have taken 
different views. The realist approach has pointed to geopolitical location, to varying degrees 
of  insulation from extra-regional influences, and to the hegemonic or policing role of 
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Britain and the US on the continent. Within the region, scholars highlight the emergence 
of  relatively autonomous regional balances of  power in countries like Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile, as well as the absence of  transport links, borders that were geographically 
moved from centres of  political and economic activity, and the gap of  military technology 
between countries (Burr, 1967; Holsti, 1996, Hurrell, 1996:535). Meanwhile, international 
society theorists stress the extent to which a shared cultural and historical experience, 
particular patterns of  state formation, and ongoing international interaction all combine 
to produce a strong regional diplomatic culture (Hurrell, 1996; Kacowicz, 2005). In 
sum, South America is ‘a regional society of  states which, although still often in conflict, 
conceived themselves to be bound by a common set of  rules and shared in the working of 
common institutions’ (Hurrell, 1996:535). 
In the 20th century, South America was essentially a no-war zone, although there were 
high levels of  violence and mistrust between neighbouring countries. In this context, 
conflict resolutions were settled by governments, and from bilateral bargains to arbitration 
or mediation channels, diplomatic strategies were characterised by a reduced number 
of  actors. 
Great powers, mediators and regional organisations
The US and regional organisations have not played a significant role in the settlement of 
international disputes in the South American region. Historically, the US has reacted in a 
range of  ways to deal with security and promoted the use of  force and interventions in 
South America during the 20th century. For instance, during the war between Ecuador 
and Peru (1939-1940), and in the Beagle Channel dispute in the 1970s, the US did not 
intervene at all. In contrast, the country was willing to support the use of  force in the 
Central American crisis during the 1980s. In this sense, it is important to note that the use 
of  force in the region has predominantly been informed by whether the US approves or 
opposes its use (Hurrell, 1996:531; Mares, 2001:83). However, the evidence shows that the 
most important external actor in the region did not play a key role in settling conflicts 
and avoided the use force in South America. As we can see in Table 2.1, during the global 
economic crisis in the 1920s and 1930s, there were ten active international disputes in 
Central and South America. According to Dominguez (2003), 35 countries served as 
intermediaries in containing or settling those conflicts. Yet even at that early stage, while 
an inter-American system of  conflict resolution was emerging, the US played a limited 
role as an intermediary (Dominguez, 2003:23). 
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TABLE 2.1  Intermediary activity in South and Middle American regions* location of dispute, 
1925‑1942
Intermediary governments South America Middle America Total
South American 15 3 18
Middle American 3 2 5
USA 5 2 7
European 5 0 5
Total 28 7 35
* Middle America refers to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. 
The same patterns can be seen in the role played by regional and international organisa-
tions. As Holsti (1996) notes, since 1945 not a single territorial/resource conflict in the 
region has been resolved through the intervention of  an international organisation. 
Governments have favoured ad hoc arbitration and mediation procedures outside of  the 
context of  international organisations (Holsti, 1996:171). 
However, we do not want to create the misleading idea that security problems have 
been overcome in Chile and in the region. Along with the traditional security agenda, 
the globalisation process has introduced security problems of  a different nature. In some 
cases, we face new actors, non-state and transnational in scope, who pose new threats, and 
with different intensities in each region. In the case of  Latin America, the most important 
problem is transnational organised crime, whose main activity is drug trafficking, although 
it is not limited to drugs. Trafficking in persons and small arms are also serious problems, 
amongst other illicit activities that overwhelm the capacities of  states and demand an 
urgent strengthening of  statehood and international cooperation.
Along with these are problems of  international security stemming from global dynamics, 
which in turn demand growing and perhaps new forms of  international cooperation of 
an increasingly cosmopolitan character. Climate change and global warming are perhaps 
the most important and challenging of  the new issues on the international security 
agenda, although they are by no means the only ones. However, they are non-volitional 
phenomena which pose a risk to the human species and all life on the planet, making 
them risks rather than threats. 
Defence diplomacy
In the 90s, Chile, together with others in the region, ratified or adhered to the most relevant 
international agreements regarding non-proliferation and limitation of  weapons of  mass 
destruction. Amongst these are the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of  Nuclear Tests, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological 
Weapons Convention. Along with this, Chile substantially increased its contribution to 
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the operations of  United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, ratified the Antipersonnel Mines 
Convention, and showed its willingness to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
Likewise, after the 9/11 attacks, Chile supported the policies and treaties adopted by the 
Security Council of  the UN, including the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
In the strategic arena, the democratisation process gave way to a new type of  regional 
relationship amongst Latin American countries. Along with the pacification of  Central 
America, these included the Argentine-Brazilian approach, and Argentine-Chilean 
distension. From 1990, Chile joined this process of  strategic regional transformation, 
giving it a renewed impetus in the neighbourhood. They distinguished two strategic areas: 
bilateral and multilateral. 
In terms of  bilateral strategy, the transformation of  the relationship with Argentina was 
key (Van Klaveren, 1998:129; Robledo, 2010). During the 90s, Argentina and Chile agreed 
to resolve pending territorial litigation, identifying 24 problems linked to the demarcation 
of  the international boundary. 22 of  these were resolved directly in 1991, while the other 
two (Laguna del Desierto and Campo de Hielos Sur) were resolved by international 
arbitration in 1994 and a treaty in 1998 respectively (Van Klaveren, 1998:129). Ongoing 
measures were implemented to promote mutual trust (MCM), such as the Treaty of  Peace 
and Friendship of  1984, and the Permanent Chilean Security Committee (COMPERSEG) 
in 1995 which was aimed at increasing the transparency of  bilateral strategic relationships, 
thereby reducing mistrust and allowing progress towards more advanced relationships. 
This resulted in the elaboration of  the Common Standardized Methodology for the 
Measurement of  Defense Expenses, with the support of  the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLAC 2001). 
In 2004, based on the experience of  joint work during the UN Observation Mission 
in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and despite the difficulties that would begin to emerge in the 
bilateral relationship in the gas sector, the countries agreed to constitute a combined and 
joint military force for operations of  peace (Southern Cross Brigade). The progression 
from cooperation under a security dilemma towards cooperative security was the result 
of  a long process, timidly initiated in 1984 and re-launched with new impetus from 1990, 
finally crystallising at the end of  the 20th century. In 1999, Argentina published its first 
Book on National Defense, affirming for the first time in its bilateral relationships with 
Chile that it no longer had basis for conflict with the country. Meanwhile, in 2000 during 
his first trip abroad after assuming the presidency, President Ricardo Lagos made a state 
visit to Argentina, declaring before its Plenary Congress that Chile no longer had a conflict 
hypothesis with Argentina (Lagos, 2000).
Thus, the Chilean-Argentine relationship evolved from one characterised by conflict over 
numerous territorial differences, to cooperative security, to eventual association, reflected 
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in the constitution of  the Cruz del Sur Brigade. In this stage, both states acted in a joint 
and coordinated manner, together with Brazil and a growing number of  other countries, 
but they ultimately failed to consolidate progress and come to an agreement on common 
agenda and policy. 
At the multilateral level, since 1990 Chilean foreign policy has placed a strong emphasis 
on the creation and strengthening of  cooperation institutions at the subregional, regional, 
and inter-American level. At the inter-American level, security threats emerged in two 
dimensions: the interstate or traditional security agenda, and the agenda of  new threats, 
usually of  societal origin and with a transnational scope.
In the traditional agenda, one of  the first efforts was oriented to the development of 
mutual confidence measures on a regional scale. After several academic meetings held 
in Argentina and Chile, in 1995 the countries carried out the first Regional Conference 
on Measures of  Mutual Confidence, thus beginning a process that would continue in 
1999 and 2001, would be extended and consolidated in the region, and would finally be 
institutionalised in the System Inter-American Commission at the 2003 Special Conference 
on Hemispheric Security. This regime would add Chile’s support to the Inter-American 
Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, adopted in 1999. 
Along with this, the Summits of  the Americas process was begun in 1994, and began a 
new dynamic of  cooperation between the US and the region, which would be extended 
to the field of  security with the development of  the Ministerial Conferences of  Defence 
from 1995. 
At the Latin American level, cooperation was also developed, although the most relevant 
achievements have been in the traditional agenda. After the end of  the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear competition, there was a regional move towards nuclear non-proliferation. The 
Treaty of  Tlatelolco in 1994 created the conditions for the incorporation of  Chile and, a 
few years later, of  other countries as well (Chile signed the non-proliferation treaty in 1993, 
Argentina in 1995, Brazil in 1997, and Cuba in 2002). Over time, all countries in the region 
joined the regional and international regimes for the prohibition of  weapons of  mass 
destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical): the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was complemented by a regional agreement, 
the Commitment of  Mendoza. In this way, Latin America was consolidated as a Zone of 
Peace and completed a long process of  transformation of  regional policy.
In terms of  the new threats such as trafficking, Chile is part of  a number of  conventions 
and mechanisms, such as the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA) 
(1997), as well as the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). Similarly, 
efforts related to the protection of  democracy and human rights were applied after the 
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Declaration of  Santiago, in the cases of  Peru, Haiti, Guatemala and Venezuela. These also 
contributed to regional stability, producing indirect strategic effects.
In the early 2000s, Chilean foreign policy and regional policy was marked by the beginning 
of  Latin American cooperation in peace operations, specifically around Haiti and 
MINUSTAH in 2004. Although peace operations are part of  the collective security system, 
in some cases they enable cooperative agreements between countries. Because they are 
not conceived as military alliances against a common enemy, but rather generators of  a 
common security, under certain conditions, such as those indicated in the case of  Chile 
and Argentina with the Southern Cross Force, they can give way to processes of  political 
association. 
From the 1990s, Chilean defence and foreign policy converged, contributing to bilateral, 
subregional, regional and inter-American cooperation processes, joining existing treaties, 
such as the Treaty of  Reciprocal Assistance; and the UN Charter. This dynamic enabled a 
shift from a militarised and highly conflictual regional policy to a new dynamic of  greater 
cooperation, fewer traditional interstate conflicts, and the development of  new regimes 
to cope with transnational problems. Ultimately, this led to a dynamic of  flexible security 
architecture, which described the emergence of  a network of  cooperative regimes and 
groups that operated simultaneously at different levels (Bachelet, 2002; Robledo, 2011).
The Zone of Peace: An important legacy and asset 
The Zone of  Peace is an important political and diplomatic outcome, a regional contri-
bution that the developed world usually ignores. Latin America today is not a source of 
global insecurity. Rather, it is a contributor to global security, both through its own stability 
as a continent, and through its participation in international cooperation for peace and 
global stability. It is from this extraordinary and positive Latin American regional reality 
that Chileans define the priorities of  their international activity in the field of  security. 
These priorities are, first, consolidating our Zone of  Peace and the construction of  a 
community of  security; second, constructing global security; and third, strengthening 
cooperation between the regions and their member states.
Regionalism and security in Latin America 
Chile’s first priority is to consolidate the achievements described in the previous 
paragraphs. To this end, the country promotes regional security cooperation through the 
construction and development of  a network of  multilevel regimes, both neighbourhood 
and subregional, Latin American and inter-American. This is what the Chilean Defence 
Policy has called a complex, collective and cooperative security architecture.
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In turn, the regional security agenda has two important political purposes: to move from 
the Zone of  Peace towards more advanced and ambitious stages of  regional cooperation, 
such as the idea of    a pluralistic security community; and to renew the inter-American 
institutions, which we consider a fundamental space for dialogue between the US and 
Latin America.
In terms of  the first objective, Latin American regionalism has taken important steps 
in recent years with the creation of  the Community of  Latin American and Caribbean 
States, the birth and rapid development of  the Pacific Alliance, and the creation of  the 
Union of  South American Nations (UNASUR), whose South American Defence Council 
(CDS) is a central tool for further progress in regional security and contributing to 
international peace. 
For Chile, the strengthening of  this regional architecture and the contribution that it has 
and continues to make represents one of  its main objectives in the field of  international 
security, which is why Chile makes significant efforts to strengthen both UNASUR and 
CDS. Since their origins, Chile has shown a great commitment to these institutions, by 
both promoting their foundation, and actively contributing to their development and 
improvement, which President Michelle Bachelet ratified. In its Government Programme, 
it was stated that, ‘during the period 2014-2018, the main objective of  the National Defense 
Policy will be to create a Security Community in South America … with the Defense 
Council of  UNASUR the institution to advance in this matter’.
The strengthening of  the CDS made it possible to consolidate the region as a Zone of 
Peace and establish the political basis for what in the long term could become a security 
community in South America. To do this, it was necessary to continue to build trust and 
transparency, and to lay the foundations for common policy. Chile collaborates on all 
initiatives of  the CDS, paying special attention to areas of  growing relevance. An example 
of  this is the promotion of  UNASUR member countries’ commitment to international 
peace and security within the framework of  the UN, such as the formation of  the 
Combined Joint Binational Peace Force, ‘Cruz del Sur’, an agreement with Argentina. 
Other areas of    relevance are cyber defence; citizen participation in defence issues; 
incorporation of  a gender perspective; and explicit attention for equal rights and 
obligations of  minorities. Chile also aims to promote the relevance of  cooperation for 
the preservation of  the environment and biodiversity in our region, as well as to address 
natural disasters.
One of  the areas that the Chilean Defence Policy has strongly focused on is the extension 
of  measures of  mutual trust and crisis prevention, as well as collective and verifiable 
commitments to a policy of  full transparency in terms of  military budgets and acquisitions. 
Chile has played a leading role in both initiatives.
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All these actions are part of  one of  the priority areas for Chilean defence, with the aim, as 
former President Bachelet said, to transform the Chilean strategic environment through 
cooperation, peacebuilding in the region, and overcoming the security problems facing 
the international community. Recent history has shown that this is possible, as Chile was 
able to transform its conflictual relationship with Argentina into a cooperative one. Chile 
now aims to consolidate that by moving towards a strategic partnership and pursuing a 
similar process with Peru.
From this perspective, the strategic transformation has been more complete, profound 
and successful in Argentina, because it included both Chile and Brazil (pending the 
question of  the Malvinas [Falkland] Islands). In the case of  Chile, despite developments 
with Bolivia and Peru, the results have been different. The most relevant transformation 
in the region occurred in the Brazilian-Argentine relationship, although this has not been 
the only one. Ecuador and Peru resolved their protracted border dispute, experiencing 
a transformation similar to the Argentine-Brazilian and Argentine-Chilean relationships, 
overcoming border conflicts and solving security dilemmas. Therefore, the question in 
the cases of  Chile-Peru and Chile-Bolivia is what is possible, and under what conditions. 
Regarding the war between Ecuador and Peru (1995), it is important to note how this 
conflict delayed the expansion of  cooperation in defence in the region in the post-Cold 
War period. In fact, the conflict froze such measures for a few years, maintaining mutual 
distrust in South America during the early 1990s. 
National security strategy
Based on studies carried out by the Chilean Ministry of  Defence between 2012 and 2017, 
the implementation of  a new defence planning model was outlined in the new White 
Paper in 2018. The process begins at the political level, guiding both the use of  force 
and the development of  capabilities through the preparation of  respective management 
documents. The strategic level planning process is constituted by Employment of  Force 
plans and the Strategic Capacity Development Plan, which will be carried out under the 
responsibility of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff.
The promulgation of  Law 20.424 (the National Defence Policy) in 2010 introduced 
several norms related to the planning of  national defence, which gave rise to a system 
with a greater number of  participating actors, civilian and military, and with more precise 
links between the different levels of  responsibility of  the system (political, strategic and 
institutional). In general, the law identifies the actors that must participate in the system 
and establishes their functions. In particular, it broadened the participation of  the actors 
at the political level, since the so-called primary planning or policy development resides at 
this level. However, Law 20.424 does not indicate how each actor’s responsibilities must 
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be performed. Some norms, in particular those related to the use of  force, were only 
developed subsequently, by means of  Supreme Decree 113, published in 2014. 
This new Decree (March 2018) provided some important details, such as that the National 
Defence planning process is composed of  both a primary and a secondary segment, and 
described the documentation that makes up the primary and secondary planning of 
defence, with an emphasis on the use of  force. It explained that primary documentation 
refers to sectoral documentation, not national documentation, which has a political nature, 
while secondary documentation is of  a military nature and produces joint strategy in 
terms of  general processes and unique planning. Regarding the normative and conceptual 
frameworks of  the defence planning system, the Ministry of  Defence has made progress 
in developing a methodology that is no longer based on threats, but rather focuses on 
satisfying requirements in the face of  a specific threat. 
Management of strategic resources 
Development of  natural resources will be a major objective for many countries in the 
future, since natural resources are the basis for sustainable economic growth. Chile is 
no exception, with natural resources including oil, natural gas, coal, and precious metals, 
such as copper and lithium. Given increasing demand due to rapid industrialisation in 
China, Japan and Korea, the competition over these natural resources will remain acute. 
Anticipation of  oil exhaustion, decreasing oil supply from the Middle East owing to 
political instability and military conflicts, and the quick rise in oil prices, all inevitably 
exacerbate leaders’ anxiety and spur their willingness to show their muscle if  they think it 
necessary. ‘Rising energy prices, fears of  supply scarcity, and rapid increases in oil-import 
dependency in China and other regional powers such as Indonesia have helped drive 
resource nationalism amongst regional governments’ (Collins & Erickson, 2011). Energy 
nationalism in many regions is ‘often inextricably tied to disputes over territorial and 
maritime claims and is exacerbated by the geographical proximity of  states with a history 
of  conflict’ (Collins & Erickson, 2011). 
The contemporary exercise of  sovereignty over strategic resources is key, resulting in a 
relatively great reliance on defence policy, with two interrelated effects. It raises complex 
questions of  intertemporal law and, because early international law required less for a state 
to gain sovereignty (particularly over terra nullius), it leads claimants to base arguments 
on weakly or inconsistently documented indications of  sovereignty that would be much 
too thin to be valid today. These include asserted discovery or sporadic use by a state’s 
nationals or patrols by its navy, inclusion in the state’s territory on maps or in documents 
setting forth a government’s administrative structure, and so on. Not surprisingly, such 
evidence is relatively weak and mixed in terms of  which party it supports, at least in 
contrast to cases of  territorial sovereignty over substantial, populated landmasses. 
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As a result of  economic transformations, technological, demographic and environmental 
processes were developed globally in recent decades, guaranteeing access, control 
and sustained availability, in quantity, variety and price, of  natural resources. This is 
currently a priority issue on national agendas, as well as a conditioning element of  the 
international agenda.
Climate change: A new dimension 
Many of  the challenges in security and defence require cooperative responses. Based on 
the initiatives being carried out by the defence sector in Chile, climate change, science and 
technology, and cyberspace have been considered here.
The care of  the environment and the risks associated with climate change have been at 
the centre of  the debate in recent years. Although these matters were not part of  the 
traditional security and defence agenda, they have increasingly been included as challenges 
that should be addressed. Climate change is growing in importance as a strategic issue. 
Although there is no evidence that climate change increases the likelihood of  interstate 
conflict, it is certain that the various consequences of  global warming pose risks to the 
security of  countries. From the reports prepared by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), it can be deduced that climate change would more strongly affect 
the countries with greater vulnerabilities, decrease the amount of  available resources, 
alter territorial and maritime borders, as well as affect the military installations and modus 
operandi of  the armed forces.
This is why several countries have begun to implement sectoral policies on the subject. The 
armed forces are major users of  fossil fuels, so there is a challenge to establish measures 
that reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, with a focus on the use of  new technologies 
and clean energies as the main alternative to help contain global warming. Much of  this 
can be approached in a cooperative way, on the one hand creating common risks and 
challenges and, on the other representing an opportunity to change the patterns of  use of 
energy resources.
Final remarks
To sum up, we argue that security and defence require a broad and global view that 
considers the different elements that affect them. Although traditional and non-traditional 
threats remain, and adapt in new ways that challenge our policies, the general principles 
and norms that guide our country’s international cooperation are the best tool to deal 
with new threats and actors.
In this sense, Chile works from its own successful experience as part of  a Zone of  Peace, to 
contribute to the construction of  a stable and peaceful international environment, within 
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our region, with Asia Pacific and Europe, and now also with Africa. It is fundamental to 
deepen Chilean international commitments and actions worldwide, as well as to strengthen 
interregional relations and Chile’s own internal fields of  action, in a coordinated and 
convergent manner.
Chilean Defence Policy has taken up this challenge, working on greater participation in 
the global context, such as by expanding its peace missions; strengthening its relations 
with other regions, as in the case of  agreements with the European Union; and promoting 
cooperation in its closest environment, particularly through the CDS.
We believe that this relationship, through the institutionalisation of  cooperation, is the 
main way to address the current challenges associated with security and defence. Countries 
have common challenges, but also common principles and norms with which Chile has 
agreed, and that guide the country to continue deepening its relationships and building a 
safer region, together with Latin American countries. 
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Colombia – Not So Unusual After All 
A case study on the transnational  
making of the boundary between  
‘defence’ and ‘public security’
Manuela Trindade Viana
Abstract
Colombia is often mentioned as an anomaly within the expected framing of defence and public security, an anomaly that 
arises from a faulty division of labour between the police and the military. In this chapter, I offer a different interpretation: 
I use Colombia as an entry point to analyse the processes through which the boundary distinguishing ‘defence’ and ‘public 
security’ has historically been built. The argument unfolds in two parts. Firstly, I analyse how counterinsurgency was raised 
to a privileged position in the Colombian military doctrine in the second half of the 20th century. The second analytical move 
looks at the dynamic between the United States and Colombia in the making of a counterinsurgency a la colombiana and 
inscribes this dynamic in the hemispheric circulation of military savoirs. By dissecting the main direction of transmission in this 
circuit, I show how defining Colombia as a ‘malfunction’ in the division of labour between police and military is misleading, as 
it does not account for the transnational impact on what has come to constitute ‘defence’ in Colombia. Moreover, the framing 
of Colombia as an anomaly avoids questioning the assumptions upon which disputes of anomaly/normality rest. I argue that, 
by focusing on the circulation of military savoirs, it becomes apparent that the domains of public security and defence are 
not only constitutively merged, but also transnationally so. This claim is important, given that the boundary separating these 
domains came to characterise a central part of our institutional imaginaries of democracy since the 20th century, and perhaps 
more strongly since the late 1980s in Latin America.
Introduction
In March 2015, in an interview1 I conducted in the Colombian Superior War College 
(ESDEGUE, in Spanish), I was told that Colombian defence and public security came to 
be organised as inextricably associated spheres due to the armed conflict: ‘Without basic 
internal security conditions, it is not possible to turn our attention to traditional defence 
issues, for the integrity of  the Colombian territory has been under threat for decades’. 
The connection made here between defence and public security points to the latter as 
a condition of  the former: the violence of  the armed conflict prevents the Colombian 
military forces from performing their ‘traditional’ defence role. It also suggests that the 
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military would only be able to perform their traditional role in a post-conflict scenario, 
when threats to the Colombian territory and population cease to exist, as there would 
be no longer be a need for the military to engage in public security. This could be seen 
as an attempt to justify an anomaly within the expected framing of  defence and public 
security, one arising from a faulty division of  labour between the police and the military 
in Colombia. 
However, I offer a different interpretation. Instead of  viewing the boundary between 
defence and public security in Colombia as flawed, I use it to problematise the recurrent 
framing of  this country as an anomaly in terms of  the division of  labour between the police 
and the military (as in Rouquié, 1984; Pizarro, 1987a, 1987b; Atehortúa & Vélez, 1994; 
Vargas, 2003; Ciro & Correa, 2014; Velásquez, 2015). Importantly, my objective here is not 
to justify and defend the involvement of  the military in Colombian public security matters. 
Rather, my point is that the framing of  the problem as such misses the fundamental 
question regarding the assumptions upon which disputes about Colombia’s status as an 
anomaly rest.
The objective of  this chapter is to use Colombia as an entry point to analyse how the 
boundary between defence and public security has historically been built. I argue that by 
focusing on the military savoirs – technical knowledge whose authority derives from the 
experience in a specific professional domain – it becomes apparent that public security 
and defence are not only constitutively merged, but also transnationally so. In other 
words, public security and defence are intertwined, not as a Colombian idiosyncrasy, but 
globally through the circulation of  military expertise, or military savoir. This claim is of 
fundamental importance, given that the boundary separating those domains came to 
characterise a central part of  our institutional understanding of  democracy since the 20th 
century – perhaps more strongly since the late 1980s in Latin America, when the region 
was going through a so-called “re-democratisation” processes.
One might say that using Colombia as a case study to argue that the boundary between the 
terms is blurred is an easy task, for nothing else can be expected from a country where the 
Military Forces have for decades been engaged in public order affairs. However, my point 
is precisely that we cannot understand how the spatial and functional limits of  defence 
have been historically constituted without looking at Colombia in the broader context of 
military savoirs in the hemisphere – what I call a ‘circuit of  military savoirs’ (Viana, 2017). 
In the next pages, I show that it is key for us to grasp how the role of  Colombian military 
professionals in public security as defence has been defined.
The argument unfolds in two parts. First, I analyse how counterinsurgency attained a 
privileged position in Colombian military doctrine in the second half  of  the 20th century. 
I focus on the Colombian Army2 as the branch of  the military forces which, throughout 
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the second half  of  the 20th century, has more systematically been the focus of  the military 
savoirs here analysed. In this process, it becomes clear that we need to bring the United 
States (US) to the fore if  we want to identify how the national security doctrine took 
shape in the making of  defence policy in Colombia, and thus also of  public security. The 
emergence of  counterinsurgency as a privileged military savoir helps to understand the 
systematic entanglement of  the Colombian military with public security affairs.
The second aspect of  the analysis looks at the broader context of  military savoirs in the 
hemisphere. Through this, I show how defining the division of  labour between the police 
and military in Colombia as malfunctioning is misleading, as it does not account for 
the transnational influences on what constitutes defence in Colombia. The section also 
looks at Colombia’s recent re-positioning in the hemispheric circuit of  military savoirs. If 
Colombia has been seen as an anomaly when it comes to distinguishing defence from 
public security, what is its status in relation to other countries?
Colombia and the US in the making of a counterinsurgency a la 
colombiana
The literature on the professionalisation of  the military in Colombia associates the 
prominent role of  the army in public security with the close relationship between 
Colombian and US military officers in the second half  of  the 20th century (Rouquié, 1984; 
Pizarro, 1987b; Atehortúa & Vélez, 1994; Leal, 2002; Rodríguez, 2006; Vargas, 2014). What 
are the main features allowing for such a claim, and why is the US used as a reference in 
the Colombian military’s engagement with public security?
In order to address these questions, we need to turn our attention to the 1950s, as it 
was in this period that interaction with the US army started to crystallise into assistance 
programmes, instruction materials, and training programmes. A starting point for our 
discussion is the Korean War (1950-1953), presented by military officers in Colombia 
such as General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, as ‘a source of  extraordinary experiences  […] 
which divides the modern history [of  the army] in two eras: before Korea and after this 
experience, when the army was modernized and learned how to fight accordingly to 
modern concepts’ (Pizarro, 1987b). Although the Korean War was the Colombian Army’s 
first experience in battle with the US military forces, the way it is portrayed in Colombian 
military historiography does not match the occasional character of  interactions with the 
US military prior to the war, or the improvised character of  recruitment.3 Nevertheless, 
this experience was used by military officers as an opportunity for the intensification of  the 
professionalisation of  the army along ‘US lines’ (Atehortúa, 2008:67-70). More specifically, 
high-ranking military officers who returned from the Korean War translated their 
experience into ‘technical’ improvements in the Army (Pizarro, 1987b:32; Leal, 2002:20; 
Rodríguez, 2006).
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For example, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, who commanded the Colombia Battalion 
No. 1 from July 1952 to June 1953, registered what he considered the main contributions 
from this experience in three different books (1956a, 1956b, 1965). At the tactical level, 
the aspects he highlighted derive from guerrilla warfare, shown in the importance he 
attributes to the role of  infantry, small-units patrol, and training infantry soldiers not only 
for body-combat, but also for long-distance marching, rather than counting on motor 
vehicles for that purpose (Rodríguez, 2006:64). He also pointed to the need to replace 
heavier and costlier non-portable artillery used in conventional warfare, like cannons, 
howitzers, and war tanks (Rodríguez, 2006:65). According to the general, one of  the main 
benefits Colombia could gain from closer interaction with the US army was specifically 
related to psychological operations. He argued that the use of  propaganda, rumours and 
information campaigns could be useful in demoralising communist guerrillas (Rodríguez, 
2006:65-66). It is thus noteworthy that he offered a justification of  the position of  the US 
army as a reference point for professionalisation that was more attuned to the ‘problem 
of  communism’ facing Colombia.
Furthermore, General Ruiz Novoa is known for having conceived the main aspects that 
came to constitute ‘Plan Lazo’, a set of  military operations launched in 1962, when Novoa 
was Minister of  War. Aiming at ‘pacifying’ Colombia, the rationale of  the Plan was that 
violence had social and economic root-causes (Leal, 2002:43). Specifically, ‘the philosophy 
of  the Plan was “to remove the water from the fish”, that is, to remove the peasant’s support 
to the guerrilla’ (Ruiz, 1992, in Leal, 2002:44) through a set of  social and economic policies 
that were added to the military intervention. This tactical component was referred to as 
‘civil-military action’ (acción cívico-militar) by Novoa, in a speech published in 1964 (Ruiz, 
1964:247). In practice, civil-military action in Plan Lazo often involved the distribution of 
pamphlets with information on the mission of  the Colombian army, in addition to very 
occasional services offered by the military in small villages, such as shoe repair and tooth 
extraction. Importantly, the provision of  those services always coexisted with armed 
confrontations and psychological techniques, such as infiltration and torture, aimed at 
gathering information on the insurgents.
The forces participating in Plan Lazo had been trained in irregular warfare in the 
Lancers’ School (Escuela de Lanceros), established in 1955 as a specialised unit of  the 
infantry. Months before the foundation of  the school, a commission of  five Colombian 
high-ranking military officers visited Fort Benning in Georgia, US, in order to attend 
the ‘Ranger Course’ (Leal, 2002:44; Rodríguez, 2006:77). Formalised in 1951 as a specific 
department within the US Army Infantry School, the rangers are agile and flexible small-
unit soldiers engaged in irregular warfare, whose training constituted short-term courses 
based on counter-guerrilla warfare for jungle and urban terrains, instruction on how to 
perform ambush and infiltration, and a set of  exercises focused on physical preparation 
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and resilience (Rodríguez, 2006:77). With the assistance of  the US army’s Captain Ralph 
Puckett, the Escuela de Lanceros was built as a mirror of  the Rangers School in terms of 
training and military procedures.
In an article published in 1959 in the official review of  the US Army Infantry School (Infantry 
Review) and then in the Colombian Revista Militar, it was claimed that the Colombian 
Army’s interest in the Ranger Course derived from the massive presence of  guerrillas and 
bandoleros in specific regions (Puckett & Galván, 1959:94, in Rodríguez, 2006:78):
These irregular groups have been, for a long time, a continuous threat to the 
peace and security of  the Colombian people; being experts on the mountains and 
jungle paths, they are very difficult to find and defeat, and the Army has not been 
successful in dominating them. To overcome this difficulty, it was necessary to put 
forth a specific training program for a special kind of  operation; since small units 
have been used to combat the anti-socials, the solution became evident: selected 
officers and non-commissioned officers had to be trained in order to fight the 
enemy in its own terrain and with its own methods. This was the mission of  the 
Lancers’ School, and it excelled at it.
As the excerpt above shows, the creation of  the Escuela de Lanceros was considered a 
concrete response to a security necessity, given the ‘continuous threat to the peace and 
security of  the Colombian people’. This version of  the national security doctrine became 
the main axis around which defence practices were developed in Colombia. In this context, 
the Escuela de Lanceros excelled in fighting ‘the enemy in its own terrain and with its 
own methods’, not only through the mobility that such irregular warfare required, but 
also a specialised savoir in the terrains that guerrillas and bandoleros were experts on: the 
mountain and the forest. According to a campaign manual dated 1944, translated and 
adapted by the US military mission to the Colombian Military Forces, ‘In the war in the 
jungle, the soldier fights two different enemies: man and nature. Between them, nature is 
often the most impressive one’ (Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Miltares. República 
de Colombia, 1944:5). 
Such a statement has two main implications. Firstly, it highlights the reliance on the 
‘native population’. In order to make the soldiers more familiar with the hostile conditions 
of  the jungle, the manual instructs troops to count on ‘carefully selected local guides, 
whose loyalty and integrity are undisputable’ (Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas 
Miltares. República de Colombia, 1944:50). However, while necessary for the military 
to feel safer in a terrain they are not familiar with, the ‘native population’ constitutes 
a potential danger, for there may be enemy infiltration, a risk which a careful selection 
process aims to minimise. Furthermore, according to the manual, ‘The use of  organized 
native troops  … will not only help dissipate any opposition to the presence of  our troops, 
it will also bolster solidarity against a common enemy’ (Estado Mayor General de las 
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Fuerzas Miltares. República de Colombia, 1944:51). The population is thus portrayed as 
either an enemy to be defeated or an asset to be explored so that the operation succeeds, 
constituting a source of  knowledge on the terrain, as well as a source of  intelligence 
and legitimacy.
The second implication of  fighting where and how the ‘anti-socials’ fight is the format of 
the training programme. With the assistance of  the US military, the Escuela de Lanceros 
dedicated a significant part of  its training programme to familiarising soldiers with the 
hostile environmental conditions of  the jungle.4 The first groups who graduated from 
the Escuela de Lanceros were attached to brigades operating in regions considered to be 
‘infested with guerrillas’ (Vásquez & Negret, 1960:60, in Rodríguez, 2006:81). The 1960 
memoirs of  the Minister of  War, Rafael Hernández Pardo (1959-1960), celebrated the 
efficiency of  the lanceros in controlling “subversion” foci in those regions. Within a few 
years, this infantry specialisation constituted the backbone of  Plan Lazo.
The features of  Plan Lazo correspond to the main pillars characterising what we have come 
to know as counterinsurgency (Porch, 2013): (i) an emphasis on tactics, mobility, and the 
small units deriving from it; (ii) a population-centric approach and a ‘winning hearts and 
minds’ motto, due to the idea that the population acts as both the key to the success of  the 
operations and the risk of  infiltration of  the enemy; and (iii) an emphasis on intelligence, 
given the difficulty of  discerning an enemy from an ally in a given population. These 
features remained the main axes guiding military operations in Colombia throughout the 
following decades.
The analysis so far has shown how Plan Lazo was central to the elevation of  counter-
insurgency to a privileged position in Colombian military doctrine, as well as to a more 
systematic interaction with the US in terms of  the professionalisation programme of  the 
Colombian Army in the second half  of  the 20th century. I now turn my attention to 
another fundamental piece in our puzzle: Plan Colombia. On the one hand, the analyses 
about Plan Colombia often underestimate the importance of  the war in Korea and Plan 
Lazo to the consolidation of  the features mentioned above. However, if  understood as an 
important point within a broader trajectory, Plan Colombia is an unavoidable subject if 
we want to discuss the implications of  the so-called “post-conflict” context in Colombia 
for defence doctrine in this country. This is because Plan Colombia takes the features 
mentioned above to another level, in terms of: (i) the intensity of  the relations with the US; 
(ii) the resources mobilised in the Plan; (iii) the areas covered by the specialisation of  the 
military in Colombia; and (iv) the scale of  the professionalisation of  the Colombian Army.
The first two aspects are intrinsically linked. Between 2000 and 2006, US foreign assistance 
to Colombia amounted to US$ 4.7 billion, 80% of  which was concentrated in military 
and police training, equipment, weapons, and vehicles (Isacson, 2006), making Colombia 
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the main recipient of  military aid from the US in Latin America, and the third in the 
world, after Israel and Egypt. Amongst the many ways one can interpret the scale of 
Plan Colombia, one is that the regime of  justification mobilised by the Colombian Army 
evoked a “military crisis” in a context marked by an intensification of  violence in the 
country. Ongoing military defeats to the FARC in fronts considered as strategic by the 
Armed Forces resulted in the claim that military reform was both necessary and urgent 
(El País, 1998; Rangel, 1998; Revista Semana, 1998; Villamizar, 2003). Based on this, the 
Minister of  Defence, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo (1998-1999), created the Commission for 
the Restructuration and Modernization of  the Armed Forces in 1998, with the objective 
of  developing a comprehensive reform plan.
One of  the main components of  Plan Colombia was the procurement of  aeroplanes and 
helicopters aimed at strengthening the air power of  the Colombian Army, and based on 
this, 74 helicopters were supplied by the US, and additional ones were procured by the 
Colombian government (Vargas, 2014:140). Four years after Plan Colombia had been 
implemented, Colombia had the third largest fleet of  helicopters in the Americas, after the 
US and Brazil (Villamizar, 2003:50). As of  2003, the police and military forces in Colombia 
had 230 helicopters, of  which 30 are of  the assault kind, mostly produced in the US (Black 
Hawk, Bell, Huey, and Hughes) (Villamizar, 2003:51).
If  Plan Lazo was characterised by the specialisation of  the combat forces within the 
Colombian Army, this specialisation was further deepened with Plan Colombia, and 
organised according to different criteria: (i) the geographical characteristics of  the 
Colombian territory, as in the case of  the four Mountain Battalions (Batallón de Alta 
Montaña); (ii) specific skills mobilised by military operations, as in the four Mobile Brigades 
and the Rapid Deployment Force (Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido – FUDRA, in Spanish); and 
(iii) the category of  threat, as in the case of  the Counternarcotic Brigades (Brigadas Contra 
el Narcotráfico – BACN, in Spanish).5
Amongst those specialised forces, the BACN is emblematic of  how the US engaged with 
training in the context of  Plan Colombia. Created in 1999, the Counternarcotic Battalions 
were trained by the 7th Group of  US Special Forces in Fuerte Tolemaida.6 The training 
programme combined a focus on physical preparation with the familiarisation of  the 
soldiers with terrains such as the jungle and mountain, highlighting the persistent relevance 
of  the rangers in the irregular form of  warfare characteristic in Colombia.7 What is 
important in Plan Colombia in this regard is the explicit incorporation of  counternarcotic 
policies into military expertise – a domain which until then had been part of  the scope of 
the Colombian National Police (Vargas, 2012).
Finally, an additional key feature of  Plan Colombia was how quickly it expanded the 
manpower of  the Colombian Army, predominantly through “professional soldiers” 
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(soldado profesional), those who, after having concluded the mandatory military service 
(18-24 months), decided to remain in the Military Forces, receiving specific training and a 
salary for their work (Villamizar, 2003:61). In 1998, there were 22,000 professional soldiers 
in Colombia, while by 2002 there were 55,000 (Vargas, 2014:141). The increase stemmed 
from the so-called Plan 10,000, issued in 1999 with the objective of  substituting 10,000 
“regular soldiers”8 for the same number of  “professional soldiers” each year until 2001 
(Villamizar, 2003:61).9 The short-term process in the conversion of  a regular soldier into a 
professional soldier allowed for the rapid increase of  combat soldiers in Colombia: most 
professional soldiers were incorporated into the Counter-guerrilla Battalions (BCG, in 
Spanish) and Mobile Brigades (BRIM, in Spanish) (Villamizar, 2003:61-62) after a 14-week 
training programme.10
Preparing thousands of  soldiers for combat required dedicated infrastructure, and the 
School of  Professional Soldiers (ESPRO, in Spanish)11 was created in December 1999, 
based in Nilo (Cundinamarca), offering training facilities and short-term courses focusing 
on the physical preparation of  soldiers. Interestingly, the polishing of  those who were 
to become instructors in the ESPRO was undertaken in Fuerte Tolemaida,12 which was 
founded in the department of  Cundinamarca in the 1950s, during general Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla’s administration (1953-1957). Under Plan Colombia, Fuerte Tolemaida received 
massive investments aiming at developing its infrastructure and transforming it into a 
centre of  excellence in military training.13
This analysis of  Plan Colombia highlights the re-definition of  counterinsurgency in 
Colombia so as to encompass counterterrorism and counternarcotic tactics in a more 
systematic way. More recently, as Colombia claims to have overcome the violence of  the 
late 1990s, these domains correspond to the military savoirs the Colombian Army has 
been increasingly taken as a reference for to its counterparts in Latin America. In the 
next section, we describe the transnational influences leading to defence being viewed as 
public security in Colombia and discuss how the country has come to enjoy a privileged 
position in more recent years.
The circulation of military savoirs in the Americas and the recent 
re‑positioning of Colombia
In mapping the main defence practices of  the Colombian Army in the second half  of  the 
20th century, the previous section revealed a fundamental aspect: the role of  the US Army 
as an example for the Colombian Army in the structure, organisation, and execution of 
their professionalisation programmes. In this section, I argue that this is a specific example 
of  a broader circulation of  military savoirs in Latin America,14 which also characterises 
the US as a diffusion hub, and counterinsurgency as the most valorised concept. For us to 
57Colombia – Not So Unusual After All 
grasp the texture of  this circuit, we need to identify the main mechanisms through which 
these military savoirs circulate: the military schools operating as diffusion sites; courses 
taught and manuals useds in those schools; military missions travelling from one country 
to the other in the hemisphere; and specific military doctrines.
The hemispheric circulation of  military savoirs started to gain shape in the 1940s, in the 
context of  the Cold War, and contributed to synergies between military forces across 
the Americas. For example, the organisation of  regular meetings and competitions and 
the creation of  permanent commissions on specific topics allowed for the exchange 
of  doctrine and instruction materials, along with the comparison of  forces (such as 
equipment and personnel), the design of  cooperation mechanisms, the articulation of  a 
“common” agenda, and networking. These practices are shared, compared, and discussed 
in inter-American institutions: the Inter-American Defense Board, the Organization of 
the American States (OAS), and the School of  the Americas (SOA). Such an institutional 
system – and the interactions it allowed for – has two main effects. Firstly, it contributed 
to the harmonisation of  military savoirs throughout Latin America during the second half 
of  the 20th century. Secondly, its weight created a reluctance to change the direction of 
this harmonisation.
A closer look at the SOA will illustrate this point. Colombia only figured prominently in 
the student population of  the SOA from the 1970s onwards (Gill, 2004:74).15 Between 1970 
and 1979, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, and Peru sent between 1,100 and 
1,800 students each, accounting for 63% of  total enrolment in the School (Gill, 2004:78). 
Returning from those courses in the SOA, Latin American military officers often had 
the content of  the material translated into Spanish/Portuguese, so that it could be used 
as reference for the courses taught in their home countries (Gill, 2004:99). This form of 
knowledge sharing has continued: in the second half  of  the 20th century, training manuals 
on counterinsurgency were created in Fort Levenworth, and then translated to Spanish at 
the SOA (Gill, 2004:54).
As the definition of  what constitutes a threat was developed through the decades, the 
configuration of  the SOA changed, both in terms of  the courses offered and in student 
demographics. For example, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US 
Army Special Warfare School sent their civil and military professionals to the SOA to teach 
Latin American students, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Federal Bureau 
Agency (FBI) undertook similar practices as drug trafficking increasingly became seen 
as the main threat facing the Americas by the 1980s. In terms of  the student population, 
Mexico, El Salvador and Colombia accounted for 9,000 students in the 1980s – 72% of 
the total student population (Gill, 2004:83). However, it was only in the 1990s that the 
Colombian Armed Forces – both police and military personnel – attended specific courses 
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on drugs at the SOA. The SOA Watch database16 illustrates the changing curriculum 
offered by the SOA, as well as revealing For instance, the “Patrol Operations” course, 
attended by 129 low-rank military officers17 and non-commissioned officers (suboficiales) 
from Colombia during the 1980s, disappeared as such in the following years.18 Only 30 
high-ranked Colombian officers19 attended courses at the School from 1960 to 1989. 
Similarly, some of  the courses were “tailor-made” for a specific state or group of  states – 
as in the case of  “Jungle Courses”.
On one hand, the best-attended courses in a given historical context might suggest a 
transformation of  military savoirs throughout the second half  of  the 20th century. On 
the other hand, the changes mentioned above are all organised under a broader category 
of  military savoir: counterinsurgency. The transformations identified must thus be read 
as a re-articulation within a specific military savoir or, more specifically, as refinements 
in counterinsurgency tactics based on contextual interpretations of  what “insurgency” is 
being combatted, and information on how this “enemy” operates. In other words, the 
changing curriculum during the second half  of  the 20th century is not a transformation 
of  military savoirs in the same way as the displacement of  conventional warfare by 
counterinsurgency in mid-20th century Latin America.
There is another fundamental aspect related to the courses offered in military schools 
such as the SOA since the second half  of  the 20th century. As shown above, while the US 
enjoys a position of  authority in the diffusion of  counterinsurgency to other countries 
in the hemisphere, the tactical refinements and adjustments point to the agency of 
Latin American military professionals in this process. Since the mid-20th century, the 
US Army has indeed been the reference point for others in the region when building 
their professionalisation programmes. However, this does not imply a unidirectional flow. 
As mentioned above, there is a demand-driven component to courses taught in these 
institutions, an institutional response to what was considered a priority by key military 
partners in the region. Indeed, the circulation of  Latin American military officers amongst 
these schools allowed for a solid hemispheric network of  military professionals, as well 
as the legitimisation of  the discourse on the “threats” facing societies in the hemisphere, 
contributing to the fabric of  military institutions in those countries.
Enabling this circulation of  Latin American military professionals was one of  the remarkable 
features of  the history of  this institutional fabric. For instance, the economic constraints 
facing many Latin American states since the end of  the 1970s led to a significant decrease 
in the number of  students at the SOA. As an effort to facilitate the flow of  students by that 
time, in 1976 the Gerald Ford administration initiated the International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) programme, funding the training of  foreign troops (Gill, 2004:78). 
By the 1980s, when many Latin American states were immersed in economic crises, these 
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resources funded Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), small teams formed by US military 
officers who trained troops in situ (Gill, 2004:75, 85). With time, this came to constitute 
the main platform through which military training was provided in Latin America.
As shown in the previous section, military missions were also important channels through 
which military expertise on intelligence and irregular combat (the lanceros, for instance) 
were transmitted. The format of  such missions varied in duration (the 1962 intelligence 
mission to Fort Holabird lasted for 8 months, for instance) and scope (to attend a course, 
to instruct troops, to create a military school and build its curriculum, etc.). As in the 
case of  the Escuela de Lanceros, the purpose of  the US military mission to Colombia was 
not only to crystallise a savoir on irregular warfare in the form of  a specialised school, but 
also to create the conditions for the transmission of  that savoir. It was for this reason that 
a group of  high-ranking military officers visited the facilities at Fort Benning to attend 
the “Ranger Course”, making sure that they were in a position to teach others when they 
returned. Importantly, the SOA was only one of  the destinations for Colombian military 
personnel to familiarise themselves with a specific technique, domain or doctrine.
This circuit of  military savoirs seems to have changed in recent years, with Colombia 
coming to operate as a hub for the diffusion of  military knowledge in the region. In Fuerte 
Tolemaida from 2009 to 2013, the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police 
trained 10,310 professionals from Mexico; 3,026 from Panama; 2,609 from Honduras; 
1,732 from Guatemala; 1,132 from Ecuador; 510 from Peru; 465 from El Salvador; and 
377 from Costa Rica (Tickner, 2014:3). In April 2013, the Escuela de Lanceros, one of  the nine 
training schools in Fuerte Tolemaida, concluded its 367th course, resulting in the training 
not only of  Colombian military professionals, but also of  582 international students from 
19 different countries (including Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Peru and 
the United States) (CENAE, 2013). These numbers reveal that other countries in the 
world, and particularly in Latin America, have come to take Colombia as a reference in 
the training of  their military and police units in counterinsurgency. Colombia’s position 
in the circuit of  military savoirs is predominantly based around Fuerte Tolemaida, a facility 
whose modernisation and transformation into a centre of  excellence in military training 
relied on significant shares of  the resources from Plan Colombia.
However, the re-positioning of  Colombia in the Latin American circuit speaks not only 
to the range of  courses that came to attract attention from other armies in the region, 
but also to a specific category of  military professional. For example, ESPRO, the school 
specialising in preparing soldados profesionales through short-term courses focused 
on irregular warfare, appears as a key destination for military personnel in the region. 
The most-attended courses on ‘tactical military operations against illegal organisations’ 
include elite units; mobile units; explosive units; demolitions; and demining (ESPRO, n.d.). 
60 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
In this sense, ESPRO trains soldiers in both the highly-ramified specialisation that came to 
characterise the Colombian Army, and a form of  “professionalisation” in other armies in 
Latin America. Being the only school of  its kind in South America, ESPRO has received 
students from Brazil, Chile, China, Israel, Paraguay, Peru, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the US (ESPRO, n.d.) 
The training of  Latin American military professionals in Colombia in recent years is a 
result of  the country overcoming the problem of  insurgency in its territory, and now 
being in the position to teach others based on its expertise. In the words of  the Minister of 
Defence (2011-2015) at the time in Colombia, Juan Carlos Pinzón (2015:8):
Because of  the sustained progress since the turn of  the century, and their exceptional 
expertise and experience, the Colombian Armed Forces are well positioned to 
evolve into a regional leader in training, education, and actively participate in 
international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief  missions 
around the globe. Colombia’s experience successfully combating insurgent 
groups, illicit facilitators, transnational criminal organizations, and drug trafficking 
organizations, makes it uniquely capable and qualified to assist other nations that 
today, or one day, may face similar threats.
Of  course, it is important to explore how this re-positioning of  Colombia affects the 
privileged position that the US has enjoyed in the hemisphere for so many decades. 
Although this is outside the scope of  this chapter, it is noteworthy that this recent dynamic 
is more like a trilateral organisation – preserving the US as a key piece in this arrangement 
– than a full displacement of  the US as the main authority on counterinsurgency. Two 
elements arising from my fieldwork in Colombia20 account for this hypothesis. Firstly, the 
Colombian Ministry of  Defence reserves a whole section of  its main building in Bogotá 
for military staff  from the US. Second is the significant numbers of  military instructors 
and high-ranked military officers from the US going to Fuerte Tolemaida and the Superior 
War College (ESDEGUE, in Spanish) respectively.
For the purposes of  this chapter, however, the main argument emphasises another aspect 
in this dynamic, which is the boundary allegedly differentiating defence from public 
security. In the introduction to this chapter, I highlighted that Colombia is repeatedly 
framed as an anomaly for the practices undertaken by its Military Forces which are not 
considered part of  a traditional defence agenda. According to this understanding, the 
historical and systematic engagement of  the Colombian Army with public security 
constitutes a problem in terms of  the principles underlying the differentiation of  defence 
and public security.
Within these terms, Colombia’s position as an authority in the region in recent years 
leads to a puzzle, as even countries whose military forces are not seen as anomalies, such 
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as Chile, France, and the UK, have been learning from Colombia’s experience in public 
security matters. In post-conflict Colombia, the debate on the role the Military Forces 
can perform in peacetime reinforces the need for the Colombian National Police to take 
the lead in internal affairs. Along with this, the Colombian Army should emphasise civil-
military action which, as we have seen, is not that different from counterinsurgency, and 
export its expertise to ‘nations that today, or one day, may face similar threats’ (Pinzón, 
2015:8). Thus, if  Colombia is considered to be a post-conflict context, but the “disturbing” 
participation of  the military in public security continues, the position of  the country as 
a provider of  solutions to counterinsurgency operations must be taken as an analytical 
puzzle. As the analysis here shows, Colombia’s position in a broader circuit of  military 
savoirs suggests that the term “anomaly” should apply to the whole hemispheric circuit, 
not just to Colombia. However, this is tantamount to saying that we should question the 
standard of  normality against which this so-called anomaly is assessed.
This chapter has problematised the supposed boundary between defence and public 
security. By offering an account of  how military savoirs circulate in the hemisphere, it 
highlighted that defence and public security are transnational social constructs. Accordingly, 
the labelling of  Colombia as an anomaly when it comes to traditional defence practices 
is challenged, because it makes it difficult for us to identify the historical processes that 
resulted in a specific contextual understanding of  defence. It is not a matter of  shifting the 
responsibility for “problematic” institutional design from Colombia to the US, for we must 
also recognise the agency of  Colombian military professionals in the history of  military 
savoirs. Similarly, we cannot limit our understanding of  public security to a given space or 
function, precisely because it requires broader definitions of  internal and external.
Final remarks
What are the assumptions behind the boundary we draw between defence and public 
security? This chapter has taken up this question through a focus on Colombia as an 
analytical point of  entry. What makes Colombia relevant as a case study is the recurrent 
framing of  the country as an anomaly in light of  persistent and pervasive engagement of 
the Military Forces with public security. This chapter has a twofold argument.
First, I explored how it is necessary to account for the active role of  the US Army in the 
emergence of  counterinsurgency as the main military savoir guiding the engagement of 
the Colombian Army with public security. I argued that it is impossible to understand the 
Colombian Army’s notion of  defence without including the US Army in the analysis. My 
second move involved looking at this interaction within a hemispheric circuit of  military 
savoirs. The influence of  the transnational idea of  defence as public security on Colombia 
points to the limits of  confining the anomaly to a specific territorial context. After all, 
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the blurred boundary between those two domains stems from the relation between US 
and Colombian military professionals, a dynamic which itself  is inscribed in a circuit of 
military savoirs.
Furthermore, exploring the circulation of  military savoirs in Latin America in the second 
half  of  the 20th century allows us to more closely examine the common valorisation of 
counterinsurgency as more relevant to the “threats” that the military in the hemisphere 
were believed to be facing. Importantly, however, the re-positioning of  Colombia 
in the circuit of  military savoirs does not refer exclusively to the military. In the post-
conflict context, both police and military professionals from other countries have sought 
Colombian expertise to solve the problems they claimed to be facing.
In this sense, the chapter displaces the spatial (from Colombia to the circuit) and temporal 
(from internal war to post-conflict) lenses through which we frame “problems” in the 
supposed boundary between defence and public security. This transnational perspective 
of  how the military came to perform public security functions in Colombia is thus of 
fundamental importance if  we are to question the notion of  the two as distinctive spheres 
of  policy, involving contrasting tasks and different professionals of  the public force. 
Considering the position of  authority that such a boundary enjoys in our beliefs about 
democracy, the discussion here acquires particular significance, and particularly in Latin 
America, where militarisation has increasingly been debated.
One might say that a key aspect is the transformation of  warfare. Indeed, the multiple 
forms that counterinsurgency has taken all share at least one constitutive element: the 
population-centric approach. This is an essential component, for it is this element that 
leads to an inherent confusion between police and military functions. If  we accept 
counterinsurgency as a central tenet of  defence on the one hand, and public security on 
the other, then we must also be prepared to accept the modalities of  war that constitute 
social ordering practices in our daily lives.
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Notes
1 The interview took place in ESDEGUE on 9 March 2015. Personal information about the interviewee 
are not public, under the request of  the interviewee. For more details on the content of  the interview, 
however, please contact the author: m.trindadeviana@gmail.com
2 The Colombian Armed Forces are constituted by the Military Forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy) 
and the National Police.
3 Indeed, at least 15 volunteers joined the Battalion right before it departed to Korea: although they 
were formally enlisted, many of  them did not have any previous military instruction (Atehortúa 
Cruz, A.L., 2008:66).
4 Its main course comprised a twelve-week instruction, structured into four phases. The first one was 
a six-week course focused on the physical preparation of  the soldier through military gymnastics, 
fencing with bayonet, personal defence, swimming, and survival. During this period, the soldier was 
also taught on intelligence and tactics, as well as on how to read aerial-photographic maps, to work 
with explosives, and to lead. The second phase (two weeks and a half ) corresponded to patrolling in a 
flat, jungle terrain, where the soldiers were given eight different counter-guerrilla missions. In the two 
weeks constituting the third phase, the soldiers patrolled in mountainous terrains and participated in 
technical and tactical exercises on how to prepare and protect from an ambush. Moreover, in this part 
of  the course, the soldiers engaged in combat simulations, with a mission, a target, and a weapon, 
and were trained on how to jump on the river with their equipment and uniform. In the final week 
of  the Lancers’ Course, the soldier went through several tests on command, patrol and physical 
resistance (Rodríguez, H., 2006:80).
5 It is important to mention that this process had been accelerated since the 1980s, in the context of  the 
intensification of  the “war on drugs”. Indeed, in 1985, the Colombian Army created the Urban Anti-
terrorism Special Forces Group (Agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales Antiterroristas Urbanas – AFEUR, 
in Spanish), with the objective of  countering and neutralising terrorist actions in the main urban 
areas of  Colombia. In 1996, the Army created the Unified Action Groups for the Personal Liberty 
(Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal – GAULA, in Spanish), exclusively dedicated to 
avoiding and finding solutions to practices of  kidnapping and extortion. Currently, the FUDRA, the 
AFEUR, the GAULA, and the BACN are 4 of  the 6 Special Forces of  the Colombian Army. For more 
information, see https://bit.ly/3aPpysq [Accessed 7 September 2018].
6 Currently, the Brigade is constituted by three maneuver units (BACN No. 1, 2 and 3), and one support 
unit – the Counternarcotic Services and Support Battalion (Batallón de Apoyo y Servicios Contra el 
Narcotráfico – BASCN, in Spanish), responsible for the provision of  materials, budget and logistics to 
the maneuver units (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017).
7 The training programme is constituted by four pillars. The first one involves a technical preparation 
in which the soldier learns how to master weapons and equipment such as compass, GPS and night 
vision devices, as well as techniques such as how to build an improvised vessel. In this phase, soldiers 
are also trained on “ranger operations”. The second pillar corresponds to training on physical tactics, 
including physical resistance exercises such as marching, trotting and training in specific formations 
(polygonal) and self-defence, in addition to the emphasis on swimming for river crossing and rescue. 
The third component of  the training programme is focused on the psychological preparation of 
the soldiers, mainly through simulations on how to deal with situations under pressure. Finally, 
the programme aims at familiarising the soldiers with the legal frameworks on human rights and 
humanitarian law. In this last phase, the courses instruct soldiers on how to deal with local authorities, 
and how to proceed with invasion, capture and confiscation.
8 The category “regular soldier” refers to a military professional whose career is prepared from the basis in 
the Escuela de Cadetes (School of  Cadets). In the latter, the military students remain for 4 to 5 years, 
as the starting point of  the military career programme for the low-ranked military in Colombia.
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9 The category “regular soldier” refers to a military professional whose career is prepared from the 
basis, in the Escuela de Cadetes (School of  Cadets). In the latter, the military students remain for 
4 to 5 years, as the starting point of  the military career programme for the low-ranked military 
in Colombia.
10 See https://bit.ly/2w6kYr5 [Accessed 15 September 2018].
11 See https://bit.ly/3aSMFlW [Accessed 15 September 2018].
12 Ibid.
13 In this context the fortress had its name changed to National Training Center (CENAE, in Spanish). 
Currently, Fuerte Tolemaida has nine schools specialized in lancers (ESLAN), military parachuting 
(ESPAM), army tactics (ESERT), support and services for training (BASEN), special forces (ESFER), 
professional soldiers (ESPRO), shooting (ESTIR), high mountains (ESAMO) and jungle (ESSEL). For 
more information, see http://www.cenae.mil.co/ [Accessed 15 September 2018].
14 Actually, we could also picture it as a global phenomenon. Porch (2013), for instance, shows how 
military professionals from France and the United Kingdom travelled to the United States in the 1960s 
so as to engage in conversations on how their experience could be mobilized in counterinsurgency 
tactics that were being advanced by the United States in Southeast Asia. In a book edited by Arielli 
and Collins (2012), a compilation of  chapters reminds us how the circulation of  military professionals 
is not a phenomenon confined in a specific geography, nor in a specific time frame.
15 According to Gill (2004:74), after the Cuban Revolution, the SOA had a 42% increase in the number 
of  students in comparison to the 1950s. During the 1960s, when the SOA was transferred from Fort 
Benning (United States) to Fort Gulick (Panama), 13,500 students attended courses at the School. 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Panama, and Peru represented the greatest shares: from 1960 to 1969, 
between 1,000 and 2,000 trainees were sent by each of  these states. 
16 https://bit.ly/2WeJG36 [Accessed 17 February 2017].
17 From Second Lieutenant (Subteniente) to Major (Mayor).
18 From 1978 to 1988, the course was attended by 823 Latin American students.
19 From Lieutenant Colonel (Teniente Coronel) to General (General). However, only Lieutenant Colonels 
and Colonels attended courses at the SOA in the period mentioned above.
20 My fieldwork involved interviewing military professionals from diverse ranks in the Ministry 
of  Defense and military schools in Colombia. Focused on the training and schooling of  military 
personnel, I also had access to specific manuals which were used in those schools. The work 
comprised four 15-day visits to Bogotá from 2014 to 2016.
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Hard and soft power, 1959‑2018
Dirk Kruijt
Abstract
Cuba, a country with eleven million people, played a significant military and development role from the 1960s to the late 
1980s, and is still an influential donor country. Its reputation was built on support to revolutionary and national liberation 
movements in Latin America and in Africa. Additionally, Cuba also was a provider of medical and humanitarian assistance to 
the global South. 
Cuba’s military were involved in training and advising Latin American revolutionaries and provided assistance in several 
African colonial and postcolonial wars. During the ‘special relation’ with the Soviet Union and the COMECON countries, Cuba 
had a redoubtable military and intelligence apparatus, at the same time procuring explicit defence against a potential 
invasion by the United States (US) and supporting multiple revolutionary and resistance movements in Africa, Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the COMECON, Cuba restructured its economy, strongly supported by its Armed 
Forces as a management instrument and as a food and security provider. In the 1990s, when its strong military position was 
weakened, Cuba still preserved and even expanded its medical and literacy assistance to many countries. During the period 
of the Latin American Pink Tide governments (2000‑2015), Cuba was again a high‑profile player in Latin American and 
Caribbean politics.
Introduction: Cuba’s diplomacy and ‘revolutionary internationalism’ 
Cuba, a country of  eleven million inhabitants, was a significant power in the international 
political arena from the 1960s to the late 1980s, and it is still an influential donor country. 
Its reputation was built on support to revolutionary and national liberation movements 
in Latin America (providing training and assistance to guerrilla movements) and in Africa 
(through a strong military presence). However, it is less well-known that Cuba is also an 
innovative and significant provider of  medical assistance to the Global South, beginning 
in the early 60s and intensifying until the present. To this day, the country is a significant 
development actor in terms of  medical and literacy expertise, especially in Africa and 
Latin America.
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In this chapter, I will trace the emergence and evolution of  Cuba’s formal and informal 
diplomatic networks which supported and influenced the political and social agendas 
of  Latin American, Caribbean and African countries.1 This will be done through an 
interpretation of  Cuba’s ‘Revolutionary Internationalism’ and its motives, the modus 
operandi of  its diverse hard and soft power institutions, and its large-scale personnel 
involvement. The chapter traces the results of  Cuba’s internationalism in the context of 
their foreign relations with the two superpowers during the Cold War, and with Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East. My guiding research question is: 
how did Cuba cope with its singular position of  enmity with the US and relatively stressful 
friendship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War without losing its own long-term 
objective, which was not only to survive but also produce radical changes in the so-called 
Third World? How did Cuba maintain its influence and prestige when the military muscle 
and generous economic assistance of  the Soviet Union ended? 
With its strategic position in the Gulf  of  Mexico, and its proximity to the US (Florida, 
90 miles), Mexico (Yucatan, 120 miles), Haiti (50 miles) and Jamaica (90 miles), Cuba is a 
key country in the Caribbean. However, it is precisely this geopolitical location that made 
Cuba, the largest island of  the Caribbean, an object of  the expansionist policies of  its 
larger neighbours, especially the US. Several 19th century American presidents tried to 
annex or buy the island and its population when it was still a Spanish colony, and during 
the last of  its three consecutive liberation wars, the US intervened and occupied the island 
in 1898. 
Formally declared independent in 1902, it remained an American protectorate until 
1 January 1959, when the Cuban Revolution triumphed. However, it remained economically 
vulnerable until the end of  the 20th century, reinforced by the centuries-long tradition of 
sugar production, lack of  energy sources, and need for a strong defence structure against 
external threats. Cuba’s economic vulnerability was intensified by an economic embargo 
imposed in 1962 by the US, which also meant economic sanctions against third party 
commercial relations. 
Senior Cuban diplomat, Carlos Alzugaray, former ambassador to the European Union, 
clarified ‘Cuban national interests’ as follows (2017):
Preserving and defending the independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and 
security of  the Cuban nation as the primary mission; establishing external economic 
relations that will promote its development without being used as a means of 
external pressure; assuming and protecting a popular, democratic, and participatory 
form of  government based on its own traditions; establishing and promoting of  a 
prosperous and fair socio-economic system in which “the full dignity of  the human 
being should be the first law of  the Republic (…)”; safeguarding and protecting 
Cuba’s cultural identity and socio-political values; and projecting Cuba’s cultural 
69Cuba’s Defence Diplomacy
and ideological values internationally at a level of  involvement proportional to its 
real possibilities as an effective member of  international society.
In the course of  this contribution, it will become clear that, as a guiding principle, Cuba 
always sought and acquired political support from the non-aligned (NO-AL) countries 
and became an eminent member state of  this organisation, accompanying its military 
endeavours with humanitarian aid as long as it had one of  the largest standing armies in 
the region. After the Cold War, it continued its humanitarian assistance and maintained a 
position of  influence far beyond its ‘country class’ of  a relatively small country. 
I will analyse two distinct phases in Cuba’s relations with the outside world. The timespan 
covers the period from 1959 to 1989 during which Cuba, with Soviet support, had created 
the second-largest military force in the Western hemisphere and participated in large-
scale expeditionary operations in Africa, as well as providing continuous support to left-
wing movements and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. During the 60s, 
its revolutionary objectives and defensive and stability priorities sometimes clashed with 
those of  the Soviet Union, but in the period thereafter, keen diplomacy and military 
expeditionary support to Africa were balanced. From the early 70s to the late 80s, Cuba 
experienced relative welfare under Soviet support. However, a new phase was initiated 
with the implosion of  the Soviet Union, when Cuba’s ‘Special Period’ began, a period 
of  internal austerity and drastic changes in its foreign policy that continued in the 21st 
century, based on soft power and peace facilitation. 
Cuba’s overtures towards the Soviet Union were initiated in February 1960, when Soviet 
Vice-Premier Mikoyan visited Cuba and negotiated a trade agreement on the importance 
of  Cuban sugar, Soviet oil and commercial loans. In May 1960, diplomatic relations with 
Moscow were re-established; they had been ruptured in 1952. Che Guevara headed the 
first significant Cuban mission to the Soviet government and, in May 1962, the Soviet Union 
became Cuba’s self-appointed military protector by soliciting Fidel Castro’s permission to 
deploy nuclear missiles on the island. Kruschev intended to kill two birds with one stone 
(Pavlov, 1994:40-42): 
… positioning nuclear weapons on the doorstep of  the United States with the noble 
justification of  the “defence of  Cuba against possible American aggression”. An 
agreement was reached about the deployment of  intermediate and tactical nuclear 
missiles and specialized Soviet forces, a total of  45,000 enlisted men and officers 
with munitions and other supplies for thirty days of  combat, while authorizing 
Field Commander Pliyev in Cuba to exercise his own flexible response … without 
asking for Moscow’s permission. 
This caused the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis. After this, Khrushchev and Kennedy cut a 
secret deal without consulting the Cubans, who heard of  the deal through the radio and 
were deeply offended (Ramonet, 2008:312). The Soviet government tried to soften Cuban 
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feelings with multi-billion-dollar grants, abundant military assistance, and the continued 
presence of  the Soviet military on the island with a combat brigade of  2,800 men.2 
However, the mutual relations only improved during the Brezhnev years (Bain, 2007:27; 
Latrèche, 2011). 
Part I: Cuba’s hard power (1960s to 1980s)
After 1959, Cuba had to handle three main concerns: redesigning its relationship with the 
US, whose growing enmity had become obvious; reshaping an economic and political 
support structure with new allies in Europe, Asia and Africa; and remodelling its formal 
and informal diplomacy to support and promote similar revolutionary efforts elsewhere 
while maintaining its sovereignty, and economic and commercial interests, and building 
a broad international support structure. That meant simultaneously building an army; 
developing formal and informal diplomacy; establishing an economic support structure 
with new allies; and creating an internal security system and foreign intelligence service. 
Army and militia (the FAR and MINFAR) 
Fidel Castro, the political and military leader of  the insurgency, resisted a counterinsurgency 
campaign by the regular army of  dictator Batista, before taking the initiative in a successful 
offensive strategy that finally caused the collapse of  Batista’s forces (Castro, 2010a, 2010b). 
Cuba’s new armed forces were created from the structures of  the guerrilla forces, the 
Rebel Army in the Eastern mountains of  the Sierra Maestra, and the armed resistance 
groups of  students and youth in the flat lands and the cities. Along with this, rebellious 
army, navy and air force officers who had been incarcerated by the former dictator were 
reintegrated in the new army (Graña, 2008). In February 1959, Fidel Castro became prime 
minister (and president in 1976), while his brother Raúl Castro took over command of  the 
Armed Forces.
Cuba’s first armaments were donated by the Venezuelan government of  that time, or 
captured by the rebel leaders, while the first military training of  the newly appointed 
officers was sometimes given by former sergeants of  Batista’s army (Báez, 1996). The new 
military ranks still referred to the former rebel army ranks, and anyone above the rank of 
captain was comandante (major), even the commanders of  brigades (Bell, Caram, Kruijt 
& López, 2004; Kruijt, 2017). In 1961, the government structure was reorganised, and 
the Ministry of  Defence became the Ministry of  the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
(FAR and MINFAR). Raúl Castro was the minister from 1959 to 2006 when he succeeded 
his brother as (interim) presiden, before being formally elected Cuba’s president in 2008, 
retiring in 2018 while remaining first secretary of  the Communist Party.
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The FAR had a double mission in the 1960s (Dominguez, 1978:342-246). The first was to 
suppress internal insurgencies of  ‘counterrevolutionary forces’, mainly in the mountainous 
Escambray region in Central Cuba where around 180 smaller and larger rebellion groups 
were contesting the new government. The second was to protect the country against 
invasions, as in the Bay of  Pigs (Playa Girón) in 1961, when a group of  1,300+ CIA-trained 
mercenaries undertook a failed invasion. After two days of  severe fighting, the invaders 
had suffered casualties of  114 dead and 1,200 captured. Immediately before the invasion, 
the government had also created a system of  militias (currently called the Milicias de 
Tropas Territoriales, MTT), youth members with light weapons who protected Cuba’s 
infrastructure and assisted the FAR. However, before the Missile Crisis of  1962, the Soviet 
Union had already provided support to the Cuban Armed Forces in the form of  equipment. 
In 1970, after a failed sugar harvest, the Cuban leadership had to publicly recognise that 
its economy needed Soviet support. Sugar was Cuba’s only real export commodity, and 
at the time both capitalist and Soviet economists were unanimous about the wisdom 
of  continuing this mono-product culture, despite all previous efforts of  industrial 
diversification and import substitution. Numerous Soviet experts visited the island for 
economic planning, business management, engineering projects, infrastructural design, 
military and technological advancement, and even higher education. In 1972, Cuba 
became a full member of  the COMECON (an association for economic integration), 
and the contingent of  Soviet specialists increased from 1,000 in the early 1960s to 6,000 
by 1975; of  them, 50% were military specialists (Duncan, 1985:87ff., 101).
Soviet investments and development assistance contributed to a remarkable growth of 
new industrial plants, and the reconstruction of  out-of-date enterprises, mostly sugar 
plants (Pavlov, 1994:76). The Soviet Union had essentially become Cuba’s mono-supplier 
of  essential products, oil and raw materials, its principal provider of  fertilisers, trucks, cars, 
and road-construction equipment, and also paid the running costs of  transportation in 
both directions, dispatching about 300 cargo vessels on a permanent basis (Pavlov, 1994:83). 
One of  the institutions that strongly benefitted from Soviet support was FAR (Báez, 
1996; Vellinga, 1976). The Cuban military maintained warm relations with their Soviet 
counterparts and commanding officers received training in Moscow or Leningrad 
(Baez, 1996). The FAR were modernised along Soviet lines, and until the late 90s, nearly 
all Cuban generals had been trained in the Soviet Union. 
In the early 70s, a re-equipment programme was launched with the most sophisticated 
weaponry (MIG fighter-bombers, T-62 tanks and BM-21 missile launchers) and military 
technology at the time (Duncan, 1985:101). During the three decades of  ‘fraternal 
cooperation’ between the Soviet Union and Cuba, the FAR was annually provided with 
supplies, training and equipment worth about US$1 billion (Latell, 2003:10). By the 
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late 1970s, the Armed Forces had expanded hugely and at its peak by the end of  the 1970s, 
and during its Africa campaigns, the FAR had between 470,000 and 510,000 members 
(Latell, 2003:11; 2009): 
It was the largest military force in Latin America and vastly bigger than those of 
countries Cuba’s size anywhere in the world. Furthermore, man for man during 
the 1970s and 1980s, it may have been the best and most experienced fighting force 
of  any small nation, with the single exception of  Israel. 
In the early 1970s, military officers also started to perform managerial functions beyond 
the soldierly realm. There had always been cabinet ministers with a military rank, and 
from that point on, a process started in which eight to ten senior members of  the FAR 
were permanently in charge of  strategic ministerial portfolios (Duncan, 1985:108-109).
The FAR also implemented large-scale expeditionary operations in Africa LeoGrande, 
1980; Gleijeses, 2002, 2013; George, 2005; Liebenberg, Risquet & Shubin, 2016). By the 
60s, the Cuban leadership had sent military deployments to Algeria and Syria, to Congo 
Brazzaville and Congo (Zaire), and it operated in the Horn of  Africa in the 70s. However, 
its most prominent role was in Southern Africa. Cuba sent 380,000 soldiers and 70,000 
additional civilian technicians and volunteers to Angola, equipped with 1,000 tanks, 600 
armoured vehicles and 1,600 pieces of  artillery (Risquet, 2007:xlvii; 2008:102). Along with 
this, Cuba had a military presence in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, 
and sent civilian ‘internationalists’ to at least ten African countries. However, the FAR 
operated only sporadically in Latin America, especially in the 1960s (Ramonet, 2008:733), 
although it was often not the FAR members who participated, but rather special envoys 
or instructors of  the Special Forces within the Ministry of  the Interior (MININT), under 
the leadership of  Piñeiro (see the section below on Foreign Intelligence).
Diplomacy (MINREX and ICAP): The managing of Cuba’s foreign relations 
Whatever the Soviet influences and pressures on matters of  foreign policies in Latin 
America, especially with respect to the political actors of  the left, Fidel Castro was never 
an obedient subscriber to Soviet politics (Pavlov, 1994:97ff.). While the Soviets assisted 
with credit lines, commercial activities, technical and military assistance, and arms delivery, 
the Cubans acted as political advisers and provided military training to national liberation 
movements in Latin America and in Africa. In fact, over several decades, Cuba was the 
‘general hospital’ for many wounded or crippled revolutionaries and welcomed insurgents 
and political exiles onto the island.
Militarily, Cuba became engaged in African wars, while politically it heavily supported 
Latin America’s guerrilla movements in the 60s and continued to help new politicians and 
actors of  the left in Latin America and the Caribbean. Fidel Castro personally monitored 
Cuba’s foreign policy closely, and this is perhaps illustrated in an observation by the 
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then-Minister of  MINREX, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. In 1972, at the request of  Cuba’s spy 
master Manuel Piñeiro, three senior members of  Cuba’s foreign intelligence requested an 
interview about the Central Committee’s policy with respect to the US. Rodriguez told 
them bluntly (Suárez & Kruijt, 2005:47ff., 233ff.): 
Look … if  Fidel instructs me that I explain to you Cuba’s policy with respect to the 
United States, I think that I’m able to do it. But don’t worry too much. Here, [even] 
the members of  the Politburo do not know what our policy is about. We’re going 
to give you instructions and you follow what Fidel and I tell you to do. Because 
here, [the two] who handle it, are Fidel and me.
Cuba was one of  the 20 founding members of  the Organization of  American States 
(OAS) in 1948, but in 1962 its membership was suspended by a majority vote, under 
strong American pressure. The island was excluded because ‘Marxism–Leninism was 
incompatible’ with the principles and objectives of  the inter-American system (Birsen, 
2015), although the two US neighbours, Canada and Mexico, never ruptured diplomatic 
relations with Cuba. During the Reagan administration, Cuba was put on the US ‘State 
Sponsors of  Terrorism’ list in 1982, and there is no other country in the world that was the 
subject of  American sanctions for so many decades (Bernell, 2011). 
Cuba’s formal and informal diplomacy was in support of  the group of  NO-AL countries, 
of  which the island became an influential member, and in 1979 and 2006, the country 
hosted the sixth and the 14th NO-AL summits. Cuban diplomacy was also explicitly 
aimed at establishing and maintaining good relations with all member states of  the United 
Nations (UN), and it participated and participates in nearly all organisations of  the UN 
system. It took special care to nurture its relations with Latin America and with the many 
small Caribbean states, all of  them voting members of  the UN General Assembly (Ceceña, 
Barrios, Yedra & Inclán, 2011; Suárez & Amézquita, 2013). Its prestige and reputation as 
an important international and regional ally made the persistent economic embargo a 
yearly dispute in the UN meetings. 
Many of  Cuba’s political alliances with leftist movements and their leaders were based 
on personal friendships with Fidel Castro, who developed a strong affinity for Caribbean 
leaders, becoming close with Chile’s Allende, Panama’s General Torrijos, Peru’s General 
Velasco, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez after 1994. He also occasionally hand-picked Cuban 
diplomats who he thought would be appreciated by these leaders and become ‘friends of 
the president’, even before the establishment of  formal bilateral relations.
An additional instrument of  informal policy was and is the Instituto Cubano de Amistad 
con los Pueblos (ICAP, Cuban Institute of  Friendship with the Peoples), initially an 
organisation created to accommodate foreign visitors and sympathisers, but which 
gradually became an institution where semi-diplomatic relations were nurtured with 
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countries still not officially tied to Cuba. These included the overseas territories of 
American and European countries, especially in the Caribbean before independence, with 
relevant political and popular organisations in other countries, and the Caribbean islands 
with American, British, Dutch and French statehood. 
The ICAP identified other actors and movements beyond the traditional ‘revolutionary 
movements’, searching for other nationalist-leftist regimes and movements: 
We realized that by being more open-minded and using a more delicate tone, we 
penetrated sectors to which we otherwise would never have gotten access. That 
is what we called “popular diplomacy”, going beyond the sectors we traditionally 
reached, the so-called “revolutionary sectors”.3
The ICAP also created ‘visiting brigades’ when American, European, African and Asian 
delegations came to the island. Notwithstanding the official Cuban ‘scientific atheism’, 
the ICAP and the Departamento América tried to invite the representatives of  Liberation 
Theology of  to the island:
During a long period, we maintained good relations with many of  the progressive 
religious believers … A large number came to Cuba and it facilitated the ideological 
and political insight of  Cubans into that even so important issue. On matters of 
religion many Latin Americans and some Europeans, like François Houtart, 
assisted us. I conversed and dined twice with Gustavo Gutiérrez, the founder of 
Liberation Theology, and transmitted him Fidel’s invitation to come to Cuba. But 
he didn’t dare to make that trip.4 
The famous Dominican Frei Betto (1985) came to Havana and interviewed Fidel Castro 
about religion and revolution. In the early 1990s, ICAP co-organised solidarity flights from 
Brazil (with theologists Frei Betto and Leonardo Boff ), accompanied by entrepreneurs, 
politicians, students and artists. ICAP also assisted in masses celebrated by progressive 
priests with solidarity groups from Argentina and Colombia.5
Foreign intelligence (MININT and Central Committee)
The most publicly acknowledged Cuban organisation for relations with Latin American 
rebel movements was the Departamento América, which was formally created in 1975 
but had operated under other names since early 1959. Its chief  was the veteran comandante 
Manuel Piñeiro, a close friend and confidant of  Fidel and Che Guevara. This small but 
efficient organisation was hidden in the corridors of  the MININT, until 1961 called the 
Ministry of  Government, and initially was called section ‘M’.6 
‘M’ had several sections, and section M-OE was reserved for Special Operations 
(M-Operaciones Especiales), the paramilitary unit that trained many Latin American 
guerrillas. Section M (and its successors) always operated autonomously as they were 
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created with the consent of  Fidel Castro, who wanted a swift and agile organisation 
without bureaucracy. Originally, Piñeiro was also in charge of  State Security and Foreign 
Intelligence, as Technical first Vice-Minister of  MININT. In the early 70s, State Security, 
Intelligence and ‘National Liberation’ were split in three, and ‘National Liberation’ 
became a ‘civilian’ committee of  the Central Committee of  the Communist Party. The 
Departamento America was an elite organisation, with members hand-picked by Piñeiro. 
Algeria and Mexico were of  crucial importance for Cuba. Algeria was the pre-eminent 
country for diplomatic and other contacts with liberation movements in Africa and Asia, 
and in 1962, Piñeiro formed a “working group” for strategic cooperation. Cuba assisted 
with a mission during the Algerian-Moroccan conflict in 1963, followed in 1965 by an 
agreement on intelligence cooperation between the two countries. Also in 1965, a special 
unit was created to accommodate relations with other African liberation movements. 
Che Guevara travelled to Africa for three months in 1964-1965, establishing more direct 
contacts, and Algeria was instrumental in establishing these relations. 
Mexico was the only Latin American country that did not rupture its diplomatic contacts 
with Cuba in the 60s under strong American pressure. Thus, Mexico, and by the late 
1960s Panama under General Torrijos as well, were the bridgeheads for travel and contact 
with clandestine movements in the region. In Mexico City and Panama City, many 
revolutionary refugees found a home, and institutional contacts were established during 
the decades of  military dictatorship. From the Cuban embassy in Mexico to the legation 
in Panama, intensive contacts with the Central American guerrillas were maintained.7 
Latell, the former CIA officer at the Cuba desk in 1964 and the National Intelligence 
Officer for Latin America in the 90s, considered the Cuban intelligence as ‘one of  the five 
or six best such organizations in the world, and has been for decades’ (Latell, 2007:192). 
Part II: Cuba’s soft power (1989 to present)
Civilian assistance has always been another hallmark of  Cuba’s policy, even during 
interventions in war contexts. During the Central American civil wars, the future FPL 
representative of  the largest military organisation within the Salvadorian guerrilla army 
FMLN, Jorge Juárez, was severely wounded. He remembers the treatment he received 
during his periods of  convalescence: 
It is surprising, but nobody wrote a study about the enormous efforts of 
the Cubans to attend to the many injured of  the wars in Central America. 
Nearly all patients received literacy courses, primary or secondary education 
as well; the blind were trained in braille. It was probably the most important 
contribution of  Cuba to the combatants of  Central America.8 
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In fact, most military missions in Africa were accompanied by medical and literacy 
campaigns, albeit on a smaller scale. The most striking example was the spontaneous 
post-war development assistance in Angola. When the Cuban military contingents were 
to return after their tour of  duty in Angola, the authorities asked Raúl Castro for urgent 
reparation and reconstruction assistance. Many common soldiers and officers, mechanics, 
drivers, engineers and paramedics took off  their uniforms and continued working for 
weeks, or sometimes months, as civilian volunteers, applying their own professional 
experience. However, soft power diplomacy became the first priority after the implosion 
of  the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc in the late 80s and early 90s. 
The FAR and national defence after 1991
When the Cold War came to an end and the US emerged as the only military superpower, 
the consequences for Cuba were disastrous. Cuba had become highly dependent on 
economic and military support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in the form of 
credits, soft loans and export subsidies. Its economic structure had been transformed into 
a mono-exporter of  sugar and agricultural products to the COMECON countries, and 
while not a member of  the Warsaw Pact, its military standing had benefitted enormously 
from special training and favourable delivery of  equipment and spare parts. However, 
the collapse of  the Socialist bloc was not the only catastrophe that struck Cuba, as the 
US intensified their already-damaging embargo. The Cuban government announced a 
‘Special Period in Peacetime’, as the standard of  living was drastically reduced. 
Cuba’s economy and society were transfigured into a system of  extreme austerity and belt-
tightening. Food was incredibly scarce, and nutritional deficiencies began to develop, while 
the desperate shortage of  fuel nearly caused a standstill of  the public transport system. 
The government prevented hunger and starvation by distributing packages of  essential 
food and clothing, and the situation slowly improved after the turn of  the century. Cuba’s 
economy was in part refinanced by the ‘special relationship’ between Cuba and Venezuela 
after the election of  Chávez as president (Clem & Maingot, 2012; Trikunas, 2012; Piccone 
& Tricunas, 2014). The dependency on incoming hard currency (euros from tourism 
and medical tourism) grew, and dollar remittances from the Cuban diaspora increased 
from US$1,2 billion in 2006 to US$3,5 billion in 2014 (Erisman, 2018:51-55. Nickel exports, 
medical missions abroad, medical services for paying foreign visitors, and Canadian, 
European and Latin American tourism became the primary source of  foreign currency. 
President Putin pardoned 90% of  the unsettled foreign debt, and Cuba restructured its 
foreign debt with the member states of  the European Union. Finally, in 2015, after decades 
of  silent diplomacy, diplomatic relations with the US were re-established (LeoGrande & 
Kornbluh, 2014; Ramírez & Morales, 2014), but the effects of  25 years of  the ‘special 
period’ are ongoing. 
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Cuba’s military was also hit hard by the downfall of  the Socialist bloc, and in December 
1982, Soviet Party leader Andropov explicitly told Raúl Castro that the Soviet Union would 
not defend Cuba by sending troops. Subsequently, the MINFAR created a defensive tunnel 
structure and a voluminous militia system with the ‘nationwide capabilities to revert to 
guerrilla warfare in the event of  major military hostilities’ (Latell, 2003:11). Economic 
and military support by the Soviets continued on a diminishing scale after 1985, but fell 
dramatically by the end of  1991, when the Soviet Union morphed into Russia. Delivery 
of  new weapons and spare parts was very difficult, and the FAR’s only option to remain 
operational was cannibalising older equipment. Fuel was another crucial shortage. 
When Chávez negotiated with Cuban diplomats about an invitation to travel to Cuba 
in 1994, the Departamento America let him know, ‘that Cuba not even could buy him 
a matchbox’, and Chavez decided to buy the ticket himself.9 When a Guatemalan army 
delegation visited the island in 1996 during the reconciliation sessions with the guerrillas, 
the pilots were shown MIGs, but they were not ignited, as this was only permitted in 
emergency situations.10 
Trainings in Russia were cancelled, intelligence hardware was restricted, and military 
service was reduced from three to two years. The FAR’s personnel was officially halved, 
although the reductions probably went further, to one third or less of  its previous strength, 
while the budget was cut in half  (Klepak, 2000:3ff., 2005:47ff., 2014; 2018:26ff.; Diamint & 
Tedesco, 2018). A similar process occurred within the MININT’s military structures, and 
in 1994, the Special Forces of  the MININT, the training specialists of  the Latin American 
guerrillas in former decades, were dissolved. 
Thus, Cuba’s hard power diplomacy came to an end. During the 80s, Cuba had supported 
Central American guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the victorious post-
guerrilla Sandinista government in Nicaragua. However, in 1990 it had to retire all of  its 
military presence, and in 1991 the last troops departed from Africa. The reduced FAR 
received new tasks. There had always been military veteran generals in key posts of  the 
government, and now, with an economy in crisis, these veterans were selected to fulfil 
management functions in most of  the strategic Cuban industries (Klepak, 2018:30-31). 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, approximately 60% of  state enterprises had a military 
manager, and in the early 90s, promotion to lieutenant-colonel required a management 
course in agricultural or industrial economy. During the twelve years of  government by 
Raúl Castro (2006-2018), the budget of  the FAR slowly increased.
Public health care and medical brigades 
Cuba’s internationalism, which until the mid-1980s had been predominantly expressed 
through support for guerrilla movements in Latin America and the Caribbean and large-
scale military operations in Africa, had now turned to provision for humanitarian assistance 
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by medical and literacy teams (Feinsilver, 1993; Kirk & Erisman, 2009; Kirk, 2015, 2018; 
Erisman & Kirk, 2018). Cuba’s civilian development aid aims to provide poor citizens in 
underdeveloped or poor countries with assistance in fields in which Cuba has expertise: 
public health provisions and literacy campaigns, post-disaster reconstruction, and sport 
(training and facilities). According to the statistics of  the MINREX, from 1959 to 2011, 
around 156,000 Cuban civilians worked as ‘internationalists’ worldwide: 81,000 in Africa, 
47,000 in the Americas, and 10,000 in the Middle East. In the same period, around 40,000 
academic professionals, of  whom 30,000 came from Africa, graduated in Cuba.11 Cuba 
assisted in the establishment of  medical schools in Yemen (1976), Guyana (1984), Ethiopia 
(1984), Guinea Bissau (1986), Uganda (1988), Ghana (1991), Luanda (1992), Gambia (2000), 
Equatorial Guinea (2000), Haiti (2001) and Eritrea (2003).12 
The first Cuban medical mission abroad was in Algeria (1963), and by 1978, around 2,000 
Cuban health personnel worked abroad, which increased to 3,000 in 1999, 3,800 in 2001, 
15,000 in 2003, 25,000 in 2005 and 30,000 in 2007 (Kirk & Erisman, 2009:8, 12). During the 
administration of  Raúl Castro, this number grew and other medical initiatives, such as 
medical schooling for foreigners, were continued or expanded. In July 2016, 55,000 medical 
professionals (of  which 25,000 were doctors) were working in 67 countries (Kirk, 2018:59). 
This brought and brings Cuba an enormous amount of  prestige in the Global South 
(Huish, 2014:188ff.).
In October 1998, Fidel Castro launched the idea of  a special Medical School for Latin 
American students, the Escuela Latinoamericana de Ciencias Médicas (ELAM). The 
university opened its doors in September 1999 with students from 18 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. By the mid-2000s, it started to attract students from other continents 
and from 2012, students from 98 countries graduated from ELAM. The ELAM system 
and study allowances also expanded to other countries when Venezuelan President 
Chávez co-financed and co-developed the Cuban initiative. ELAM-like medical schools 
were established in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, and undergraduate schools were 
set up in Guyana and Nicaragua.13 
In 2004, Cuba launched the programme Operación Milagro (Operation Miracle) to cure 
cataract and other eye diseases, co-financed by Venezuela. It started in Venezuela and 
was extended to many other countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. 
According to official data, 2,577,000 persons benefitted from this Cuban-Venezuelan 
initiative between 2004 and 2015 (Misión Milagro, 2016) Medical brigades operated and 
still operate in many Latin American and Caribbean countries, especially after natural 
disasters (Kirk, 2018:63-66ff.). In 2016, the countries which most benefitted from Cuban 
medical support in Latin America were Venezuela (28,351 medical personnel), Brazil 
(10,994), Bolivia (721), Ecuador (567), Guatemala (415) and Guyana (181); while those 
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in Africa were South Africa (9,344), Angola (1,712), Mozambique (303), Guinea (221), 
Namibia (125) and Gambia (113). During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 258 medical 
specialists were sent to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea (Anderson, 2014).
Literacy campaigns
A second instrument of  international assistance is literacy campaigns. In Cuba, a massive 
literacy campaign was organised in 1960, and in 1961 the island had been officially declared 
‘free of  illiteracy’. Based on these experiences, Cuban teachers advised on, assisted in and 
implemented literacy programmes in Angola and Nicaragua, and in other assistance 
missions in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. 
In 2000, the instrument was standardised in an audio-visual programme called ‘Yo, sí 
puedo’ (Yes, I can) (Artaraz, 2012). In the early 2000s, it was implemented in Venezuela on 
a massive scale, with half  a million unemployed students incorporated as teachers, and 
around 500 Cuban experts assisting in the specific design. In 2006, Venezuela was also 
declared ‘free of  illiteracy’, and the programme was then adapted for the multinational and 
multilingual country of  Bolivia. Of  the indigenous population, around 40,000 Quechua 
and Aymara monolingual Bolivians benefitted from the programme, while Cuban and 
Venezuelan teachers adapted the design for a second campaign during assistance to Haiti 
in the aftermath of  the 2010 earthquake.14 Meanwhile, Cuba had implemented adapted 
versions of  ‘Yes, I can’ in 30 countries (Abendroth, 2009).
Peace negotiations
By the late 80s, Cuba became engaged in peace negotiations in the Latin American region. 
Fidel Castro and Piñeiro convinced the leaders of  the M-19 and members of  the Colombian 
Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB) to engage in a political rather than a 
military solution, and Piñeiro organised meetings between the CGSB and the Salvadorian 
FMLN to facilitate formal and informal peace dialogues. Cuba continued to play a leading 
role in the peace process in Colombia and in Guatemala, the last two countries in which 
guerrilla movements were still fighting in the last decade of  the 20th century. 
After the brutal years of  counterinsurgency (1978-1983) under the military governments 
of  Lucas García and Ríos Montt, the guerrillas lost the war, and retired to remote 
indigenous regions, retaining some smaller urban pockets in the western highlands and 
the northern jungle (Balconi & Kruijt, 2004; Kruijt, 2008:144-153). The leadership of  the 
URNG lived in exile in Mexico City, from where the chief  commanders directed the war 
by fax and telephone. 
After the return to democracy, informal conversations were initiated in Costa Rica and 
Spain, and formal discussions in Oslo. From 1991 to 1996, the peace negotiations continued, 
but the real breakthrough came when two key negotiators, Rodrigo Asturias (of  the 
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Guatemalan URNG) and General Julio Balconi (an army general), reached an agreement 
about informal consultation, extended to extra-official sessions between the army and 
the guerrillas, with the silent approval of  the civilian presidents. Norway and Cuba acted 
as facilitators, and in March 1996, Cuba organised a three-day session of  reconciliation 
between the army and the guerrillas in Havana, after which the guerrillas announced 
a unilateral cease-fire, and a timetable for disarmament was drawn up.15 The peace 
negotiations were successfully ended after the Havana session, and Cuba’s relationship 
with Norway on matters of  peace in Latin America would continue throughout the larger 
period of  the Colombian peace talks in the 1990s and 2000s.
Colombia’s peace process had a history of  pacts, ceasefires, amnesties, demobilisation 
and reintegration into society (Pizarro, 2017; Villamizar, 2017). During one of  the most 
important peace processes, which lasted from 1989 to 1991, Cuba acted as a peace 
facilitator, at the request of  both the Colombian government and the guerrilla movements. 
Thereafter, only the two oldest guerrilla movements, the FARC and the ELN, continued 
their insurgency operations. From then until the present, nearly all consecutive Colombian 
presidents asked for Cuba’s assistance to re-initiate informal dialogues, re-open informal 
peace talks, provide facilities in Cuba, and ask for peace diplomacy and missions of  Cuban 
diplomats (Castro, 2017). 
After the peace agreement with FARC in 2016, peace negotiations were initiated in and 
then suspended by the new government of  President Duque. 
Conclusions
Ninety miles away from the US, the most powerful military world power, Cuba’s diplomacy 
was based on defence alliances and support from Asian, African and Latin American 
countries. With its relatively weak economic structure and its history of  sugar exportation, 
it relied largely on monocultural sugar production and generous credits and grants during 
its alliance with the Soviet Union and the European Socialist bloc. This was also true of 
its military capability. It supported guerrilla and national liberation movements in Latin 
America, largely through training, medical support and facilities on the island, and in 
Africa, with expeditionary military forces as well as medical and civilian support.
After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, Cuba’s soft power became the defining characteristic 
of  its defence policy. During more than 15 years of  intimate relations with Venezuela 
(1999-2015), Cuban-Venezuelan soft policy favoured manifold countries. It was during the 
time of  ALBA (the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, Bolivarian 
Alliance for the People of  Our America) that a special bond between Cuba and Venezuela 
was created in 2004, and afterwards expanded to Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007) and 
Ecuador (2009), and a further six Caribbean island-states between 2008 and 2014. 
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The first 15 years of  the 21st century were also Latin America’s Pink Tide, with friendly 
socialist or reformist governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guyana, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and 
good relations with most Caribbean island-states. Cuba and Venezuela opted for new 
Latin American bodies, where the US was absent or not dominant: UNASUR (the Union of 
South American Nations, the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, although Cuba did not 
become a member); CELAC (the Community of  Latin American and Caribbean States, 
Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, a kind of  OAS but excluding 
Canada and the US); and the Sao Paulo Forum, a side group of  leftist Latin American 
political and social movements. 
Cuban defence policy has always been interwoven with its internationalism, which 
became part of  the daily life of  many Cuban families, where husband or wife, daughter 
or son participated in missions abroad. ‘Roughly a tenth of  Cuba’s population of  eleven 
million has taken part in some form of  internationalism: as soldiers in foreign wars, disaster 
relief  personnel, teachers, doctors, cultural workers, and specialists in a vast variety of 
fields’ (Randall, 2017:209).
During the long consecutive government periods of  Fidel Castro (1959-2006) and Raúl 
Castro (2006-2018), ‘internationalism’ and international solidarity were the backbone of 
Cuba’s foreign relations and defence diplomacy. Bilateral relations with Asian, African, 
Latin American and European countries, and membership of  nearly all organisations of 
the UN system, were and are nurtured. While Cuba’s military capabilities have shrunk 
dramatically and its economy, even after the prudent reforms of  former president 
Raúl Castro, is still seeking its stability and self-sustained growth, it enjoys significant 
international goodwill. For example, year after year, the UNGA has voted against the 
continuance of  the US embargo, with a growing majority of  countries condemning it. By 
November 2017, only two countries opposed the resolution – Israel and the US. Cuba’s 
defence policy is therefore not based on military presence or sophisticated equipment, 
but on humanitarian assistance and medical expertise. It even downgraded its pretences 
of  being an offensive force promoting revolutions worldwide. In June 2019, the Cuban 
government closed the offices of  the OSPAAAL, the former Organization of  Solidarity 
with the People of  Asia, Africa and Latin America, founded in Havana in January 1966 
after the Tricontinental Conference, when it had acclaimed to be the forerunner of 
revolutionary support to the socialist cause.
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Notes
1 This article draws on research published as Kruijt (2017) and Suárez and Kruijt (2015). 
2 The combat brigade remained in Cuba until September 1991, a month after the coup attempt 
against Gorbachev.
3 Interview with Giraldo Mazola (Havana, 3 February 2012) and Luis Morejón (Havana, 1 March 2012). 
Mazola was the founding Director and Morejón was the Vice-Director of  the ICAP (see Suárez & 
Kruijt, 2005:15ff., 422ff.).
4 Interview with Fernando Martínez Heredia, Cuba’s leading philosopher until his death in 2017 
(Havana, 2 March 2012); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:703ff.).
5 Interview with Luis Morejón (Havana, 1 March 2012); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:422ff.).
6 I use the term ‘Departamento América’ to cover all institutions that evolved from G2 in M in Vice 
Ministerio Técnico (VMT) of  the MININT: Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), Dirección 
General de Liberación Nacional (DGLN), all operating within the MININT, and then Departamento 
América after 1975. Eventually, the Departamento América was incorporated into the Departamento 
de Relaciones Internacionales of  the Central Committee. 
7 Interviews with Ramiro Abreu (19 and 25 October 2011), Jorge Luis Joa (27 October 2011), and 
Fernando Ravelo Renedo (interview 17 October 2011); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:520ff., 95ff., 120ff.).
8 Interview with Jorge Juárez Ávila (16 July 2015).
9 Interview with Carlos Antelo, then the minister councillor at the embassy in Caracas (Havana, 
24 and 27 October 2011); see Suárez and Kruijt (2015:600ff.).
10 Conversations with General Julio Balconi in Cuba (October 2003).
11 Presentation by and discussion with Noemí Benítez y de Mendoza (Sociedad Cultural José Martí), 
“Internacionalismo y política exterior de la Revolución Cubana”, at the International Symposium La 
Revolución Cubana. Génesis y Desarrollo Histórico, organised by the Instituto de Historia de Cuba 
(13-15 October 2015.)
12 https://bit.ly/2w5KgFQ [Accessed 12 January 2016].
13 Interview with Maritza González Bravo, academic vice-rector of  the ELAM system (9 November 
2012); see Suárez and Kruijt (2015:656ff.). 
14 Interview with Javier Labrada (Havana, 8 November 2012). Labrada was a senior adviser in Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Haiti; see Suárez and Kruijt (2015:634ff.).
15 Interview with Ramiro Abreu, the long-time Cuban overseer during the Central American civil wars 
(Havana, 25 October 2011); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:520ff.).
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Venezuela’s Defence Diplomacy 




Between the 1950s and the late 1980s, Venezuela’s economy and welfare attracted many migrants. An economic crisis, 
subsequent mass uprising and riots, and brutal repression by the armed forces was a watershed. Mid‑career officers conspired; 
one of them, Hugo Chávez, a Lieutenant‑Colonel staged a coup that failed (1992). Imprisoned and amnestied, he founded a 
political movement, won the presidential elections and took office in 1999.
Chávez and Castro became revolutionary brothers‑in‑arms. Venezuela supported Cuba by subsidised oil, Cuba provided 
military and intelligence experts, and medical and literacy personnel on a massive scale, around 50,000 in 2013. Chávez 
launched an extraordinary pro‑poor reform programme, the ‘socialism of the twentieth century’. Meanwhile, he strengthened 
the armed forces both numerically and budgetarily, buying Russian and Chinese equipment. He also created militias of armed 
civilians up to 365,000 members. 
Gradually the military occupied more strategic positions as cabinet ministers or supervisors of state institutions. Chávez 
death in 2013 coincided with the fall of the oil prices, dramatic budget cuts, mass demonstrations, and mass outmigration, 
in the context of a galloping inflation and a polarised society. His successor Maduro governs by decree (there are two 
contending parliaments) and turned nearly all significant cabinet and top administrative positions in the public sector and the 
nationalised economy to the military, his staunch allies. 
Introduction: Venezuela’s natural resources under previous 
governments 
Venezuela has the second largest oil deposits in the world, owns huge gas reserves, and 
has the second largest hydropower facilities in Latin America. For almost the entire 
twentieth century, Venezuela was blessed with abundant natural resources that enriched 
the national elite and a growing middle-class population. Oil was discovered in the 1920s, 
and in the first three decades after World War II, the booming oil prices made Venezuela 
a wealthy country. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, Venezuela’s economy experienced 
consistent growth, and the country enjoyed one of  highest standards of  living in Latin 
America, attracting many migrants. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, oil revenues 
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guaranteed generous public spending on welfare programmes, health care and education, 
and food and transport subsidies. Venezuela was also one of  the founding members of  the 
Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1976, the oil industry was 
nationalised and by 1980 the new conglomerate, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), was 
the third largest oil company in the world after the purchase of  refineries in the United 
States (US) and Europe. 
From the late 1950s onwards, Venezuela had a bipartisan political system, the result, 
after a period of  dictatorship, of  a pact between two parties: Acción Democrática (AD), a 
social democratic party with a strong labour base; and the Comité de Organización Electoral 
Independiente (COPEI), a centre-right Christian Democratic party. For 40 years, they largely 
alternated office, but in the late 1980s this political structure deteriorated, as a result of 
internal leadership disputes and widespread corruption amongst public officials (Levine, 
2002). The political decline was accompanied by a collapse of  world oil prices, a process 
of  devaluation and double-digit inflation (84% in 1989 and 99% in 1996). 
An IMF-assisted adjustment programme, launched by government technocrats as shock 
therapy for the economy, prompted mass uprising and riots in the country’s capital 
Caracas, which were repressed by the armed forces (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018:5). This 
so-called ‘Caracazo’, with a death toll of  at least 500 citizens, was a watershed event. 
The advent of Chávez 
Venezuelan mid-career officers, members of  a group called COMACATE (in English: 
Comandantes [Lieutenant-Colonels], Mayors, Captains and Lieutenants) began to 
conspire against the government and planned a reformist coup. There were also other 
parallel military opposition groups, one of  which was headed by Hugo Chávez, then a 
Lieutenant-Colonel who, along with his brothers-in-arms, formed a clandestine movement 
(MBR-200) and staged a failed coup in 1992. He received only a light prison sentence 
and he retained a considerable popularity as someone who had stood up to government 
corruption. After his release, he founded another political movement with a programme 
of  social reforms and presented himself  as a presidential candidate. 
After his release from jail, he was discreetly monitored by Cuban diplomats. When he 
launched his new movement and campaigned in the slums and rural villages, they were 
impressed by the adoration he attracted, and when they heard religious villagers saying, 
“The Messiah has come, I want to touch the Messiah”, they were convinced that Chávez 
would be the next Venezuelan president. His campaign for social and economic reforms 
won him the favour of  both the rural poor and urban slum dwellers, the working class 
and the impoverished middle classes. When he wanted to visit Cuba, he was told that 
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“Cuba not even could buy him a matchbox” and he bought his own ticket. When the 
plane landed, Fidel Castro greeted him as if  he already were a Chief  of  State. It was the 
beginning of  a special bond: Fidel the wise old mentor, Chávez his young revolutionary 
successor and colleague. 
Chávez was not the first revolutionary Venezuelan military president. In 1958, after the 
overthrow of  Venezuelan dictator Pérez Jimenez and before the bipartisan pact between 
AD and COPEI, leftist Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal became interim president. He 
sent a large stock of  weapons to Castro’s Rebel Army in December 1958, when they were 
at the brink of  victory. Similarly, Chávez was a life-long devotee of  Simon Bolívar and 
admirer of  leftist military reformists Velasco (in Peru, 1968-195) and Torrijos (in Panama, 
1968-1981), and he built on their legacy. Bolivar, Velasco, and Torrijos believed in the ideal 
of  an indivisible unity between people and the army, and identified themselves as military 
reformers with a special calling to break the power of  the economic and political oligarchy, 
restore national control over the economy, and carry out social reforms, implemented by 
the Armed Forces. Their public discourses and they are basically identical: soldiers of  poor 
descent, familiar with poverty, educated within the army which let them grow beyond 
their expectations, extremely loyal to the armed institution, and acting as structural 
reformers for the benefit of  the poor and underprivileged. However, Chávez was the 
most outspoken and emphasised the role of  the military as the vanguard of  his future 
revolutionary process. In his own words: ‘We can say that it is like the formula of  water: 
H2O. If  we say that the people are the oxygen, the armed force is the hydrogen. Water 
doesn’t exist without hydrogen’ (Bilbao, 2002:28-29). The new president decided to trust 
his loyal brothers-in-arms and other military senior officers.
He campaigned as a presidential candidate against the two existing but disintegrating 
political parties (Carnevali, 2014), and won the elections in 1998. In 1999, he organised a 
Constituent Assembly where he obtained a large majority. He later won three consecutive 
presidential elections: in 2000 (with 60%), 2006 (with 63%) and 2012 (with 55%).
Like Simon Bolivar, the national and Latin American hero of  the War of  Independence, 
Chávez envisioned a ‘civil-military alliance’. Before Chávez’s presidency, the Venezuelan 
military was constitutionally restricted to safeguarding public security and protecting the 
national territory. They could not vote in elections and were not expected to participate 
in public debates. The new Chávez Constitution drastically changed the role of  the armed 
forces, turning it into an instrument of  national development and a service provider 
to the poor and underprivileged. His initial political movement, and later the United 
Socialist Party of  Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV), was built on the 
sympathy and the loyal votes of  the poor classes of  society; by the time he took in office 
in 1999, approximately half  the population lived below the poverty line (ECLAC, 2001:44). 
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He also received support from grassroots organisations that emerged during his presidency, 
and more than 30,000 ‘communal councils’ (consejos comunales in Spanish), elected by the 
community to initiate and oversee local activities and policies. 
However, there was also growing opposition from military elites, and segments of  the 
middle- and upper-classes. In 2002, Chávez survived an attempted military coup, and a 
failed general strike, organised by a heterogeneous alliance of  military and opposition 
party leaders, which left the already-divided political opposition discredited. As a result, 
Chávez purged the higher military echelons, and loyalty to the president and the ‘Bolivarian 
Revolution’ became a career requirement. 
The Venezuelan armed forces under Chávez
The Venezuelan Armed Forces have four branches: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, 
and the National Guard (a kind of  militarised police). These were renamed the “National 
Bolivarian Armed Force” (FANB, Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana in Spanish). Gradually, 
the FANB became the executive instrument of  the charismatic President-Comandante, 
who had organised his sympathisers into a political party, militias, trade unions, and 
neighbourhood associations. The higher echelons of  the military and the mid-ranking 
officers became part of  the transformed army, used as a state-building institution and the 
right arm of  the president. The nationalist-leftist ideology of  the ‘military as guardians of 
the nation’, acting for the benefit of  the entire nation, especially the poor, contributed to 
their institutional status. Since the beginning of  the Chavez’s presidency, the armed forces 
had been used for civil tasks, and this role was later expanded, such as in the management 
of  gigantic housing projects and other infrastructural provisions.
The appointment of  the military to management positions in these projects, the admini-
stration, and the nationalised economy helped to increase their loyalty to the president, 
who styled himself  as following in the footsteps of  Bolivar. It also helped that military 
salaries were increased, and that lower-class popular access to the military and militias 
was encouraged. After the removal of  adversaries within the armed forces after the failed 
coup of  2002, Chávez rapidly promoted loyal non-commissioned officers to officers and 
mid-career officers to top jobs, and members of  the armed forces were permitted to vote 
in elections.
Between 2008 and 2015, the armed force’s budget grew from 1.06% to 4.61% of  the GDP, 
while military personnel increased from 117,400 in 2010 to 197,744 in 2014 (from 40 to 
63  per  10,000 citizens). In 2015, the number of  militias was 365,046, organised in 100 
‘integral defence areas’ (RESDAL, 2016:210-215; Jácome, 2018). Chávez named these 
popular auxiliary forces the ‘People-in-Arms’ (Pueblo en Armas) to emphasise the bond 
between the armed forces and the civilian population. 
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Venezuela’s sources of  weaponry changed over time. At first, Chávez tried to match the 
much-larger armed forces of  Colombia (around 400,000 effectives due to its ‘internal 
armed conflict’) by buying sophisticated Russian equipment especially for the Venezuelan 
air force and navy. In later years, that was complemented by Chinese multipurpose 
airplanes. He also tried to acquire Brazilian and Spanish aircraft and French submarines, 
but US pressure prevented the delivery (IISS, 2009:57-58). In 2005, Chávez also signed 
a contract with Russia for the assembly of  Kalashnikov assault rifles, ammunition and 
drones for popular defence purposes, in the case of  a US invasion. As long as world oil 
prices were high, the Venezuelan government heavily invested in weaponry. 
Socialism of the 21st century, Cuba and petro-diplomacy
In the first ten years of  Chávez’s presidency, he expanded on his notion of  ‘socialism of 
the 21st century’. World oil prices were booming, and the oil revenues were the basis 
for an extensive redistribution programme. Chávez’s socialism consisted of  extensive 
nationalisation and expropriation, more than 20 major social and economic reforms, new 
political structures, the incorporation of  the army as an executive body, and a charismatic 
President-Comandante. He launched a large series of  domestic social and economic 
‘missions’, headed by trusted military personnel and civilians, in the process creating a 
system of  presidential ministers and cabinet members who depended directly on the 
president’s orders. 
Research NGO Transparencia Venezuela worked out that, of  all 526 Venezuelan state-owned 
enterprises, 74% were nationalised or expropriated under presidents Chávez and Maduro. 
Oil giant PDVSA, nationalised in 1975 and extended to a conglomerate of  interlinked 
corporations, became the financial draft horse of  the reforms, while the nationalisation 
of  banks facilitated financial control by the government. In 2003, a policy was issued 
on foreign exchange and on consumer prices in the hands of  the state (Transparencia 
Venezuela, 2017:3-4, 12, 32).
After 2002, Castro provided Chávez with Cuban bodyguards, as in the case of  Allende 
in the early 1970s. Chávez also began to arm civilian militias as had been done in Cuba, 
where militias had been created immediately before the Bay of  Pigs invasion in order to 
prevent domestic difficulties or counter an invasion by foreign mercenaries or soldiers. 
In later years, the Cuban and Venezuelan security apparatus reached an agreement of 
mutual cooperation, enabling operations in one another’s territory.
Chávez and Castro built a relationship as two equal partners with Venezuela as financier, 
which became a mutually beneficial agreement: Cuban doctors, literacy trainers and 
educational experts went to Venezuela, while Cuba received generous oil deliveries at 
preferential rates. In 2013, the year of  Chávez’s death, around 50,000 Cuban teachers, 
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literacy experts, university professors, doctors, dentists, paramedical personnel and other 
experts were employed in Venezuela. Chávez also became the financier of  a network of 
like-minded Latin American countries, the ALBA countries (Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of  Our America): with Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007), Ecuador (2009) and six 
Caribbean island-states, with Surinam and Haiti receiving observer status. Honduras’s 
affiliation in 2009 was prevented by a military coup.
The Cuban and Venezuelan leaders considered a kind of  further political unification, with 
Cuba’s Vice-President of  the Council of  State in 2005 claiming that, “there was only one 
country with two presidents”. In 2007, Chávez launched the idea of  a Cuban-Venezuelan 
confederation: ‘In the near future we, Cuba and Venezuela, could perfectly establish a 
confederation of  republics: one confederation, two republics in one, two countries in 
one.’1 However, Venezuela and Cuba had two decidedly different economies and political 
structures, and Venezuela’s was already strongly polarised. As a result, the project was 
never realised.
The Cuban-Venezuelan health programme and the many other missions initiated in those 
first years were a great success, giving Chávez huge popularity. Undeniably, the quality 
of  life for the poorer people of  Venezuela greatly improved during the first ten years of 
his presidency (ECLAC, 2017:47, 50). According to the Venezuelan Institute of  statistics 
(INE), the poverty percentage decreased from 44% in 1999 to 27% in 2010.
Chávez’s foreign policy was aimed at a Latin American integration policy that was not 
dominated by the US. He was one of  the main architects of  a new hemispheric integration 
model, with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) in 2004, the Union of  South 
American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008, and the Community of  Latin American and 
Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC) in 2012. 
These organisations were created to bypass US and OAS political and military influence, 
and to exclude those Caribbean islands with US or European statehood. Most of  the 
ideological underpinning was a fervent pro-poor, pro-socialist and ‘Our America’ discourse, 
accompanied by vitriolic anti-US rhetoric.
There is good reason to use the term ‘petro-diplomacy’ (coined by Clem & Maingot, 2011) 
when discussing Venezuelan foreign policy. Financial support was given from Venezuelan 
oil revenues or on the basis of  highly favourable oil-supply programmes, like PetroCaribe, 
PetroSur, PetroNica and PetroAndina. Chávez was an important contributor to institutions 
like the Forum of  São Paolo, founded in 1990 by Lula and Castro, that comprises more 
than 100 organisations and movements, and he also co-financed the World Social Forum, 
a Brazilian initiative created in 2001. In 2003, Castro and Chávez initiated the Network of 
Intellectuals and Artists in Defence of  Humanity, presided over by Mexican sociologist 
Pablo González Casanova. 
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However, with respect to Chávez’s domestic policy, while poverty and income inequality 
declined, urban crime grew. Between 1999 and 2010, the number of  murders per 100.000 
inhabitants increased from 25 to 57, and this is at least partly due to radical changes in the 
institutional order. The new government encouraged land invasions, the establishment 
of  a new social order destabilised the existing institutions of  law and order: a new 
criminal legislation curtailed the role of  the police, there were public conflicts between 
the president and the armed forces during the failed coup in 2002, conflicts with the 
old political structures, and half-hearted government action against armed gangs in 
communities (Briceño-León & Camardiel, 2015). 
Along with this, political opposition proliferated. A divided segment of  the two former 
political powers (AD and COPEI), as well as 18 smaller opposition parties of  all political 
orientations, formed the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, 
MUD) in 2009. In June 2009, former social democratic politician Antonio Ledezma was 
elected as Mayor of  Caracas and re-elected in 2013. The onset of  an economic recession, 
double-digit inflation, increasing levels of  poverty and insecurity, and reports of  corruption 
affected Chávez’s popularity in his last years, but did not stop him from winning an 
electoral victory just before his death. However, under the presidency of  his successor 
Maduro, the problems multiplied exponentially.
Maduro’s Venezuela (2013-2018)
Nicolás Maduro, son of  a prominent union leader and later a union leader himself, 
followed cadre courses in Cuba and was a loyal ‘Chavista’. He made a career under Chávez 
as President of  the National Assembly, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, Vice President and, 
after Chávez’s death, as Interim President. He won the presidency in 2013 with a narrow 
majority, and was soon confronted by a deep economic malaise, conflicting power blocs 
within the governing PSUV, and growing popularity of  his political opponents.
In the last quarter of  2013, Venezuela’s economy entered a recession, and in 2014, world 
oil prices fell dramatically. The government’s course of  action was monetary financing. 
Venezuela became heavily indebted to Russia and China, and the ‘parallel dollar’ (the 
price setting of  nearly all consumer goods) went up explosively. Analysts can only use 
estimates because the Central Bank has not published inflation statistics since 2015, but 
most foreign analysts describe the Venezuelan economy at present (May 2019) as in free-
fall or meltdown with an inflation rate of  815,194 percent. The circulation of  cash is 
restricted, and there is an acute shortness of  essential goods and services, particularly 
medicine and food.
The social and political divide in Venezuela, already visible during Chávez’s last years, 
became catastrophic under Maduro’s presidency, resulting in opposition marches and 
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wide-spread discontent. However, the opposition MUD is also internally divided. The most 
government-friendly sector wants clean elections and the release of  political prisoners, 
others would welcome a coup by the armed forces, while the most radical wing would 
opt for an invasion by the US.
When the crisis started to impact the daily budget and national diet, Maduro’s government 
organised a new clientelist instrument, Comités Locales De Abastecimiento y Producción 
(CLAP), local production and distribution committees who provide a three-weekly food 
package per household. It is a national programme that sustains the core of  the Maduro 
vote. In 2014, only 8% of  Venezuelans received a package, but this had jumped to 28% by 
2016, while structural poverty escalated to 38% in 2016 (ENCOVI, 2017). It is generally 
agreed that by August 2018, poverty had reached the same percentage (around 50%) as 
when Chávez took office. The ‘Carnet de la Patria’ (Certificate of  the Fatherland) and 
CLAP are the new political loyalty programmes of  the government, and the food packages 
are distributed by the military or the local party representatives (López Maya, 2018:69).
Since 2014, the number of  Venezuelan migrants seeking refuge in Latin America, the 
US and Spain has grown (Freier, 2018), although the exact amounts are hard to ascertain. 
According to UNHCR and OIM data, 328,888 official asylum-seekers and other legal 
migrants had left Venezuela by 31 August 2014, the asylum-seekers predominantly to 
Peru, the US, Brazil and Spain, the other legal migrants principally to Colombia, Chile, 
Ecuador and Argentina. However, that is only the tip of  the iceberg, and Venezuelan 
scholars estimate that the exodus already numbers between three and three and a half 
million Venezuelans, predominantly economic migrants (May 2019). The first wave was 
the academic brain-drain: engineers, doctors, architects, and other professionals. After 
this, mass migration increased. 
Corruption and crime also increased, particularly in Caracas, the larger cities and the long 
border region with Colombia, where violent non-state actors operate, such as former 
guerrilla units, drug gangs and armed criminals. It is widely-known that of  the 50 most 
lethal cities of  300,000 inhabitants or more in the world in 2016, 42 are located in Latin 
America, and Caracas is the most violent city of  all, with 130 assassinations per 100,000 
inhabitants (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz, 2017). 
Researchers have noted the nebulous or non-existent government publications about 
crime and crime statistics and, in 2015 and 2016, two renowned scholars published on 
the structural character of  corruption in the country, drawing attention to the large 
Colombian and Venezuelan criminal and drug networks (Tablante & Tarre 2015; 2016). 
Journalists and academic researchers can only speculate about the extent of  illegal import 
and export of  drugs and valuables, gold and capital, but there are strong indications that 
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Rampa 4, the government airfield, is a site from which gold, monetary instruments and 
stockpiles of  cash are transferred to accounts at foreign banks in Europe and Panama, or as 
deposits for residences and other properties in foreign countries (Briceño Torrealba, 2016). 
The researchers also highlighted substantial corruption within the oil giant, PDVSA, and 
other state-owned enterprises, such as production and distribution consortium, Pdval 
(Tablante & Tarre, 2016:104ff., 168ff.). 
In information about the 526 state-owned or nationalised companies, only 21% of  the 
shareholder structure, 6% of  the names of  the board members, and 24% of  the names 
of  the CEOs have been published, and of  the identified CEOs, 30% are active duty or 
retired military (Transparencia Venezuela, 2017:8). The military oversee and administer 
CLAP, and also manage the entire electrical and hydro-power sector, the Metro of  Caracas, 
and the Corporación Venezolana de Guyana, the source of  nearly all national natural 
and mineral resources. Additionally, they operate the entrepreneurial industrial complex 
associated with the Ministry of  Defence (Ramos Pismarato, 2018:271ff.). 
Along with this, Maduro governs by decree, supported unconditionally by the upper 
echelons of  the armed forces. In early 2015, the Mayor of  Caracas, Ledezma, was detained 
on charges of  supporting an attempted coup, then put under house arrest, confined again, 
and again put under house arrest. In November 2017, he fled to Spain where he received 
political asylum. In December 2015, the united opposition MUD won the parliamentary 
elections with 56% of  the vote, and in response, Maduro by decree organised the election 
of  a Constituent Assembly in June 2017. The MUD parties boycotted the elections and the 
governing PSUV won a massive victory in the absence of  rivals. At present, the Constituent 
Assembly ‘cohabits’ with the elected parliament but has assumed all legislative functions. 
In two subsequent elections, for the governors of  the federal states in October 2017 and the 
mayors of  the municipalities in December 2017, the PSUV again achieved victories. The 
MUD was divided on participation, and Maduro won 19 of  the 23 seats, and surprisingly 
obtained a (disputed) majority in states where even Chávez was defeated at the height of 
his popularity, although the opposition considers these elections as flawed. In the municipal 
elections of  December 2017, only some of  the MUD parties presented candidates. With 
a turnout of  only 47% of  the electorate, Maduro won 300 of  the 335 municipalities, even 
in the principal districts of  Caracas, recently seen as an opposition city. In May 2018, 
with a turnout of  46%, and with the MUD parties again boycotting, Maduro won the 
presidential elections with 68% of  the votes, his closest challenger oppositional ‘Chavista’ 
candidate Falcón, who won 21%. In January 2019, Juan Gaidó, president of  the parliament, 
declared himself  interim president disputing the legitimacy of  both Maduro’s presidency 
and the Constituent Assembly. The country has again two presidents in one country, but 
not exactly what Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez had intended.
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The Venezuelan armed forces under Maduro
After Maduro’s inauguration, civilian ministries and management functions were 
increasingly transferred to the military. Active or retired military officers occupied 
key cabinet positions; and important sectors and strategic public instruments, like tax 
collection, budgeting, public contracts and tendering, purchases and acquisitions in the 
public sector, public imports, and control of  the public banks are also managed by military 
officers (Tablante & Tarre, 2015; Ramos Pismarato, 2018). 
Under Chávez, the FANB were already a powerful instrument, acting as both the right 
(defence and internal security) and left hand (in charge of  ministries, missions and 
economic management) of  the president. However, Chávez’s charisma was undisputed 
and he maintained control by annual appointments of  new senior commanders, resulting 
in career mobility of  more junior officers.2 He also rewarded loyalty with promotion, 
thus creating a system of  rank inflation within the armed forces. Some recently retired 
high-ranking senior commanding officers estimate the number of  generals (and their 
equivalents in the navy, air force and national guard) at 700.3 
At present, the armed forces still act as both the defence and management, and control and 
repression forces of  the ruling government. Maduro also developed a new mass promotion 
programme to reward loyalty. On 5 July 2018, the Independence Day of  Venezuela, 
Maduro promoted 183 officers to general or admiral (El País, 2018), and topped up the 
salaries of  the officers’ corps, so that in terms of  national salary scales in the public sector, 
an army colonel earns 15 times more than a university professor. During the 20th century, 
Venezuelan ministers of  defence could be either a civilian or a high-ranking military officer, 
but under Chávez, 12 loyal senior military officers were appointed first as commander-in-
chief  of  the armed forces, and subsequently as minister of  defence. 
Maduro extended this system of  selecting only fierce ‘Chavista’ military loyalists, such as 
General Vladimir Padrino, who was commander-in-chief  in 2013, and was made minister 
of  defence in 2014. Confronted with political mayhem and economic calamity, Maduro 
issued an ‘emergency economic decree’ in July 2016, creating a ‘sovereign and safe supply’ 
of  food and goods, to be headed by his minister of  defence. Padrino appointed 24 flag 
officers as section heads: for rice, fruits, chickens, beans, etc., and because food provision is 
politically vital in present-day Venezuela, the military effectively controls the government 
and the ministers. Large-scale corruption within the armed forces is a common research 
topic in the academic and journalistic fields, and according to information published in 
El País (2018), in the first half  of  2018 the Ministry of  Defence received 35% more budget 
than the Ministry of  Education, and 17 times more than the Ministry of  Agriculture. 
General Padrino is now in charge of  national defence and management of  the national 
economy, at the same time overseeing all other social missions, acting as a kind of  super-
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premier, and the armed forces oversee 51% of  the entire national budget (Transparencia 
Venezuela, 2017:7; Jácome, 2018). In November 2017, Maduro appointed the commander 
of  the National Guard, General Manuel Quevedo (another loyal ‘Chavista’), as both the 
Oil Minister and as president of  the PDVSA, the state-owned industrial complex of  oil 
enterprises on which the Venezuelan economy is so dependent. Consequently, senior 
military members are strongly intertwined with government. In the present (September 
2018) 32-member cabinet, 12 members are military, controlling the most vital positions: 
Defence, Interior, Justice, Alimentation, Housing, Public Works, Transport, and Electricity. 
The close collaboration between Cuba and Venezuela in terms of  intelligence and 
state security has been consolidated (Trinkunas, 2005; Ramos Pismarato, 2008; Ramos 
Pismataro, Francesca & Andrés Otálvaro, 2008; Jácome, 2011; Sánchez Medero, 2014; 
Strønen, 2016; Giacalone, 2017). Cuban assistance and training have strongly influenced 
the military defence strategy, as well as the ideology of  high-ranking officers of  the armed 
forces, and the intelligence and counterintelligence services in their efforts to ‘control 
external and internal threats’ ( Jácome, 2017). Civilian, military and political intelligence 
tend to overlap, and the distinction between the functions and operations of  the Servicio 
Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence Service, SEBIN), the Dirección 
General de Inteligencia Militar (Military Intelligence, DGIM) and the Dirección General 
de Contrainteligencia Militar (Military Counterintelligence, DGCIM) is unclear in practice 
(Ramos Pismataro, 2018:268). 
Conclusions
On 3 May 2018, President Maduro published a page-long article in El País, arguing that 
Venezuela’s democracy is quite different from all others, ‘Because all others – in practically 
all other countries of  the world – are democracies created by and for the elites … class 
based democracies … For us, the essence of  our democracy is that the economy serves 
the people and not [that] the people are at the service of  the economy … For us … the 
economy is justice and democracy, protection.’ 
The declaration is hopeful, but less encouraging is the phenomenon of  growing autocracy, 
and militarisation of  the economy, society and political structures. Less hopeful, too, is the 
hyperinflation and mass emigration, not only by the elites and upper-middle classes, but 
by poor people arriving at refugee camps and bivouacs in other Latin American countries 
at the mercy of  perhaps distant family members or former Venezuelan refugees, other 
people with compassion, or foreign governments overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
the continuing migration stream. 
Venezuela’s democracy is based on an alliance between the elites of  a political party 
and the military establishment, supported by a core of  roughly 30% of  the electorate. 
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However, in general, military institutions have a better life-expectancy than political parties, 
political careers and political leaders. At present (September 2018), the political fate of  the 
president is largely dependent on the loyalty of  his military supporters, while Venezuela 
is a house divided, economically and politically. The military sustains the president and 
oversees a large part of  governing the country and managing the economy. But what 
if  the Venezuelan economic and political crisis grows deeper, the protest movements 
become more desperate, and the armed forces, instead of  loyal supporters, feel the need 
to become the national arbiter?
With two conflicting parliaments, a serious national division, an economy in hyperinflation, 
a failed refinancing of  foreign debt, and rapid impoverishment of  a considerable part of 
the population, the future of  the country is depressing. In the near future, Venezuela’s 
stormy years may turn into a hurricane.
Notes
1 Carlos Lage quoted in Pérez Marcano and Sánchez García (2007:176) and Hugo Chávez quoted in 
Martínez Heredia (2010:79).
2 Traditionally, the general commanders of  the four branches have the highest seniority. If  a more 
junior commander is appointed, all higher-ranking officers are invited to retirement.
3 Author’s interviews in November 2017 in Caracas.
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South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy in Africa
Ian Liebenberg and Raymond Steenkamp-Fonseca
Abstract
South Africa’s defence posture in Africa changed radically between 1950 and 2018. From a garrison-minded state mired 
in diplomatic isolation, the country ‘returned to Africa’ following its negotiated transition to democracy. As South Africa’s 
relations on the continent evolve, so too does the country’s use of various instruments of foreign policy. This chapter primarily 
considers the military instrument in foreign policy, and in particular the country’s policy and practice of defence diplomacy. 
Shaped in part by the presidential styles of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma, the interplay between foreign 
policy and defence has required South Africa to ensure it is not perceived as a hegemon by its neighbours in Africa, but as 
a declared partner – albeit often as the dominant partner. Even so, expectations continue that South Africa should extend 
its role in the African Union (AU), and through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) it helped to establish. As 
the chapter notes, significant gains have been made in advancing South African interests through defence diplomacy, but 
real limitations exist and these should be considered rationally before unrealistic demands or inflated expectations are 
uncritically accepted.
Introduction
Under apartheid policy (1948‑1994), the quest to impose internal control required a 
complementary external policy. South Africa’s defence posture therefore created an 
intolerant and aggressive power on the continent, and while confident of  its policies, 
the Pretoria regime fundamentally misjudged the evolving international setting. In the 
years to come, its actions were based on a fundamental strategic flaw, misreading both 
developments in and reasons for conflict in southern Africa – both within South Africa, 
and in the region. 
For decades, South Africa acted both as an exporter of  armed conflict and as an economic 
destabiliser in the region, particularly in the neighbouring frontline states (Ispahani, 1984). 
This was ultimately an untenable defence posture. The People’s Armed Forces of  Liberation 
of  Angola (FAPLA) and its Cuban allies forced the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
to a standstill in Angola, and eventual withdrawal from Angola and Namibia. Namibia 
became independent in March 1990 under United Nations (UN) Resolution 435, and in 
February 1990, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan‑Africanist Congress (PAC), 
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and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were unbanned and restrictions were 
lifted on internal political organisations, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
and the National Forum (NF). The negotiated transition that resulted in constitutional 
democracy in South Africa allowed the country to re‑enter world politics and the socio‑
politics and economy of  the African continent, as a potentially constructive actor and 
peace multiplier. With this transformation and demilitarisation of  security policies, a new 
posture saw South Africa framing its role as peacemaker and agent for change towards 
reconstruction, development, growth and, to an extent, democratisation. Thus, between 
1990 and 2000, South Africa arguably transformed from an imposing hegemon to a 
relatively benevolent partner on the continent. 
However, one should be cautious of  over‑simplifying this transformation. The dichoto‑
mous approach, understanding South Africa’s defence and foreign policy as neatly divided 
between the apartheid‑era and a post‑apartheid era, risks being too simplistic. The 
primary shortcoming is that by focusing on South Africa’s own political trajectory, this 
perspective does not adequately take into account the changing context of  African security 
and African development. Neither does it account fully for the rapidly changing macro‑
political international context. In order to appreciate South Africa’s defence diplomacy 
in Africa more completely, it is essential to consider public policy as having an internal 
trajectory as well as being a response to changes in the regional and international political 
and security environment. We begin in the next section by setting out the historical 
context, using the example of  South Africa’s involvement in Namibia and Angola, and 
the use of  the military instrument in foreign policy. The subsequent section looks at the 
transition to a democratic dispensation and explains the broader policy context under the 
1996 Constitution. The discussion is structured around the country’s Foreign and Defence 
policy under the Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma presidencies, in terms of  their principles, 
policy formulation, and implementation.
It is within the wider spectrum of  policy choices in the deployment of  soft power that 
the concept of  peace diplomacy becomes relevant. Peace diplomacy is not a frequently‑
used concept, despite the use of  ‘peace’ and ‘diplomacy’ as central to the study of  inter‑
national relations (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012), and one may also choose to refer to conflict 
management (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Our use of  the term follows closely that of  Van 
Nieuwkerk, where peace diplomacy refers to ‘the activities associated with peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding’ and thus in the South African case, as the government’s 
‘involvement in continental peacemaking (diplomatic interventions in the form of 
mediation or negotiation processes), United Nations mandated peacekeeping operations 
(also known as multidimensional peace support) and peacebuilding (in line with the AU 
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framework for post‑conflict reconstruction and development)’ (2012:84). It is important 
to note that multiactor coalitions and policy implementation entities are involved (Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2012). 
The remainder of  the chapter looks at SA defence policy, and structural and organisational 
changes since 1994; the principles on defence engagement through multilateral institutions 
like the UN, the AU, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC); 
bilateral relations with countries with whom defence agreements have been signed on 
training, VIP protection, joint operations, or peace missions; South Africa’s role in the 
region, including its involvement in (southern) African peacekeeping; South Africa’s role 
in the African Standby Force and the African Command, and the relationship with the 
current APSA; and South Africa’s defence policy and the challenges of  defence diplomacy 
in the medium term.
From apartheid to transition and transformation
From being a well‑regarded actor on the international stage under the rule of  Field‑
Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts, South Africa’s image deteriorated after the electoral 
victory of  the National Party in 1948. Apartheid policies were implemented at all levels 
of  society, based on a system of  racial discrimination which was underpinned by racial 
classification, largely benefiting the white population. Black South Africans had no voting 
rights, and hence no right to citizenship, and the voting rights of  so‑called coloured people 
were scrapped. The policy of  apartheid, including rigid racial separation, the withholding 
of  full citizenship rights, discrimination, and the displacement of  the internal population 
along racial lines, was coupled with increasing repression, particularly from 1963. This 
repression was first carried out by the police and later by military structures, enforcing the 
whites‑only minority regime and resulting in the militarisation of  state and society. Thus, 
the apartheid system and its grave social injustices was clearly a form of  structural (state) 
violence imposed in an authoritarian way. 
Initially, Pretoria sided with the (perceived Christian) West and the capitalist states. Aligned 
with the Allied Forces during World War II, South Africa participated in the ‘Berlin Lift’, 
the air‑relief  operation in Germany (1948‑1949), and in the UN‑mandated multinational 
operation in the Korean peninsula from 1950. Though nominally supported as a bulwark 
against Communist expansion in southern Africa, South Africa’s political stance was 
increasingly questioned at the UN. South Africa had argued from the start that its 
government policies fell within the country’s domestic jurisdiction, and as a sovereign 
state, it need not subject itself  and its domestic affairs to international scrutiny. However, 
this defence proved baseless and apartheid was labelled as a crime against humanity by 
General Assembly Resolution 2202  A  (XXI) of  16 December 1966. Strong opposition to 
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apartheid came from most of  the developing countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, 
and Latin America. Even in Europe, voices of  protest rose, starting in the East European 
countries and social‑democratic states such as the Scandinavian countries, and eventually 
from some members of  the Security Council (Pampallis, 1991:278). Sanctions were 
to become a large part of  the anti‑apartheid struggle. On the African continent, the 
Organization of  African Unity (OAU) helped bolster a broader ‘Third World’ voice 
through the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM) bloc within the UN General Assembly. In the 
face of  an international anti‑apartheid movement, and especially from the 1970s onwards, 
South Africa’s defence posture was driven by a siege mentality. The dominant ideology 
of  the political leadership was that of  a garrison state, perceiving itself  to be under a 
‘total onslaught’ from Soviet/Chinese Communism, a hostile Africa (through which 
the disconcerting winds of  change of  independence were blowing), and an increasingly 
unappreciative West.
One can draw parallels between South Africa’s internal and external policies. Internally, 
the government used strong‑arm tactics and ignored the feelings of  the majority of  South 
Africans. Externally, this was mirrored in the government’s disregard of  international 
criticism, including criticisms voiced at the General Assembly. ‘South Africa [provided] 
a dramatic illustration of  the internationalisation of  a domestic situation’ (Pampallis, 
1991:205). Heavy‑handed domestic policies and repressive actions inside the country 
reflected a diplomatic but hard‑fisted foreign and defence policy. Pretoria’s policies led 
South Africa to international pariah status, aptly described as ‘diplomacy of  isolation’ 
(Geldenhuys, 1984). 
Namibia
South Africa’s treatment of  the Namibian people should be considered alongside its 
domestic record of  repression. Mandated after World War I by the League of  Nations 
to protect German West Africa (later South West Africa – SWA), neither the Smuts 
government nor the apartheid government saw fit to withdraw from Namibia. The South 
African political elite and their followers started referring to Namibia (still called SWA) 
as South Africa’s ‘fifth province’, but in spite of  this, the Namibian people persevered 
in their attempts at independence, combating superior armed forces from South 
Africa who believed SWA was rightfully theirs (UN, 1974). In this, the Namibians, and 
specifically the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), were supported in 
their international efforts by persistent objections at the UN from India, Liberia, Mexico, 
and numerous others that joined the call for Namibians to choose their own destiny, an 
opportunity denied them ever since the brutal German colonial occupation during the 
1880s (Liebenberg, 2015:17‑34, 2018:16).
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As in South Africa, territorial segregation between ‘ethnic’ groups was envisaged and South 
African legislation, including security laws, was applied in the territory (Seegers, 1996:135). 
The Odendaal Commission (1962‑1964) made it clear that ‘a policy of  differentiation must 
be followed’ and ‘ethnic groups are basic units of  development’ (Seegers, 1996:22‑24). In 
the eyes of  many, this was a clear attempt to structure Namibia along apartheid lines. This 
all took place despite the visit to Namibia by a UN Special Committee for South West 
Africa, to which Pretoria reluctantly agreed. Members of  the Committee pointed out that 
the Pretoria government was intent on the subordination of  the people of  Namibia to 
their own likes. Pretoria obstinately forged ahead (Seegers, 1996:21) and requests to solve 
the tensions around segregationist policies and the issue of  Namibia fell on deaf  ears 
(Frankel, 1984:278, 279; Pampallis, 1991:278; Geldenhuys, 1984:205). Despite resistance 
and protest, Namibia’s status remained that of  a mandate (UN, 1974). In 1961, the UN 
General Assembly asked for collective action against South Africa, and by November 1962 
the Assembly called for specific diplomatic and economic sanctions against the apartheid 
government (Geldenhuys, 1984:206). 
For a brief  period in 1966, South Africa’s mandate over Namibia seemed confirmed when 
the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) ruled that Liberia and Ethiopia did not have any 
legal rights or interest in the matter of  SWA. In a way, many Namibians felt that their long 
struggle for self‑determination since the 1880s had been betrayed by this ruling, and it 
affirmed their need to pursue an armed struggle. In response, South African authorities 
introduced emergency regulations, security operations, and detentions, while maintaining 
its position in the face of  international criticism. The UN Security Council revoked South 
Africa’s mandate in Namibia, and by 1971, the ICJ re‑affirmed that South Africa’s occupation 
of  Namibia was in contravention of  international law. In his special report for 1973, the 
Secretary‑General of  the UN, Kurt Waldheim, emphasised the ‘special responsibilities 
of  the international community towards the Territory and the people of  Namibia’, and 
urged the UN organs, and the Security Council in particular, ‘to seek effective approaches 
to bring about a solution based on the inalienable rights of  the Namibian people to self‑
determination, national independence, and the preservation of  the unity and territorial 
integrity of  Namibia’ (Geldenhuys, 1984:42).
Following a Resolution by the UN General Assembly, governments from Scandinavia, 
Eastern Europe, the NAM, and other countries recognised SWAPO as Namibia’s sole 
representative (Geldenhuys, 1984:14ff.; Du Pisani, 1986:6ff.). When the UN adopted 
Resolution 435 in 1978, the so‑called Western Five – the US, UK, West Germany, Canada, 
and France – temporarily agreed that Namibia should be granted independence and that a 
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was to assist in ensuring free and fair elections. 
However, covert support to South Africa continued, notably from the US, UK and France 
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(Stockwell, 1978:272‑273; Jaster, 1985:92, 114; Namibia Support Committee, 1988:698‑701; 
Liebenberg, 2011:72‑73).
Angola 
South Africa invaded Angola in 1975 to bolster the ‘anti‑communist’ forces amongst the 
rebel movements. After the coup in Portugal against the Caetano government in 1974, 
three liberation movements in Angola vied for power, but only one was a legitimate 
liberation movement: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of  Angola (MPLA). The 
Union for the Total Liberation of  Angola (UNITA) was implicated in earlier dealings 
with Portuguese security forces, while the leader of  the third, the National Front for the 
Liberation of  Angola (FNLA), was hardly on Angolan soil, having chosen Kinshasa in Zaire 
as his headquarters, and was in the pay of  the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 
contrast, the MPLA had significant support in urban areas, including trade unions, and since 
1954 had demonstrated its ability to mobilise in towns and the countryside, and to fight 
and survive in the field, despite setbacks (Liebenberg, 2008:66‑68). South Africa’s support 
for Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, and supply of  hardware and advisors to Holden Roberto’s 
FNLA guerrillas, escalated the regional cycle of  violence, and both Namibia and Angola 
were to suffer for decades from the destabilising conflicts that they experienced. Even 
if  they had combined their resources, the frontline states could not match the military 
power of  South Africa, as the consistent build‑up of  South African forces led to an arms 
race in southern Africa. South Africa’s aggressive posture forced the frontline states to 
spend money on arms, rather than much‑needed development, all while South Africa 
deliberately destabilised the frontline states through punitive economic steps.
In summary, as the examples of  Namibia and Angola show, South Africa’s isolation forged 
a unilateral foreign policy to ensure regional hegemony. This ‘total strategy’ led to the 
country’s militarisation, and the destabilisation of  its neighbours. The primacy of  the 
military as an instrument of  foreign policy saw the SADF engaging in cross‑border conflict 
and a geopolitics of  war, in the face of  pressure from the international community.
A new era dawns
South Africa’s negotiated transition (1990‑1996) marked a significant advance in the 
country’s political development, and a clear break in how it sees and is seen by its 
neighbours. The anti‑apartheid struggle was an international one, and South Africa was 
subsequently welcomed into a new world that, at least temporarily, had left behind the 
bipolar Cold War schisms (Dyer, 2009:186, 198). 
As South Africa returned to the international community, there was a wide range of 
international actors with whom to interact, and the country engaged broadly with other 
nations and continents through both bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, it 
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is clear that, rather than being swayed to join a specific power bloc, South Africa could 
act from its position as an emerging middle power. For example, South Africa returned 
to the British Commonwealth, yet was also a leader of  the NAM; it deepened relations 
with European countries, the EU, and with the US (particularly under Clinton), but 
simultaneously further enhanced long‑standing connections with Libya and Cuba, and 
acted independently in its relations with countries like China, India, and Iran. Van Wyk 
argues that ‘South African scholars predominantly evaluated the Mandela presidency 
as a period of  (new) foreign policy‑making, the establishment of  new relations and the 
continuation of  old relations’ (2012:277). South Africa thus was able to forge a balanced 
stance, arguably based on moral principles, yet asserting that the new democracy also 
identified its own interests.
South Africa developed a new diplomatic orientation and stepped out of  its self‑declared 
alliance with the West and close association with military regimes in Latin America and 
aggressive pariah states such as Israel, preferring a ‘foreign policy of  peace’ and multilateral 
international participation and engagement. South Africa demonstrated its solidarity with 
the developing world and became a member of  the NAM, as well as being involved with 
what was to become the AU, initiating the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), despite initial differences on 
how to unify Africa and on what economic pathway to follow to ensure sustainability and 
stability. Within the southern Africa subregion, South Africa entered the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the precursor to SADC. Thus, South 
Africa moved from a destabiliser to a cordial beneficiary and partner in solidarity on the 
continent, at least in the new political elite’s view. Recognised as a regional economic core 
and possessing a relatively strong military, this leadership role seemed a natural position, 
but the challenge was how to be a benevolent partner, rather than a selfish hegemon. 
Any hegemonic enterprise reminiscent of  apartheid power policy would rightly invite 
scepticism from other African states.
South Africa’s policy context 
Partly as a result of  the Cold War, there was extensive armed conflict on the African 
continent during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The year 1991 also saw widespread conflict, 
both globally and on the African continent, but Cilliers (2014) observed that this was 
followed by a steep decline in conflict occurrence, which reached low levels from 2002 
to 2005. However, since 2009 there has been a rise in armed conflicts, especially in Africa, 
partly because of  the so‑called War on Terror and intervention by Western core states 
(Cilliers, 2014).
For South Africa, the end of  the Cold War required an adjustment of  foreign policy within 
a changed international environment, from one based on Cold War rivalry to a post‑
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Cold War global order. This international context provides a necessary but incomplete 
understanding of  the setting of  South Africa’s foreign policy, which requires consideration 
of  the context of  South Africa’s transition, which we will address below.
Foreign policy
The new South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy closely echoed its expressed domestic 
values. Achievements in the domestic domain, such as being able to successfully find a 
negotiated resolution to long‑standing conflict and formalise a commitment to peace, 
reconciliation, and democratisation of  state and society, understandably shaped how the 
country saw itself  internationally. The new Constitution (Act 108 of  1996), based on a Bill 
of  Rights and principled constitutionalism, envisaged a democratic non‑racial society that 
focused on peace and conflict resolution internally and externally. Van Nieuwkerk argues 
that ‘the link between foreign policy and peace diplomacy (as an instrument of  foreign 
policy)’ created the image of  South African presidents, especially Mandela and Mbeki, ‘as 
foreign policy actors and peacemakers’ (Van Wyk, 2012:277). This approach saw a shift 
from hard power to soft power, entailing an opportunity for defence diplomacy.
This domestic context can be seen in the light of  the personalities of  the leaders who made 
the democratic transition possible. Under presidents Mandela and Mbeki (1994 to 2008), 
South Africa’s experience of  resolving national conflict through negotiation strongly 
influenced the formulation of  foreign and defence policies shaped by a commitment to 
values, and not just interests. With their global presence, these leaders were influential 
in carrying out foreign policy themselves, perhaps under‑utilising their foreign ministers, 
and ultimately failing to ensure the development of  diplomatic expertise at the depart‑
mental level. 
Under presidents Mandela and Mbeki, South Africa embarked on a range of  bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, diplomatic, political, economic and cultural, with SADC, the rest 
of  Africa, and countries on other continents. Foreign policy under these presidents was 
consistent with attempts to: (1) advocate South Africa’s negotiated transition as a model 
of  conflict resolution; (2) stress South Africa’s commitment to the region and the African 
continent; (3) affirm South Africa’s relationships with past supporting nations outside of 
and including the NAM (i.e. Russia, Cuba, Libya), and with friendly nations on the European 
continent such as the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands; and (4) re‑orientate 
South African engagement with states outside South Africa’s normal ambit, such as Brazil, 
China, Iran, and others. The foreign policy approach also demonstrated that South Africa 
was ready and willing to work with Western core economies such as Germany, the UK, 
and the US, and subsequent bilateral agreements testified to this. However, despite the 
diplomatic projection reflecting re‑alignment with Africa, affirmation of  old friendships 
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and a willingness to act as peacemaker on and off  the African continent, foreign policy 
under Nelson Mandela to an extent remained ad hoc. Some would even argue that it 
was greatly reliant on Mandela as president, his international profile, personal actions, 
and preferences.
When Thabo Mbeki assumed the presidency, foreign policy was still thoroughly influenced 
by the executive branch of  government, and it has been argued that under Mbeki, the role 
of  Parliament diminished (Van Wyk, 2012:279). Along with this, the Mbeki administration 
organised government functions into ‘clusters’, as coordinating mechanisms of  integrated 
governance (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). This applied at cabinet ministerial level (policy), but 
also at the Director‑General level (implementation), and foreign policy and defence policy 
are considered together within the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) 
Cluster. The cluster included the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the 
externally‑directed intelligence agency (the SASS), and Foreign Affairs who led the work 
of  policy formulation and implementation (Africa, 2011). The cluster approach underlines 
the primacy of  political action through diplomatic channels, and the necessity to engage 
peaceful instruments of  foreign policy before considering military engagement.
Mbeki’s vision of  an African Renaissance saw South Africa push for the AU, for its economic 
programme NEPAD, and for internal accountability through the APRM. Although not 
everyone accepted Mbeki’s views on the future continental strategy, especially in the 
economic realm, South Africa pushed for greater regional integration between West, East 
and Southern Africa (Ngwenya, 2012) with the AU as the foundation stone for continental 
cooperation and, perhaps, closer integration. 
Under Jacob Zuma, the Department of  Foreign Affairs (DFA) was renamed the 
Department of  International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) to help enhance ‘public 
diplomacy’ and ‘facilitate domestic constituency engagement’. There was a shift from 
conflict resolution to economic diplomacy (Vickers, 2012), which was emphasised in 2011 
in the Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy (Masters, 2012:27‑28). 
Soft power 
South Africa sought to internationalise itself  with a new more inclusive approach, 
presenting principled aptitude to furthering peace, reconstruction, and development. The 
promotion of  human rights, derived from the experience of  apartheid and the attainment 
of  a liberal constitution, played an important role in the early years of  South Africa’s foreign 
policy orientation (Masters, 2012:145; Neethling, 2012:479‑482), and some observers argue 
that soft power from 1994 until 2012 was the very essence of  South Africa’s foreign policy 
(Smith, 2012:69). The use of  soft power stems partially from South Africa’s value‑laden 
approach (involving conflict prevention, conflict resolution, preference for negotiation, 
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and democratisation) and partially from the realisation of  the limits of  their economic 
and military power. In reality, there are limits to what a middle power such as South Africa 
can do, despite its relative strength in a region (Hughes, 2001).
South Africa embraced multilateralism as a way to solve diplomatic challenges, and its 
foreign policy emphasises the importance of  working through multilateral institutions. 
Ten years after independence, Nathan (2005) summarised that, ‘South Africa promotes 
multilateralism in the international system as the best means of  maintaining global order, 
addressing global problems, mitigating the domination and unilateralism of  powerful 
states, and empowering weaker countries.’ However, more than just participating in 
international institutions, the idea was to actively promote a reformist programme in 
these institutions (Alden, 2014). ‘South Africa embraced multilateralism as an approach 
to solving the challenges confronting the international community … it took up a leading 
role in various multilateral forums’ (Monyae, 2012:139). South Africa promoted peace 
and security with a definite emphasis on Africa and developing nations in general, and 
attempts were also made to improve interaction with, and cooperation between, the UN 
Security Council and others (Monyae, 2012). Some even talked about these activities as 
an ‘evolving doctrine of  multilateralism’ by South Africa, as a ‘realist middle power’ and a 
‘pluralist middle power’ (Monyae, 2012:139, 141, 142). 
South Africa entered African politics as a regional power on the continent and an aspiring 
middle power internationally (Hughes, 2001), and it changed from regional hegemon 
to benevolent partner – at least in terms of  its discourse. However, there were on one 
side those who advocated a stronger role, and on the other side those who dreaded such 
a possibility. 
Defence policy
The South African Constitution (Act 108 of  1996), the White Paper on Defence (May 
1996) subtitled ‘Defence in a Democracy’, and the Defence Review (April 1998), and 
the Defence Act (Act No. 42 of  2002) collectively set the direction of  the Department of 
Defence (today the Department of  Defence and Military Veterans, DOD) and the SANDF. 
Though the main issues were the transition to democracy and the transformation of 
the DOD, the White Paper also set out a foreign policy and defence posture based on 
a principled preparedness to engage constructively with states in the region. The policy 
foresaw armed forces with a primarily defensive orientation, and thus envisaged a change 
from animosity to friendship with South Africa’s neighbours. The process of  publishing 
‘Defence in a Democracy’ can itself  be seen as a necessary change from the past, as it 
was a relatively transparent and inclusive process, with extensive domestic consultation 
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across Ministries and other government departments, but also with academic experts and 
broader civil society (Africa, 2011). The second Defence Review was less inclusive, but did 
not deviate much from its predecessor in terms of  defence posture, force projection, and 
South Africa’s role in Africa with regards to peacekeeping operations. The latest defence 
review also raised some concerns, such as the need to rejuvenate the SANDF and to update 
and replace obsolete equipment, including the need for modernised aerial troop transport, 
and a highly-educated officer’s corps. Ignoring these issues may impact on South Africa’s 
obligations and defence diplomacy, but so far very little has been done by the DOD to 
implement their obligations in terms of  the 2015 Defence Review.
A clear philosophy was reflected of  constructive involvement in preventive diplomacy, 
peacebuilding, peacemaking, development based on pro-active resolution of  conflict, and 
moral leadership. Peace Missions were defined as including ‘participation in Preventative 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Enforcement, Peace Building, 
Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Intervention’ (Department of  Government 
Communications and Information Systems (GCIS), 2003). South African policy also 
reflects the change in how international peacekeeping is carried out under UN mandates, 
in particular the increased attention of  Peace Support Operations (PSO) on post-conflict 
reconstruction, security sector reform, and humanitarian assistance (GCIS, 2003). On 
paper, this orientation is consistent with a foreign policy based on liberal humanitarian 
principles. 
However, if  South Africa expected to play a larger role in regional stability and 
international peace missions, then the SANDF force structure and modernisation plans 
needed to accommodate this new role. Granted, the primary role of  the armed forces 
remains defence of  the homeland, but even as a secondary mission, external deployment 
to enhance regional stability requires proper training, preparation, and equipment. It is 
in this light that one must understand the arms acquisition process, or Strategic Defence 
Procurement (SDP), commonly referred to in South Africa as the Arms Deal, announced 
in September 1999. The acquisition of  submarines, frigates, helicopters, fighter jets, and 
training aircraft for the air force and the navy indicate an orientation towards traditional 
conventional threats, contradicting the stated defensive posture of  the SANDF, and 
contributing little to South Africa’s peacekeeping role on the continent. The exclusion 
of  any significant procurement for the army at the time highlighted these contradictions, 
and still raises questions about operational readiness. Moreover, investigations into the 
irregularities of  the Arms Deal, which led to charges of  corruption against members 
of  parliament and the executive, including Jacob Zuma, significantly eroded the public 
perception that the military could be trusted by broader civil society. Put another way, the 
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fallout from the Arms Deal controversy and corruption has prevented a clear picture of 
anything good being done by the civilian and military leadership, resulting in an increasing 
civil‑military relations gap.
South Africa’s defence policy should be understood in its multilateral policy context, and 
specifically the regional dimension, through the common security arrangements for the 
SADC region. ‘South Africa has not flinched from active engagement, both within its own 
region and on the global stage’ and this against a background of  high expectations from 
the international community about [South Africa’s] role’ (Sidiropoulos, 2007:1; DOD, 2009). 
Within SADC, South Africa aimed at a new security orientation, and seemingly committed 
itself  to future conflict resolution, mediation, and conflict management through the 
creation of  the SADC Organ on Peace, Defence and Security Cooperation. The SADC 
Organ has a strong security mandate, as it is endowed in Article 2 of  the Protocol with the 
power to ‘consider enforcement action’ as a last resort to prevent, contain, resolve inter‑ 
and intra‑state conflict (Hammerstad, 2005). In theory, SADC has power to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of  member states, but this has not been the case in practice. The discourse 
on regional security in SADC arguably hinged on differing interpretations: Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia preferred a mutual defence pact with a military response to conflict, 
while the camp led by South Africa preferred a common security regime based on conflict 
resolution and political solutions (Nathan, 2005:42). The SADC Standby Brigade, as part 
of  the AU’s African Standby Force, can be seen as an effort driven by South Africa to create 
coherence between the subregional and continental security architecture.
The Future SA Army Strategy (Strategy 2020) was released in 2009 and includes reference 
to the army’s role in peacekeeping and peace enforcement on the continent. The primary 
role, constitutionally defined, remains protection of  national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, but there was recognition from army planners that peacekeeping operations 
will dominate in the future (Baker, 2009:12). The Defence Review 2015 indicates the 
broader role of  the SANDF within a developmental state, and re‑affirms South Africa’s 
African focus and its role in post‑conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), while 
the country’s role in ‘regional and continental processes to respond and resolve crises’ is 
stressed (Neethling, 2012:474‑479). Some theorists saw the Draft Defence Review 2012 
as a positive development, ‘given the demands placed on the SANDF in the field of  post‑
conflict reconstruction and development’ (Neethling 2012:472), arguing that this may 
impact positively on the evolution of  developmental peacekeeping. Most recently, the 
Minister of  Defence formulated a Directive on ‘Execution of  Defence Diplomacy Policy 
in the DOD’. The challenge, as revealed in the Annual Report 2016/17, is that there needs 
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to be synchronisation between the Ministers’ Directive and the DIRCO policy, as set out 
in ‘Anchor State Document on Defence International Engagements’ (DOD, 2017).
This policy background therefore demonstrates the gap between acquisitions and the 
conceivable external deployment missions of  the SANDF. Some illustrative examples will 
be useful, and the chosen cases are Lesotho, Burundi, Democratic Republic of  Congo 
(DRC), Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR), each demonstrating a particular 
aspect of  South Africa’s use of  the military as defence diplomacy in Africa. First, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the range of  bilateral agreements on defence issues.
Defence diplomacy engagement
Defence dialogue and cooperation are inherent in defence diplomacy arrangements, and 
aim to avert misunderstandings and ease mistrust by promoting transparency. In practical 
terms, this can be done through exchange of  defence attachés, and exchange of  information 
on a number of  topics, such as defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans, 
and deployments. A second feature of  defence diplomacy is establishing bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, as well as participating in multinational organisations, such as 
the UN, the AU and SADC (especially in the Interstate Defence and Security Committee) 
(GCIS, 2017). Bilateral defence diplomacy and cooperation take place at a number of 
political levels and institutions, although as Blake reveals, there is a dearth of  information 
on South Africa’s defence cooperation generally, and his position as a military practitioner 
means his study provides useful insights (2016). At a deeper level of  connection, states may 
participate in military education and joint military exercises. Following the framework of 
Cottey and Forster (2004), defence diplomacy engagement can be divided into a number 
of  areas of  activity:
High-level political ties: The Bi‑National Commission (BNC) is a forum for dialogue 
at the presidential level. The BNC is usually chaired by the South African President, and 
includes the Minister of  Defence and Department officials. In contrast, a Joint Commission 
on Cooperation ( JCC) is chaired by the Minister of  DIRCO, but usually includes other 
government ministers, including the Defence Minister, and other senior officials. The 
Minister of  Defence chairs meetings at the Joint Permanent Commission on Defence 
and Security ( JPCDS), which are annual bilateral meetings with representatives of  states 
contiguous to South Africa. At the level of  Secretary for Defence (equivalent to a Director‑
General), meetings are held as a Defence Committee (DC) with senior departmental 
officials in attendance (Blake, 2016).
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Military-to-military contacts: As set out in the Defence Review 2014, the relationship 
with other armed forces is carried out through a DOD Foreign Relations Strategy. Defence 
International Affairs (DIA) formulates and provides policy advice on Defence Foreign 
Relations, which administers support to the SANDF defence attaché offices abroad and to 
foreign military dignitaries (DOD, 2015).
TABLE 6.1 SA defence diplomacy involving SADC states (2011‑15)
SA defence diplomacy involving SADC states (2011‑15) Total
Defence dialogue:
  Bilateral meetings










  Anti-Piracy Operations
  HADR
  Border Liaison Forums











SOURCE: Developed from Blake (2016)
Defence diplomacy in South Africa’s continental peacekeeping 
operations
Lesotho
South Africa moved beyond its stated preference for diplomatic conflict resolution with its 
first foreign deployment of  the military to Lesotho in 1998. The post‑election constitutional 
crisis in that country resulted in Prime Minister Mosisili requesting assistance to prevent 
a possible coup. Peaceful diplomatic solutions had been tried, including through the 
SADC Troika, but Mandela’s preventive diplomacy efforts and calls for constitutional 
reform were not sufficient to avoid the crisis following the disputed general election 
of  April 1998. The crisis was compounded by members of  the Lesotho Defence Force 
(LDF) staging a mutiny in September 1998, and an increase in civil disorder and public 
violence which led to internal instability. The SANDF deployed under Operation Boleas 
to prevent an unconstitutional take‑over of  power and secure law and order, a military 
action that Du Plessis called the ‘intrusive use of  the military instrument in the form of 
military intervention’ (2003:130). South Africa maintained that it was a peace operation 
under a SADC mandate and not an invasion, as the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) had 
been involved.
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The issue remains whether South Africa gave up on negotiating a political settlement too 
quickly, deploying the military without a full understanding of  how the enforcement 
action would be viewed. There were also questions about the requirements for regarding 
a military response as a SADC response since, as Neethling points out, there were no clear 
guidelines from SADC regarding military responses in internal conflicts (2012). At the 
time of  Mosisili’s request, the SADC Chair and the president of  South Africa were the 
same person (Likoti, 2007). Moreover, South Africa had not participated in the August 
1998 intervention operation in the DRC after requests from President Laurent Kabila for 
military assistance, while Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia did intervene. In both Lesotho 
and the DRC, regional security cooperation under the SADC banner in intrastate conflict 
proved controversial. From an international perspective, De Coning argues that, ‘South 
Africa, Botswana and SADC, appeared to have failed to obtain prior authorization from 
the UN Security Council as required by Chapter VIII of  the Charter’ (1998:22), while 
others hold that, although there is debate about the strict legality of  the operation, South 
Africa’s actions were legitimate (Southall, 2006:7). Nevertheless, South Africa was aware 
that acting unilaterally could be interpreted as hegemonic dominance, and leading up to 
the 2002 election, they continued to engage Lesotho via SADC.
Burundi
The Burundi intervention can be seen as one of  South Africa’s most successful uses of 
the military in foreign policy in support of  diplomatic negotiation and peacemaking (Du 
Plessis, 2003:126; Southall, 2006:12). Nelson Mandela became involved as the key peace 
mediator in the OAU peace process after the death of  Julius Nyerere in 1999 although, 
as Van Eck notes, Nyerere’s facilitation was flawed as two Burundian political‑military 
movements had been excluded (Van Eck, 2009:168‑170). Mandela’s diplomatic efforts 
resulted in the Arusha Agreement of  Peace and Reconciliation of  August 2000, the basis 
of  which was a three‑year transitional government based on power‑sharing between Tutsi‑ 
and Hutu‑dominated political parties. 
Given the resistance from the excluded armed movements, the peace process required 
ongoing ceasefire negotiations, and South Africa was prepared to back up its diplomatic 
efforts with a military presence. With Jacob Zuma, then the country’s deputy president, 
taking the lead, South African negotiations resulted in armed groups, political parties, 
and regional neighbours maintaining a fragile peace. South Africa deployed a military 
force to Burundi in support of  the Arusha Peace Agreement, facilitating the return of 
exiled political leaders and providing protection to those participating in the Burundi 
Transitional Government. The military deployment of  the South African Protection and 
Support Detachment (SAPSD) was referred to as Operation Fibre, a protective military 
deployment in the context of  a negotiated settlement.
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There was also a multilateral track to South Africa’s involvement, as the Department of 
Foreign Affairs had approached the UN for assistance in gaining international support 
for the deployment (Makwetla, 2012). This support was confirmed in Security Council 
Resolution 1375 (20 October 2001) which ‘Endorses the efforts of  the Government of  South 
Africa and other member States to support the implementation of  the Arusha Agreement, 
and strongly supports in this regard the establishment of  an interim multinational security 
presence in Burundi, at the request of  its Government, to protect returning political 
leaders and train an all‑Burundian protection force.’ 
Along with this, South Africa also worked through the newly created AU. The AU Mission 
in Burundi (AMIB), established in May 2003 as the first AU peacekeeping mission, had 
a South African as its first Force Commander, and South Africa participated alongside 
Ethiopia and Mozambique as the major military contributors. It must be pointed out 
that South Africa had an authoritative role in the creation of  the AU, and that a number 
of  initiatives regarding the deployment of  the mission were carried out by President 
Thabo Mbeki in his capacity as AU chairperson (Landsberg, 2012). South Africa also 
continued to play a major role in Burundi when the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 
was established in June 2004. South African Major General Derrick Mgwebi was the first 
ONUB Force Commander, a first for a South African in an international peacekeeping 
force (Makwetla, 2012).
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC case presents a range of  examples of  South Africa’s use of  the military instrument. 
As noted above, in contrast with South Africa’s more pacific approach within SADC, the 
trio of  Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia pursued a militarist line. This resulted in their 
participation in the hostilities in the DRC, and consequently to a cleavage on this issue in 
SADC and antagonism between SADC states. Nevertheless, the diplomatic initiatives of 
Thabo Mbeki between 1999 and 2002 promised political stability to the DRC and resulted 
in the signing of  the Lusaka Peace Agreement in July 1999. This paved the way for the 
establishment of  the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo 
(MONUC), and diplomatic efforts were bolstered by the deployment of  the SANDF as 
part of  the internationally‑mandated mission. South Africa’s participation in MONUC 
from September 1999 was code‑named Operation Mistral.
South Africa’s multilateral participation in MONUC increased, particularly after the 
assassination of  President Laurent Kabila in January 2001 placed renewed pressure on 
the UN to expedite the implementation of  MONUC. The UN allocated a number of  staff 
officer posts to South Africa, and SANDF personnel were deployed for 12 months. South 
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Africa was also requested to deploy its specialist elements, the South African National 
Defence Force Specialist Contingent (SANDFSPECC), as well as the SANDF Aero Medical 
Evacuation team. South African Military Police members were also deployed to establish 
the MONUC Military Police Unit, and in July 2002, the UN DPKO requested that South 
Africa deploy a Task Force to MONUC.
South Africa entered into the DRC with bilateral or trilateral defence diplomacy agree‑
ments. South Africa had signed an agreement with the DRC and Belgium to support 
security sector reform in respect of  the DRCs Armed Forces (FARDC). This deployment 
of  the South African Detachment Assisting with Integration and Training (SADAIT) in 
the DRC from January 2005 was named Operation Teutonic, and its primary role was 
to provide assistance with the identification and registration process. This was expanded 
later in 2005 (Teutonic II) with the deployment of  additional personnel to the Eastern 
DRC to facilitate with training centres.
The situation in the DRC continues to evolve. In July 2010, the UN mission received a 
new mandate and was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo (MONUSCO). The SANDF presence in the 
DRC in support of  MONUSCO consisted of  three military observers, 12 staff  officers, 
and a contingent of  1200 members. In 2014, a new mandate was decided by UN Security 
Council Resolution 2098, which saw South Africa deploying a battalion as part of  the 
MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade.
Sudan
The Sudan example sheds light on the deployment of  an AU mission, although it was 
also partly a hybrid AU‑UN mission (Khadiagala, 2014). The SANDF launched Operation 
Cordite in July 2004 with the deployment of  staff  officers and military observers to Darfur, 
Sudan. This was in support of  the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and to supplement the 
existing Sudan deployment. An infantry protection company and an explosive ordnance 
disposal unit were also deployed. AMIS was terminated at the end of  2007 by the UN 
African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), becoming the first AU‑UN hybrid mission. The 
South African contingent remained in Darfur in support of  this hybrid mission, and 
the UN requested that South Africa increase the contingent to a standard UN Infantry 
Battalion‑size force in 2008. However, challenges regarding the infrastructure within the 
mission area made it impossible to comply. By 2012, the contingent totalled 760, including 
eight military observers and seven staff  officers. In assessing South Africa’s participation 
in the AU‑led mission, we can nevertheless conclude that ‘The mobilisation of  the AU 
Mission in Darfur failed to stem the genocide committed by the Sudanese government 
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of  Al‑Bashir against defenceless civilians seeking autonomy for the region’ (Khadiagala, 
2012:278). A full account of  South Africa’s participation, beyond the scope of  the present 
chapter, should include Thabo Mbeki’s diplomatic role on behalf  of  the AU/UN and 
the wider implications of  South Africa’s changing relationship with the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).
Central African Republic
South Africa’s involvement in CAR signalled a significant change in foreign policy. As has 
been noted above, foreign policy is shaped by the Presidency, and in the case of  President 
Zuma, there was a significant shift from the policies of  his predecessors. However, some 
argued that there was continuity in both personnel and the vision for an African Agenda 
in foreign policy (Habib (2009:143). While it is true that the African unity rhetoric 
continued to underpin foreign policy narratives, Khadiagala (2014:279) characterised the 
Zuma period as ‘muddling through’ rather than leadership, and criticised the economic 
diplomacy in Africa as leading to the ‘conflation of  national and party interests as ANC 
elites and Zuma’s family members joined in the scramble for economic opportunities’. 
It is in this context that one must try to understand the military deployment to CAR. 
According to some allegations, the CAR involvement may have partially been caused by 
business interests that included the Zuma family. While all of  the facts are not yet in 
the open, this may change with the initiation of  the Commission on State Capture on 
20 August 2018. What is known from a briefing by deputy Defence Minister Makwetla 
is that the original mission to CAR of  March 2007, Operation Vimbezela, was primarily 
comprised of  training and engineer personnel. This was in response to a request from 
the CAR for assistance with training and refurbishment of  training facilities. The 2007 
bilateral military agreement was signed by then President Mbeki and CAR’s president 
Francois Bozize, and was apparently renewed in December 2012 under Zuma’s rule, by 
which stage Bozize’s authoritarian rule was coming under significant pressure from the 
armed rebel coalition known as Seleka. For reasons that are not entirely clear, South 
Africa deployed an estimated 200 paratroopers during January 2013. What is clear is that 
the SANDF troops that were dispatched to CAR were not for training or infrastructure 
refurbishment, and that they were deployed with neither parliamentary approval, nor 
coordination with DIRCO (Römer Heitman, 2013). Along with this, neither the AU nor 
the SADC security organ were consulted.
The rationale of  the deployment of  forces to CAR remains opaque and thus speculative. 
We can dismiss the argument that there was a need to defend a national security interest 
or substantial economic interests, since CAR does not feature as a significant security or 
commercial partner (Khadiagala, 2014:279). Neither is the argument one based on historical 
ties, as the CAR leadership was not involved in the anti‑apartheid struggle. One reason 
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offered by Khadiagala is that South Africa’s pan‑Africanist credentials are strengthened 
by its involvement in French‑speaking Africa, but this view is in reference to Mbeki’s 
2007 bilateral agreement, not to Zuma’s unilateral adventurism. From the perspective of 
the Seleka rebels, who entered into power‑sharing negotiations with the Bozize govern‑
ment in January 2013, the South African troops were propping up the Bozize regime 
(Khadiagala, 2014:279). Seleka’s military offensive to capture Bangui in March 2013 resulted 
in 13 South African soldiers being killed, with 27 wounded and one missing in action. 
This ill‑fated involvement in CAR remains controversial. There was domestic criticism 
because the deployment happened with less parliamentary oversight than was necessary, 
and because there were inconsistencies in the explanations offered after the deployment 
ended in tragedy. Similarly, there was insufficient consultation within SADC, of  which 
CAR is not a member, and with the Economic Community of  Central African States 
(ECCAS), of  which CAR is a member. This failure of  domestic oversight of  defence 
diplomacy has led to media speculation that South African soldiers were deployed to CAR 
to protect mining companies with links to the ANC, and to protect the financial interests 
of  the Zuma family. 
While President Zuma maintained that those killed in Bangui ‘died in defence of  the 
country’s foreign policy’, there were considerable efforts to avoid full accountability 
(Khadiagala, 2014:285). Instead, Zuma was quoted as saying (Khadiagala, 2014:285): 
There must be an appreciation that matters of  military tactics and strategy are not 
to be discussed in public … No country reveals and discusses its military strategies 
in the manner that South Africa is expected to do. Those who are engaging in this 
game should be careful not to endanger both the national interest and the security 
of  the republic. 
However, an analysis by two professors of  Military Strategy at the South African Military 
Academy concluded that the CAR deployment is indicative of  the deep‑seated strategic 
failures of  South African military action on the continent (Vreÿ & Esterhuyse, 2016). 
Despite the CAR incident as a low point in South Africa’s defence diplomacy, expectations 
continue that South Africa should extend its role in the AU and through the APSA it 
helped to establish. Significant gains have been made in advancing South African interests 
through multilateral diplomacy, including in the continental security institutions, but 
caution is advised.
Defence diplomacy on the continent 
Under Mbeki’s diplomatic initiative between 1999 and 2002, South Africa played a key role 
in transforming the OAU into the AU. The AU’s Constitutive Act condemned genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and the AU thus has the right to intervene 
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against military coups and in defence of  human rights. With its creation in July 2002 came 
a framework for APSA, based on a collective security approach from a human security 
perspective (Hutchful, 2009). The AU’s 15‑member Peace and Security Council (PSC) is 
the most important African institution for the management of  peace and security issues, 
authorising peace operations and coordinating conflict management strategies (African 
Union, 2002). Since 2004, the AU has intended to build its capacity to respond to conflicts 
rapidly and effectively through the creation of  the African Standby Force (ASF), but 
while initially scheduled for operation by 2010, the delay in creating the ASF reveals the 
weaknesses of  Africa’s institutional capacity at the subregional level. 
In contrast, SADC declared its new regional military formation, the SADCBRIG, 
operational in August 2007 (Mandrup, 2009). South Africa was crucial, and described as 
‘very active in the formation of  the ASF, and SADCBRIG’, which was modelled on the 
Nordic Stand‑by High Readiness Brigade (Mandrup, 2009:18). South Africa’s ambitions 
were also evident at the AU itself: in 2012, South Africa aggressively campaigned for the 
candidacy of  Nkosazana Dlamini‑Zuma for the position of  AU Commission Chair. This 
was controversial as it went against the unwritten rule that no major African power should 
occupy this position. By May 2013, the AU Assembly established the African Capacity 
for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), based on individual African states deploying 
troops. South Africa strongly championed ACIRC, but key continental players such as 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya expressed reservations (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015:2‑3). 
Some argue that South Africa’s push for ACIRC diverted resources and political energy 
away from finalisation of  the ASF (Warner, 2015), while critical observers hold that the AU 
had been used as a tool of  South Africa’s foreign policy. Dlamini‑Zuma served only one 
four‑year term as Chair.
Conclusions and recommendations
South Africa’s involvement in Africa via its defence diplomacy aimed to show the country 
as a potential peace multiplier. However, as this role has expanded, both in terms of 
geography and complexity, new demands and expectations must be met with realism. 
On the one hand, South Africa’s diplomacy demonstrates a commitment to Africa, its 
people, and the continent. On the other hand, a lack of  reflection or poorly‑calculated 
pragmatism has introduced discrepancies. Despite South Africa’s appearance of  relative 
strength, there are real limitations that should be considered rationally before unrealistic 
demands or inflated expectations are uncritically accepted (Brooks, 2001; Nibishaka, 2011; 
Dube, 2013; Fabricius, 2013; Schuenemann & Cilliers, 2013). These are the fundamental 
issues that impact South Africa’s defence diplomacy.
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As we noted, the ‘new’ South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution on the continent 
and elsewhere was to advocate its own internal solution to other conflict‑ridden societies: 
that of  transition through negotiation and the attainment of  constitutional democracy. 
Promoting peace through advocating negotiated settlement was taken seriously, especially 
under Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, as South Africa’s diplomacy after 1994 moved 
from a militarist to a moralist approach in its external relations. The country’s foreign 
policy centred on the themes of  Africanism, promoting human rights and democracy, a 
holistic approach to security, pacific forms of  conflict resolution, and multilateralism. As 
Nathan (2005) points out, these five themes have value when they are mutually‑consistent, 
conceptually‑linked, and consolidated. 
Although Nathan (2005) was referring specifically to the early years of  the Mbeki 
presidency, he also identified significant contradictions. One such inconsistency was an 
absence of  common values in the region, which inhibited collective action and policy 
consensus. An example of  this disconnect between declared democratic commitments 
and foreign policy in action was the policy towards Zimbabwe. Far from being ‘quiet 
diplomacy’, Nathan (2005) shows South Africa’s foreign policy as expressing support for 
Mugabe, even in response to state repression and the undermining of  the rule of  law. This 
position on Zimbabwe was also inconsistent with South Africa’s stated holistic approach 
to human security. Nathan (2005) argued that South Africa’s foreign policy is constrained 
by deep political divisions in the region and in SADC, and this chapter demonstrates that 
this has had an impact on how the country carries out its defence diplomacy, and on the 
effectiveness of  such policy.
Relative to the region, South Africa has both a strong and vibrant economy and a capable 
military force. Expectations therefore run high for South Africa to be actively engaged in 
peace missions. Simultaneously, the country also has to guard against the perception of 
behaving as an imposing hegemon. It has also had to steer clear of  involvement with other 
international actors, such as the US, UK and France, that may be perceived as colonial 
or neo‑imperial powers. Yet the expectation that South Africa, as the regional power in 
SADC and one of  the significant powers in Africa, has to be more involved in a spectrum 
of  peace missions, including peace enforcement, persists (Tlhaole, 2013:13; Williams, 
2011:1). South Africa’s mission‑based approach, including peace‑support operations and 
defence diplomacy, must be seen as selective engagement, depending on force levels, 
capabilities and resources in support of  properly articulated foreign relations (Liebenberg 
& Mokoena, 2014:8). The challenge is to align expectations with real capabilities, or to 
align ends and means.
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South Africa is currently constrained by having a weak economy, limited capacity for 
external action, and a number of  domestic problems, including poor service delivery. Real 
limitations exist in the military too, such as the age profile of  SANDF staff, the levels of 
available skills, budgetary constraints, and the state of  readiness of  equipment, some of 
which was bought in the 1990s and is now not immediately deployable. These limitations 
should be kept in mind by political and military leadership, even if  South Africa has a 
coherent foreign policy. The challenge to be able to deliver effectively without promising 
too much requires a coherent long‑term national security strategy. A solid document on a 
National Security Strategy is required.
Once this national security strategy is properly articulated, South Africa’s defence 
diplomacy as an extension of  its foreign policy needs to focus on coordination with its 
partners. Aside from the greatest obstacle of  financing, coordination and leadership are 
huge challenges. States on the continent have different abilities and capabilities, and how 
to streamline coordination between the militaries of  states, regional organisations and 
the AU requires continuous attention. As Hughes argues, ‘some states must in practice 
come to take a greater initiative than others’ (2001:296), and South Africa would do well 
to work through the organisations it has been instrumental in creating: SADC and the 
regional organisations (West, East and in the Maghreb) within the continental realm (AU, 
ASF, APSA). Responsibilities should be shared and cooperation enhanced through task 
division that keeps in mind the asymmetric nature of  the economic power and relative 
influence of  African countries in the broader partnership. Future success will depend on 
how well‑coordinated, planned and executed operations will be, how cost‑effective within 
a set time‑frame, and to what extent states with differing economies in each region and on 
the continent can contribute to missions. 
A fundamental aspect, however, has to underpin all of  South Africa’s international action 
and that is its democratic status and respect for the constitutionally‑mandated rule of 
law. Effective civilian oversight is necessary, and political and military leaders must be 
held accountable for the availability of  funding, material capacity, human capacity, and 
skilled resources. There must be informed debate on the conditions for intervention: 
When to go and when not to go? Here, capacity, expectations, skills, and finances are of 
great importance, as timely, rather than reactive, intervention is necessary. Of  importance 
is that the decision for intervention be thoroughly agreed upon by all the actors. Force 
generation should match cooperation, consultation, entrance, and exit strategies. These 
are all factors that require military expertise but need to have civilian oversight. In this 
regard, the recent criticisms can be summarised as: (1) the undue influence of  the ruling 
party on political decision‑making, especially under Jacob Zuma; (2) the relatively low 
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levels of  participation by parliament; (3) the relative lack of  influence of  the Defence 
Secretariat (Fourie, 2012); and (4) the lack of  coordinated policymaking and development 
of  a long‑term vision for South Africa’s security position and engagements in the region 
and on the continent. Critical observers also point out that ‘parliament’s reactive rather 
than pro‑active foreign policy role has often been criticised’ (Van Wyk, 2012:279). 
Assuming that this is true, a lot of  work remains to ensure closer interaction between 
DIRCO, the Presidency, parliament, the Defence Secretariat (as a significant independent 
institution), and the DOD. As foreign policy impacts so closely on defence diplomacy, 
a more integrated approach is necessary, while civilian oversight is simultaneously 
strengthened. This is a necessary approach as the country combines its soft power and hard 
power capabilities. The challenges from earlier remain. If  South Africa oversteps the line 
between benevolent strong partner and imposing hegemon, some diplomatic gains will be 
lost and replaced with underlying tensions. On the other hand, if  the benevolent partner 
overstretches or over‑estimates its capacity, it may lead to loss of  face and diminished trust 
between continental actors. There are no easy choices here.
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National Security in Complex Times
The South African military dimension
Shadrack Ramokgadi, Tobie Beukes and Ian Liebenberg
Abstract
Having returned to the international gallery of nations in 1996 after its apartheid pariah status was lifted, South Africa had 
to adjust its defence posture, defence diplomacy, and general national security framework to new conditions. The Cold War 
was over, interstate wars in the region were unlikely, and if undertaken at all, military deployment was to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. With the apartheid garrison state mentality a thing of the past, a new national security strategy 
became a necessity. This chapter discusses the need and guidelines for a national security strategy suited to a democracy 
and a developmental state aware of current and future socio-economic challenges, and its role in the region and on the 
African continent.
Introduction
In South Africa, an official National Security Strategy (NSS) is prepared and reviewed 
periodically by the executive authorities, who are required to outline national security 
priorities, and suggest policy responses. Post-1994, the NSS process began with the 
White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of  South Africa (1996), followed by 
the Defence Review 1998, and Defence Review 2015. The latest NSS is currently being 
developed, but it faces challenges. This chapter exclusively uses publicly available sources 
as it attempts a fresh look at a future NSS, highlighting lessons from the national security 
strategies of  other countries, and providing some comparative insights.
Methodology
The methodology used here is qualitative and involved an extensive literature study 
of  open source documents. While the goal was to gain insights on a possible security 
strategy for post-apartheid South Africa, we limited our country comparisons, choosing 
not to focus on core aggressive states, self-perceived ‘world policemen’, or societies that 
see themselves as beleaguered by a hostile world, such as the US. The authors assume that 
regional and international cooperation remain important tools, and that multipolarity in 
the future is a given.
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National security in a new democracy
This contribution will do the following:
	Define the concept of national security;
	Describe current and future challenges to national security;
	Discuss the mandate of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF); 
	Provide an outline of the role and functions of the military in national security; 
	Discuss the SANDF Military Strategy;
	Discuss security as a concept and its links with perceived national values;
	Discuss regional challenges; and
	 Indicate the threats that face the population of South Africa.
Defining the concept of ‘National Security’ 
The challenges experienced by states have changed since the end of  the Cold War and the 
temporary lessening of  the East-West divide. Increased globalisation and hyper-capitalism 
brought with them intensive international integration, yet simultaneously increased social 
alienation, fragmentation, and the rich-poor divide (Giddens, 1993). These have also led 
to new tensions and (armed) conflicts between multiple stakeholders (including non-state 
actors), often expanding into hybrid conflicts. 
‘National security’ has no single definition (D’Anieri, 2014:69), but a broad description of  a 
national security strategy, focusing on a diverse array of  global threats including political, 
social, economic, health and environment, is relevant for the purposes of  this chapter. 
The South African White Paper on Defence (1996: chapter 2) described national security 
as follows:
In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly 
military and police problem. It … broadened to incorporate political, economic, 
social and environmental matters … Security [became] an all-encompassing 
condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate 
fully in the process of  governance; enjoy the protection of  fundamental rights; have 
access to resources and the basic necessities of  life; and inhabit an environment 
which is not detrimental to their health and well-being … At national level the 
objectives of  security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of  democracy; 
the achievement of  social justice, economic development and a safe environment; 
and a substantial reduction in the level of  crime, violence and political instability. 
Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually 
reinforcing. At international level the objectives of  security policy include the 
defence of  the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of  the 
South African state, and the promotion of  regional security in Southern Africa.
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The above implies a move away from restrictive threat analysis to what may be described 
as a new and broader security realism, where the future safety of  people is linked not only 
to armed threats, but also to threats to human life and life quality within communities 
and regions.
Current and likely future challenges to national security
In the current context, the threats and risks to the state and society encompass the military, 
economic, political-cultural and resource-environmental sectors (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 
2017:29ff.; De Wet & Liebenberg, 2018; Mandrup, 2018:136ff.). However, economic, social 
and political dynamics also offer opportunities and challenges to enhance the interests 
of  South Africa. The South African approach to national security, we argue, should be 
based on an agreement between state and organised civil society (or civil community) 
on the protection of  social liberties and human security, and the readiness for managing 
threats and risks in the regional environment. Thus, economic, political-cultural and 
resource-environmental security must be clearly identified in terms of  both traditional 
and non-traditional threats and risks, as well as the positive challenges and opportunities 
that can enhance the interests of  South Africa, the region, and the continent. 
Current and likely future challenges to national security for South Africa include, but are 
not limited to:
	Regional instability (i.e. deterioration of quality of life and increasing poverty);
	Climate change and disasters;
	Energy supply and water/food sustainability;
	 Internal (violent) reactions related to service delivery, xenophobia, crime;
	Possible intervention by states outside the continent; and
	Possible cyber-attacks and terrorism.
The military and the Constitution
The Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, Act 108 of  1996 (hereafter, Constitution, 
1996) holds that:
a. The defence force is the only lawful military force in the Republic;
b. The defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force;
c. The primary object of  the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its 
territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the 
principles of  international law regulating the use of  force; 
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d. The President as head of  the national executive is Commander-in-Chief  of  the defence 
force, and must appoint the Military Command of  the force; and
e. Command of  the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the directions 
of  the Minister of  Defence under the authority of  the President.
South African National Defence Force functions
According to the Defence Act, Act 42 of  2002 (Section 18 (1) (d)), the SANDF may, subject 
to the Constitution, be employed: 
a. For service in the defence of  the Republic, for the protection of  its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; 
b. For service in compliance with the international obligations of  the Republic with 
regard to international bodies and other states; 
c. For service in the preservation of  life, health or property; 
d. For service in the provision or maintenance of  essential services; 
e. For service in the upholding of  law and order in the Republic in cooperation with 
the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said 
Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own;
f. For service in support of  any department of  state for the purpose of  socio-economic 
upliftment; and
g. To effect national border control.
Along with this, according to the Constitution (1996, Schedule 6, section 24):
(2) The National Defence Force shall exercise its powers and perform its functions 
solely in the national interest in terms of  Chapter 11 of  the Constitution of  the 
Republic of  South Africa, 1996.
(3) The employment for service, training, organisation and deployment of  the 
South African National Defence Force shall be effected in accordance with the 
requirements of  subsection (2).
The role of the military
Development requires stability, and stability requires sound state and social structures 
which are seen and experienced as legitimate by the citizenry (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 
2017). Thus, a well-trained and equipped military which holds legitimacy in the eyes 
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of  civil society is imperative. The military provides security for both internal crises (in 
cooperation with the South African Police Service [SAPS]) and external aggression or 
threats to peace, making it a potential tool to ensure regional and international security. 
After 1994, the new government replaced the militarist security project of  the apartheid 
government with a more holistic approach, using the lessons learnt through negative 
experiences and the flaws in civil-military relations under apartheid. Currently, the primary 
threat to security is not military and cannot be dealt with by purely military means. Along 
with this, in a constitutional state civil-military relations and safe communities hold more 
value than the ability to suppress with force, and the military is bound to accept civil 
control. This has an influence on the role of  the military, whether internal or external, 
and also impacts the national security strategy.
This new approach arose from the success of  the country’s negotiated settlement and the 
leadership preference for persuasion and negotiation. Force has been viewed as a limited 
mechanism, applicable only in exceptional situations, and rather than projecting military 
force, South Africa’s aim is to project diplomacy and enhance cooperation and peace, 
meaning that all other options should be exhausted before the use of  force. 
Strategic national security functions of the South African  
government and SANDF
Security in all forms is seen as a core function, and the armed forces and other state 
organs are required by government to contribute to this. The SANDF, as an arm of  the 
state, is required to respond to both internal and external security issues, as guided by 
national and international regulatory frameworks, and this provides the foundation for 
a comprehensive approach to national security. Arguably, the main role of  the SANDF 
is the use of  military capabilities to achieve identified policy objectives. One approach 
suggests that the security-creating role of  the government can fall into six strategic 
functions: China after a period of  relative disruptive Western Colonial intervention 
returned to what perhaps can be called the geographical space of  a perceived “greater” 
China as many ages before. While China became a republic, it was to experience a wide-
ranging and destructive Japanese invasion before World War II and a civil war between 
communists and nationalists that was to end with the defeated nationalists establishing 
a nationalist government in exile in 1949 on the island of  Taiwan (the latter seen by the 
Chinese government as an errant province). In a sense then the European imposed model 
of  nationalism (or in cases a paradigm widely accepted in current discourse) had long-
term consequences, some of  which we still see today: (1) Anticipation; (2) prevention; 
(3) deterrence; (4) protection; (5) intervention; and (6) stabilisation (Constitution, 1996; 
White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review, 1998).
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Anticipation 
As a representative of  a community of  citizens, the government is to prepare for foreseen 
and unforeseen contingencies, including incidents that may threaten the interests of 
South Africa or international rule of  law. The role of  the SANDF is to prepare forces 
which can respond to any foreseeable circumstances for the protection of  its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, and if  needed, secondary roles of  various forms (Constitution, 
1996: Chapter 11, Section 201(2)).
Prevention 
The SANDF is required to proactively prevent possible future threats to the country or 
region. The Constitution (1996: Chapter 11, Section 2019(c)) provides for the deployment 
of  the SANDF for services in compliance with the international obligations of  the country, 
in line with international bodies and other member states. The most common obligation 
is the duty to protect people from any harm through prevention. Given the South African 
context and historical experience, the principle of  ‘self-defence’ demands the prevention, 
management and resolution of  conflict through non-violent means (White Paper on 
Defence, 1996: Chapter 4).
Deterrence 
The South African government is expected to discourage any actions that are in conflict 
with the interests of  the state or the international rule of  law (White Paper on Defence, 
1996:Chapter 4), including protection outside the geographical confines of  the country 
and its inhabitants.. In effecting this, the government of  SA states that the prevention 
of  conflict and war is a primary course of  action (Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 2). 
This includes self-defence, requiring a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to 
deter potential aggressors (Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 2). The credibility of  the core 
force capability must therefore be maintained at all times, as per the core-force approach 
(Ministry of  Defence, 2010). The Constitution prescribes the mobilisation of  the SANDF 
for service in upholding law and order within the country in cooperation with the SAPS, 
under circumstances where the police services are unable to do so alone (1996: Section 
201(2)(a)). Such cooperative arrangements require an awareness of  the limitations of  the 
armed forces for deployment within a civilian environment and should be treated with 
care in terms of  ‘deterrence’. 
Civilian control over the military remains paramount. The deployment of  the SANDF in 
cooperation with the SAPS should only be carried out with the awareness that military 
solutions to political problems are inherently limited. The Constitution (1996) prescribes 
that the president is the Commander-in-Chief  of  the defence force and appoints the 
Chief  of  the Defence Force. The White Paper on Defence, the Public Service Act, and 
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the Public Finance Management Act provide for the Secretary for Defence (a civilian), 
who shall exercise their functions and powers as Head of  Department and Accounting 
Officer (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Along with this, the Constitution established a 
Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister of  Defence with functions related to issuing of 
orders, directives, and commands, and the execution of  budgetary programmes, as well as 
oversight, in close cooperation with parliament and defence-related committees. 
Protection 
South Africa views itself  as a member of  the international community, and the SANDF is 
therefore expected to participate in international peace operations. For the purposes of  the 
protection of  the people, peace support operations are characterised by military operations 
other than war (MOOTW). Participation in MOOTW is founded on the understanding 
that regional peace and security is important to SA, as any spill-over from neighbouring 
countries will impact on its territorial integrity and national security (RSA Constitution, 
1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998).
One has to note that international peace support operations are not limited to the 
deployment of  troops, and can include providing equipment, medical personnel and 
facilities, logistical support, engineering services, communication systems, and staff  (RSA 
Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998).
Intervention 
A function of  the state is to carry out offensive operations to enforce change in the 
behaviour of  actors or alliances that threaten the interests of  the state, the region or, 
where applicable, international rule of  law (Ministry of  Defence, 2010). This can include 
peace support operations, which for the purposes of  intervention are characterised by 
peace enforcement entailing the application or threat of  coercion (Ministry of  Defence, 
2010). The application of  such force should aim to promote international peace and abide 
by international resolution (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; 
Defence Review 1997/1998; Ministry of  Defence, 2010).
Stabilisation 
In terms of  the above the South African security forces may be requested to assist in 
re-establishing security in any of  the affected countries in the region. Thus, stabilisation 
refers to common security, regional defence cooperation, and confidence- and security-
building measures in Southern Africa (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 
1996; Defence Review 1997/1998; Ministry of  Defence, 2010). In this context, the SA 
government is to be committed to political, economic and military cooperation with 
neighbouring states. 
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The Constitution (1996) also states that the SANDF may be employed in other roles in 
addition to self-defence, deployment in cooperation with the SAPS, and international 
peace support operations. These activities include disaster relief, the provision and 
maintenance of  essential services, search and rescue, evacuation of  South African 
citizens from high-threat areas, protection of  maritime resources, and regional defence 
cooperation (Constitution, 1996). 
Figure 7.1, compiled by the authors (see below), represents a summary of  the proposed 
strategic functions of  the South African government and the SANDF. Government is 
responsible for national security; the SANDF for activities to attain such goals, keeping in 
mind civilian control over the military.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA
1. Defence of the state, territorial integrity and citizens. 
2. Support to national and regional interests. 







FIGURE 7.1 Strategic functions of the SANDF in pursuit of the National Security Agenda
SANDF and national security frameworks
At present, the South African Defence Review (2015) is the only national policy framework 
that guides the development of  the NSS into an implementation and funding model 
in South Africa. Thus, the operational activities of  the SANDF should be aligned with 
the prescripts of  the Defence Review. For example, the alignment of  the military’s 
operational activities with the agenda for sustainable development within the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) is important, along with military intervention 
in promoting international peace and security. While the Defence Review 2015 remains 
the only official statement that defines security concerns and prescribes the nature of 
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acceptable policy responses, the White Paper on National Defence is the cornerstone in 
providing comprehensive and long-range planning on matters related to defence doctrine, 
force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and 
funding (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 1). 
The aim in designing the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review 1998 was to 
achieve national consensus on defence matters, subjected to consultation with multiple 
stakeholders and other interest groups (Defence Review, 1998). Defence reviews present 
proposals on themes such as defence posture and doctrine, force design options, and civil 
military relations, and act as an attempt to determine the appropriate size, structure, force 
design and posture of  an armed force. 
Defence posture and doctrine 
In terms of  defence posture, the SANDF should abide by the government’s primary chosen 
course, which is the prevention and deterrence of  conflict and war, and the government 
should go to war only when non-violent strategies and deterrence on all available levels 
have failed (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 2). Thus, this needs to find expression in the 
NSS, keeping in mind political, economic, social and cultural rights, and primary needs 
of  South Africa’s citizens; the commitment to goals of  arms control and disarmament at 
national, regional and international levels; and the country’s vision to pursue peaceful 
relations with other states, including through military cooperation (Defence Review, 
1998:Chapter 2). 
In protecting the state and its people against external threats, the SANDF is to employ 
the following NSS guidelines (Defence Review, 1998): (1) Military cooperation with other 
states in pursuit of  common security; (2) prevention, management, and resolution of 
conflict through non-violent means, such as diplomacy, mediation and arbitration; and 
(3) force employment, as the very last option. Similarly, the Constitution requires that the 
deterrent capability be established in line with international law on armed conflict, and 
related international humanitarian law (1996: Chapter 11, Section 200 (2)). For example, 
the show of  force through joint multinational military exercises should also respect 
international environmental rules and regulations.
South Africa’s defence doctrine is derived from its defence posture and the related policy 
frameworks, and encompasses the main principles and concepts that guide the conduct of 
military operations in support of  national objectives. The SANDF doctrine is also founded 
on the Constitution’s commitment to international rule of  law governing aggression, 
and provides for military capability that is able to halt, contain and reverse the effects of 
offensive actions at operational level of  conflict, although this approach does not rule out 
offensive operations as the last instance (Constitution, 1996).
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Force design options 
The SANDF is required to plan and prepare force structure elements (e.g. land, sea, air, 
and cyber defence; and health support) that are ready at all times to act in defence of  South 
Africa and to respond to other defence contingencies (Defence Review, 1998). Force design 
is based on readiness to execute the primary functions of  the SANDF, namely defence 
of  the state, its people and its territorial integrity against military aggression (Defence 
Review, 1998). Force design options are also influenced by the required level of  defence, 
the approved defence posture, and the defence budget. For the latter, a funding model 
remains a challenge to be addressed.
Given economic and political-constitutional constraints, political judgment and military 
expertise are at play throughout the process, implying the development of  various 
scenarios, policy responses or conceived courses of  action. Needless to say, the approval of 
a specific option is primarily determined by the maintenance of  the specified capabilities at 
the approximate level (Defence Review, 1998). Force design is a multidimensional system 
and should be open for review and innovation, enabling flexible responses to various 
security challenges or threats. Affordability is dependent on the long-term sustainability 
of  the design, while upgrading and replacement of  equipment is dictated by the lifespan 
of  the capability itself, both man and material (Defence Review, 1998). Thus, force design 
process should translate into manageable options, and strategic gaps and related risks 
need to be consistently considered (Defence Review, 1998).
Civil military relations 
The democratic transition in South Africa is relevant here, despite conceivable shortcomings 
since 1996 (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Civilian control over the military is the 
assumed cornerstone of  democratic practices in South Africa. Civilian control relates to 
constitutional and legal transformation, oversight mechanisms, normative and cultural 
transformation, and future organisational restructuring (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). 
The SANDF is required to remain subordinate to the elected government and should 
retain ultimate respect for the principle of  civil supremacy. This view should be reinforced 
through training and development programmes in the SANDF, with emphasis placed on 
the respect for civil control, as entrenched in the SANDF code of  conduct for uniformed 
members (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). In this regard, continuous rejuvenation, 
persistent education of  personnel, and the creation of  a tertiary-educated officer corps is 
of  utmost importance, and currently in need of  urgent attention.
The Constitution (1996) prescribes that the president is the Commander-in-Chief  of 
the defence force and appoints the Chief  of  the Defence Force. The White Paper on 
Defence, the Public Service Act, and the Public Finance Management Act provide for the 
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Secretary for Defence (a civilian), who shall exercise their functions and powers as Head 
of  Department and Accounting Officer (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Along with 
this, the Constitution established a Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister of  Defence 
with functions related to issuing of  orders, directives, and commands and the execution 
of  budgetary programmes, as well as oversight, in close cooperation with parliament and 
defence-related committees. 
The SANDF Military Strategy (SANDFMS) and envisioned 
national values
The SANDFMS (2002) plans for eventualities in the military environment and attempts to 
provide answers to military challenges in the foreseeable future. The strategy hierarchy 
stems from the Constitution, the Defence Act, White Paper, Defence Review, and other 
statutory prescripts, and is fed by national values. In turn, the Department of  Defence 
(DOD) Military Strategy provides and employs force strategies inclusive of  support 
strategies (SANDFMS, 2002). Military strategy documents provide the strategic profile 
through the DOD’s Vision of  Effective defence for a democratic South Africa, as a 
constitutional democratic state (SANDFMS, 2002).
The SANDFMS closely relates to the constitutional values of  the country, and reflects 
on the use of  the military outside its borders, seeking peace, and preventing or resolving 
conflict rather than acting belatedly and in a heavy-handed manner see in this regards the 
chapter by Liebenberg and Fonseca on South Africa’s defence diplomacy). In the case of 
South Africa, these values are to be underpinned by the notions of  democratisation of 
state and society, the constitutional state-principle, and unity in social diversity.
South Africa is a diverse community (Zegeye, Liebenberg & Houston, 2000; Van der 
Heyden, 2018), and one of  the constitutional norms is unity in diversity. The SANDF 
should therefore reflect the values of  diversity, tolerance, service to the community, 
representivity on all levels, and accountability for its actions (Polley, 1988; Corder, 1989; 
Van Zyl-Slabbert, 1992; Duncan & Seleoane, 1998; Seleoane, 2001; Houston, Liebenberg 
& Humphries, 2001). These national values need to be reflected within the SANDF and its 
deployment in the region, and should be seen to be part of  practice and attitude wherever 
defence force members may find themselves. Other terms that crop up in the national 
discourse and that have a bearing on the SANDF are a non-racialist approach, respect for 
personal freedom and community safety, social cohesion, and a strong sense of  service 
delivery. On a critical note, the interaction between civil society and the military should 
remain favourable, although a growing civil-military gap can be observed in South Africa, 
which needs urgent attention.
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SANDF Military Strategy
At the core of  SANDFMS are the military strategic objectives and military strategic 
capabilities, contained in the Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (DOD, 2011). The SANDF Military 
Strategic Objectives are to be aligned to a corresponding NSS, and are intended to highlight 
(1) the enhancement and maintenance of  comprehensive defence capability; (2) promotion 
of  peace, security and stability in the region and continent; and (3) providing support to 
the people of  the Republic of  South Africa (DOD, 2011). 
The Military Strategic Missions are to be founded on a mission-based approach, using 
peace and war-time time missions to direct the strategy for force preparation and force 
structure (DOD, 2011), and accommodating both primary and secondary functions 
of  the SANDF. The missions are to be aligned to a mandate-driven approach set out 
by parliament, and are to be implemented in non-conventional tasks, health support 
duties, peace support operations, special operations, defence diplomacy, support to 
other government departments, disaster relief  and humanitarian assistance, presidential 
tasks, and conventional operations. The Military Strategic Concepts (Mission Based 
Approach) are guidelines on how to accomplish the Military Strategic Objectives. Specific 
concepts are mission-essential training, mission trained force, selective engagement and 
strategic positioning.
National values and interests; security arrangements regional and 
continental
South Africa changed from a society based on racial segregation to a constitutional state 
through an extended process of  transition (1990-1996). New values and legal frameworks 
had to be negotiated in tenuous circumstances, a process which has yet to be completed. 
Some core values which entered the discourse during the transition are principled 
non-racialism and an ethos of  service to the community. Along with this, various religious, 
linguistic and cultural entities exist in South Africa, and the Constitution requires that 
the public sector, which includes the military and broader security community, enact 
tolerance of  differences, as well as equality between peoples of  different communities. 
The South African socio-political vocabulary was extended with terms such as equity, 
service delivery (batho pele), ubuntu,1 accountability, development, sustainable growth, and 
knowledge transfer. 
These terms outline national values to be achieved, and future national values to be nurtured, 
and these should also be reflected within the SANDF in terms of  internal and external 
interaction with other communities and the evolving security community in Southern 
Africa. South African’s national values share a link with the broader security community.
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In terms of  regional involvement, South Africa abides by regional structures as well as the 
protocols of  the African Union (AU), and also adheres to international agreements and 
the protocols of  the United Nations (UN). In cases of  intervention, diplomatic or military 
(i.e. peacekeeping or peace enforcement), South Africa is bound by its Constitution and 
by international agreements, and adherence to the role of  a constitutional state and a 
facilitator of  peacemaking on the continent should be the focus. However, values and 
interpretation of  reality remain complex, and the country may also find itself  in a situation 
where the push of  powerful states will clash with South Africa’s role as peacemaker. South 
Africa’s NSS will therefore have to decide on how to deal with similar future challenges. 
Regional challenges
Observers pointed out that South Africa has to move from a diplomacy of  a dominant 
power in the region to one of  engagement in diplomatic, political and military activities 
such as peacekeeping (Malan & Cilliers, 1997). 
The expectations for the NSS are high, but the authors have important limitations to 
consider. There are massive economic differences between states in Southern Africa even 
while South Africa holds a lion’s part of  the collective GDP in the region.2 Because of  this 
other member states may expect much from South Africa in terms of  a financial contri-
bution to the region and the continent. In reality, the South African defence budget has not 
increased significantly over the past five years and is unlikely to experience large increases 
soon (see Appendix below). In terms of  maintenance, the replacement and modernisation 
of  equipment and manpower/human resource expenses limit the SANDF’s capacity, and 
this must be kept in mind, both in defence diplomacy and in conceptualising an NSS. 
Since the Declaration and Treaty of  the SADC (1992) and the launch of  the Organ 
for Peace, Defence and Security (OPDS) (1996), South Africa has been woven into the 
regional security architecture. In recognition of  Chapter VIII of  the UN Charter, southern 
African states agreed on the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 
which confirms respect for sovereignty, equality, interdependence, non-aggression and 
non-interference in the affairs of  other states. The achievement of  solidarity, peace and 
security, and the recognition of  cooperation in political, defence and security measures 
both form part of  this understanding. Add to this the promotion of  peaceful settlement 
of  disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and the full picture 
becomes challenging in a region where there are large-scale economic disparities and 
occasional differences of  opinion. The objectives of  the protocol relate to curbing cross-
border crime and promoting communities based on domestic security, as well as enhancing 
and nurturing regional capacity in terms of  disaster management and international 
humanitarian assistance.
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Against this background, South Africa is expected to play a role in both the region and 
the AU. Future security thinking will revolve around economic interdependence, closer 
cooperation, integration (without worsening social marginalisation) and awareness of 
outside influences and pressures. While positive growth rates are being experienced in 
the majority of  countries in the region, these often do not translate into an abundance of 
funding for military and peacekeeping purposes. Interdependence is likely to remain in 
southern Africa for many years to come, and people will look towards South Africa for its 
contribution. Under current conditions, the expectations on what South Africa can do are 
unrealistically high. A consistent balance needs to be struck here when an NSS is framed. 
Threats that face the population of South Africa
Traditionally, the concept of  security has been interpreted in militarist terms, namely the 
simple military defence of  the state or the offensive use of  military power. However, since 
the 1994 Human Development Report of  the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the 
concept of  security has included human security, which implies a condition of  freedom 
from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or their lives. It is seen as an all-
encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; 
participate fully in the process of  governance; enjoy protection of  fundamental rights; 
have access to resources and the basic necessities of  life; and inhabit an environment that 
is not detrimental to their health and well-being. 
Within the human security paradigm, the South African population face some potential 
and real threats, and an NSS should reflect an awareness of  these potential threats and 
contingencies. Examples are health (including HIV/AIDS), lack of  social services at all 
levels of  government, social insecurity (high levels of  poverty and crime), and corruption 
(syphoning money from social upliftment and economic growth). Within this broad 
architecture, the roles and duties of  the military should be outlined to ensure that military 
action in a secondary role remains within the set parameters, yet will be functional, 
effective and professionally available when the need arises.
By 2004, it was reported that South Africa had the highest HIV prevalence rates in the 
world, with 20% of  the adult population (roughly five million people) being HIV positive 
(Nattrass, 2004). Although the health budget has increased and antiretroviral treatment 
has been rolled out, the situation is still not satisfactory. In 2001, there were 4.1 million 
people living with HIV in South Africa (9.4% of  the total population), and this increased to 
5.24 million by 2010, representing 10.5% of  South Africans (SAIRR, 2010:52). The highest 
rates were recorded in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Free State, with the Western 
Cape having the lowest prevalence rate of  6% (SAIRR, 2010:55). According to the SAIRR’s 
future demographic projections, the situation is likely to worsen substantially from 2020 
to 2040 (SAIRR, 2010:56). 
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AIDS impacts heavily on existing human capital, infecting mainly young adults, and 
affecting people’s health and productivity, resulting in them becoming a burden on the 
state. It destroys a section of  people capable of  contributing to the economic and social 
life of  the community, while care for the frail and sick demands financial resources from 
the state, the taxpayer, and the private sector. More worrying is the social dislocation 
caused by the loss of  fathers, mothers, caregivers, guardians or children, which damages 
the social fabric of  society. The disease has the potential to disrupt economic growth, the 
maintenance of  a labour force and human/intellectual capital and contribute to greater 
inequality. The latter can in turn act as a trigger for internal conflict.
When considering an NSS, the military needs to make its contribution through educating 
its own personnel and their families, and the communities within which they are active, 
around diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The military health services should also be available 
to assist in problem areas, and with initiatives of  government health services in a clearly 
defined and publicly acceptable secondary role, especially in rural areas.
Other threats, such as climate change and its conceivable negative spin-offs, also need to 
be factored in. The extent of  such challenges (e.g. drought and floods followed by scarcity 
of  resources) are not fully predictable, and the consideration of  multidisciplinary task 
teams to act as early warning forums are necessary.
Communities and social divisions
Social conflict is multifaceted, and one of  the main challenges to democratic consolidation 
in South Africa is the cultural divisions within the country. The country is divided across 
a variety of  linguistic, ethnic, racial and religious lines, and there is a sharp rich-poor 
gap which creates tension and conflict through real or relative depravation. One of  the 
worrying trends in South Africa is a growing class of  people without access to any job or 
occupation – the jobless class. The existence of  a jobless class can further tensions between 
those with jobs – even if  only part-time or poorly paid – and those without access to 
jobs. The result of  these tensions, confounded by suboptimal service delivery, may lead to 
active alienation from government or the state, and even active distrust of  the state and 
the electoral process.
Another challenge is the inflow of  migrants, both legal and illegal, which can trigger 
tensions and xenophobia, as the newcomers are seen as people who take jobs, and hence 
economic opportunities, from South Africans. In the past, this led to violent confrontations 
and tensions remain. The issue of  national security is linked here with social tolerance 
and human security. While creating tolerance through education and with optimum 
immigration control, the military are also called upon to ensure the efficient patrolling of 
South Africa’s borders, which have become porous since 1998. Those aware of  national 
security challenges need to factor this in too.
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In case of  violent conflict within communities, the military (including the medical support 
services) may be called upon to assist in a strictly secondary role, and the ability and 
capability of  officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to negotiate, manage and 
facilitate conflict is important here. In this regard, training should be offered to officers 
and NCOs where possible, and the same applies where the military may be called upon to 
assist in crime reduction.
The framework for an NSS should take cognisance of  all of  the above. One of  the adverse 
consequences of  divisions or perceived schisms in society is political intolerance, with the 
potential for social conflict. In deeply divided societies, people typically develop strong 
in-group identities, often leading to strong out-group animosity that can culminate in 
alienation and violent civil conflict. The protracted conflicts in the region, such as in 
Sudan, are attributed to attempts by one group to subjugate or impose its will on other 
groups. With its numerous ethnic and linguistic groups and deep social stratification, 
South Africa may face similar challenges. As a constitutional extension of  the state, the 
military should be aware of  this and contribute to tolerance, inter-group communication, 
and maintenance and nurturing of  principled non-racialism and caregiving to smaller or 
marginalised groups and communities. 
Like schools, religious groups, the media and sport organisations, the military is an agent 
of  socialisation for their personnel, their families and peer groups. It is important that 
the values of  life-long education, knowledge sharing, tolerance and accommodation are 
reflected actively into the organisation and into the community.
The Grim Reaper(s): Unemployment, inequality and poverty
The policy of  separate development implemented by the apartheid regime created one 
of  the most unequal societies in the world, and South Africa’s macro-economic policies 
since 1996 further contributed to inequalities. In 1996, 1,8 million South Africans were 
earning less than US$1 a day, but by 2005, the figure had risen to 4,2 million people 
( Johnson, 2010). The unique feature of  this inequality is that, unlike in other countries, the 
disenfranchised group in South Africa is the numerical majority. This has left a large part 
of  the society in a situation characterised by poverty and limited chances of  emancipation. 
A further characteristic of  inequality in South Africa is that inequalities within groups 
also deepened while, according to a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report, 
households originally living in poverty had sunk deeper into poverty (Schwabe, 2004). ‘In 
the past inequality in South Africa was largely defined along race lines. It has increasingly 
become defined by inequality within population groups as the gap between rich and poor 
within each group has increased’ (Schwabe, 2004).3
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Inequality has serious consequences, such as lack of  social capital, lack of  upward 
mobility, and social disorganisation, which frequently spill over into secondary problems 
such as crime, health threats, or intercommunity tensions. Despite the efforts of  the new 
democratic government, couched in the National Development Plan, these challenges 
largely remained by 2018, and current inequality remains a serious challenge (Mulaudzi & 
Liebenberg. 2017:29ff.). 
Along with this, unemployment in South Africa is very high, and rising. The country 
arguably has one of  the highest rates of  unemployment in the world, which in 2002 was 
41% on a broad definition, and 30% on a narrow definition. Unemployment is especially 
high in rural areas and informal settlements. (Landman, Bhorat, Van der Berg & Van 
Aardt, 2003). 
The economy is unable to productively absorb the current labour force, which is 
different from the patterns that exist in most developing countries, where scarcity of 
jobs in the formal sector translates into large informal sectors, rather than high levels 
of  unemployment. Unemployment in South Africa remains a matter of  serious concern 
due to its effects on economic welfare, production, human capital, social exclusion, crime 
and social instability. The level of  unemployment and its rise is the most serious problem 
facing the country. Following the first democratic elections in 1994, the government’s 
efforts to eliminate poverty have been frustrated by the ongoing shedding of  jobs from the 
formal economy, resulting in continued poverty for sections of  the population. Landman 
et al.(2003) came to the conclusion that 40% of  people in South Africa are living in poverty, 
with the poorest 15% in a desperate struggle to survive, and the authors suggested that 
the most challenges facing South Africa following transition to democracy is to break the 
grip of  poverty. Despite short spurts of  growth, unemployment remains a major social 
challenge (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 2017:29ff.).
People who perceive their poverty as permanent or increasing may ultimately be driven 
by hostile impulses, rather than rational pursuit of  their interests. Thus, a high level of 
poverty can result in the breakdown of  values, and other undesirable behaviours such as 
high levels of  crime.
Land
One of  the damaging legacies of  colonial and apartheid history in South Africa is the 
inequitable distribution of  land between race groups. In addition to being a source of 
social tension, the result is that impoverished communities have little opportunity for 
providing for themselves through subsistence and commodity production. Many rural 
people are essentially landless, and those who have land find it too small or poor for 
production. In addition, these families and communities lack financial support for training 
and productivity.
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Land reform is an accepted necessity, but when land reform takes place in an unplanned 
and haphazard way, tensions are created. Simultaneously, weak planning of  land reform 
can have dire consequences for the agricultural output of  the country and its ability to 
produce enough food for use and export. There should be awareness of  the sensitivity 
of  the issue in South Africa, which must be factored into the national and community 
security architecture.
It has been pointed out that, in view of  the expected increase of  the South African 
population (natural growth, as well as incoming people) between now and 2025, South 
African agricultural outputs need to increase drastically, but the need for growth in 
agricultural output acts as a double challenge. Agricultural output has to be enhanced, yet 
it may be tempered by land reform if  the latter is not managed well and implemented with 
care. One challenge relates to a concrete negative outcome, namely food insecurity, while 
another relates to possible dissatisfaction with the speed of  land reform. These challenges 
cannot be neglected and future needs and wants will have to be balanced carefully (De 
Wet & Liebenberg, 2017). 
Crime
Crime is one of  the most difficult challenges facing SA, with a crime rate amongst the 
highest in the world, and all South Africans are vulnerable to its effects. In 2007, South 
Africans had to live with the reality of  around 19,000 murders per year, roughly 200,000 
robberies and aggravated robberies, 300,000 burglaries (some violent), 85,000 stolen cars 
and 55,000 rapes (Altbecker, 2007:37-38). Crime diverts resources to protection efforts, 
increases health costs, and generally creates an environment unconducive to productive 
activity, and the exodus of  professionals and specialists is largely attributed to this factor. 
All of  this has the potential to discourage investment and hinder long-term growth in 
the country. 
Rising crime rates are often typical in countries undergoing transition, as democracy tends 
to compound crime by weakening the overbearing controls put in place by a previously 
oppressive government, and even relatively affluent citizens have an incentive to participate 
in crime when controls are weakened. The South African crime situation is aggravated by 
relatively easy access to illegal firearms and the existence of  numerous crime syndicates. 
Surveys suggest that South Africans are particularly exposed to violent crime and murder, 
and while crime statistics over the past years have shown a slight improvement, there is no 
room for complacency. Crime causes feelings of  insecurity and undermines confidence in 
democratic governance and government policies. 
The military can set an example to society by maintaining a crimeless military community. 
However, the military cannot and should not act as a police force, although it will have 
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to be considered as an element to support the police in exceptional cases. Inwardly, the 
military as an institution should demonstrate that the military institution strives to be free 
of  crime and corruption. 
Corruption
The prevalence of  corruption – or even the perception of  corruption – can lead to deep 
discontent and loss of  legitimacy for governments. To maintain legitimacy, governments 
should be able to prove that they are making positive changes to the negative experiences 
of  citizens. The threat of  criminalisation of  state and society cannot be ignored. Not 
addressing it can invite social discontent and alienation. Post-apartheid South Africa saw 
many trials and tribulations, including high levels of  corruption, especially under President 
Zuma’s rule. The current investigation into ‘state capture’ hopes to unveil the truth, and 
the commission will ideally propose concrete steps to prevent future corruption. To 
create a secure society, these challenges cannot be ignored when reflecting on and framing 
security in South Africa.
While the military is not a tool to be used for corruption prevention, its role as a socialisation 
agent and example setter should not be underestimated. Leading by example by stamping 
out corruption is important. 
Extremism and violence
Since the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, the likelihood of  extremist attacks 
has reduced substantially in South Africa. Some tensions remain, but the incorporation of 
most of  the dominant white political parties has diminished the likelihood of  right-wing 
extremism, although it must be mentioned that the majority of  then white parties, with the 
exception of  supporters of  authoritarianism, in principle agreed with a parliamentary and 
representative system. There are also no left-wing groupings that advocate violent regime 
change, even if  the rhetoric is fairly militant (i.e. the Economic Freedom Fighters or EFF); 
rather, the ‘left’ opposition generally work within the ambit of  the democratic and labour 
structures available in South Africa. Some may argue that Muslim fundamentalists pose 
a danger to South African communities, but in terms of  cultural and religious tolerance, 
the Muslim and Christian communities generally coexist peacefully in South Africa, and 
to a large extent are socially enmeshed/integrated.
Unfortunately, as a result of  the US’s ‘war on terror’, Muslim people are frequently 
associated in foreign media with ‘terrorism’ or as ‘political Islamists’, and such labelling 
causes intolerance and alienation. However, it seems unlikely that the South African state 
can be labelled as an extension of  those countries that are waging a war on terror, given its 
non-alliance stance and interactions with other states (Latin-America, Middle East, China, 
Europe, India, Russia, African peers). Close association with countries that have declared 
146 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
a war on terror may be seen as guilt-by-association by their targets, but South Africa has 
so far steered clear of  such associations in its multilateral relations and involvement on 
the continent. 
Keeping a distance from states that habitually project military power outwards will benefit 
national security in South Africa and should be continuously on the agenda. Experience 
over the past two decades has shown that countries that uncritically associate themselves 
with the US’s war on terror can become targets as a result of  guilt by association, and 
the bomb attacks in Spain are but one example. The US chose to project military power 
far outside its own borders against those perceived to be part of  a ‘terrorist onslaught’, 
and such power projection frequently caused social dislocation, insecurity, alienation, and 
destruction in the targeted communities, deeper animosity, alienation, and the urge to 
retaliate. Close association with those that fight a war on terror may well cause discontent 
in other communities, and apartheid is an example of  a case where a wide definition of 
terrorism was uncritically applied. Attempts to suppress ‘terrorism’ eventually had the 
opposite effect, galvanising communities against the apartheid state and its policies.
The vulnerability of  African states to extremism is attributed partly to porous borders, 
weak authority in governance and public finance, seemingly irrepressible internal conflict 
over scarce resources, criminal groups attempting to gain access to scarce resources 
(diamond, ivory, etc.), the reluctance of  long-serving leaders/governments to step 
down after losing legitimacy or national elections, and the easy availability of  weapons. 
Extremism is frequently founded on a lack of  economic perspectives, social deprivation, 
a loss of  cultural identity, political repression, and a dysfunctional state. Like any country, 
South Africa is a possible target for extremist action, but government foreign policy, 
African policies, and the constitutional commitment to religious and economic equality 
play important roles in reducing such a risk. 
However, the likelihood of  local protest over dissatisfaction with service delivery and 
infrastructure is greater and needs to be kept in mind. It is also important not to label 
such instances as extremism, or as that of  people intent on anarchy or ‘manipulated by 
dark forces’. The focus here should be on preventing and resolving such protest through 
awareness of  the context, and by addressing the root of  the problem, which is lack of 
services. It is of  utmost importance that local discontent be solved through addressing the 
root causes, rather than forceful action and/or attaching negative labels to the discontented. 
The role of  the military here can be educational or to lend a hand in community initiatives 
in order to improve perceptions and to demonstrate a willingness to assist, on the condition 
that such educational help is according to constitutional obligations and is non-partisan. 
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Nuclear weapons and national security
In the aftermath of  the Cold War, the immediate risk of  a nuclear war subsided. Despite 
the reality of  mutually assured destruction (MAD), there was the possibility that a 
nuclear war could be triggered unintentionally or mistakenly. As a relatively small state 
(‘middle power’) under apartheid, South Africa, like Israel, was a nuclear-holding nation, 
projecting an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Since then, South Africa has signed 
the non-proliferation treaty and other relevant treaties, and is a non-nuclear power.
In reality, the mass holders of  nuclear power are still in the West, while Russia also retains 
significant, if  not competitive, numbers. Relative ‘newcomers’, such as India and China, 
do not seem inclined to use their nuclear power other than as a deterrent under serious 
provocation, and as a last resort. New ‘newcomers’, such as North Korea, do not have 
even vaguely competitive capacities, and if  offensive nuclear capacity is reached, they will 
be unlikely to stockpile significant numbers. Thus, given the reality of  limited arsenals 
and despite being labelled as ‘rogue states’, it remains highly unlikely that such a state 
will unleash a nuclear war, with the possible exception of  Israel, which operates within a 
framework of  ‘being besieged’ and threatened. 
In short, the nuclear threat that new newcomers pose is overrated when measured against 
current stockpiles of  nuclear arms. More likely, such attempts at building nuclear capacity 
are to boost confidence, as these countries are consistently criticised and threatened 
and may thus have developed the feeling of  being besieged, which will have worsened 
the feelings of  exclusion and isolation of  their governments and significant chunks of 
their population. South Africa faces no nuclear threat in the short to medium term, as 
it is not geographically near to any of  these powers, nor is it in competition with them. 
Realistically, the likelihood in the long-term is also limited. Any ‘hard’ military threat that 
may arise is likely to be from stronger powers in search of  scarce resources, or who have 
strong ideological differences with South Africa or its leadership, and in this case the threat 
would be economic, rather than nuclear. 
The vision, mission, structures and posture of  South Africa’s defence should include 
both conventional and non-conventional capabilities. The military have responsibilities 
to participate in peacekeeping operations and carry out border security. The capabilities 
for this need to be retained and honed in a cost-effective way, and the defence policy 
and NSS should take heed of  this. Added to this is the challenge of  planning a policy of 
rejuvenation within the current defence budget, as an increase is highly unlikely in the 
short to medium term, and savings will have to be incurred through piecemeal methods 
such as salary cuts for top management, and natural attrition in higher age categories.
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In terms of  disaster management, the military, in cooperation with civilian institutions, 
should be prepared to assist in case of  a nuclear disaster, both on and off  our soil. South 
Africa has one nuclear reactor, and may add more given the current power crisis, and 
the reality is that having nuclear power goes with the possibility of  a nuclear disaster. 
A nuclear disaster around our shores also cannot be ruled out, as various maritime vessels 
that pass along the sea routes of  South Africa are nuclear-powered of  which some are 
ageing fast.
Armed intervention by core states
The risk of  direct invasion does not face South Africa. However, as both Kosovo and Libya 
have proven, the responsibility to protect (R2P) can be used as a rationale to intervene in 
other smaller states that are rich in resources. In the case of  Iraq, the action was taken by 
core industrial states (US, UK) with others in alliance (‘the willing’) using the excuse of 
weapons of  mass destruction (WMD). In Libya’s case, it was an abuse of  the R2P.
Given the shortage of  certain resources on the globe, African and regional states should 
be aware of  this threat. Any attack on an African state can have negative consequences 
in surrounding states, as the Libyan example now demonstrates. Preparedness for such 
interference and contingencies in this regard should be considered and planned for.
Conclusion
South Africa’s citizenry currently faces no direct threat from nuclear or conventional 
attack. Some countries on the continent may be vulnerable to armed intervention by 
core states, under pretences such as the war on terror or R2P, or simply because they 
hold scarce resources. However, South Africa faces numerous other socio-political and 
economic challenges. The country’s population currently does not face a conventional 
threat or reactionary violence and, given South Africa’s diplomatic stance and multiple 
relations on the globe, they are also not a priority for what is described as ‘terrorism’.
Being viewed as a regional powerhouse, South Africa can expect to be called upon within 
SADC and on the continent (AU) to provide mutual security, and to contribute to peace 
operations and/or disaster relief. Such requests are likely to increase rather than decrease.
South Africans face numerous human security challenges. An NSS should be aware of 
this and, as far as the SANDF is concerned, it is in these areas that it may need to be 
prepared to render services within prescribed parameters when called upon. In terms 
of  its constitutional position and social responsibilities, the SANDF has a role to play in 
leading by example in terms of  health, service delivery, accountability, corruption and 
crime-eradication, and community interaction. Projected inside the country, this example 
should also be seen to be visible both in the region and more broadly. 




This appendix provides an overview of  successive South African defence budgets and their 
effects on the SANDF during the period 2008-2017. Defence underfunding and its effects 
constitute arguably the most significant military security development in post-Mandela 
South Africa, and analysing the defence policy and its outcomes without taking defence 
spending into account is less than useful.
Sustained underfunding and a shrinking budget 
TABLE 7.1 Overview of South African defence budgetary allocations during the past decade 
SA Defence Budget & Related Figures, 2008‑2017















2008 2.28tr 27.8 1.21% 11.8% 8.27 62,082 15,071
2009 2.08tr 32.0bn 1.58% 7.2% 7.36 62,082 15,071
2010 2.68tr 30.7bn 1.14% 5.8% 7.40 62,082 15,071
2011 2.95tr 30.4bn 1.03% 5.9% 7.09 62,082 15,071
2012 3.2tr 37.9bn 1.18% 5.64% 8.20 62,082 15,071
2013 3.46tr 44.6bn 1.28% 5.77% 9.20 62,100 15,050
2014 3.65tr 42.8bn 1.17% 6.3% 10.69 62,100 15,050
2015 4.03tr 44.6bn 1.11% 4.8% 12.72 62,100 15,050
2016 4.28tr 47.2bn 1.09% 6.4% 15.26 62,100 15,050
2017 4.61tr 48.6bn 1.05% 5.4% 13.40 66,350 15,050
SOURCE: The Military Balance, 2009‑20184
It is clear that the South African inflation rate over the past decade has neutralised the 
effects of  any nominal growth in the defence budget. The table provides an indication 
of  the extent to which the Rand (ZAR) declined in value against foreign currencies, and 
the increasingly unfavourable foreign exchange rate compounded the damaging effects of 
the inflation rate on South African defence spending. The currency exchange rate directly 
affects not only main equipment acquisition costs, but also the cost of  refits, maintenance, 
training and other services provided by armament system suppliers. 
Table 7.1 further demonstrates how the defence budget declined to about 1% of  the 
South African GDP, although the current minister of  defence (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) 
and her predecessor (Lindiwe Sisulu) both called for a defence budget amounting to at 
least 2% of  the GDP. That percentage, if  provided and sustained, would have enabled the 
SANDF to rebuild itself  over a period of  about 20 years. 
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Sustained overstretch 
Table 7.1 demonstrates that SANDF personnel numbers have changed little over the past 
decade. Amongst other things, growth in SANDF foreign deployments did not result in a 
significant growth of  personnel numbers. Figure 7.2 below provides an indication of  the 
annual number of  SANDF members deployed on UN peacekeeping missions from 1999 
to 2018.
FIGURE 7.2 Number of SANDF members on UN peacekeeping missions, 1999‑2018
                                                SOURCE: De Carvalho, 2018
Unchanging personnel numbers had a direct impact on any personnel shortages 
experienced by the SANDF during the past decade. For example, in 2008 the SAAF had 
only 38% of  its target strength in fighter pilots and 60% in fighter aircraft technicians. It 
also had only 72% of  its helicopter pilots and 68% of  its helicopter technicians. The air 
transport force had 68% of  its target pilot quota and 59% of  its technicians.5 Persistent 
and significant personnel and budgeting shortages strain or overstretch a workforce, and 
the DOD Annual Report 2010/2011 mentioned overstretch specifically. The SA Army 
is referred to as ‘severely overstretched, especially in the infantry, engineer and support 
capabilities.’6   The Air Force fared no better,7 while the SA Navy ‘continued to experience 
critical shortages of  personnel within the technical, combat, diver, submariner and 
logistics domains’.8 
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Any increase in personnel costs during the past decade cannot be attributed to a manpower 
increase, and this is especially interesting when one considers personnel costs as a 
percentage of  the defence budget. Increasing percentages of  the defence budget have 
been spent on personnel costs over the past 14 years. About 30% of  the 2004 budget was 
allocated to personnel costs,9 while the percentage of  the 2016 budget was 57%10 and 80% 
for the 2017 budget. During the course of  2017, the Defence Ministry announced plans to 
reduce the numbers of  military personnel to 66,016 by 2019.11 If  the funding allocation for 
personnel cannot be increased, the Minister of  Defence has no choice but to reduce their 
numbers, or at least cut remuneration and/or staff  at high-ranking levels. 
Defence policy implications
In May 2018, the Minister of  Defence reminded parliament that they had endorsed the 
2015 Defence Review as the national policy on defence but that the Defence Review 
remained unfunded. The declining budgetary allocation has reached the stage where 
the SANDF is losing essential capabilities. Given the expected current and future tasks 
of  the SANDF, such expectations cannot be executed. The defence policy implications 
of  sustained underfunding are clear. Sustained underfunding will increasingly amount 
to a contradiction of  the South African defence policy, as articulated in the 2015 Defence 
Review, and continued underfunding reduced the status of  the 2015 Defence Review to a 
relatively toothless policy.12 
Notes
1 An African concept implying recognition of  and abiding by reciprocal dignity and human-centredness.
2 In terms of  the collective regional GDP in 2003/2003, South Africa held 74.9%, Angola 4,2%, 
Zimbabwe 4,2%, and Tanzania 3,9%, while Mozambique stood at 1,6%, the DRC at 2,6%, Zambia 
1,6%, Swaziland at 0,5%, and Lesotho at 0,4%.
3 South Africa’s Gini coefficient for the African population increased from 0,62 in 1991 to 0,72 in 2001 
(HSRC, 2004). On the World Bank Gini Index, South Africa finds itself  at 67%, ahead of  Angola 
(59%), Bolivia (57%), the Central African Republic (56%), the Comoros (64%), Haiti (60%), Lesotho 
(53%), Zambia (51%) and Zimbabwe (50%). Within the region, only the Namibians were worse 
off  at the time and rated 70% (Schwabe, 2004). In 2016, it was reported that the Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.61 (all population groups) in 1996 to 0.64 by 2014 (SAIRR, 2016:313ff.).
4 Table 7.1 is based on data collected from ten consecutive issues of  The Military Balance, annually 
published online. These are: 109(1):319-320, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220802709910 [30 Jan 2009]; 
110(1):325-326, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220903545858 [3 Feb 2010]; 111(1):441-443, https://doi. 
org/10.1080/04597222.2011.559842 [7 Mar 2011]; 112(1):452-454, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222. 
2012.663218 [7 Mar 2012]; 113(1):530-532, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2013.757005 [14 Mar 
2013]; 114(1):457-459, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2014.871886 [5 Feb 2014]; 115(1):468-470, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996365 [10 Feb 2015]; 116(1):467-469, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
04597222.2016.1127636 [9 Feb 2016]; 117(1):534-537, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271216 
[13 Feb 2017]; 118(1):433-434, 485-487, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986 [13 Feb 2018]. 
5 The Military Balance, 110(1):292, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220903545858 [3 Feb 2010]. 
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6 Annual Report 2010/2011, p. 61. Department of  Defence, Republic of  South Africa, 2011. Available 
on the DOD website: www.dod.mil.za
7 Ibid., p. 68. 
8 Ibid., p. 74. 
9 The Military Balance, 110(1):292, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220903545858 [3 Feb 2010]. 
10 The Military Balance, 117(1):488, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271216 [13 Feb 2017].
11 The Military Balance, 118(1):433-434, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986 [13 Feb 2018]. 
12 The following articles, published on defenceWeb (http://www.defenceweb.co.za), support the 
arguments made in the Appendix: ‘Alarming issues’ uncovered on border fact-finding mission 
(30 November 2018); ‘Critical maintenance events’ impact on SAAF maritime patrol capabilities 
(9 November 2018); Acknowledgement all is not well with the SANDF comes from the top 
(5 November 2018); Alternative funding, models needed for SA defence industry – Armscor 
(24 October 2018); Defence Legal Services will be impaired by lack of  funds (11 April 2018); Defence 
Minister needs a hearts and mind campaign and a retrenchment plan (6 June 2018); Defence Review 
– no money, so no implementation (11 October 2018); Defence Review 2015 unlikely to ever be 
fully implemented (published on 29 November 2018); Navy Defence acknowledges it is in danger 
of  sinking (5 June 2018); Navy deteriorating, Parliamentary Committee hears (26 November 
2018); SA Navy funding and capacity need careful consideration – ISS (16 July 2018); SANDF 
suspensions cost millions (26 September 2018); Slow progress with DOD financial misconduct 
disciplinary proceedings (13 April 2018); Speech: Defence and Military Veterans Budget Vote 2018-19 
(25 May 2018); Yam bemoans underfunded SANDF (18 October 2018). 
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Namibia’s Defence Diplomacy and its Foreign, Defence and National Security Policies are products of a protracted liberation 
struggle of 23 years. The formative role that the United Nations (UN) played in the complex transition and protracted process 
that culminated in the independence of the country on 21 March 1990, too, left its imprint, while statutory provisions in the 
Constitution (especially the provisions contained in Chapter 11 on the Principles of State Policy) and the changing geopolitics 
and security environment within which the country finds itself, by-and-large shaped and continues to shape policy. As a 
small state, the domestic sources of defence diplomacy and policy, coupled to the country’s key bilateral and multilateral 
relations and membership of regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African 
Union (AU), and of the United Nations (UN), determine the topography of the country’s international relations of which its 
defence diplomacy and defence policy are constitutive parts. Namibia has a number of defence attachés in its 33 missions 
and 3 consular missions. 
In late October 2019, Namibia had 10 foreign military advisors/attachés attached to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). These 
came from the following countries: Angola, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Poland, Ukraine, Italy, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the 
United States of America. Several other countries collaborate with Namibia in matters of training and policy design, most 
notably, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), India, South Africa and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
There is little evidence of defence intellectuals within the Ministry of Defence and the Namibia Defence Force (NDF), even 
if a few senior military officers have published on the defence and military posture of the country and its participation in 
peacekeeping operations under different mandates.1 From a research point of view, the terrain of defence diplomacy and 
defence policy is under- explored with few available published sources on the topic.2
Introduction
In a memorable formulation a British diplomat once said, ‘Foreign policy is what you 
do, diplomacy is how you do it’.3 Although this basic distinction is useful, it is seriously 
incomplete, since all techniques for the implementation of  foreign policy are, in the 
final analysis, political, and diplomacy engages with a range of  actors, relationships and 
complexities. This goes for what some analysts call ‘niche diplomacy’ and also holds for 
public diplomacy.
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The central feature of  diplomacy in its different forms is communication. Historically, 
the basis for creating permanent diplomatic missions in the fifteenth century was the 
desire of  kings and princes to have representatives in other courts to carry out continuous 
and systematic communication with other monarchs. The rules of  protocol, diplomatic 
immunity, and non‑interference in domestic politics, for example, were established to 
reduce conflicts over rank and status amongst diplomats, to prevent host governments 
from interfering with the diplomatic representatives of  other states, and to prevent 
diplomats from engaging in the domestic affairs of  their hosts. These legal rules codify 
diplomatic interactions.
In the contemporary international system, diplomacy has five substantive functions,4 
these are: First, conflict avoidance and management. Second, generating sustainable 
outcomes to different kinds of  conflicts, thirdly, enhancing and facilitating cross‑cultural 
communication as a means of  confidence building, fourthly, facilitating negotiation and 
bargaining on specific issues, treaties, and agreements, and finally, providing a framework 
for managing programmes and activities of  the foreign policy decisions of  a range of  state‑
based and non‑state actors. Procedurally, these activities result foremost in communicating 
the views of  a particular government and in exchanging information. After successful 
negotiation, diplomacy is often required to implement the agreement reached and to 
manage such agreements over time.
Modern diplomacy, however, unavoidably involves the presence and participation of  third 
parties observing and supporting the diplomatic activities at hand, often to serve their own 
particular interests. Increasingly, also diplomacy is linked to economic‑ and trade relations, 
but also to cultural exchange, the environment, public health, peace and security and to 
science and technology. 
In summary form, in foreign policy diplomacy refers to a policy instrument, often 
in association with other instruments such as economic or military force to enable 
an international actor to achieve its policy objectives. Diplomacy in world politics 
refers to a communication process between different international actors that seeks 
through negotiation to resolve conflict short of  war. This process has been refined and 
institutionalised over many centuries and continues to evolve.
The corset of Namibia’s defence diplomacy: On history and  
policy interfaces 
The formation of  the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) on 19 April 
1960 ushered in the beginning of  almost three decades of  struggle for an independent 
and democratic Namibia. Twenty‑three of  the 30 years were in the form of  an armed 
liberation struggle. At the end of  the all‑important Consultative Conference held in 
Tanga, Tanzania, from 26 December 1969 to 2 January 1970, SWAPO established various 
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departments, amongst these a Department of  Foreign Affairs, tasked to execute the party’s 
foreign policy and drive its diplomacy in exile.
Prior to independence, SWAPO had 27 foreign missions on all five continents and enjoyed 
observer status – the first African liberation movement to have been accorded such 
international recognition – at the United Nations (UN).5
This was the position from the beginning of  1970, when the party’s Department of  Foreign 
Affairs was established, up and till March 1990, when the country gained its independence 
under the auspices of  the United Nations (UN). Table 8.1 shows SWAPO’s international 
representation prior to formal independence in March 1990.
TABLE 8.1 SWAPO’s international representation prior to independence





























United States  
of America
Australia United Nations 
(observer status)
The SWAPO Mission in Finland was closed in 1972 and the responsibility resorted to the 
Mission in Sweden. The actual office stayed open and was run by SWAPO students in 
Finland, who dealt mostly with education, health and related concerns.
It is noteworthy that despite the fact that SWAPO had no diplomatic representation in 
countries such as the People’s Republic of  China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic 
of  Korea (DPRK) and Brazil, these countries and their commercial interests, as this chapter 
will show, became very important in the foreign relations and defence diplomacy of  the 
independent State, for reasons that will become evident. 
In the post‑independence period, Namibia’s bilateral relations with the PRC strengthened 
and deepened significantly. Such relations include the training of  navy military personnel 
and the procurement of  coastal defence vessels to protect the country’s rich marine 
resources. The military training that the PRC provided during the protracted liberation 
struggle became the springboard for robust bilateral relations in the post‑independence 
period. As this chapter will show, diplomatic and defence relations with the PRC, Brazil 
and India, became more salient since March 1990 when the country took its independence. 
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Apart from bilateral relations, SWAPO in exile, also had diplomatic relations with 
several other countries, amongst these, with the former Eastern bloc countries (under 
the ideological mantra of  the Cold War), which, by 1984, provided roughly 60 percent 
of  the total funds donated to the former liberation movement.6 In addition to students 
who were members of  SWAPO in exile studying in countries where the movement had 
diplomatic missions, there were students in Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda. The People’s Republic of  China 
(PRC) provided military training to members of  the People’s Liberation Army (PLAN), 
the military wing of  SWAPO, while humanitarian and material assistance came from 
‘progressive organizations and countries’ such as Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal and Switzerland.7 The Nordic countries were particularly generous 
with their political support and material assistance to SWAPO.8 
It is also important to point out that prior to independence SWAPO participated in and 
maintained meaningful relations with several international organisations. As early as 1976, 
the United Nations General Assembly gave special diplomatic recognition to SWAPO 
in exile. The United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) Resolution 31/152 of  1976, 
recognised SWAPO as the ‘sole and authentic representative of  the Namibian people’.9 
Subsequently, SWAPO was accorded observer status in the UNGA – at the time, a unique 
privilege accorded to an African liberation movement.
In terms of  its other multilateral relations, SWAPO maintained diplomatic relations with 
the Organization of  African Union (OAU), the antecedent of  the African Union (AU). 
Since its inception in May 1963, the OAU’s Liberation Committee provided SWAPO with 
material and financial support. Later, in 1978, SWAPO was admitted as a full (non‑state) 
member of  the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM), and as the liberation struggle deepened 
and expanded, the movement received support from the Commonwealth and the then 
frontline states (FLS). Moreover, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and other senior leaders 
such as the late Theo‑Ben Gurirab, regularly attended and addressed high‑level meetings 
of  many intentional organisations, amongst these: the UNGA and the UN Security 
Council, different UN agencies, Heads of  State Summits, and meetings of  the OAU, NAM 
and the FLS.10 
While SWAPO in exile developed foreign policy capacity, the actual foreign policy decision‑
makers were limited to a few individuals, such as the President of  the Party, the Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of  Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Observer 
to the United Nations (UN).11 
The other important foreign policy actors, as distinct from key decision‑makers, included 
members of  the SWAPO Central Committee and Political Bureau (Politburo) who mostly 
formed part of  several delegations to the UNGA, the UN Security Council and other 
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international conferences that focused on advancing the independence of  the country. 
Many such conferences took place in cities such as Geneva, London, Oslo, Stockholm, 
Brazzaville and Lusaka. In a related context, SWAPO also interacted over a long period 
with the former Western Contact Group (WCG), comprising of  Canada, France, West 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of  America (USA).
When Namibia gained independence on 21 March 1990, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
was established and the newly independent Government entered into formal diplomatic 
relations with a number of  countries. Significantly, the new Government continued 
diplomatic relations with all countries that it had relations with while in exile. New 
relations were also established, amongst these with Belgium that hosts the headquarters of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), the antecedent of  the European Union (EU).
During the first year of  independence, Namibia opened thirteen (13) diplomatic missions. 
Of  these, four (4) were newly opened in Africa, six (6) in Europe and three (3) in the 
Americas. By then, a total of  156 agreements were entered into with foreign governments, 
as well as with international, inter‑governmental and non‑governmental organisations. 
These agreements covered health, economic and development cooperation, diplomatic 
relations, military cooperation, education and culture, scientific and technical cooperation, 
consular matters and aviation.12 One such bilateral agreement was with Brazil, that 
facilitated military cooperation and training of  the nascent Namibian Navy and became 
important for procuring naval vessels. Twenty‑nine years after independence, Namibia 
has 31 embassies abroad and three consulates.
At the time of  independence, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (MFA) advanced five key 
objectives for the country’s post‑independence foreign policy. These were:
	To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity and ensure the return of 
Walvis Bay and the offshore islands to Namibia;
	To promote Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid 
and colonialism;
	To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure 
better terms of trade for Namibian commodities;
	Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola and the transformation 
of South Africa into a non‑racial and democratic state, and
	To promote world peace through an active role in international organisations, such 
as the UN, OAU and NAM.13 
What is interesting about these five key foreign policy objectives, is that they were 
formulated in a context where the SADC‑region was not at peace, with civil war in 
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Angola, internal conflict in South Africa as that country was edging towards a transition 
to democracy and when Namibia’s own independence and sovereignty were not 
complete, because of  the non‑integration of  the port of  Walvis Bay and the off‑shore 
islands. Regional geopolitical and security concerns and fractures directly shaped the way 
foreign policy and later defence diplomacy, were configured. At the same time, a strong 
emphasis was retained on multilateralism in international bodies such as the UN, the 
former Organization of  African Union (OAU) and the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM). 
Namibia also joined the Commonwealth, and that, too, impacted upon its foreign policy 
and defence diplomacy postures.14
These five objectives mentioned above, rest upon Article 96 of  the Constitution (as 
amended), that states that the State shall endeavour that in its international relations it:
‘(a) Adopts and maintains a policy of  non‑alignment;
(b) Promotes international cooperation, peace and security;
(c) Creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations amongst nations;
(d) Fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
(e) Encourages the settlement of  international disputes by peaceful means’.15
The principle of  non‑alignment harks back to the Cold War and to SWAPO’s diplomacy in 
exile as this chapter argues. Taken together, the principles reflect realist, idealist and liberal 
conceptions of  foreign policy and relations. The belief  in peace through law approach, 
coupled to the encouragement of  conflict by peaceful means is a marker of  the country’s 
foreign policy and of  its defence diplomacy, as will be shown in the following sections of 
this contribution.
Having introduced the diplomacy of  SWAPO in exile and the objectives and principles 
that inform the foreign policy and relations of  Namibia, of  which the country’s defence 
diplomacy is an integral part, the focus now shifts to structural and policy aspects 
of  the Ministry of  Defence (MOD) and the evolution and practice of  the country’s 
defence diplomacy.
Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Namibia Defence Force (NDF)
The Ministry of  Defence (MOD) was established in terms of  Article 118 of  the Constitution, 
a mere month after the country achieved its independence. The MOD was responsible for 
creating the organisational and administrative structure needed to manage the Namibia 
Defence Force (NDF).
Through its various directorates and divisions, the MOD has a number of  key responsibilities. 
Chief  of  these are: 
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1. To formulate and implement defence policies for the Government;
2. To provide central operational and administrative headquarters for the Namibia 
Defence Force (NDF), and
3. To procure equipment for the NDF, mostly through a commercial company, August 26.
The principal roles of  the NDF are:
	To ensure the maintenance of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of 
the country;
	To provide various forms of humanitarian assistance to civil authorities and 
communities as and when required;
	To undertake ceremonial and diplomatic functions, and
	To assist the process of national reconciliation.16 
Structure of the Ministry
The Ministry if  headed by a minister who also chairs the Defence Staff Council, the highest 
management committee of  the Ministry, and represents the Ministry in the National 
Assembly (NA) and Cabinet. The minister is supported by the Chief  of  the Defence Force 
and the Permanent Secretary, the financial officer of  the Ministry.
The key directorates and divisions that formulate policy and operational concepts are:
First, the Directorate Policy and Operations with responsibility for policy and operational 
concepts formulation, such as organisation, deployment, planning of  force design, policy 
for support arms, management of  day‑to‑day military cooperation, and combat support 
services. This Directorate is headed by the Chief  of  Staff: Operations, who also serves on 
the Senior Management Committee (SMC) and the Military Steering Committee (MSC).
Secondly, the Directorate Logistics that is responsible for combat supplies and materials 
required for the efficient functioning of  the NDF. This Directorate is headed by the Chief 
of  Staff: Logistics who is also a member of  the SMC and MSC.
Thirdly, the Directorate Military Intelligence regarding all issues regarding defence and 
security, inclusive of  providing security advice to the Ministry; ensuring the security of 
all military installations, personnel and equipment; collection, analysis and dissemination 
of  security information; managing the Ministry’s communication policy, and managing 
relations with the print and electronic media. The Directorate is headed by the Chief  of 
Staff: Military Intelligence who is a member of  the SMC and MSC.
Finally, the Division Procurement, Research and Development, an independent 
division, established to coordinate capital procurement for the NDF, which includes the 
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procurement of  all military equipment, ammunitions and materials. The Division also 
enters into contract negotiations with suppliers and attends military exhibitions, liaising 
with manufacturers in the military industry to establish business contacts and securing 
supply channels. The Division is also responsible for researching, designing and developing 
(R&D) military materials to keep abreast of  a fast‑changing technological environment 
and operational needs.
The Namibia Defence Force (NDF)
The Namibia Defence Force (NDF) consists of  the army, the Namibia Air Force and the 
Namibian Navy. Of  these, the army is the largest and the Namibian Navy, the most recent. 
The legal basis for national defence is provided by Article 118 of  the Constitution, as 
amended, which states that a Namibia Defence Force should be established by an Act of 
Parliament, in order to ‘defend the territory and national interests of  Namibia’. This was 
further developed in the Defence Amendment Act (Act No. 20 of  1990) that amended 
the earlier South African Defence Act (Act No. 44 of  1957) which set out various legal 
requirements for the composition and organisation of  the Defence Force. The Defence 
Amendment Act of  1990 was also supported by a Military Discipline Code that emanated 
from the earlier 1957 Act. 
The chief  roles of  the Army are to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the country; to provide assistance to civil authorities and communities when required; 
to undertake ceremonial functions on behalf  of  the State, and to assist in the process of 
reconciliation. The Army comprises of  former combatants of  the People’s Liberation 
Army of  Namibia (PLAN) – the military wing of  SWAPO in exile – and the minority South 
West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), after these two formations were demobilised and 
many of  them were integrated into a unified Namibia Defence Force (NDF).
The Air Force is envisaged in the policy and mission statement of  the Ministry and was 
established after the Army and has since evolved into an important part of  national 
defence. It is headquartered in Grootfontein in the central north of  the country. The key 
roles of  the Namibia Air Force are: to operate in support of  the army and navy, to engage 
in surveillance; transportation of  personnel and or supplies and equipment; rendering 
support to civil authorities or communities; and engaging in training.17
The Navy was established to defend the country’s maritime domain and resources against 
illegal fishing, piracy and external attack. The core officers of  the Navy underwent their 
naval training in Brazil, and subsequently also in China, once the country sourced vessels 
from there. Training was provided under various International bilateral agreements.18 
and over time, Namibia procured naval vessels from both Brazil and China. The most 
meaningful transformation started on 7 October 2004, when the navy was transformed 
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from a wing to a fully-fledged navy. In October 2019, the Navy celebrated its fifteenth 
year of  existence in Walvis Bay. The key role of  the Navy lies in the domains of  maritime 
security and the protection of  the resources associated with the blue economy. 
Late in October 2019, Namibian President Dr Hage G. Geingob officially opened the 
Chinese-funded Namibia Command and Staff  College in Okahandja, north of  the Capital 
City, Windhoek. The College was completed in 2016 with the purpose of  enhancing 
the country’s capacity to train army officers based on Namibian military doctrine. The 
doctrine covers aspects such as tactical and operational warfare both at command and staff 
level, as well as a sound understanding of  the military’s role within a democratic polity. 
At the official inauguration of  the College, it was said by the Acting Chief  of  the Defence 
Force, Air Vice Marshall Martin Kapolo Pineas, that the facility would be providing 
training to other ministries and individuals. The College boasts a library, laboratory and 
syndicate room.19 
Policy development: The early years
In February 1993, the then Minister of  Defence, Peter Mwesihange a former combatant, 
presented to Parliament what is known as a Statement on Defence Policy.20 
From its inception, defence and defence diplomacy, were posited as key parts of  the new 
Government’s foreign- and security policies, which were decided collectively by Cabinet. 
Since then, the main elements of  Defence Policy have been set out annually in the Statement 
on the Defence Estimates (SDE). The SDE is built on the Government’s assessment of 
developments that affect the country’s security, its responses to such developments and 
the resources available that it proposes to allocate to defence. A similar Annual Security 
Estimate (ASE) is undertaken by the Namibia Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) for 
the President and Cabinet – particularly for members of  the Cabinet Committee on 
International Relations, Defence and Security (CCIRDS).
The 1993 Statement on Defence Policy articulated the following key values and principles 
for directing the roles and functions of  the NDF. These included:
	Apolitical – organised, trained and managed to serve the Government of the day and 
all the citizens of the State;
	Accountable – well-disciplined and accountable to the political leadership and the 
‘people through clearly defined political mechanisms of control’;
	Capable to meet its primary role – that is, defence of the territorial integrity of the 
country – while playing a constructive role in promoting peace; and
	Affordable – bearing in mind national resource constraints, ‘defence should not 
represent an unaffordable burden on the economy’.21 
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The February 1993 Statement on Defence Policy made it clear that future defence policy 
would be shaped by the above values and principles, even if  policy implementation would 
have to ‘reflect practical developments of  all kinds affecting the country, both directly and 
indirectly’, adding that ‘in particular, it will need to take account of  up‑to‑date assessments 
of  potential threats to our security interests’.22
The initial 1993 Defence Policy articulation concluded by saying that, while the 
disengagement ‘of  the global powers from involvement in the conflicts of  Southern 
Africa is a positive, though recent development; however, the continuing instability in the 
region means that the general risk remains high enough to justify the maintenance of  an 
independent national defence capability’.23 
As early as February 1993, and indeed in subsequent policy framings, Namibia’s security 
was directly linked to, and dependent upon, regional stability. As a result, as will be shown 
in this contribution, regional security cooperation and coordination became and continues 
to be an important string in the bow of  Defence and Security Policy more generally.
Procurement Policy, too, was premised on the principles of  ‘best quality equipment and 
materiel, provided that it suited the local terrain, climate, personnel, storage, accounting 
and other requirements; can be supported logistically, maintained and repaired in Namibia, 
as far as is practicable; can be delivered to or supplied in Namibia within the required 
time, and is available at the cheapest all‑inclusive price, and with the most favorable terms 
of  payment’.
The NDF made much of  the nascent local armaments industry and made it clear, as 
early as February 1993, that the Ministry of  Defence, ‘intends to trade freely throughout 
the world’ and that given the nature of  defence business, the NDF would not become 
dependent on any one source of  supply24 The key holding company is August 26 and 
its affiliates. 
In addition to procurement, the February 1993 policy statement also covered specific 
aspects relevant to defence diplomacy. These included the following five specific aspects: 
foreign military materiel aid and training assistance; the employment of  advisers on 
technical and programme‑related matters; the employment of  consultants when such 
skills do not exist within the Namibian Public Service; the Employment of  Contract Staff 
in areas where critical skills gaps exist, subject to the development of  specific policies, 
and the deployment of  military attachés to those countries ‘with whom Namibia has 
significant defence relations, or where a future relationship will necessitate a permanent 
presence’.25
On the matter of  defence resources, the 1993 policy statement stated: 
A central aim of  the policy is to ensure that defence continues to account for no 
higher proportion of  Government expenditure that is affordable. The MOD is, 
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therefore, beholden to ensure both its own management systems and those of  the 
NDF represent the best value for money possible. It is also recognized that the 
implications of  this policy for the defence programme are considerable and that its 
full implementation will therefore, depend upon the economy’s ability to pay for 
them. The programme will be implemented as resources permit.26 
This chapter will return in a subsequent section to the matter of  defence budgeting and 
economics, as the share allocated in the various national budgets to the MOD, has grown 
exponentially since independence in 1990.
The 2011 Defence Policy represents the most recent and comprehensive statement on 
Policy, risks, the strategic environment, military strategy, military posture and force 
design, International Law and Agreements, human resources and research, development 
and procurement to date.27 
While long awaited, this Policy and subsequent policy framings on Namibia’ International 
Relations and Cooperation28 provide the most comprehensive and recent policy 
frameworks for discussing the country’s defence diplomacy. It is to these framings that 
the chapter next turns. 
The 2011 Defence Policy: A précis
The introduction to the Defence Policy makes it clear that the Policy has been developed 
to complement other policies, particularly the National Security‑ and Foreign Policy. In 
this sense, the 2011 Defence Policy should be seen as a complementary policy to other 
security policies, with two key aims: assuring the security of  the country, so as to allow 
it to pursue by just and peaceful means, its national interests at home and abroad, and 
maintaining a credible defence capability to any potential hostile intentions and actions.29
The legal basis for the 2011 Defence Policy derives from Article 118 of  the Constitution 
(as amended), while the Defence Act 2002 (Act 1 of  2002), under Section 2, provides for 
the composition and organisation of  the Namibia Defence Force’s three Arms of  Service: 
the Army, Air Force and Navy.
As one of  the constitutive elements of  the national strategy that aims at protecting 
the survival and National Interests of  the State, the Policy advances guidelines for the 
development of  the NDF, sets out is principal roles and functions, provides for programmes 
to enhance its development and locates Policy within a regional, SADC framework, and 
internationally in terms of  several bilateral and multilateral agreements.
The Policy derives its orientation and thrust from the country’s Policy on International 
Relations and Cooperation, as newly revised in 2017. The latter, International Relations 
and Cooperation, is anchored on Article 96 of  the Constitution, with its provisions for 
non‑alignment, the promotion of  international cooperation, peace and security, respect 
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for international law and treaty obligations and the settlement of  international conflicts 
by peaceful means. These constitutional principles, in conjunction with the provisions of 
the Defence Act 2002 (Act 1 of  2002), frame the 2011 Defence Policy and provide it with 
legal import.
The national vision for the country derives from Vision 2030, the long‑term development 
frame of  the country with the core objective of  transforming Namibia into an industrialised 
and knowledge‑based economy. The national values come from the Constitution and 
is rights‑based following the provisions of  Chapter 3 of  the Constitution that provides 
for a justiciable Bill of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. In addition to these values, 
‘patriotism’ has been added as a core value that underpins the Policy.
The national interests have been defined along two registers: ‘vital interests’ and ‘peripheral 
interests’. The former, ‘vital interests’ typically involve the survival of  the nation, protecting 
the territorial integrity of  the State, guaranteeing the Nation’s sovereignty, protecting 
democratic values and the economic resources of  the country. The category of  ‘peripheral 
interests’ includes, but is not limited to the following: cooperate with SADC to promote 
peace and stability in the region; cooperating with the African Union (AU) in ensuring 
economic prosperity and the entrenchment of  democracy on the African continent; 
promoting global economic and greater social justice based on equality amongst nations, 
respect for international law and human rights and justice and fairness in global trade; 
promoting the collective security interests and system of  SADC and working with the 
United Nations (UN) in terms of  the provisions of  the UN Charter.30
Collective security, which in essence is state‑centric, remains the keystone of  Namibia’s 
defence policy and diplomacy. As summarised above, the 2011 Defence Policy does 
mention aspects of  human‑, economic‑ and environmental security, but in political and 
organisational terms, the country invests most of  its time and resources in more traditional 
forms of  collective security. 
The strategic assessment contained in the 2011 Defence Policy, focuses sharply on the 
regional security environment and emphasises the responsibilities of  SADC Member 
States under the SADC Protocol on Defence and Security Cooperation of  2001, as well 
as the various bilateral Joint Commissions on Defence and Security that Namibia has 
with all its neigbours, Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as 
with Tanzania. Additionally, the Policy identifies various international security concerns 
that Namibia must take into account. These include, amongst others: environmental 
degradation that speaks to drought, water stress and the impact of  global warming; global 
demographics and refugees; international terrorism and the proliferation of  small arms 
and light weapons.31 
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The threat assessment that informs the Policy lies at two registers: internal and external. In 
respect of  internal threats, the Policy specifically mentions secessionist sentiments in the 
former Caprivi Region (now the Zambezi Region); claims to ancestral land and for radical 
land redistribution; the plight of  ex‑combatants; youth unemployment; the unsustainable 
use of  land in communal areas; the effects of  global warming and the social impact of  the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. External threats include, amongst others: threats that emanate from 
extensive and porous international borders, illegal economic migration and the presence 
of  foreign military on African soil.32 
The Defence Diplomacy of  Namibia comes out most clearly in the part of  Policy that 
deals with potential scenarios for the deployment of  the NDF. Apart from the obvious 
threat to the territorial integrity of  the State, other scenarios include: Raids and blockades, 
especially in protection of  the vital sea route, the country’s most important trade route; 
engagement in counterinsurgency and ‘low intensity conflicts’ in support of  the United 
Nations, the African Union and SADC; deployment in the context of  natural disasters 
such as floods, earth quakes, fires and famine and participation in Peace Support missions 
as provided for in Section 32 (2) (a) and (b) of  the Defence Act, Act 1 of  2002 and when 
called upon under the provisions of  Chapters 6 and 7 of  the United Nations Charter, as 
well as peace missions authorised and mandated by the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Council in Chapter 8 of  the UN Charter.33 
Since the 2011 Policy, Namibia through the MOD and the NDF has become an active 
member of  the SADC Standby Force. The country hosts a logistics support facility near 
Gobabis in the East of  the country and has participated in various military exercises under 
the aegis of  SADC and its security architecture. The NDF participated in the following 
military exercises with other SADC member states who contribute to the SADC Standby 
Force: Exercise Pabalelo (which loosely translated means ‘safety’ in Tswana) conducted 
from 14 to 29 November 2018 in Maun, Botswana a Level III exercise in medical support 
by health professionals from all participating SADC countries; a SADC Command 
Post Exercise code‑named Umodzi, held in Malawi in October 2018; the SADC Special 
Forces Exercise, code‑named Matumbawe, which was held in Tanzania in August 2017, 
and the SADC Military Aviation Exercise, code‑named Blue Kunene held in Namibia in 
September 2017. These military exercises have been timely especially as SADC will go 
into the African Standby Force Roster duties from January 2019, whereby SADC will be 
expected to provide rapid deployment capability towards peace support efforts as part of 
the African Union’s conflict resolution mechanisms. Namibia pledged a Battalion to the 
SADC Standby arrangement. 
At policy level, regional security cooperation remains an important priority to the country. 
This is evidenced in Namibia’s participation in the SADC Inter‑State Defence and Security 
Committee (ISDSC), the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, the SADC Protocol on Defence and 
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Security Cooperation of  2001, the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Commission 
(SARPCCO), the Harare‑based Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, in various Joint Commissions on Defence and Security. 
As far as aspects of  internal security are concerned, the NDF was engaged in operations 
between 1998 and 2002 in the Ohangwena, Kavango (now Kavango East) and Caprivi 
(now Zambezi) regions against elements of  UNITA and the secessionist rebels of  the 
Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) in the then Caprivi Region. The work of  the NDF, with 
technical and financial assistance from International Cooperating Partners (ICPs), in 
de‑mining operations, in the Oshana‑, Ohangwena‑ and Omusati Regions in the north of 
the country are especially noteworthy. These de‑mining operations were undertaken by 
the Engineer Regiment of  the NDF over a period of  five years and successfully cleared 
all known landmines and unexploded ordinances. These operations also included the 
clearance of  402 electrical power pylons from Ruacana south wards. These pylons were 
heavily mined by the former South African Defence Force (SADF) at the time of  the bush 
war in the country.
Peacekeeping operations
The engagement of  the NDF, together with soldiers from Angola and Zimbabwe, 
between 1998 and 2001 in the internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of  Congo 
(DRC) was the most controversial to date. The NDF intervened militarily following a 
request from former president Laurent Dessire Kabila to SADC Member States to help 
his newly formed government repulse a rebel attack that threatened the capital city of 
Kinshasa. A divided SADC gave the mandate to intervene militarily in the conflict in the 
DRC that soon took on regional and international dimensions. Compared with Namibia’s 
earlier engagement in Angola, in 1996, the DRC operation was less successful, more 
complicated and significantly more secretive. The cost of  the operation, as well as the 
circumstances under which two Namibian peacekeepers died, have yet to be made public. 
The Namibian Parliament was informed only after the NDF had dispatched a brigade to 
the DRC. During the intervention in the DRC, the NDF dispatched training instructors, 
to train the Congolese Armed Forces at the Kamina military base.34
Namibia’s participation in various international peace missions constitutes one of  the most 
visible forms of  the country’s defence diplomacy and of  its international relations. With 
limited peacekeeping experience, the NDF deployed its first contingent of  peacekeepers 
to Cambodia in early 1993 under the aegis of  the United Nations. Since then, Namibia 
has become a significant troop and police contributor to the United Nations, African 
Union (AU) and SADC peace support operations (PSOs). The country’s participation in 
peace support operations included the deployment of  units up to battalion strength and 
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individual peacekeepers such as Staff  Officers and Military Observers. To date, the NDF 
participated in more than 15 peace support missions, under various mandates,35 of  which 
the SADC‑led Preventive Force in Lesotho is the latest, while the NDF has seconded senior 
officers to the UN Department of  Peace‑Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York at 
the request of  the said department. 
Participation in joint military exercises
Since 1997, the NDF has been a regular participant in various joint military exercises, 
chief  amongst these: Exercise Blue Hungwe conducted in Nyanga, Zimbabwe, involving 
armed forces from various SADC member states from 1 to 20 April 1997; Joint Combined 
Exercise for Training, code‑named Ex‑Flintlock II B, conducted in Namibia from May to 
August 1997 and sponsored by the US Special Forces, European Command; Battle Group 
Exercise (B‑GEX) at Oshivelo Training Area in northern Namibia; Exercise Blue Crane, 
which took place in South Africa from 7 to 30 April 1999; Operation Dolphino held in 
Namibia along the coast in 2014; Regional Air Force Exercise Blue Kunene (August to 
September 2017) held in Kunene Region of  Namibia, and Battle Group Exercise held in 
Malawi in September 2018.
From 16 to 27 March 2019, Namibia together with several other African nations entered 
a new chapter in their military cooperation with India when they met in that country 
to participate in the inaugural version of  the Africa‑India Field Training Exercise 
(Afindex‑19). The stated objective of  the Exercise was to acquaint the contingents with 
each other’s operational procedures to ensure improved operability in consonance with 
the requirements of  the United Nations as outlined in Chapter 7 of  the UN Charter.
Contingents from 17 African nations – Namibia, Benin, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe – along with a contingent of  the Maratha Light Infantry 
( Jangi Paltan) representing India, came together for the first edition of  the training 
exercise. Each African country sent 10 military personnel to the Aundh Military Station 
in Pune, India.
As part of  the defence cooperation, India over the years, provided training to a large number 
of  African military officers in various countries. India is one of  the largest contributors 
to peacekeeping in Africa. The importance of  engaging with Africa had been identified at 
the highest political level and been encapsulated in the India‑Africa Forum Summit 2015. 
In mid‑September 2019, the Indian naval battleship, INS Tarkash (which means ‘quiver’) 
called at the Port of  Walvis Bay as part of  a routine exercise and as a gesture of  peace to 
Namibia. The Tarkash is considered a modern stealth frigate commissioned in 2012 and is 
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part of  the Western Fleet of  the India Navy based in Mumbai, India, under the Western 
Naval Command. The INS Tarkash visited many ports such as Djibouti, Alexandria (Egypt), 
Tangiers (Morocco), Lagos (Nigeria), Dakar (Senegal) and Maputo (Mozambique).36
Arms transfers
Since independence in March 1990, the Ministry of  Defence (MOD) has been procuring 
armaments and other equipment from a number of  countries, chief  amongst these: 
India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and China. The Federal Republic of  Germany donated 
transport and other logistical equipment. Significant arms transfers occurred over the past 
decade or more, even in a context of  a faltering economy in the 2016‑2018 fiscal years.37
By far the most controversial bilateral relationship since independence has been the 
one with the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea (DPRK). Apart from construction 
companies from that country that built most of  the post‑ independent memorials such 
as Heroes Acre and the Museum of  the Liberation Struggle, the NDF entered into a 
secret agreement with the DPRK to set up a munitions factory south of  the capital 
city Windhoek. This agreement and the subsequent activities were a clear violation of 
several United Nations Security Council Resolutions and late in 2017, the Namibian 
Government had to eat humble pie when sanctioned individuals and the company were 
declared persona non grata in the country. This followed initial denials that Namibia was 
in violation of  any United Nations Security Council Resolutions at the highest level of 
government. At the same time, a contract to build the new Defence Headquarters by the 
same company, Mansudae Overseas Projects, from the DPRK had to be cancelled, even if 
the same company built a building that houses August 26 Holdings in Academia, a suburb 
of  Windhoek.38
Defence budget
For a small, stable and peaceful state, with a population of  2.5 million (2017) and faced by 
many developmental challenges, Namibia has a rather large defence budget that in 2010 
reached 4.2 percent of  GDP. Table 8.2 shows the defence budget of  the country over the 
2000‑2018/19 period.39
TABLE 8.2 Defence Budget (2000‑2018/19)






















Analysts of  Namibia’s defence budget, and of  defence economics more generally, face 
special difficulties in obtaining reliable and comprehensive data on all aspects related to 
defence spending. The variances under the main divisions in the budget, such as Office of 
the Minister, Training, Army, 21st Guard Battalion, Air Force, Military Hospital, Navy and 
Procurement, are very difficult to calculate accurately. Procurement and modernisation 
programmes are even harder to determine. In the latest Defence Vote under the Defence 
Appropriation Bill 2018/2019, for example, the formal statement by the Minister simply 
reads on the targets provided for in the corresponding Medium‑Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF): ‘Carry out research on modern equipment and acquire 16,5% of 
Defence equipment by 2018/2019 and replace obsolete and outdated equipment with at 
least 16,5% latest technology by 2018/2019.’40
In the absence of  a strong opposition and a robust system of  parliamentary committees, 
there is precious little parliamentary oversight over the defence budget and expenditure. 
To make matters worse, August 26 Holding Company that has the mandate for research 
and development (R&D) and for procurement on behalf  of  the MOD, has never had its 
books publicly audited since its establishment more than a decade ago. 
Conclusions
As an integral part of  the country’s Policy on International Relations and Cooperation, more 
so as reiterated in January 2017, it is to be expected that the Namibia’s defence diplomacy 
will continue to mirror closely what happens in the country’s foreign relations. Especially 
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noteworthy are new elements in Policy that have taken on significantly more salience on 
account of  the country’s geopolitics as a logistics hub for SADC and the special emphasis 
put in Agenda 2063 of  the African Union (AU). Such elements include, but are not limited 
to the following: the Blue Economy Initiative of  the AU; more effective protection of  the 
country’s marine resources; trade and investment; infrastructure development; oil and gas 
and strategically positioning the country, especially for landlocked states, as a logistics hub 
for SADC within which the Port of  Walvis Bay will play a vital role.
The fact that Namibia’s defence diplomacy is mutually constitutive of  its wider inter‑
national relations, means that the latter defence diplomacy privileges a few strong bilateral 
relations such as with South Africa, Botswana and for training, technical support and 
procurement, the Federal Republic of  Germany (FRG), India, Brazil and China. At the 
time of  writing, November 2019, Namibia hosted military attachés from a number of 
foreign states, amongst these: the United States of  America (USA), the United Kingdom, 
the Federal Republic of  Germany, Argentina, South Africa, Turkey and Tanzania. The 
country’s defence diplomacy is new realist and draws on the doctrines and diplomatic 
practice of  a range of  nations, inclusive of  Western countries and those of  the Global South. 
The provision of  higher‑level academic education in security and strategic studies at 
the Military School housed within the University of  Namibia (UNAM) and the Military 
Academy in Okahandja, holds much promise for developing defence intellectuals and 
diplomats for the 21st century. 
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The Trajectory of Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy 
and Defence Diplomacy 
Torque Mude and Sadiki Maeresera 
Introduction
Zimbabwe’s pursuit of  foreign policy through defence diplomacy has largely escaped 
scholarly attention. However, defence diplomacy has featured prominently in the 
country’s foreign policy lexicon and practice. Like other states, Zimbabwe uses defence 
resources and capabilities in peacetime for the fulfilment of  foreign policy and security 
objectives. With the diminishing likelihood of  the threat or use of  force in the pursuit 
of  foreign policy goals in contemporary world politics, Zimbabwe adopted the concept 
of  defence diplomacy and institutionalised it in pursuit of  bilateral and multilateral 
relations. Interstate defence and security cooperation, provision of  defence attachés, 
the conduct of  joint permanent commissions on defence and security, and special force 
training programmes within Southern Africa and the African continent have been part of 
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in the 21st century.
This chapter discusses the interplay between Zimbabwe’s defence diplomacy and foreign 
policy since the turn of  the millennium. The constitutional obligations of  the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces (ZDF) underscore the role of  the military in fulfilling the country’s 
foreign policy objectives. Even though the term ‘defence diplomacy’ is not explicitly 
mentioned in any formal document, it falls within the wider scope of  Zimbabwe’s foreign 
policy. For instance, the Zimbabwe Defence Policy reiterates the commitment of  the 
ZDF to the creation of  common regional security architecture and the maintenance of 
international peace and security. To this end, the country’s military engages with regional 
and subregional political, economic and collective security institutions, including those 
of  the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and 
other African states, in realisation of  defence diplomacy. Understanding Zimbabwe’s 
pursuit of  foreign policy objectives through defence diplomacy requires an explanation of 
the two concepts under discussion, foreign policy and defence diplomacy, and these are 
outlined below.
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Conceptual overview of foreign policy and defence diplomacy
Foreign policy and defence diplomacy are intrinsically interrelated in so far as the latter 
implies activities in realisation of  the former. However, it is also important to clearly grasp 
what the two concepts denote independently of  each other, and where and how they 
are related. 
Debating foreign policy
Foreign policy is not a new concept and is generally considered to be one of  the ways in 
which the processes of  international politics operate. The term has been influenced by 
a number of  divergent philosophical standpoints, such as realism, which emphasises the 
pursuit of  national interests by any means; idealism, which places emphasis on morality; 
and institutionalism, which values the role of  institutions and cooperation. However, there 
is some consensus that foreign policy relates to the pursuit and projection of  national 
interests in relation to other states as well as non‑state entities. 
Dominant foreign policy scholars, such as Modelski (1962:6‑7), define it as activities 
designed to alter the behaviour of  other states as well regulate a state’s own actions in 
the international political environment, while Padelford and Lincoln (1977:197) state 
that it is the process through which states pursue their interests, goals and objectives. 
Similarly, Rodee (1967:571) views foreign policy as the pursuit of  principles adopted by 
states to change the behaviour of  other states and safeguard their national interests. From 
a multilateralism lens, Frankel (1968:1) conceptualises foreign policy as a collection of 
actions and decisions in relations between states, highlighting the terms interdependency 
and institutionalism which emphasise collective action and decision‑making as the pillars 
of  contemporary international politics.
While states have varying foreign relations goals, ranging from attaining selfish goals to 
war, the end of  the Cold War saw a shift from a reliance on military force or violence for 
survival to military cooperation as a tool for statecraft (Winger, 2014). However, peace 
and security have remained the primary objectives of  defence diplomacy, in much the 
same way as they were during the era of  relying on military force for state security. Like 
other states, Zimbabwe has been active in defence diplomacy in pursuit of  the country’s 
foreign policy goals, which include the attainment of  peace and security at home, and 
within the Southern African subregion, the African continent at large, and the entire 
international community. Thus, the chapter now turns to a discussion of  the concept of 
defence diplomacy. 
Understanding defence diplomacy
Defence diplomacy denotes the peacetime use of  military forces and related infrastructure 
as tools of  foreign and security policy (Cottey & Foster, 2004:5‑6). The concept emerged 
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at the end of  the Cold War as an antithesis to the obsession with the threat or use of 
force as the means to achieve peace and security (Clarke, O’Connor & Ellis, 1997). As a 
variant of  soft power, defence diplomacy is concerned with the use of  armed forces in 
non‑violent operations, including regional defence fora, personnel exchanges, aircraft visits, 
confidence‑ and security‑building, as well as joint training and exercises (Chernyl, 2008). 
These activities aim to manage state relations, as well as consolidate collective security, and 
are sometimes referred to as military diplomacy. While the terms are usually conflated, 
the latter is an aspect of  the former, referring to the role of  military attachés and their 
related activities.
Thus, it is clear that the activities associated with defence diplomacy fall within the 
spectrum of  foreign policy. This is partly attributable to the fact that the security of  a 
state, which is the primary objective of  international relations, cannot be understood 
only in terms of  individual interests, but must rather be viewed collectively alongside 
the welfare of  other states. Having said that, it can be argued that Zimbabwe’s practice 
of  defence diplomacy with other African states and regional organisations is designed 
to enhance national, regional and international security, which are interrelated due to 
political, economic and security interdependence.
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and defence diplomacy: Complementary 
bedfellows
Even though the National Defence Policy of  the ZDF does not make explicit reference to 
defence diplomacy, the country’s military forces, in close coordination with the foreign 
ministry, have engaged in several defence diplomacy associated activities. The ZDF is an 
active participant in the SADC early warning system, which was established in 2010 to 
deal with anticipated security challenges stemming from conflicts. The Regional Early 
Warning System, which was established at the recommendation of  the Interstate Defence 
and Security Committee (IDSC), is part of  the SADC collective security infrastructure 
that brings together the military wings of  SADC member states to safeguard peace and 
security in the subregion. 
Furthermore, the hosting of  the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre by Zimbabwe is 
an example of  the country’s defence diplomacy in relation to SADC member states. The 
centre falls under the auspices of  the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and 
was established in 1996 to provide training for peace support activities in the subregion 
and continent. It aims to promote regional integration in peace and security issues and 
to equip SADC member states with technical peacekeeping skills. Hence, the centre 
operates as a regional security management institution which aligns with Zimbabwe’s 
interests, and those it has in common with other SADC states. This is attributable to 
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the post‑Cold War discourse of  military cooperation, rather than a military competition‑
oriented foreign policy.
Moreover, the ZDF actively participates in the SADC Brigade and African Standby Force 
(ASF) for regional peace operations, under the ASF Policy Framework launched in 2008. 
The ASF is headquartered in Zimbabwe, and its responsibilities include participating in 
peace support missions, interventions for peace and security maintenance at the request 
of  a member state, and actions to manage conflicts in Southern Africa and beyond. With 
a mandate to manage the security of  the whole of  Southern Africa, the fact that the ASF is 
headquartered in Zimbabwe is as an example of  Zimbabwe’s management of  its relations 
with Southern African countries through the defence and security apparatus. 
Zimbabwe’s defence diplomacy in the pursuit of  its foreign policy objectives has also been 
seen in the country’s commitment to the maintenance of  peace and security in the region, 
through its contribution to regional forces for peace support operations. In 2014, following 
the attempted coup in Lesotho, the ZDF joined South Africa and Namibia to help create 
the conditions for national security and political stability (Vhumbunu, 2015). While the 
peace support efforts were geared towards peace and security in the region, they also 
served to promote Zimbabwe’s national security, which partly depends on stability in the 
region. Apart from the national and collective security objectives, the ZDF’s participation 
in the Lesotho peace process illustrates Zimbabwe’s cordial defence and security relations 
with its Southern African counterparts. 
Zimbabwe’s advancement of  foreign policy goals from a defence diplomacy perspective 
extends beyond the Southern African region. Zimbabwe is amongst the contributors to the 
ASF, which was previously commanded by a Zimbabwean, Major General Trust Magova 
(The Sunday Mail, 2015). The ASF is a multidisciplinary force which acts under the direction 
of  the AU and is deployed in situations of  crisis on the African continent. However, since 
it was declared functionally ready in 2016, the African Standby Force is yet to be deployed, 
due to a range of  factors including the divergent strategic interests of  member states, 
financial resources constraints, and politicisation of  operations in regional mechanisms 
(Darkwa, 2017). However, it is not the focus of  this chapter to discuss the challenges 
confronting the ASF, but rather to highlight Zimbabwe’s commitment to African security.
While defence diplomacy focuses on the ways in which states pursue their own interests 
in global affairs, contributing to security on the continent goes a long way towards the 
preservation of  interstate relations, and the mere fact of  coordination and cooperation 
within collective security frameworks is an indication of  the desire to coexist in a peaceful 
and secure environment. Compared to World War I, World War II and Cold War politics 
of  military competition, aggression and ideological conflicts, the use of  the armed forces 
as a non‑violent diplomatic tool is one of  the factors that explain the absence of  major 
interstate wars in contemporary world affairs. 
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The establishment of  joint permanent commissions on military and security issues is one 
of  Zimbabwe’s variants of  soft power, enabling it to avoid military confrontation with 
other countries. For example, the Zimbabwe/Botswana Joint Permanent Commission on 
Defence and Security has gone a long way to unite the two countries, even when they had 
political differences. For example, Ian Khama of  Botswana was critical of  Robert Mugabe’s 
dictatorship in Zimbabwe, leading to a diplomatic row between the two countries. Defence 
diplomacy has been crucial in dealing with security challenges in Zimbabwe‑Botswana 
economic relations, and through the joint permanent commission, Zimbabwe has been 
able to boost her national security and human security through cooperation in combating 
transnational crimes, including human trafficking, trafficking of  precious minerals, cattle 
rustling, and drug trafficking, amongst others (30th Session of  the Zimbabwe/Botswana 
Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security, 2016).
The exchange of  information and experience on military and intelligence issues has also 
been one of  the premises of  joint permanent commissions. A case in point is the South 
Africa/Zimbabwe Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security, which involves 
the seconding of  Zimbabwean Airforce instructors to train South African Airforce 
pilots, aircraft technicians and other support staff  (Ministerial Session of  the South 
Africa/Zimbabwe Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security, 2005). As a 
result, South Africa and Zimbabwe have consolidated a special relationship with roots 
in postcolonial political and diplomatic engagement emanating from a shared history of 
oppression, and of  cooperation during the liberation struggles of  the two states. 
Moreover, the exchange of  intelligence between Zimbabwe and South Africa has yielded 
considerable results in dealing with transnational crimes and terrorism. In 2004, South 
African and Zimbabwean military intelligence‑sharing led to the interception of  a group 
of  mercenaries who were en route to Equatorial Guinea to stage a coup. Samuel Mani and 
his men were arrested in accordance with universal jurisdiction, which empowers any state 
to arrest perpetrators of  universal crimes such as terrorism, piracy, war crimes and other 
international crimes. The arrest of  the mercenaries, which was arose from Zimbabwe’s 
defence diplomacy, resulted in the strengthening of  relations between Zimbabwe and 
Equatorial Guinea. 
Defence diplomacy between Zimbabwe and South Africa has therefore benefited not 
only the two states, but others as well. In addition to the incident described above, the 
Zimbabwe‑South Africa Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security has 
accelerated interaction between the air forces of  the whole Southern African region through 
experience and training exchanges (Ministerial Session of  the South Africa/Zimbabwe 
Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security, 2005). To this end, the security of 
the entire subregion is bolstered by the military engagement initiatives instigated by these 
two states.
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Zimbabwe’s defence diplomacy has also been illustrated by the country’s consistency in 
deploying its defence forces for peacekeeping purposes in neighbouring states. In 2014, the 
ZDF were deployed as military observers in Mozambique to ensure post‑election tensions 
did not escalate into violence between the two major contesting parties, Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 
(Channel Africa, 2014). The ZDF joined forces deployed by eight other states to maintain 
peace in violence hotspots in the Tete, Sofala, Nampula and Inhamabane provinces in 
Mozambique (All Africa, 2014). Defence‑ and security‑related exchanges and assistance 
between Zimbabwe and Mozambique date to Zimbabwe’s war of  liberation, which was 
characterised by the training of  freedom fighters and grooming of  political leaders in 
Mozambique. 
As a result of  the strong military ties between the two, Zimbabwe aided its neighbour 
during the Mozambican civil war by deploying troops under the direction of  the 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to monitor the peace process 
in the country. The mandate of  ONUMOZ was to monitor the ceasefire, separation 
and concentration of  forces, demobilisation, storage and destruction of  weapons; and 
provide security in the major transport corridors. In the aftermath of  the civil war, 
Zimbabwe trained 540 Mozambican military officers at a military facility in Nyanga in 
the eastern part of  the country (ONUMOZ News, N.d), and the initiative was known as 
the Joint Commission for the Formation of  the Mozambican Defence Forces. Since then, 
Zimbabwe has maintained strong military ties with Mozambique. As a result, the two 
countries regular conduct infantry‑training exchanges and visits.
Regular joint multinational field training of  military personnel has been carried out 
by Zimbabwe and its SADC counterparts with the aim of  preparing SADC military 
peacekeepers. In 1997, Zimbabwe hosted the multinational joint field training code, 
named Exercise Blue Hungwe, in Nyanga to train SADC peacekeepers in international 
peacekeeping tactics and techniques (Inter Press Service News Agency, 1997). A total of 
1,570 military personnel from Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Malawi participated in the exercise (Inter Press 
Service News Agency, 1997). Similar exercises include Exercise Blue Crane, which was 
conducted in 1999 in the Indian Ocean and at a South African Battle School in the Kalahari 
Desert (De Coning, 1999), to which Zimbabwe sent military personnel.
In 2009, military forces from the SADC Brigade conducted joint military drills under 
operation Golfinho at the Angola Special Forces Centre in Cabo Ledo in northern Bengo 
province. Military forces from Zimbabwe joined their counterparts from Swaziland, 
Mozambique, Congo, Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC), Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Angola in the joint 
military exercise (South African Government News Agency, 2009). Exercise Blue Kunene 
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was also conducted in Namibia in 2016 with Zimbabwe military forces taking part, and 
was designed to prepare SADC member states’ air forces for rapid deployment in response 
to humanitarian crises in Africa and beyond (DCD Defence, 2017). 
While Zimbabwe’s defence diplomacy has been largely tailored to safeguard African peace 
and security, examples of  Zimbabwe’s selfish interests in some bilateral and multilateral 
defence and security engagements cannot be ignored. For instance, the regular and 
consistent deployment of  military forces in Mozambique and the DRC are widely 
speculated to have been motivated by Zimbabwe’s desire to protect the Beira corridor, 
through which oil is transported to Zimbabwe. Regarding military assistance to the DRC, 
it has been argued that the interventions were designed to protect diamond mines and 
other business ventures owned by Zimbabwe’s political elite. If  these claims are true, they 
support the realist assumption that the actions of  states as they relate to others are driven 
by selfish interests (Morgenthau, 1967). They also resonate with Carr’s (1964:239) assertion 
that morality in foreign policy is used as a scapegoat for the pursuit of  national interests. 
Be that as it may, Zimbabwe’s defence diplomacy has been crucial in the fulfilment of 
the country’s foreign policy goals, including national security, regional security and 
international security. Hence, Zimbabwe’s national interests have been accomplished 
through peaceful cooperation with other states and international organisations.
Conclusion
In the pursuit of  intrinsically related national, regional and international peace and 
security objectives, Zimbabwe has resorted to defence diplomacy in its relations with 
state and non‑state entities. As a soft power tool in world affairs, defence diplomacy 
has created, maintained and consolidated cordial relations between Zimbabwe and her 
neighbouring states. Furthermore, defence diplomacy has been instrumental in the 
country’s multilateral foreign policy, through which national, regional and international 
peace and security have been supported by the non‑violent use of  the defence apparatus 
to advance strategic objectives through cooperation. For Zimbabwe, defence diplomacy 
therefore appears to be one of  the most important means of  statecraft.
Editors’ note
Zimbabwe was ruled as an authoritarian state by Robert Gabriel Mugabe since independence in 1980. 
Mugabe became increasingly unpopular as a result of  his personal style, the mismanagement of  the 
economy, corrupt practices, favouritism and earlier human rights abuses. In November 2017, some sections 
of  the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) took control of  the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and 
key areas in Harare, the capital of  Zimbabwe. The uprising took place amid tensions in the ruling party. In a 
heated atmosphere, First Vice‑President Emmerson Mnangagwa, a favourite of  the ZDF, was relieved of  his 
duties by President Mugabe. A week later, the Chief  of  the ZDF, Constantino Chiwenga, strongly criticised 
the firing of  Mnangagwa. Mugabe was removed as party leader and given a deadline for resignation. Mugabe 
stalled for some days but eventually resigned. Mnangagwa was sworn in as President on 24 November 2017. 
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Zimbabwe as an authoritarian state ruled by Mugabe and following recent developments is not yet in a 
period of  transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The resignation of  President Mugabe under 
pressure from the military, the latter stopping short of  a coup in November 2017, is not yet implying the 
achievement of  a stable or sustainable democracy in the near future. What evolved in 2017 was a change within 
government and not a regime change. Democratic transition implies a change from an authoritarian regime to 
a (more) democratic regime, including a change of  the previous ruling party (or incumbent political elite) 
to new incumbents. The notion of  transition implies that civil society, following elite differences within 
the ruling party, moves to a significant extent into the public space at the moment of  transition. During 
the 2017 stalemate in Zimbabwe, the civil community went to the streets but were not the main dynamo 
of  the change. They seemed to have been merely supporting the military in their attempt to force Mugabe 
out of  Zimbabwe’s power politics. A transition to democracy under current conditions remains remote. 
Space for citizen politics may open up, but it remains to be seen whether the “new”/“old” elite that arose 
from recent internal differences will allow significant change. Possible transition to democracy was for the 
moment arrested. It remains to be seen whether the post‑Mugabe ZANU‑PF elite will become divided on a 
future pathway to democracy and how it will impact on foreign and defence diplomacy. Zimbabwe’s future 
remains full of  both risk and possibilities.
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China in a Global World
Ian Liebenberg and Justin van der Merwe
Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the growth of China as a political, military and economic power since its emergence as an 
independent communist state in 1949. China became a notable political force during the era of decolonisation (1950‑1980) 
and one of the leading states within the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM). Due to its relative economic development and 
substantial population, China became well‑known for posing alternatives to Western domination. During the era of 
decolonisation, China’s external involvement increased through its use of soft power and as a result of its support for liberation 
movements in Africa. The end of the Cold War saw the demise of the bipolar world and resulted in unipolarity. More recently, 
however, multipolarity has taken root through the rise or resurgence of non‑Western emerging powers. Since 1990, and 
especially since 2000, China has moved from being a regional hegemon to a global power. This chapter describes the rise of 
China and its current status as an aspiring global hegemon. Although the chapter is mainly descriptive, it also provides some 
reflective and analytical notes on China’s current and conceivable future role on the international stage. 
Background
The Washington Conference of  1921/1922 recognised China’s sovereignty and indepen­
dence. From 1922, the area now known as China experienced violent Western colonial 
interventions, civil war, and contesting “Republics”, before the emergence of  the 
communist People’s Republic of  China in 1949, which became a notable power in the 
Global South. China grew in stature in global politics between the 1960s and 1990s, 
growth which accelerated from 2000. Today, it is one of  the undisputed global political 
and economic powers. 
The rise of  modern China represents a unique historical trajectory. The Chinese civilisation 
went through tumultuous periods and several changes, ranging from the early rise of 
interactive communities (3000 BCE) and the Shang/Yin settlements (1700­112 BCE), 
through several dynasties such as the Chou and Ch’in period (1100­221 BCE), the Ch’in 
Empire (221­206 BCE), and the Han Dynasty. After the demise of  the Han Empire, the 
Wei, Shu Han and Wu dynasties were overtaken by the Sui and T’ang dynasties (circa 
500­756 CE). The Sturm und Drang that led to the creation of  today’s geographical region 
of  China foreshadowed what was to come. 
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Over these periods of  new orders supplanting or surpassing old ones, unique forms 
of  writing, bureaucracy, legislation, and military organisation (including conscription) 
evolved. From 1211, periods of  Mongol rule were interspersed with the growth of  a 
gradually unifying China. Systems of  administration developed, trade flourished, and 
literature and culture bloomed through both long­term internal developments and some 
infusion from outside, until the Mongols were driven out around 1400. The centralised 
rule and extensive (centralised) bureaucracies that have become key features in modern 
China began to develop in this period. The Ming dynasty brought further developments 
and unification, and the aims of  foreign policy at the time were for the centralised 
state to maintain the security of  a (presumably) uniting China, prevent further Mongol 
interference, and to retain and expand trade channels.
Gavin Menzies suggests that, following the expulsion of  the last of  the Mongols, Emperor 
Zhu Di built up an army of  nearly a million and brought Japan and Korea under Chinese 
influence, and some would argue that this already augured well for a greater China. Zhu 
Di also dispatched a large armada of  merchant and battleships, initiating a maritime 
tradition that was to grow significantly in the years to come (Menzies, 2003). Regarding 
grey diplomacy, these ambitious maritime ventures certainly brought China into the 
international picture as far back as the middle of  the 1400s, if  only briefly. The Ch’in 
dynasty marked further cultural growth.
In his work, Africa in History, Basil Davidson points out that trade between Africa, China 
and India developed between 900 and 1300 CE (Davidson, 2001:114, 193). The rise of 
Islamic expansion also played a role here (Davidson, 2001:72, 193). By the 1400s, trade 
between the East Coast of  Africa and the Far East was well­established, though it was 
soon to be interrupted and violently taken over by the Portuguese (Davidson, 2001:194). 
The decline of  the dynasties in China introduced the ‘Western Challenge’ or Western 
intervention from 1839 onwards.
As mentioned, the Washington Conference of  1921/1922 signalled the West’s formal 
recognition of  China’s status. Despite international recognition, the country was to 
experience leadership and military rivalries, Japanese aggression, internal and external 
strife, and a civil war that lasted from 1945 to 1949. In 1949, a Chinese communist 
government came to power under Mao Zedong. The Nationalist forces withdrew to 
Taiwan and declared a republic, despite mainland China viewing it as merely a belligerent 
province. This remains a contentious international issue to this day.
In Beijing, a red star rises
Following the establishment of  the People’s Republic in mainland China in 1949, 
development and socio­economic transformation were both expected and demanded by 
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the Chinese people, and the political leadership that created these expectations had to 
address the pressing questions of  modernisation, industrialisation and large­scale land 
reform. The decades 1949 to 1979 saw many developments, as the country experienced 
(sometimes contradictory) political developments, experiments in policy, intense 
leadership clashes, and elements of  Soviet­style five­year plans. The period was also 
marked by economic policies that swung from a focus on industrialisation to land reform 
for the peasant population. The Hundred Flowers campaign (1956­1957) opened up 
criticism of  Mao and brought great political turmoil. However, Mao survived. The Great 
Leap Forward saw attempts to build a rural industry, ending more in disaster than success 
(Service, 2007:331ff.), but Mao’s image remained largely intact despite public criticism 
(Service, 2007:334). The so­called Cultural Revolution that arose with Mao’s tacit consent, 
had to be reined in by the Chairman himself  by 1969 (Service, 2007:339).
Despite these upheavals, during the 1950s, together with the Soviet Union, China 
represented a rising ‘Red Danger’ for the (liberal) capitalist West or its allies. The latter 
formed a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while a 
Russo­Chinese treaty signed in February 1950 brought together the People’s Republic of 
China and the Soviet Union. Other treaties signed during the visit of  Zhou Enlai (Chou 
En­lai) to Moscow in 1952 further cemented these ties, and China soon announced its first 
five­year plan along the lines of  a Soviet model (Calvocoressi, 1982:54). The Korean War 
during the 1950s seemed to draw China and the Soviet Union closer together and created 
greater distance from the United States (US) and its allies (Calvocoressi, 1982:58­60). The 
Cold War was in full swing. 
However, relations between the Soviet Union and China were strained, despite their shared 
commitment to international communism. Calvocoressi suggests that, by 1956/1957, the 
relationship was ‘ruffled by suspicion and friction’ due to differences in strategy on how 
to spread the communist ideology abroad. The issue was further complicated by personal 
differences between Mao and Khrushchev (Calvocoressi, 1982:64ff.). The rising influence 
of  China, its involvement in Africa, its links with Nicolae Ceausescu of  Romania within 
Moscow’s arc of  influence, its move away from industrialisation and Marxism­Leninism 
(as perceived by Communist leadership in Moscow), and border clashes with the Soviet 
Union all played a role in creating distance between Moscow and Beijing (Boggs & Boggs, 
1974:72­75; Lundestad, 1991:242; Service, 2007). So too did national pride, with Lundestad 
(1991:239) noting that, 
… [t]wo countries as strong and proud as the Soviet Union and China could not see 
eye to eye despite their commitment to the ideology of  communism … China was 
not a major power at the moment, but the Chinese traditionally (assumed) that 
they are (a centre of  the world) and believed in a great future.
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To complicate matters, China opened itself  to a rapprochement with the US (Dallek, 2007), 
and the overtures made by the then president, Richard Nixon, closely advised by Henry 
Kissinger, contributed to more tension between the Soviet Union and China. Kissinger 
and Nixon succeeded in the goal of  splitting the Soviet Union and China, despite these 
two countries sharing similar goals. China gained international stature through this 
exercise and proved that it was an actor on the global stage, although in the politics of 
the so­called ‘Third World’ or the ‘Global South’, it had already achieved this stature. The 
ping­pong diplomacy of  Mao and the Chinese leadership’s choice to do their own thing 
were key reasons for the split with the Soviet Union (Dallek, 2007:267­268; Lundestad, 
1991:239, 241).
Meanwhile, in the West, the ruling discourse and world view defined by political and 
military leaders was that the world was caught up in a Cold War between ‘rational’ liberal 
capitalism and ‘irrational’ communism. Much of  this was underpinned by the mentality of 
the US and its allies of  being the benevolent masters of  world politics – global guardianship 
or Herrschaft. The US had been the undisputed Western and global economic power 
since World War I, and its economy already outstripped that of  Britain by 1900, further 
benefitting from the two World Wars (1914­1918 and 1939­1945) which brought social 
dislocation and havoc to Europe, but were never fought on American soil. The US enjoyed 
a certain privilege during this time due to its relative isolation, and status as a supplier to 
those at war, stimulating massive economic growth and the start of  a military­industrial 
complex that would grow in decades to come (De Wet & Liebenberg, 2012:247­249).
Red stars in Africa 
The Soviet Union became involved in anti­colonial struggles and wars of  national liberation 
in Africa, sometimes by choice, sometimes by imposed conditions (Eidelberg, 2015:35ff.). 
By contrast, China mostly followed a soft approach of  infrastructural development in 
exchange for geopolitical influence against the West and the Soviet Union. The China­
constructed Tanzam railway, linking Tanzania and Zambia, bears testimony to this. A 
capital­intensive project, the line was surveyed in 1968, work started in October 1970, and 
the ambitious venture was completed by the middle of  1976. Completing a railway over 
1,800 kilometres through challenging environments from rainforests to near desert was 
an engineering milestone, and the Tanzam enterprise raised more than an eyebrow in the 
West (New York Times, 29 January 1971; Chinese Economic Studies, 1977:27). 
During 1970, the Peoples’ Republic of  China also ventured into less­soft diplomacy on the 
African continent, albeit tentative. One example is the case of  Angola, which lapsed into 
civil strife in 1975 after the hasty withdrawal of  the Portuguese colonisers and interference 
by the US, apartheid South Africa and Zaire, a chosen proxy of  France, Belgium and 
193China in a Global World
the UK. Mozambique and Angola saw independence arriving when the authoritarian 
regime of  Caetano fell in Portugal in 1974 and was replaced by a leftist government. The 
Soviets and China supported the Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO, although 
Mozambique was not ‘a primary Cold War battle ground’ (Ciment, 1997:15). However, 
Angola was to become something of  a test for the foreign policy of  a rising China.
China chose to support one (and later two) of  the three then feuding Angolan liberation 
movements. The Chinese sent approximately 100 advisors to Kinshasa to assist Holden 
Roberto’s Front for the National Liberation of  Angola (FNLA) movement (Ciment, 
1997:46; Meredith, 2005:313). Roberto was both corrupt and close to the American 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Gleijesus, 2002:238­239; Shubin, 2008:45,  63), but 
despite him being on friendly terms with the US, he remained open to involvement from 
China. Roberto visited Beijing in 1973 and persuaded the Chinese to supply FNLA with 
arms and instructors (Meredith, 2005:313), and Shubin observes that this added to the 
highly complex situation in Angola as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of  Angola 
(MPLA) had earlier also visited Beijing (2008:59­60). The matter of  Chinese involvement 
was also discussed by Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, George Bush, Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping (Shubin, 2008:59­60). Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were deeply critical of 
the American government’s support of  apartheid South Africa, and South Africa and the 
CIA were already part of  a messy equation (Shubin, 2008:59, 60). The Chinese withdrew 
their advisors when, to their surprise, they discovered that the CIA and South Africa were 
already assisting Holden Roberto in the field. The situation in Angola was confusing due to 
the intermingling of  colonial, neocolonial and liberation struggle interests, personalities, 
social ideals, and contending ideologies. 
Ciment noted that, ‘[i]f  politics make strange bedfellows, then Angolan politics positively 
made for bizarre ones’ (1997:119). For a moment, the US and apartheid South Africa 
(exploiting the Cold War mythology for their benefit) seemed to work together with 
Communist China, with a tactical consensus on some version of  anti­Sovietism. In making 
a rational calculus, China eventually backed out, becoming aware of  the complexity of 
such a Kaf ka­esque involvement. The Chinese leadership withdrew from the engagement 
with the FNLA and narrowly prevented an international debacle with itself  as the loser.
Angola was not the only case where China became involved. At times, it also supported 
the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) during the liberation struggle against 
the minority regime of  Ian Smith in then Rhodesia (Shubin, 2008:158­159). 
Back home in the 1980s: Lessons learnt, future visions 
A connection between lessons learnt, foresight and the will to succeed through action 
(or praxis) can change a political context from idealism to one of  achievement. Despite 
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human rights abuses and authoritarianism, Chinese leadership through the Communist 
Party managed a collective of  people and made important decisions aimed to enhance the 
economic future of  the country. While there were several challenges and human suffering 
from 1950 to the 1960s, China increased its influence on the international scene during the 
1970s, establishing a platform for what was to come. 
In 1976, Deng Xiaoping succeeded an ailing Mao. Changes were needed and as a result, 
he introduced the Four Modernisations, which were goals to strengthen the fields of 
agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. The plan aimed to 
coordinate and integrate China’s internal and external policies in complementary fashion, 
and if  successful, would see a rejuvenation of  China’s economic power and stature in the 
global community.
The four modernisations were to change China from an actor in the Global South to 
a major force in international economics, and a growing actor in international politics. 
With significant experience on ‘how not to do it’, and a commitment to building a united 
China as a force to be reckoned with, the initiation of  the four modernisations was a 
well thought­out strategy linking domestic challenges and the international context 
with China’s national interests. From an outsider’s perspective, this approach may be 
seen as linking (and perhaps intertwining) socialism and state­sponsored enterprise, and 
complementing this with continuous adaptations to macro­ and micro­economic needs.
Some argued that the new economic approach was not capitalism as seen in Western 
contexts. Chinese theorists suggested that it steered clear of  simplistic solutions such 
as ‘pure’ capitalism and ‘pure’ communism. (Pan, 1987; Yiwei, 1988; Jiatun, 1991; 
Congming, 1991; Wenming, 1984). Lu Congming echoed these sentiments, suggesting 
that a re­assessment of  socialist and capitalist thought could achieve a theoretical, and 
hence a practical, working economy that responds to internal needs and external interests 
(Congming, 1988:25ff.; see also Jiatun, 1991). 
Since the 1970s, and particularly since the late 1980s/early 1990s, China demonstrated a 
strong upward trajectory, with agricultural reforms from 1980 already adding value by 
midway through the decade (Wenming et al., 1984). This was also part of  what its state elite 
had viewed as ‘Greater China’ (Hoogvelt, 1997:217). In the late 1980s, Lynn Pan suggested 
that China demonstrated a unique development trajectory in comparison to Western 
states, wondering ‘Would China become the world’s next colossus?’ (Pan, 1987:238).
China, 1990‑2020: Economic power and the global political economy
Samir Amin argues that, since the formation of  what is commonly called the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (a set of  agreements between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, and US Treasury Department), the world economy has been dictated by 
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liberal­capitalism through a Western (core­state) consensus, and alternative pathways 
to the dominant capitalist paradigm were not popular (Amin, 2006:168). He argues that 
China and Russia (and other so­called Third World countries) found themselves confronted 
with the dominance of  capitalism, and the marginalisation of  alternative economic 
pathways, namely socialism (Amin, 2006:168). However, Western­style capitalism faced 
its own problems. As the dominant system, it too did not achieve economic equality. On 
the contrary, it deepened class differences and increased the gap between rich and poor 
both globally and regionally (Amin, 2006; Chomsky, 2007; Martin & Schumann, 1997; 
Keulder, 1996; Hoogvelt, 1997). As neoliberal globalisation has spread across the globe, 
characterised by liberalising markets, trade openness, deregulation and privatisation, the 
situation has worsened (Amin, 2006; Chomsky, 2007; Dyer, 2006). Other alternatives 
were needed.
However, questions persisted over the extent to which China was actually proposing an 
alternative system, or whether it was merely repeating the prevailing Western­led system, 
albeit with Chinese characteristics. By the end of  the 1990s, China acted boldly on the 
international stage by adopting its ‘going out’ policy in 1998, and shortly thereafter 
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In contrast to its stated ambitions 
of  providing an alternative to the dominant system, there are two initiatives intimately 
tied to China’s global ambitions which demonstrate its acquiescence to global capitalism: 
BRICS, and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative, founded by Xi Jinping in 2013, who 
prioritised foreign affairs after becoming president earlier in the year.
The BRICS alliance is probably the strongest proponent of  what today is commonly 
called South­South relations, the origin of  which can be traced back to the NAM, and the 
partially China­led Bandung Conference hosted in Indonesia in 1955 between African and 
Asian heads of  state. Building on this, the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) alliance of 
prominent emerging economies was founded in 2005. The term ‘BRIC’ was initially coined 
by Jim O’Neill from Goldman Sachs in 2001, by which he hoped to capture the prominent 
emerging economies from the non­West, whose markets had vast growth potential and 
substantial populations. For example, in 2013, the BRICS accounted for 42% of  the global 
population and 40% of  the global gross domestic product (GDP) (Lumumba­Kasongo, 
2015:87). The BRIC states started hosting formal annual summits from 2009, and in 2010 
South Africa was invited to join the group, making it ‘BRICS’.
The most significant achievement of  the bloc thus far was the creation of  a New 
Development Bank (NDB) in 2014 to help finance infrastructure projects in the BRICS 
countries and within their respective regions. This bank, along with the China­controlled 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, supposedly heralded a 
challenge to the prevailing Washington Consensus. Proponents of  this argument suggest 
that the emerging powers, led by China, are attempting to challenge Western capitalism 
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by replacing it with a Chinese model of  development, or ‘Beijing Consensus’. The goal is 
also to challenge the hegemony of  the dollar with the renminbi. 
However, despite this goal, the NDB (at least initially) chose the US dollar as its preferred 
trading currency ( Johnson, 2015:209), as did the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). 
The CRA is a framework which assists the BRICS states to manage their short­term balance 
of  payments problems. However, it too resulted in a further strengthening of  the IMF, as 
if  a country seeks a loan in excess of  30% of  its borrowing quota, it would be required to 
take out a structural adjustment loan and subject itself  to conditionality (Bond, 2016:613). 
Some have also questioned the viability of  the NDB with regards to its ambitions and 
extent of  required infrastructure, as it possessed a total strength of  $100 billion against the 
World Bank’s $250 billion (Bertelsmann­Scott et al., 2016). Although the increased use of 
local currencies (not the US dollar) in trade and financial deals is cause for some optimism, 
in short, the creation of  an alternative financial system to substantively challenge the 
prevailing Western­led one seemed unlikely.
China’s OBOR initiative was devised to recycle some of  China’s accumulated capital and 
to repurpose the construction materials based in its state­owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
it was hoped that this would increase exports and further globalise the renminbi. OBOR 
is therefore an amplified version of  China’s ‘going out’ policy that was launched in the 
late 90s to increase capital outflow whilst seeking to further expand the reach of  Chinese 
companies (Rolland, 2017:130). 
OBOR’s land and maritime routes (spanning East, Middle and West Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe and Africa) comprise a series of  parallel and interlinked features, including inter­
continental railway routes, freeways, ports, and energy pipelines. OBOR comprises over 
60 countries, including 4 billion people and a market share of  approximately one­third of 
global GDP (Ferdinand, 2016:950). OBOR presents an opportunity for Chinese companies 
to invest in developing industrial, manufacturing, and special economic zones and parks 
(Du, 2016:31), and as centres for manufacturing, these parks will serve as distribution 
nodes along the many transport corridors of  OBOR. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
will be the dominant modus operandi of  OBOR, and Chinese credit will be extended to 
Chinese contractors to carry out the work of  OBOR in these countries (Hayes, 2017:1). 
China­employed financial instruments (issued by the Silk Road Fund, Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, and NDB) will fund Chinese projects in these territories, stimulating 
their markets, and even creating new ones. 
However, OBOR faces several difficulties, not least of  which are the significant security 
challenges. OBOR traverses areas where the Islamic State (IS) has been involved, and 
passes through the war­ravaged Iraq and Afghanistan. The safe passage of  capital, goods 
and people along OBOR routes is also contingent on security in the seas around the Horn 
197China in a Global World
of  Africa, and in states such as Somalia in East Africa and Yemen in the Middle East, where 
piracy poses a constant threat. On land, one has to contend with groups such as Al Shaabab. 
There are mixed views on how China should deal with these security threats (Swaine, 
2015:9). In certain quarters, it is believed that the Maritime Silk Road is closely linked 
to China’s goals of  transforming into a substantial maritime power. As Liang (2015, in 
Sidaway & Woon, 2017:596) contends, it is hoped that OBOR would turn the Peoples’ 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into ‘a robust blue water naval capability dedicated to sea 
lines of  communication defense’. Others believe that it is essential for China to establish 
contacts and ensure friendly ports and turnaround facilities based in other countries, as 
this will extend the range of  possible Chinese maritime activities (Chaturvedy, 2017). The 
so­called String of  Pearls is a strategy in which China is allegedly attempting to secure a 
series of  compliant ports and installations which would ensure their dominance over the 
South China Sea and beyond. Based on this, it seems that China may be reconsidering its 
stance on non­interference and non­intervention (Mustafic, 2017:117). 
In a similar vein to the BRICS alliance, many have argued that OBOR is a bold attempt 
to insert Chinese characteristics into broader capitalist development as a challenge to the 
Washington consensus. From this perspective, OBOR is calculated as a broader geopolitical 
gambit to challenge the Washington Consensus, similar to the way in which the Marshall 
Plan was a US­led reconstruction of  Western Europe after World War II. 
Although OBOR would signal a substantial advance by a growing global power, what 
is overwhelmingly more likely is that OBOR will fit into the Western­led system 
of  accumulation, particularly when assessed against broader trends concerning the 
BRICS reinforcement of  this system (Van der Merwe, 2018; Van der Merwe, Taylor 
& Arkhangelskaya, 2016). Chances are slim that OBOR will do anything other than 
reinforce the status quo concerning the broader systemic level and its preferred means of 
accumulation. The changes being rung in by OBOR are effectively style over substance, 
or just more of  the same. 
In 2018, China has assumed the role of  globalisation and free trade enforcer, taking 
over this role from the US, whose withdrawal from international engagements is owed 
to President Donald Trump’s trade protectionist policies and all­out trade wars with 
traditional allies such as Canada, the European Union, and China. The single most talked­
about item at the 2018 BRICS summit in Johannesburg was trade openness, and China 
came out strongly against US trade protectionism. 
Economic growth, defence and international status
D’Anieri, a US­based political scientist, argues that ‘China’s booming economy has 
probably brought more people out of  poverty than any global development scheme, 
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but development also contributes to the economic and military might that many fear’ 
(2014:298). Despite some ‘heat­up’ (a decline in sustained growth of  10%) in 2011, China’s 
macroeconomic policies contributed to relative global economic stability, and the country 
accumulated massive holdings of  foreign currencies, including US$4 trillion (D’Anieri, 
2014:298), in comparison to just over US$2 trillion in 2010 (D’Anieri, 2014:308). This 
phenomenon is expected to continue, as the Chinese central bank buys US bonds that in 
effect fund the massive US trade deficit, argues D’Anieri (2014:298).
Chinese expenditure during the 1970s was hard to calculate and estimates by prominent 
economists suggested that defence expenditure could have been US$4–5 billion, assuming 
that China had a 4–5% growth rate. Others suggested US$10–12 billion, while the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time estimated that the expenditure might 
have been as high as US$15 billion (IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies], 
1976:50), although this is likely an inflated figure or overestimation. 
Between 1977 and the mid­1980s, the four modernisations were conceptualised in China. 
During the late 1980s, IISS reports that, despite an economic growth rate of  approximately 
8%, defence spending in China declined (IISS, 1989:147). At the time, the total armed 
forces of  the People’s Republic stood at 3.2 million men and women, of  which the army 
represented 2.3 million (around a million conscripts on two­year stints). The navy staff 
consisted of  about 300,000, and the air force had 470,000 (IISS, 1989:147ff.). IISS argues 
that, given the available budget and perhaps also due to doctrine, the military posture of 
China resulted in a territorial ‘defensive force and lacked the ability, facilities and logistics 
capabilities for protracted, large­scale military operations outside China’ (IISS, 1976:48). 
However, the same publication noted ‘that China is gradually acquiring a greater logistic 
capacity’ (IISS, 1976:48). 
By 2012­2013, the IISS reported that China was making wide­ranging efforts to improve 
its military capacity, mirroring the country’s economic growth, and the Chinese Defence 
Paper, issued in April 2013, stressed that the armed forces should be ‘commensurate with 
China’s international standing’ (The Military Balance, 2014:206). The paper also pointed to 
the need to enhance maritime power. Restructuring, professionalisation, modernisation 
and diversification, including the armaments industry, were prioritised (The Military 
Balance, 2014:207). The PLA was to undergo a qualitative revolution in equipment, while 
maritime power was not to be neglected. However, there were challenges.
Following the ‘overheating’ of  the economy in 2011, Chinese economic growth slowed 
to 7.8%, down from 9.3% in 2009, and monetary policy had to be tightened. The Chinese 
defence budget for 2013 was set at US$112 billion. When defence spending accelerated, it 
was carefully monitored to keep increases in line with the comparable expansion of  the 
overall Chinese economy (The Military Balance, 2014:209). Simultaneously, as China became 
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more integrated into the global economy from the late 1990s, production capacity and 
market­networks were extended. Since 2007, policy requirements were set by the Chinese 
defence industry regulator and in 2014, the active defence force (all arms of  service) was 
set at 2.3 million (army, 1.6 million; air force, 200,000; navy, 398,000), while the number 
of  staff  in the Strategic Missile Forces was 100,000 (The Military Balance, 2014:209). Like 
elsewhere on the globe, large­scale investments were made in cyber­warfare and counter 
cyber­warfare capabilities.
Concerning economic engagement, defence and international status there are a further 
three areas discussed in this chapter. The first matter relates to the little­known entry of 
China into a new ‘space race’ between competing global powers and the associated quest 
for control of  airspace. Involvement in space is also seen as an arena that powers can enter 
only once they have graduated into the league of  developed or rich nations. Advanced 
technological and scientific development and competitiveness are also precursors for 
entry into space, and China scores highly in these spheres. The other two areas relate 
to China’s growing ambitions both in its immediate region but also further afield, and 
the tensions and responsibilities that arise from this. China’s relationship with Russia in 
historical perspective was covered in the discussion thus far, so its regional rivalry with the 
other regional power, India, will briefly be discussed. Lastly, China’s involvement in Africa 
has grown exponentially – both as an economic power and, increasingly, as a military one 
as well. Therefore, we end off  with China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping initiatives in 
Africa, as this appears to be the chosen mode in which China chooses to operate militarily 
within Africa.
A red star in space
The space race, as it was commonly referred to at the time, started during the Cold 
War, and the two leading competitors were the US and the Soviet Union. Expertise for 
developing missile construction, existing military knowledge, and practical platforms 
for development were taken over from a defeated Nazi­Germany in 1945, when German 
rocket experts from Germany surrendered to the Allied Forces and started sharing their 
knowledge of  rocket science. Other Germans scientists offered their services to the 
Soviet Union. The space race between the Soviet Union and the US became one of  the 
defining aspects of  the Cold War era and complemented the search for military power 
and dominance by these two superpowers (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016).
China entered the space endeavour rather late by sending a satellite into space in 1970, 
followed by a successful soft landing on the moon in 1976. Since 2000, China’s space 
activities have developed at a greater speed. In 2009, the Vice­Chairman of  the Chinese 
Commanding Council said that, ‘space is a … commanding height for international 
strategic competition … and means control of  the ground, oceans and electromagnetic 
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space … [thus having] a strategic initiative in one’s hands’. The Chinese Defence White 
Paper (2015) refers to space as the ‘commanding height in international competition’, 
and the Chinese government therefore took an intense interest in preparing for fighting 
‘informationised wars’, as well as developing an array of  anti­satellite weapons (ASAT) 
weapons, i.e. kinetic kill, directed energy, co­orbital capabilities, and an advanced manned 
space programme (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016).
Current competition between China and the US has broad civil and military implications, 
as it relates to power projection, national status, and pride (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016), 
and there is no need to add that a modern and expansive space programme forms part 
of  ‘China’s Space Dream’ as articulated by President Xi Jinping, and acts as a crucial pillar 
of  international prestige. In March 2003, through their Shenzhou programme, China 
launched the first manned mission (Shenzou 5), while Shenzou 7 saw a three­person crew 
launched into space and China’s first spacewalk. In 2016, nine more taikonauts went into 
space (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016), and in 2012 the first space docking took place, with 
Spacelab Tiangong. By 2016, a second space lab, Tiangong 2, was launched into orbit. 
China also executed a second soft landing on the moon following the earlier attempt 
in 1976 (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016), and the landing of  Mars rovers and deep space 
exploration are underway. China combines civilian and military objectives in their space 
approach, and arguably currently boasts the most robust and dynamic space programme.
Petra Ebeling (2016:16) remarks that, in being so advanced, ‘China has become a world 
class player in the field’. Its cooperation in space with Russia is good, although USA/China 
cooperation is at a low ebb for various reasons. Ebeling suggests that China would be 
an affordable and logical partner for the European Space Agency (ESA), which became 
involved in the Tiangong­1 project, and could participate in the latest space technologies 
(Ebeling, 2016). However, Tellis argues that, at its heart, Chinese interests in space and 
counter­space measures are rooted in their strategic needs and not haphazard government 
choices (Tellis, 2007:41ff.; see also Polpeter, Anderson, Wilson & Yang, 2016).
Closer cooperation between China and ESA will most likely become a contentious matter 
for the US. Kulacki (2014) points out that the USA space programme, whether for (deep) 
space exploration, delivery of  inter­continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ASAT or other 
military purposes, is becoming increasingly hamstrung by financial constraints, due to 
the US’s immense deficit and continued indebtedness to other global actors (Cordesman 
& Kendall, 2016; Polpeter, Anderson, Wilson & Yang, 2016). Ebeling (2016) points out 
that, despite China being a latecomer to highly diversified and specialist goal­driven space 
projects, the Chinese influence is set to grow at the expense of  the US’s prestige. The 
reasonable result would be China­US tensions mounting as the US realises that its self­
assumed world hegemony is being challenged within a context of  its declining capacity.
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Notes on the region 
China is a significant regional power, sharing this status with India and Japan. For this 
discussion, we will focus on China and India, as the two regional hegemons share 
extensive borders. In discussion with one of  the authors some years ago, Shrikant Paranjpe 
referred to India as an ‘apologetic hegemon’. However, times are changing, and both India 
and China are now regional hegemons with a global presence, and no longer need to 
be apologetic.
In 1954, India and China signed the Tibet agreement, while an Indo­Soviet Treaty was 
signed in 1971 (Paranjpe, 2013:72, 74). In 1974, India became part of  what is known as the 
Nuclear Club, and today India has a clear capacity for a weaponised nuclear programme. 
Since the establishment of  NAM, India has always played an important and frequently 
leadership role, acting as a spokesperson and leading member of  NAM. Simultaneously, 
India cooperated with the USSR regarding military agreements and the arms trade.
However, some changes took place. During the late 1990s and early 2000s some closer 
interaction marked the relations between the US and India (Kamdar, 2007:200). Kamdar 
refers to this interaction as new strategic partnership (or cooperation) between the US 
and India, including booming trade and, ‘gave Americans the idea that India is exclusively 
focused on the US’, but cautions that, ‘Nothing could be further from the complex reality 
of  today’s geopolitics’ (Kamdar, 2007:275). Kamdar goes on to note that ‘India is not going 
to play junior partner to America’s military and corporate research apparatus’ (2007:278), 
as India holds influential soft and hard power capacities. The country may not want to 
seem to be leaning towards the US (Kamdar, 2007:200), and remains open to trading with 
anyone on the global scene. 
For example, India seems to be rebuilding its relations with Russia. India participates in 
a multipolar world economy, with trade partners such as the European Union, especially 
France and Germany, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin­America (Kamdar, 2007:277). The 
country has extensive trade ties with the Middle East and countries in the Arabian Gulf 
region (Kamdar, 2007:263), and is an important political, economic, and military player on 
the global stage. Within the region, India and China seem to have found well­rationalised 
reasons for peaceful existence, and little change in this domain is foreseen in the medium­ 
and even long­term. India is aware of  the need to live in peace with its northern neighbour, 
and in November 2006, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao visited New Delhi, where the two 
countries agreed to boost bilateral trade to US$40 billion by 2010, a figure long surpassed.
Soft or smart diplomacy and new responsibilities: UN peacekeeping
With its return from relative isolation during the early years of  Communist rule, and 
given current security developments, the Chinese started getting involved in United 
Nations (UN) peace deployments. By 2014, small numbers of  personnel were or are 
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deployed in Cote d’Ivoire (UN­UNOCI), Western Sahara (MINURSCO), and Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), while larger numbers are seen in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo 
(MONUSCO, 220 members), Lebanon (UNIFIL, 343), Liberia (UNMIL, 564), South 
Sudan (UNMISS, 340) and 233 members with UNAMID Sudan (The Military Balance, 
2014:239­240). Between 2014 and 2018 the picture changed again. From just over 2000 
soldiers deployed in 2014, the figure went up to over 3000 in 2015, then saw a drop, but 
for 2016 to 2018 it remains over 2000. By January 2018, the numbers deployed on peace 
missions counted for 2,634 (ISDP Backgrounder, 2018:3). China became the third largest 
contributor to the UN budget, the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping 
budget, the 12th highest provider of  peacekeepers and the largest contributor of  troops 
for peacekeeping in the UN Security Council (ISDP Backgrounder, 2018:3).
China’s involvement in Africa intertwines with its role as a rising global hegemon, and 
foreign policy, defence diplomacy, resource procurement and national interests are closely 
connected. China has become a major economic actor on the continent of  Africa, and 
largely diminished the stake that the US, France and the UK held (Neethling, 2015). 
Neethling (2015:8) also notes that:
China offers its African partners a mix of  political and economic incentives and 
drives home the message of  a win­win situation … (China) increased its footprint 
in Africa [but] adheres to a strict policy of  non­intervention (or non­interference) in 
the affairs of  African states. 
The lack of  socio­political stability or absence of  peace in Africa also touches China’s 
interests. Quoting Wang, Neethling indicates that China’s attitude towards UN peace­
keeping changed from ‘ardent opposition in the 1970s to avid support in the 2000s’ 
(Neethling, 2015:11). However, more correctly, China had little choice in the matter. 
Part of  this increased involvement has to do with economic reasons, as stability is good 
for business, while part is to demonstrate global responsibilities and diplomacy (Wang, 
quoted in Neethling, 2015:11). Moreover, an inescapable reason for increased involvement 
in these operations is to respond to global expectations and UN insistence that member 
states participate in peacekeeping efforts. Neethling makes some deductions about China’s 
involvement in UN peacekeeping: (1) Beijing’s emergence in the field (including Africa) 
stands in direct relation to China’s growth and international influence; and (2) China’s 
peacekeeping involvement on the African continent stems from the need for stability in 
Africa as a central trading partner of  China.
China’s involvement on the African continent is generally pragmatic, and its drive for 
influence is in the main underpinned by soft power. With the spread of  China’s international 
influence, it is likely that China will become more involved in UN peacekeeping, particularly 
in Africa because, from whichever perspective one views China’s growing role, it will have 
to take part in future global multipolar governance. 
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Conclusion
China remains a substantial power in regional and global circles. The latest indications 
from the country indicate that it is preparing to play a greater role in world affairs, as 
suggested by its OBOR initiative, which represents its boldest global undertaking yet. 
However, the extent to which China has the appetite for such a role remains unknown. 
China’s rise has also caused shifts in geopolitical contours which have led to new sites of 
struggle and contestation, such as outer­space and Africa, as well as growing regional 
tensions, and China will have to pay increasing attention to these areas if  it is to manage 
and negotiate these challenges effectively. Implicitly, those who fear China’s rise also 
fear its concurrent military rise, but whether its growing economic and political clout is 
associated with an increasingly belligerent military presence also remains to be seen. How 
are we to interpret this rise, and to what lengths will it go to continue on this trajectory? 
The comparative global experience of  superpower behaviour leaves much to be admired, 
although whether this will be tempered by a more multipolar world is also uncertain. 
204 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
References
Amin, S. 2006. Beyond US hegemony? Assessing 
the Prospects for a Multipolar World. London: 
Zed Books.
Ball, P. 2015. Railways in History and the TAN-ZAM/
TAZARA project. The Heritage Portal. Pretoria: 
South Africa.
Bertelsmann-Scott, T., Friis, C. & Prinsloo, C. 2016. 
Making sustainable development the key focus 
of the BRICS New Development Bank. Pretoria: 
South African Institute of International Affairs.
Boggs, J. & Boggs, G.L. 1974. Revolution and 
Evolution in the Twentieth Century. New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
Bond, P. 2016. BRICS banking and the debate over 
sub-imperialism. Third World Quarterly, 37(4): 
611-628. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.201
5.1128816
Calvocoressi, P. 1982. World Politics since 1945  
(4th edition). London: Longman.
Chaturvedy, R.R. 2017. China’s Strategic Access 
to Gwadar Port: Pivotal Position in Belt and 
Road. RSIS Commentaries, No. 005. Singapore: 
Nanyang Technological University.
Chomsky, N. 2007. Hegemony or Survival:  
America’s Quest for Global Dominance.  
London: Penguin Books.
Ciment, J. 1997. Angola and Mozambique: 
Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa.  
New York: Facts on File Inc.
Cong, L. 1991. Basic Contradictions of Capitalism. 
China: Issues and Ideas. Beijing: Beijing 
Review Press.
Conming, L. 1991. Modern Capitalism Reassessed. 
China: Issues and Ideas. Beijing: Beijing 
Review Press.
Cordesman, A.H. & Kendall, J. 2016. Chinese Space 
Strategy and Developments. London: Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Dallek, R. 2007. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. 
London: Allen Lane.
Davidson, B. 2001. Africa in History: Themes and 
Outlines. London: Phoenix Books.
De Wet, F. & Liebenberg, I. 2012. Conflict and 
Economic Consequences: Comparative notes 
on ‘going to war’, in T. Potgieter & I. Liebenberg 
(eds.), Reflections on War: Preparedness and 
Consequences. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media. 
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781920338855
Du, M. 2016. China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: 
Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications. 
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 
2(1):30-43. https://doi.org/10.1163/23525207-
12340014
Dye, T.R. 2002. Power and Society: An introduction 
to the Social Sciences (9th edition). New York: 
Harcourt College Publishers.
Dyer, G. 2006. Future Tense: The coming World Order. 
London: Serpent’s Tail.
Ebeling, P. 2016. China’s Space Program: How 
cooperation between China and Europe changes 
as China’s space program advances. Unpublished 
MA thesis, Leiden University.
Eidelberg, P. 2015. Tempest in a Teacup? The Angolan 
War as ‘Cold War’ template. 1975-1989, in 
I. Liebenberg, G. Risquet & V. Shubin (eds.), 
A Far‑Away War: Angola, 1975‑1989. 
Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
Ferdinand, P. 2016. Westward – the China dream and 
‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under 
Xi Jinping. International Affairs, 92(4):941-957. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12660
Fuquan, T. 1990. The United States: A debtor Nation. 
China Issues and Ideas (Special edition dedicated 
to world debt challenges). Beijing: New 
Stars Publishers.
Gleijesus, P. 2002. Conflicting Missions: Havana, 
Washington and Africa, 1959‑1976. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press. 
Hayes, N. 2017. The impact of China’s one belt 
one road initiative on developing countries. 
International Development. 30 January. https://
bit.ly/2QfH80Q [Accessed 27 July 2019].
Hoogvelt, A. 1997. Globalisation and the postcolonial 
world: The New Political Economy of 
Development. Hampshire: Macmillan. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-1-349-25671-6
ISDP Backgrounder. Institute for Security and 
Development Policy. Stockholm: ISDP. https://bit.
ly/2INQ1L7
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 1976. 
The Military Balance 1975‑1976. London: IISS.
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 1989. 
The Military Balance 1988‑1989. London: IISS.
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2014. 
The Military Balance 2014. London: IISS.
205China in a Global World
Japan Science and Technology Agency (JSTA)/Center 
for Research and Development Strategy (CRDS). 
2014. A Comparative Study on Space Technology 
in the World 2014. Tokyo: JSTA/CRDS.
Jiatun, X. 1991. Reunderstanding Capitalism. China: 
Issues and Ideas. Beijing: Beijing Review Press.
Johnson, R.W. 2015. How long will South Africa 
Survive? The looming crisis. Jeppetown, 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
Kamdar, M. 2007. Planet India: The Turbulent Rise of 
the World’s Largest Democracy. Toronto: Simon 
& Schuster.
Keulder, C.J. 1996. Trends in the Modern World 
Economy and Democratization in Peripheral 
States. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.
Kulacki, G. 2014. An Authoritative Source on China’s 
Military Space Strategy. Chicago.
Lumumba-Kasongo, T. 2015. Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS) and Africa. Africa 
Development, XL(3):77-95.
Lundestad, G. 1991. East, West, North, South: Major 
Developments in International Politics, 1945‑1990. 
Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
Martin, H-P. & Schumann, H. 1997. The Global Trap: 
Globalisation and the Assault on Democracy and 
Prosperity. Bangkok: White Lotus.
Menzies, G. 2003. 1421: The Year China Discovered 
the World. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Meredith, M. 2005. The State of Africa: A History 
of Fifty Years of Independence. Cape Town: 
Jonathan Ball (with Toronto: Free Press).
Mustafic, A. 2017. China’s One Belt, One Road and 
Energy Security Initiatives: A Plan to Conquer 
the World? Inquiry, 2(2):107-134. https://doi.
org/10.21533/isjss.v2i2.87
Neethling, T. 2015. China’s international peacekeeping 
contributions and the evolution of contemporary 
Chinese strategic considerations. Strategic 
Review for Southern Africa, 37(2):7-27.
Pan, L. 1987. The New Chinese Revolution. London: 
Amish Hamilton.
Paranjpe, S. 2013. India’s Strategic Culture: The 
Making of National Security Policy. New Dehli: 
Routledge.
Pollpeter, K., Anderson, E., Wilson, J. & Yan, F. 2017. 
China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress 
in Space Technologies and implications for the 
United States. New York.
Rolland, N. 2017. China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: 
Underwhelming or game-changer? The 
Washington Quarterly, 40(1):127-142. https://doi.
org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302743
Service, R. 2007. Comrades: Communism – A World 
History. Oxford: Macmillan.
Shubin, V. 2008. The Hot ‘Cold War’: The USSR in 
Southern Africa. London: Pluto Press.
Sidaway, J.D. & Woon, Chih Y. 2017. Chinese 
Narratives on ‘One Belt, One Road’ in Geopolitical 
and Imperial Contexts. The Professional 
Geographer, 69(4):591-603. https://doi.org/10.10
80/00330124.2017.1288576
Swaine, M.D. 2015. Chinese views and commentary 
on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. China 
Leadership Monitor, 47(2):3.
Tellis, A.J. 2007. China’s Military Space Strategy. 
Survival, 49(3). Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment. https://doi.org/10.1080/0039 
6330701564752
Van der Merwe, J. 2018. Reintegrating Africa and the 
Middle East into China’s system of accumulation, 
in X. Li (ed.), Mapping China’s One Belt One 
Road Initiative. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92201-0_8
Van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I. & Arkhangelskaya, A. 
2016. Emerging powers in Africa: A new wave 
in the relationship. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40736-4
Wenming, S. 1984. On rolls the Green Revolution. 
Beijing: Guoji Shudian.
Yiwei, J. 1988. From Enterprise‑based Economy  







Independent India has utilised its armed forces to progress its international relations predominantly by rendering assistance 
for disaster relief, peacekeeping, and capacity-building through professional military training. The Indian Ministry of Defence 
considers improving defence cooperation with other countries essential for the nation’s security, promoting mutual trust, and 
conflict prevention and resolution. India’s defence cooperation is decided at the highest level involving the Cabinet Committee 
for Security and National Security Council. The scale and scope of India’s defence diplomacy has steadily expanded since 
the end of the Cold War, but a number of factors, both organisational and political, continue to constrain its reach and 
effectiveness, and the Ministries of External Affairs and of Defence do not seem to agree when it comes to defining the 
objectives of India’s military diplomacy. The country’s aim to maintain strategic autonomy tends to reduce the intensity of its 
military partnerships, while the political and bureaucratic leadership continues to recoil at the idea of power projection and 
developing expeditionary capabilities for the Indian armed forces. The national aspiration of becoming a dominant regional 
power remains somewhat unrealised. 
Introduction
India occupies an important geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), 
and its strategic interests extend from its immediate neighbourhood to an outer arc 
formed by the eastern littorals of  Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Southeast 
Asia. This geography provides India with an opportunity not only to define and protect 
its national interests but also to exert its benign influence in its extended neighbourhood 
(Sakhuja, 2011). India does not have any expansionist territorial aspirations and has never 
shown aggressive intent against any country, which has long been its outlook, instead 
using trade, religion and culture, what is now often termed ‘Soft Power’, to influence 
other countries (Malone, 2011). Since independence, India has also utilised its armed forces 
to progress its international relations, mostly by rendering disaster relief, peacekeeping, 
and capacity-building through professional military training. In the 21st century, Indian 
diplomacy has matured and learnt, albeit slowly, the importance of  utilising all facets 
of  its national power: political, diplomatic, economic, technological and military, in 
furtherance of  the national interests. 
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India’s military diplomacy, similar in many ways to other forms of  diplomacy, includes 
defence-related visits, meetings, and negotiations; participation in international security 
conferences; defence treaties and mutual pacts; import, export or gifting of  military 
equipment; joint exercises by armed forces; and training of  personnel. All these activities 
would generally be undertaken in line with the general foreign and security policy guidelines 
set by the political leadership, but they would have strategic and military significance. 
Thus, effective military diplomacy, while safeguarding the state’s independence, security, 
and integrity, also ensures the widest possible freedom of  action for the state. A strong 
military power projection capability can dissuade potential adversaries and increase 
bargaining power in diplomatic negotiations through either a coercive display of  force 
or a mere benign presence. Historically, coercion was exercised mostly through the use 
of  navies, which led to the coining of  the term ‘Gun Boat Diplomacy’. Colonial powers 
intimidated weaker states into subjugation, or at least into accepting unequal terms 
for trade and concessions for exploiting natural resources or labour. In the 21st century, 
military intervention by major powers into another country, purportedly to prevent a 
humanitarian disaster arising from internal conflict, has become quite common. Such 
interventions normally get international approval and sanction from the UN (Dorman 
& Otte, 1995). 
International view of military diplomacy
It is important to note the views of  various countries about the conduct of  military 
diplomacy. The Indian Ministry of  Defence considers improving defence cooperation 
with other countries as essential for the nation’s security, promoting mutual trust, and 
conflict prevention and resolution (Dutta, 2009), while the US government engages in 
defence cooperation in terms of  military alliances and agreements, conducting joint 
operations and interoperability exercises, and facilitating access and influence. The 
UK sees multinational defence cooperation as an arrangement where two or more 
nations work together to enhance military capability, although the country ensures 
that its defence cooperation with other nations does not affect its relations with the US 
and NATO. Meanwhile, Australia uses the terms ‘defence international engagement’, 
classifying defence cooperation as a subset of  international engagement and as the 
actions of  the target country that are funded by the Australian Department of  Defence 
through a separate Defence Cooperation Allocation. Russia defines military cooperation 
as the military relations of  friendly states aimed at the joint solution of  defence problems, 
which are determined by the compatibility of  the respective state’s interests, coherence 
of  a political course, and mutual interest in providing international and national security. 
China sees defence cooperation as foreign military relations, and one of  the most 
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important aspects is to prepare its own officers for next generation military leadership 
(Muthanna, 2006). In a newspaper article published on 21 February 2015, C. Raja Mohan 
highlighted the importance given to ‘Defence Diplomacy’ by President Xi Jinping during 
his special address to all the Defence Attachés posted in Chinese embassies the world over, 
as well as those defence officials dealing with foreign relations. 
Historical perspective of India’s defence diplomacy
In ancient India, diplomacy was considered a quasi-military activity. The epics of 
Ramayan and Mahabharat speak of  alliances between powerful kingdoms built through 
marriages, but occasionally coercion was utilised, backed by military power. Expanding 
regional influence through the conduct of  ‘Ashwamedha Yagna’1 was an Indian way 
of  exploiting military capability as an instrument of  coercion for transacting interstate 
relations (Basham, 2004), and the last known Ashwamedha Yagna was conducted by 
Maharaj Jai Singh II of  Amber, Jaipur in 1716 CE (Narayanan, 2015). Kautilya (also known 
as Chanakya),2 the most acclaimed strategist and author of  Arthashastra,3 was aware that 
stratagems would work only when backed by credible military power. He maintained that 
the ruler of  the State of  Magadh, Chandragupta Maurya,4 had a large and professionally 
trained standing army maintained by the State, although Kautilya recognised that there 
was no glory in war. In this context, he believed that negotiation was a strategic device, 
designed to lead to victory rather than compromise, andshould be pursued until the end. 
While never questioning the primacy of  politics in warfare, Kautilya viewed diplomacy 
and foreign policy as instruments of  war (Boesche, 2003). 
Indian kingdoms relied not only on their armies but also their navy to project power. 
The peninsular kingdom of  the Cholas5 in the far south in medieval India was a notable 
maritime power, leading naval expeditions to Sri Lanka and the Maldives in South 
Asia, and a campaign to Southeast Asia in 1025 CE. Their overseas campaign against 
the kingdom of  Shrivijaya in Southeast Asia involved both the army and the navy. The 
Cholas were engaged in a maritime trading relationship with China, and when Shrivijaya 
threatened this trade, which passed through the Straits of  Malacca, the Cholas responded 
with a show of  strength. The chief  reason for their naval venture in Southeast Asia was 
to gain control of  the strategic points along the Straits of  Malacca, although they had 
no territorial ambitions outside South Asia (Malone, 2011). Today the Straits of  Malacca, 
Sunda, and Lombok have gained extreme strategic importance for India, China and many 
other countries, as a large percentage of  their trade, and particularly energy resources, 
pass through these choke points. India is worried for security reasons too, with Chinese 
nuclear submarines reportedly venturing into the Indian Ocean and passing through these 
channels, ostensibly on ‘Anti-Piracy Mission’. 
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Independent India’s defence engagements 
After independence, India sought to insulate itself  from the impact of  the Cold War by 
adopting a deliberate strategy of  military isolationism. Prime Minister Nehru explicitly 
rejected the use of  armed forces for expeditionary operations, and also insisted that the 
membership of  the Non-Aligned group was limited to those countries which did permit 
establishment of  foreign military bases on their territory. India remained a member of 
the Common Wealth, but refused to join any of  the Western military alliances, and even 
as it sought weapons from the Soviet Union at the turn of  the 1960s, India was careful 
to circumscribe its military engagement with the USSR. One major exception to India’s 
military isolationism in the Cold War period was its active participation in the international 
peacekeeping operations authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Along with this, India continued to play its role as a security provider to smaller states on 
the subcontinent by reviving the British protectorate arrangements with Nepal, Bhutan 
and Sikkim in 1949-1950 (Raja Mohan, n.d). After the 1971 Bangladesh War, India came up 
with its own version of  the Monroe Doctrine, called the ‘Indira Doctrine’, aiming to assert 
India’s primacy in South Asia. New Delhi also sought to influence its neighbours against 
allowing military bases and facilities from the world superpowers in their territories. 
Unfortunately, limited diplomatic, economic and military capacities meant that the Indira 
Doctrine was not very effective. 
The 21st century has also seen sustained efforts by China to establish closer defence 
ties with nearly all of  India’s neighbours, with the exception of  Bhutan, which has been 
subjected to severe Chinese military coercion over territorial claims. The Chinese focus 
has been on developing maritime infrastructure in these countries which can serve a dual 
purpose, commercial as well as naval, and subsequently taking over the assets on long-
term lease. Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka are examples of 
China’s foothold in the Indian neighbourhood, but such Chinese initiatives are certainly 
not conducive for India’s national interests and are a setback for its regional defence 
cooperation (Tanham, 1992). Fortunately, the 2017 Doklam plateau stand-off  between 
Indian and Chinese forces in the Bhutanese territory did not escalate into a border 
conflict, partly due to India’s resolute military posture, backed by astute diplomacy 
(Chengappa, 2017). 
After the end of  the Cold War and the demise of  the Soviet Union, India reconfigured its 
economic and foreign policies, re-assessing its policy of  military isolation of  the previous 
decades and launching its military engagement with the US. The Kickleighter proposals 
(initiated in the early 1990s) provided the framework for service-to-service interaction 
between the two armed forces (Vinod, n.d), and the framework elaborated in 2005 defines 
multiple missions for operational cooperation, and calls for greater defence industrial 
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collaboration. India’s defence cooperation with the US is probably the most expansive 
in terms of  the areas covered, with the US now conducting more military exercises with 
India than with any other partner. India, which did not buy a single weapons platform 
from the US in the Cold War period, has acquired a number of  systems since 2005, such 
as one major naval ship with considerable heli-lift and amphibious capability, and C-17 
Globemaster and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, which have significantly 
enhanced India’s Out of  Area capability (Rajghatta, 2007). Today, the US considers India 
an important partner and expects it to play a significant role in the US strategy for Asia, 
especially in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s forward movement on defence engagement 
with the US has also opened the door for similar interactions with Britain, France and 
Russia, as well as deepening defence ties with US allies in Asia like Japan, South Korea and 
Australia. Today, India has bilateral defence cooperation agreements with more than 40 
countries, varying greatly in their scope and intensity depending on whether the country 
is a major power, immediate neighbour, or a state of  special interest to India along the 
Indian Ocean littoral and beyond (Tharoor, 2012). 
India’s defence diplomacy in its immediate neighbourhood
In South Asia, India’s defence diplomacy with its neighbours falls into a category of  its 
own. In the case of  Pakistan, the two countries have negotiated a range of  nuclear and 
military confidence-building measures (CBMs), but Delhi and Islamabad have struggled to 
institutionalise any contact between the two military establishments outside of  a hotline 
that operates between the two headquarters, as the military CBMs between the two 
sides are negotiated by the Foreign Secretaries and not by military professionals (Ghosh, 
2009). In a similar vein, India’s military engagement with the armed forces of  Bangladesh 
only showed improvement after the late 2000s. While the armies of  the countries have 
not clashed, para-military forces on both sides, the Border Security Force of  India and 
the Bangladesh Rifles, have not had happy relations. However, the broad framework 
agreement for cooperation signed by the two Prime Ministers, Dr Manmohan Singh and 
Sheikh Hasina, in 2011 has provisions for substantive military and security cooperation. 
Defence officers are now training in each other’s institutions. 
Although India has categorically refused to involve itself  militarily as part of  the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, it signed a strategic partnership 
agreement with the country that includes the option of  substantive Indian military 
support to Kabul. India has also agreed to train up to 600 Afghan army officers every 
year in India, with some getting specialised training in counterinsurgency, and recently 
gifted some attack helicopters to Afghanistan to enhance its capacity for undertaking anti-
insurgency operations (Panda, 2016). After the failed intervention in the Sri Lankan civil 
war in the late 1980s, New Delhi has since returned to engage with the armed forces 
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of  Sri Lanka, and though opposed by Tamil Nadu, it gave substantial military aid to Sri 
Lanka in its fight against LTTE. A seeming change of  heart, this was to keep Pakistan and 
China from getting too close to Sri Lanka militarily. However, India could not dissuade 
Sri Lanka from granting berthing facilities in Colombo harbour to Chinese submarines in 
2016, an act considered blatantly Anti-India. 
In the case of  Nepal, the Indian army maintains a special relationship with the Nepalese 
army in that the Chief  of  Army of  each country has been accorded the same honorary 
status in the other country, and Nepalese citizens can enrol into the Indian army’s Gorkha 
regiments. During a visit to Nepal by the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 
Nov 2014, a ‘Made in India’ ‘Dhruv’ advance light helicopter (ALH) was gifted to the 
Nepalese army (Press Trust of  India, 2014). However, the present political dispensation in 
Nepal, headed by Prime Minister Oli of  the Communist Party, seems to be getting under 
Beijing’s influence, much to India’s chagrin. 
Bhutan also has special status with India, which maintains a military training team in 
Bhutan. The countries have signed an agreement to ensure that no activity inimical to 
the other is allowed to take place in the country, and Bhutan has agreed to consult India 
on all matters concerning its defence. Along with this, the present King is an alumnus of 
the Indian National Defence College, and is its youngest student (Special Correspondent, 
India Strategic, October 2010).
In 2011, India signed a new partnership agreement with Maldives that focuses on deepening 
maritime security cooperation. In 1988, India was quick to respond militarily to help save 
President Abdul Gayum’s government from rebels, but since 2013, President Abdulla 
Yameen seemed to take an antagonistic stand against India, apparently under influence 
of  massive Chinese economic and military aid. For example, in 2018 the Maldives navy 
for the first time declined to attend the biennial MILAN symposium hosted by the Indian 
navy. However, with change of  leadership, India Maldives relations appear to be once 
again getting better and working towards mutual interests. 
The general global impression seems to be that India, although a rising economic and 
military power, has been mostly reactive in its policies, rather than acting with bold and 
imaginative initiative with its neighbours. On the other hand, India’s subcontinental 
neighbours have been caught off-guard by the exponential rise in China’s economic and 
military power projection capabilities, which have undermined India’s regional influence. 
India’s defence diplomacy with Central and East Asian nations
The politics, security and economics of  Central Asia have always been important for 
India, and Prime Minister Modi has visited all the countries of  this region, with security 
cooperation being discussed prominently. The spread of  ethno-religious instability 
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and terrorism in the region could have grave consequences for India’s security, while a 
politically stable Central Asia can emerge as a major market for Indian goods, as well a key 
source of  energy, particularly natural gas (Sajjanhar, 2016). With a rare display of  futuristic 
vision, India established its first military base in Tajikistan, which is manned, equipped and 
maintained by Indian Air Force personnel (Pandit, 2013). Tajikistan straddles the access 
route to this region, with India planning a strategic opening through Chabahar port in 
Iran and then through Afghanistan. Operationalisation of  the first phase of  Chabahar port 
after its inauguration by the Iranian President in December 2017 enabled India to send the 
first consignment of  wheat to Afghanistan, bypassing passage through Pakistan (Haidar, 
2017). Economic liberalisation in 1991 also saw India initiating its ‘Look East’ Policy, 
which aimed to combine political, economic and security leverage in the Asia-Pacific. New 
Delhi’s engagement with the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reflects 
the increasing geo-strategic importance of  the South China Sea and its littorals to India’s 
regional status (Tharoor, 2012). In 1996, India joined the security forum of  ASEAN, the 
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), in 2005 the ASEAN leaders invited India to join the East 
Asia Summit process that was to focus on broader political and security issues facing Asia, 
and in 2010 India participated in the first expanded gathering of  the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting (Ministry of  External Affairs Portal, August 2012). The stability and 
freedom of  navigation in the South China Sea are vital interests for New Delhi, as around 
55% of  India’s trade with Asia passes through this strategic sea route. 
The Indian navy has been at the forefront of  the military push in this region, with Indian 
naval ships making frequent visits to the countries of  SE Asia. The navy has special berthing 
rights in Vietnam, while the Indian navy’s Exercise Milan, a multinational naval exercise 
conducted since 1995, has now been institutionalised as a biennial event that draws in 
a large number of  countries along the Indo-Pacific littoral. In 2008, India took another 
initiative by convening the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which brought together all 
the navy chiefs from the Indian Ocean area (Indian Navy, 2015). Along with this, India 
is developing close defence ties with Singapore and Vietnam. Singapore conducts joint 
training exercises with the Indian army and air force at Indian military bases (MoD Annual 
Report 2015-2016), while an Indian army Combat Engineers team was recently sent to 
Lao PDR (People’s Democratic Republic) to train their cadres in de-mining and bomb 
disposal to clear a large number of  unexploded bombs and mines from the Vietnam War 
era. Indian air force instructors stationed in Malaysia have trained Malaysian fighter pilots 
on combat tactics, and every year Defence Services Staff  College training is provided 
to military officers from ten countries in the region. India’s special and rising relations 
with ASEAN nations was marked by the presence of  ten ASEAN top leaders, heads of 
government or of  the state, at the 79th Republic Day celebrations on 26 January 2018 
in New Delhi. Maritime security, anti-terrorism measures and cyber security issues 
encouraged all the leaders of  ASEAN and India to join on one platform ( Jacob, 2018). 
214 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
India’s defence engagements with African nations
Today, Africa looms large in the security and geo-strategic considerations of  many nations, 
and the continent is fast emerging as one of  the most sought-after destinations for bilateral 
engagements. India’s relations with Africa are conditioned and energised by historical 
linkages and strong political foundations of  the past. Indian troops had fought as part of 
British forces during Robert Napier’s expedition to Abyssinia in April 1868, and in both 
the World Wars in North and East Africa. Sacrifice and valour of  Indian soldiers is part of 
African history. One Indian army division had played a crucial role in Ethiopia regaining 
its independence by overthrowing Italy’s military control. As an acknowledgement of  the 
sacrifices of  Indian soldiers, in 1941 Sudan had gifted £100,000 to India, and that money 
went into making the majestic Administrative and Academic Block of  National Defence 
Academy in Khadakwasla. This building has been named ‘Sudan Block’ in gratitude. 
New Delhi’s approach to the African continent reflects a balance between national 
values and interests, taking into account the diversity of  Africa as well as the policies 
of  other key players. Training and enhancing military leadership capacities has been the 
focus, with Indian military training teams working in many African countries, and many 
African military personnel being trained in various Indian defence institutions. India 
played a central role in the establishment of  the Botswana Command and Staff  College, 
Harar Military Academy of  Ethiopia, and the Nigerian Military Academy, and the first 
Commandant of  the Nigerian Academy was an Indian army officer. IAF personnel man 
the aviation wing of  the Mauritian police force, while naval personnel do the same for 
Mauritius and Seychelles coast guards, and an IAF helicopter training team has been in 
Namibia for over two decades. 
When parts of  Africa have been afflicted by rebellions and conflicts, and restoring peace 
became a priority, India joined UN peacekeeping missions in a number of  African 
countries, including Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan 
and South Sudan, and Zaire (now DR Congo), and the fairness, professional conduct and 
valour of  Indian soldiers on these missions was acknowledged by the UN, as well as the 
host countries (UN News, n.d). The year 2018 marked 75 years of  Indian troops presence 
on African soil, mostly to liberate countries from foreign occupation or to restore peace, 
as mandated by UN Peacekeeping Missions. India also assisted Mozambique in providing 
coastal security by deploying two naval ships during the 2003 African Union Summit in 
Maputo, and in 2004 during the World Economic Forum summit attended by many heads 
of  state (Beri, 2014). India is also steadily expanding its military engagement footprint 
with the countries of  the North and South American continents. 
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Humanitarian activities by Indian armed forces
The 21st century has seen an exponential spread of  terrorism through the seas of  the 
IOR. 80% of  the world’s oil and gas is transported through the choke point of  the Gulf  of 
Aden and along the Somali coast, which has faced the scourge of  piracy. India has joined 
the international effort to combat this threat by deploying a naval ship since the year 2008, 
and Indian naval warships have safely escorted more than 3000 merchant vessels through 
the area. On a few occasions, punitive action has also been taken against the pirates, and 
these efforts are sure to raise India’s image as a responsible military power (Indian Navy, 
2015). Over the years, India has been steadily enhancing its Out of  Area Contingency and 
military intervention capabilities and has demonstrated them in recent times. During the 
1991 Gulf  War, India airlifted more than 100,000 civilian workers who were forced to leave 
Iraq, the largest airlift since the Berlin airlift at the end of  World War II (Fabian, 2011). 
During the Southeast Asian tsunami in 2004, the Indian armed forces were at the forefront 
of  rescue and relief  operations, with over 30 Indian navy ships setting sail with rescue 
teams and relief  material, even while engaged in relief  and rescue on the Indian eastern 
seaboard (Sakhuja, 2005). Indian naval ships have evacuated stranded Indians and citizens 
of  other countries from war zones, such as Lebanon in 2006, Libya in 2011, and Yemen 
in 2015. Along with this, India has been regularly exercising its armed forces with every 
major country in the world including China, displaying its strategic reach capability. These 
exercises are not only conducted bilaterally but also in multinational scenarios. The Indian 
navy conducts IBSAMAR exercises with the navies of  Brazil and South Africa, as well as 
participating in trilateral exercises with the navies of  the US and Japan. The Indian air 
force regularly participates in Exercise Red Flag, a multinational aerial combat exercise 
organised by the US air force, and also exercises with the air forces of  the UK, France and 
Russia. Such exercises contribute to greater understanding of  each other’s capabilities 
and capacities. Indian air force aerobatic teams, Surya Kiran and Sarang, have thrilled 
audiences the world over with their daredevil precision flying. 
Indian response to expanding Chinese footprint in IOR
The 21st century has seen a dramatic rise of  China in economic and military terms. 
This has given rise to its quest to become a superpower. Steadfastly China has sought 
to spread its footprint in the Indian Ocean Region by building maritime infrastructure 
along many of  the littorals, which is ostensibly intended to provide security to its energy 
trade passing through these waters. India considers the Chinese action as detrimental 
to its influence in the IOR and a potential security threat. But this should naturally be 
expected of  a rising power, and Chanakya even espoused it in his ‘Mandala Theory’6 on 
foreign policy in the treatise Arthashastra (Kangle, 1965). In fact, without an overt display 
of  aggressive diplomacy; India, too, has attempted to do the same by establishing defence 
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cooperation relations with most of  the countries sharing common borders with China 
and in its immediate neighbourhood. South Korea has been a significant defence systems 
supplier to India, including providing Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to the Indian navy. 
In 2015, India and Japan agreed to deepen their strategic relations, with mention made 
of  the possible acquisition of  long-range amphibious aircraft ‘Shinmaywa US-2’ in the 
near future, giving India an extended capacity to patrol the further reaches of  the Indian 
Ocean (Duchatel et al., 2015). In the same year, India and Mongolia agreed to elevate their 
relationship to the strategic level, and the Indian navy increased the frequency of  its ships 
showing the flag in the South-China Sea, even paying a goodwill visit to Chinese ports. 
India’s decision-making apparatus
India’s defence cooperation gets decided at the highest level, involving the Cabinet 
Committee for Security (CCS) and National Security Council (NSC), assisted by the NSC 
Secretariat (NSCS) and Strategic Planning Group (SPG), Ministry of  External Affairs, 
Ministry of  Defence and individual Service Headquarters. At apex level, decision-making 
rests with the NSC, which comprises the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Ministers of 
Home Affairs, Defence, External Affairs, and Finance, and the Chairman of  Niti Ayog7 
(National Integrated Transformation Institute) as members (Kanwal, 2016). However, 
defence cooperation and defence diplomacy are still considered subsidiary to the political 
and economic initiatives conducted by the Ministry of  External Affairs (MEA) to build 
relations with other nations. Compared to the importance given by other nations to 
military engagements to ensure their national interests, India’s focus on leveraging its 
military capacities, experience and prowess for similar purpose seems to be minimalistic, 
and at times lethargic. This is not to say that the Indian defence forces have shied away from 
such tasks, but their participation has been controlled and cleared by the MEA, and is also 
largely impacted by the enthusiasm and energy displayed by the political dispensation of 
the day towards building bilateral and multilateral relations in pursuit of  national interests. 
Challenges to Indian defence diplomacy
The scale and scope of  India’s defence diplomacy has steadily expanded since the end of 
the Cold War. Nevertheless, a number of  factors, organisational and political, continue 
to constrain its reach and effectiveness. At the organisational level, a shortage of  staff  in 
the headquarters of  the Ministry of  External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of  Defence 
(MoD) remains a major impediment. Very few Indian Embassies and High Commissions 
have Defence Attachés posted to look after military and security interests or to render 
advice to civilian diplomats, and the MEA and the MoD do not appear to agree when 
it comes to defining the objectives of  India’s military diplomacy. As of  2018, India had 
just four Defence Attaches posted amongst its twenty-nine diplomatic missions in Africa. 
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While the leadership of  the Foreign Office has come to value the possibilities of  military 
diplomacy, the MoD remains deeply conservative and has been reluctant to follow suit. 
Connected to this is an issue that is rooted in the peculiar structure of  India’s civil-military 
relations. Few democracies have the kind of  overwhelming dominance by the political 
setup and civilian bureaucracy over the military service as is seen in India (Limaye, 2007). 
This has led to a suboptimal engagement of  defence personnel in diplomatic activities. 
While training to defence officers on the basics of  international relations and diplomacy is 
carried out during various in-service courses, the professional diplomats are not regularly 
exposed to defence-related issues, hence the general lack of  enthusiasm to pursue defence 
diplomacy as part of  the nation’s overall diplomatic efforts. It is still rare to find senior 
military officers accompanying the Prime Minister or the External Affairs Minister on 
their official visits. 
India also needs to resolve a number of  political and strategic ambiguities to strengthen 
its military diplomacy. The need to maintain strategic autonomy tends to reduce the 
intensity of  military partnerships, especially with the world superpowers, as India’s 
political establishment is apprehensive of  the danger of  becoming militarily subordinate. 
The second conflict is between the traditional imperative of  territorial defence and the 
new need of  securing India’s growing interests far from its shores. The Indian political and 
bureaucratic leadership continues to recoil at the idea of  power projection and developing 
expeditionary capabilities for the Indian armed forces, yet they frequently call upon the 
security forces to manage emergencies in the immediate and extended neighbourhood. 
India has even attempted coercive diplomacy, using its military might against Sri Lanka 
when the air force air-dropped humanitarian aid over Jaffna in 1987, leading to the signing 
of  the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. 
The Indian security debate tends to be reticent about acquiring and deploying the 
military instruments of  power projection, although steps have been taken to build the 
requisite capabilities by acquiring strategic transport aircraft and naval ships. The Indian 
establishment is traditionally opposed to forward military presence through foreign military 
bases, but its growing aspirations as a regional power cannot be met unless it is able to 
protect its national interests, including beyond its shores. Similarly, to be able to operate in 
distant waters, the Indian navy will need victual facilities around the Indo-Pacific littorals. 
A beginning has been made through an agreement signed during Indian Prime Minister 
Modi’s visit to Oman in February 2018, to utilise the Duqm Port facilities for logistic and 
maintenance requirements of  the Indian navy (Panda, 2018). Similar facilities would also 
be essential for its air force, and while Indian military aircraft and ships have been given 
temporary transit facilities by many friendly countries, India will have to develop a range 
of  special political relationships and military partnerships to acquire larger basing facilities. 
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Conclusion
In the future, India may have to confront growing security challenges in its immediate 
neighbourhood, as well as in other regions important for its expanding national interests. 
It is expected that there will be greater regional and international demand for India’s 
military services, support and cooperation, and the country will need to take a more 
pragmatic and practical approach to utilising its military capacities. As part of  overall 
diplomatic efforts, its defence diplomacy would be vital to build confidence amongst 
nations, decrease the risk of  conflicts, and encourage peaceful dispute resolution. Like 
other types of  national engagements, defence cooperation is an investment for building 
capacities and relationships. It, therefore, means that mainstreaming defence diplomacy 
along with other facets of  national power projection is essential for the country in its 
quest for a position at the international high table. 
Notes
1 Ashwamedha Yagnais a Sanskrit term referring to a horse sacrifice ritual of  Vedic times in ancient 
India. It was used by ancient Indian kings to prove their imperial sovereignty. The process involved 
releasing a horse to wander for a period of  one year, and the horse would be followed by the king’s 
warriors. In the territory traversed by the horse, any rival could dispute the king’s authority by 
challenging the warriors accompanying it. After one year, if  no adversary had managed to kill or 
capture the horse, the animal would be guided back to the king’s capital. It would be then sacrificed, 
and the king would be declared an undisputed sovereign. 
2 Kautilya (Chanakya) was an Indian teacher, philosopher, economist, jurist and royal advisor. He is 
traditionally identified as Kautilya or Vishnugupta, who authored the ancient Indian political treatise, 
the Arthashastra. He mentored Chandragupta Maurya, the first ruler of  Maurya dynasty to build a 
large empire by bringing smaller fiefdoms under one control 
3 Arthashastra is an ancient treatise on statecraft, economic policy and military strategy, incorporating 
Hindu philosophy. Kautilya is credited as the author, although there is a possibility of  the book 
being a compilation of  works by many authors of  the time. After being lost for many centuries, one 
original copy written on palm leaves was discovered in South India in 1905. One principle tenet of 
statecraft was the pursuit of  power through realpolitik. 
4 Maurya Empire was founded in 322 BCE by Chandragupta Maurya, a pupil of  Chanakya, by taking 
over the kingdom of  Magadh after overthrowing the Nanda rulers. The Maurya empire spread its 
rule over a large territory, extending from present-day Afghanistan to Bangladesh, covering the entire 
peninsular India except for a small territory at the southern tip. Emperor Ashok was the third ruler of 
the Mauryan dynasty. The Mauryan empire had well-established trade relations with the Egyptians, 
Greeks and Syrians, and India’s national emblem is based on the Lion Capital of  Emperor Ashok 
at Sarnath. 
5 Chola Empire was the longest-ruling dynasty of  southern India, from 300 BCE to 1279 CE. During 
the 11th century, the empire had extended its maritime influence from the Maldives to the Malaya 
peninsula, backed by a strong naval force. The kingdom was centrally governed, with the king being 
assisted by disciplined bureaucracy. The Chola kings were patrons of  art and architecture. Rajaraja 
Chola I and Rajendra Chola I were the greatest rulers of  the Chola dynasty, during the period 985 CE 
to 1044 CE. 
6 Mandala Theory. Chankaya (Kautilya) propounded the ‘Mandala Theory’ which emphasises the 
imperatives of  international relations for any nation-state. Kautilya’s writings are studied in detail in 
major institutes for defence and strategic studies, along with Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and others.
7 Niti Ayog. The National Institution for Transforming India is the premier policy ‘Think Tank’ of  the 
Government of  India, providing both directional and policy inputs. 
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For armed forces, the capacity to secure military dominance depends on the effectiveness of military weapon systems, weapon 
delivery platforms, and other infrastructure. The military industrial complex is required to ensure timely and adequate supply 
of resources for these purposes. As such, the resources and reserves play a very important role in the overall process of nation-
building. Management and ensuring self-sufficiency of strategic resources is a complex task and requires a multidisciplinary 
approach. It involves not only financial and technological investments but is also about formulating a policy for the import 
and export of such materials. This chapter undertakes a broad assessment of India. 
Introduction
The aim of  this book is to discuss defence diplomacy, national security strategies, and 
management of  strategic resources and reserves. States have various instruments at 
their disposal, from defence to diplomacy, to ensure that their strategic interests are 
safeguarded. Countries develop military architectures to implement national security 
strategies, and one of  the most important aspects in ensuring the effectiveness of  military 
weapons systems, weapon delivery platforms and other infrastructure, is timely and 
adequate supply of  resources for these purposes. In addition, resources and reserves play 
a very important role in the overall process of  nation-building. This chapter examines the 
strategic resources and reserves in the Indian context. While there are various natural 
resources, from water to jungles to oil to mineral, for the purposes of  this work, the major 
focus is to understand minerals as India’s primary strategic resources and reserves. 
It is important to mention that this chapter does not discuss these issues at a narrow 
empirical level with significant data analysis, but rather at a more conceptual level, where 
data has been referred to for the sake of  situating the issue within larger contexts. For a 
subject like this, an assessment only based on specific data would suffer from the limitation 
of  only being relevant in a specific context. 
222 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Context 
The survival of  a nation rests upon continued access to and use of  natural resources. 
Access to water is essential for everything, from the maintenance of  a healthy population 
to agricultural production and industrial development. Along with this, food, mineral 
deposits, forestry resources and oil deposits provide a socioeconomic basis for the 
development of  a state. The crucial significance of  various natural resources ensures 
that threats to their availability become much politicised, sparking controversy, and at 
times even leading to intrastate or interstate conflicts (Hamilton, 2003). This raises the 
question of  whether every resource is strategic. The strategic value of  these resources 
could vary from state to state, depending on their physical availability within geographical 
boundaries and the state’s overall requirements. It is therefore important to first evaluate 
what the word ‘strategic’ means, and what the criteria would be from the state’s point of 
view in order to consider the resources and reserves as strategic. 
The word ‘strategic’ has different meanings under different circumstances, and there are 
various dictionary definitions, although generally it is associated with long-term planning. 
In the 21st century, ‘strategic’ is increasingly used in various sectors of  life, from social to 
business, yet it is broadly still primarily associated with the military. For defence forces, 
‘strategic’ is about the careful planning necessary to win battles, as and if  they happen. 
Generally, for the armed forces, what is short-term, and what is going to happen (or is 
already happening) in the immediate future and for which the overall canvass is narrow, is 
known as ‘tactical’. 
In order to appreciate the intricacies of  the strategic context, it is essential for any defence 
establishment to develop an ability to anticipate possible future crises, as this allows them 
to prepare for future wars. The strategic environment depends on various geostrategic 
and geopolitical factors, such as the cultural ethos, climate, economy, and geography of 
the state; locating the state in the current international environment; nature of  industrial 
infrastructure; growth of  technology; and the natural resources available within the 
state. The planning of  any strategy also depends on the nature of  the state’s international 
dependence in terms of  economy, technology, and resources. The terminology used to 
define mineral assets is divided into two major groups: Resources and Reserves.
Due to the finite nature of  natural resources, states will generally try to ensure that 
enough reserves are available to handle any eventualities. Having theoretical geographic 
and geological understanding of  the possibility of  resource availability is insufficient, so 
information about quantity, type, quality, accessibility, and financial and technological 
capabilities to extract and process them is important. 
On occasion, it has been observed that there is some misperception in the understanding 
of  the terms ‘resources’ and ‘reserve’, as they get used interchangeably. According to 
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the British Geological Survey (BGS, n.d.), mineral resources are defined as ‘natural 
concentrations of  minerals or, in the case of  aggregates, bodies of  rock that are, or may 
become, of  potential economic interest due to their inherent properties’. There is also an 
economic aspect associated with it and resources are required to be present in sufficient 
quantities to make it of  intrinsic economic interest. On occasion, the entire method of 
extraction from the earth becomes a trial and error process and the state needs to have 
the financial capabilities to take the risk that the entire process of  resource extraction may 
not yield favourable results. Eventually, ‘that part of  a mineral resource, which has been 
fully evaluated and is deemed commercially viable to work, is called a mineral reserve’ 
(BGS, n.d.). In addition, the scope to call a particular mineral extract from the earth or 
ocean surface is restricted to those minerals where the state or agency has a valid legal 
access (permitted reserves). 
Broadly, a resource is a geological commodity that exists in both discovered and 
undiscovered deposits, while reserves are that subcategory of  a resource that have been 
discovered, have a known size and utility, and can be extracted for a profit. For example, 
of  the world’s estimated oil resource of  three trillion barrels, the world’s reserves are 
estimated at about a third of  that amount (CliffsNotes, 2016). Some reserves are 
important for militaries in the production of  weapons systems and weapon delivery 
platforms, meaning there are certain resources and reserves which have specific utility in 
the designing and manufacturing processes of  military infrastructure, and are therefore 
considered strategic. However, not all states will necessarily recognise the same resources 
and reserves as strategic.
Control over natural resources has been one of  the key determinants of  wars in the past. 
An early study of  the causes of  modern wars points out that 14 of  the 20 major wars, from 
1878 to 1918, had significant economic causes often related to conflicts over resources. 
The rise of  industrialism has also led to a struggle for raw materials, such as the case of 
Chile hoping to secure a share in the nitrate trade. Chile took up arms against Bolivia and 
Peru for the control of  guano mineral deposits in the War of  the Pacific from 1879 to 1884 
(Acemoglu et al., 2012). In recent times, the best example of  conflicts over resources is the 
1990 Gulf  War. The United States (US) justified fighting this war by claiming that it was in 
line with the Carter Doctrine.1 
Classifying resources and reserves
Mining has a long history. Since civilisation began, people have used different mining 
techniques to access minerals in the earth, and there is evidence indicating that people 
from ancient Egypt, Rome and Greece were engaged in mining. During the 1600s, miners 
used explosives to break up large rocks, while motorised mining tools, such as drills, came 
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into existence much later. The industry witnessed a major change with the Industrial 
Revolution, and during the 1700s and 1800s, miners were assisted with better explosives 
and more advanced mining equipment, such as drills, lifts and steam-powered pumps 
(General Kinematics, 2013). The methodologies and technologies associated with mining 
have evolved over the centuries, and state and various other private agencies now have 
systems which are quick, accurate, energy-efficient and environmentally friendly. 
It is important to note that ‘materials’ have been fundamental in the advancement of  human 
society since prehistoric times, so much so that the system of  describing the progression 
of  human society is based on minerals and archaeological systems, such as Stone Age, 
Bronze Age, Iron Age, and Steel Age. Presently, various methods and systems are in place 
to classify mineral resources and some of  them have been accepted globally. Developed 
nations have created reporting standards that can be used universally, and after almost 
two decades of  efforts, specific guidelines have been set out by the Society for Mining, 
Metallurgy and Exploration (SME) in the US. This has helped to create an international 
accepted standard for mineral asset reporting, and in 1994, the Committee for Mineral 
Reserves International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO) was formed. The committee is 
a group of  representatives of  organisations that are responsible for developing mineral 
reporting codes and guidelines in most parts of  the world (Australia, Asia, Canada, Chile, 
Europe, South Africa, and the US). Interestingly, this group does not include important 
states like China, Russia and India, although these states are known to follow similar, and 
in some places more elaborate, classification schemes. 
Regarding mineral resources, there are a few specific subcategories. An ‘Inferred Resource’ 
is one that is based on limited sampling, and reasonably assumed but limited information. 
Samples might include those from outcrops, trenches, pits or drill holes. An ‘Indicated 
Resource’ is one whose quantity, grade (quality), shape, size and continuity can be more 
confidently reported. A ‘Measured Resource’ represents the highest level of  geologic 
knowledge and confidence in a resource. The resource characteristics are well-established 
through detailed and reliable exploration work, meaning that economic and technical 
factors can be more confidently applied. Mine and production planning can give more 
detailed estimates of  economic viability. 
In terms of  mineral reserves, the subcategories are based on a feasibility study bias. A 
Reserve is Probable when economic extraction can be justified, while a Reserve is Proven 
when economic extraction is justified. This distinction is generally based on geologic 
knowledge and, as with resources, many projects include a hybrid classification, such as 
‘Proven and Probable’ (Geology for Investors, n.d.). 
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Minerals and mining in India 
With a population of  about 1.4 billion, India is the second most populous country in the 
world after China, as well as the sixth largest economy in the world, with a nominal GDP of 
$2.45 trillion, and ranks third in GDP in terms of  purchasing power parity at $9.49 trillion. 
(Caleb Silver, 2019) Compared to Western countries, India’s GDP is highly dependent on 
agriculture (which accounts for 17%), although the services sector has started picking up 
and now accounts for 57% of  the GDP, while industry contributes 26%. India recently 
surpassed China as the fastest growing large economy and is predicted to jump up to rank 
4th on the list of  the World’s Top 10 Economies by 2022 (Bajpal, 2017). It is important to 
have this backdrop to appreciate the evolution and future of  India’s mining activities. 
India is a nation well-endowed with natural mineral resources, ranking 4th amongst the 
mineral producer countries, behind China, the US and Russia, on the basis of  volume of 
production, as per the (FICCI, 2013) Report on Mineral Production by the International 
Organizing Committee for the World Mining Congress. The country produces around 
87 to 89 minerals, including four fuel minerals, ten metallic minerals, 49 non-metallic 
minerals, three atomic minerals, and 22 minor minerals, including building and other 
materials (Hazra, Chauhan, Gupta & Sharma, 2013). In 2011, the Indian mining industry 
contributed about 2.63% to the GDP, which is one of  the lowest amongst the larger 
emerging economies, such as China (20%), Australia (8%) and Russia (14.7%) (US 
Geological Survey Report 2011-12). However, this contribution has not varied much over 
the years since 2011, although in some years the trend has actually been in a negative 
direction, with the contribution decreasing to approximately 2% to the GDP.
The largest portion of  mining in India is coal, which accounts for almost 80%, while the 
remaining 20% is made up of  numerous metals and other raw materials, such as gold, 
copper, iron, lead, bauxite, zinc and uranium. India is in the top position in the world in 
respect of  mica and mica splitting; ranks 3rd in production of  coal, barytes and chromite; 
4th in iron-ore production; and 6th in bauxite and manganese. India is also 10th in respect 
of  aluminium production (Rathi, 2015). Overall, India’s mining industry is made up of  a 
large number of  small operational mines, and the average number of  mines which report 
mineral production in India hovers around 2000, excluding minor minerals, petroleum 
(crude), natural gas and atomic minerals. 
As per the 2017-18 Annual Report of  the Ministry of  Mines, there has been roughly an 
8-12% increase in the production of  minerals every year, although for financial year 
2018 it was 13%, with minerals worth Rs 1.13 lakh crore produced in FY18 (Ministry of 
Mines, 2018). The number of  small operational mines which reported mineral output in 
the country, excluding atomic, fuel and minor minerals, was 1,531 in 2017-18. There are 
around 200 mines each in Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, but Rajasthan is in 
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the leading position in terms of  estimated value of  mineral production in the country, 
with a 20.26% share in the national output, followed by Odisha with 17.77% (The Economic 
Times, 2018).
FIGURE 12.1 India’s mineral resources 
Strategic resources 
The first attempt to define materials/minerals/resources as ‘strategic’ was made by the 
US Army and Navy Munitions Board following World War I. Two classifications were 
identified: strategic materials, and critical materials. Strategic materials were distinguished 
by their necessity for national defence, their high degree of  importance in wartime, 
and the need for strict conservation and distribution control. Critical materials were 
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considered less essential and more readily available domestically, requiring some degree 
of  conservation (Kessel, 1990:13-14). However, this term is seldom used. Broadly, strategic 
materials could be defined as (Weston, 1984:1): 
	The materials needed to supply the military, industrial and essential civilian needs of 
a state during a national emergency; and 
	The materials not found or produced in sufficient quantities to meet such needs of 
the state.
It is difficult to have a universal definition of  strategic resources, as what is strategic to one 
state may not be strategic for another, and in some instances, all the resources required 
for the strategic industry of  a particular state may be available to them in abundance. 
Along with this, the strategic quotient in respect of  the military hardware could vary from 
state to state. For example, states with nuclear weapons capabilities could have specific 
requirements which may not be required by other states. Similarly, the equipment used 
for the extraction of  strategic resources from the earth or ocean beds require energy for 
their operations, meaning that obtaining these resources involves a dependency on other 
resources, like water, coal, gas, oil, etc. Thus, individual states have their own outlook 
regarding the necessity of  strategic materials. 
The defence industry requires strategic materials, and this usually caters for three aspects: 
weapons platforms (aircrafts, ships, submarines, tanks, etc.); weapons and ammunition 
(guns, bullets, bombs, missile, etc.); and equipment (radars, sonars, staircases, batteries, 
tents, functional food, etc.). A state equips its defence industry based on the type of  warfare 
that their forces are envisaged to be engaged in, like mountain warfare, desert warfare, 
amphibious operations, etc. Some of  the major sectors of  the defence industry are the 
aerospace industry, shipbuilding industry, tank manufacturing, and the missile industry, 
and the resources required in the production of  each of  these could vary depending on 
the situation and necessity. Some of  these could be strategic resources, and it would be the 
duty of  the state to ensure the necessary supply of  such resources. 
However, it would be incorrect to consider the defence industry as the only strategic 
industry, as nuclear, space, civilian aircraft manufacturing, and railway equipment 
manufacturing could also be strategic for the state. Amongst these, the nuclear industry 
has significant strategic significance in terms of  both the defence and energy industries, 
and the sources of  nuclear energy are heavy metals such as uranium, thorium, radium, 
plutonium and lithium. Uranium is the most important of  these, and its main ores are 
pitchblende, uranite, samarskite, and thorianite. 
There are some important geographical areas of  uranium deposits around the world, 
but the geographical distribution of  thorium is much more restricted. The main ores 
228 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
of  thorium are monazite, allanite and thorianite. Beryllium (obtained from beryl, which 
is found in association with feldspar and mica in pegmatites), zirnium (found in zircon 
in beach sands) and ilimenite (found in a concentrated form in beach sands) are other 
important nuclear minerals (Minerals Knowledge, 2009). All these minerals or resources 
have specific qualities and are not easily available and are therefore considered very 
important strategic resources and reserves. The nature and requirements of  the nuclear 
industry are unique, and the associated geopolitical aspects are distinctive in nature. 
However, this chapter will not be discussing this further as the core focus is not on 
atomic elements. 
India’s strategic mineral resources 
Geographically, India is a unique country, as it covers a wide range of  terrains, including 
rain forests, deserts, and snow-capped mountain ridges, and is enclosed by the disaster-
prone Himalayan mountain ranges to its north and northeast. The country has a land 
frontier of  15,200 km, a coastline of  7,516.6 km, and an exclusive economic zone of 
2.2million km². Thus, the Indian defence forces have the task of  guarding various types 
of  land and sea borders, as well as a vast airspace, and are required to remain prepared to 
engage in both conventional and nuclear warfare. Worldwide, India currently has the 3rd 
largest military, is the 6th biggest defence spender, and is also one of  the largest importers 
of  conventional defence equipment, spending around 30% of  its total defence budget on 
capital acquisitions, while 60% of  defence-related requirements are currently met through 
imports (Make In India, 2017). 
For many decades, India’s premier defence research organisation has been the Defence 
Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which is responsible for India’s entire 
missile programme. Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) are an integral part of  India’s 
defence production architecture, and account for more than 65% of  the total output, 
with an annual production value of  around US$4 billion. The private sector also plays 
a significant role in the defence industry as subcontractors and ancillary industry, and 
are often the suppliers of  raw materials, semi-finished products, parts and components 
to DPSUs, ordnance factories, base workshops of  the army, base repair depots of  the 
air force, the dockyards of  the navy, etc. Foreign companies account for the majority 
of  procurement from the private sector in India, with approximately 60% of  Indian 
defence procurement coming from overseas sources (based on various reports available 
in the public domain) (India – Defense, 2018). Thus, despite defence hardware having a 
significant import component, there is still an appreciable dependence on local industry, 
both public and private. 
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No country is expected to officially declare which resources it considers strategic, and 
while there are no direct pointers to identify what India considers strategic in terms of 
materials, a broad estimation could be made based on available information about the 
administration of  minerals in the country and the technological requirements of  a few 
strategic sectors. However, is also important to know which materials are in short supply, 
about the nature of  the supply route of  such materials, and about the level of  dependence 
on foreign agencies. 
As discussed earlier, the strategic relevance of  resources could be subjective and vary from 
state to state. However, the general processes of  weapons and platforms development 
remain similar, regardless of  the agency, and the mineral/materials requirements of  the 
defence industry are predominantly the same: antimony, molybdenum, borates, nickel, 
chromium, rare earths, cobalt, silver, copper, titanium, diamond, tungsten, germanium, 
vanadium, lithium and zinc.
These materials have been identified based on various references made to them in the 
literature, and on discussions with scientists, the academic community, military officials 
and policymakers. However, the list is not exhaustive, and different defence industries 
could have their own lists based on their requirements. Based on open-source information, 
it could be safe to assume that the above-mentioned minerals have strategic relevance for 
India. The following section presents some details about some of  these in the context of 
India (Lele & Bhardwaj, 2014:83-88). 
	Antimony (Sb): The antimony resources in India are reported to be inferior in quality, 
and the country currently does not produce antimony, with the entire demand being met 
through imports.
	Borates: Borax is not produced in India, as economically workable deposits have not 
been established so far, and all domestic need is met through imports of raw borax. 
	Cobalt (Co): Associated mainly with copper, nickel and arsenic oxide, cobalt is an 
important strategic mineral with wide usage and unique properties. Most of the cobalt in 
India is recovered during copper and nickel processing as there is no production of cobalt 
from indigenous ores. The remaining demand for refined cobalt is met through imports.
	Fluorite (CaF2): The production of fluorite is scarce in the country and mainly 
fulfilled as a by-product in phosphoric acid production during the processing of phosphate 
rock. However, the chemical and aluminium industry requires a more refined and purified 
form; hence, the demand is solely met by imports. The production of fluorite is limited 
in India, and grades of fluorite produced do not meet the specifications of the chemical 
industry, which is the biggest user of fluorite, meaning that India will remain dependent 
on imports owing to both quality and quantity issues.
230 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
	Molybdenum (Mo): Molybdenite (MoS2) is the principle ore of molybdenum and 
usually extracted as a by-product of copper mining. The principle use of molybdenum is 
in stainless steel and in chemicals/catalysts. The global and domestic demand is known to 
be high as considerable growth in super alloys and the stainless-steel sector is taking place, 
and molybdenum demand in India is mostly met by imports. 
	Nickel (Ni): Nickel is one of the most important elements that enhances the properties 
of iron manifold and makes products hard; it is used in stainless steel production. There 
is no primary source of nickel production in India; however, nickel is recovered as nickel 
sulphate crystals, a by-product obtained during copper production. Most of the domestic 
demand is met by processing alloys and scraps, with the remaining demand met by imports.
	Selenium (Se): Selenium gets recovered as a by-product during copper, lead-zinc, 
gold and platinum ore processing; India does not have any primary source available 
for extraction.
	Tungsten (W): Tungsten is an important strategic mineral in India owing to its 
usage in high-end technology industries. India meets the demand mainly by imports and 
recycling of alloys and scrap. India possibly has technological constraints to extraction, 
and hence is known to be depending more on imports. 
India’s import reliance
Import dependency is not uncommon, and generally occurs for two reasons: minerals 
which are not physically available within the geographical area of  that state; and minerals 
which are available in large deposits of  that state but whose import is more economical 
than excavation and processing. For some minerals, India’s import-dependence is total, 
while for others it is partial. Coal and oil are two resources where India has significant 
import-dependency, and there are a few other areas where the dependence on imports is 
significant, and strategic minerals is one such area. Thus, dependency management is a 
significant (and serious) global business for strategic decision-makers. 
India primarily relies on China, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC), Russia, 
Australia, and the US for its imports. India has had an excellent relationship with Russia 
for many decades, but because of  India’s nuclear policies, the Indo-US relationship has 
witnessed various ups and downs in the past. India fought a war with China in 1962, although 
there has been significant harmonisation in the relationship has been witnessed in recent 
years. Of  the six states mentioned above, India is most dependent on the DRC for mineral 
imports, yet the DRC is the country with the most political turbulence, experiencing 
various civil wars. When discussing India’s bilateral relations, and specifically in the case of 
DRC, attention must be paid to the internal situation in the country, as unsettled political 
conditions and an ongoing conflict would obviously impact the state’s exports.
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Over the years, India has signed various bilateral arrangements to purchase minerals from 
a number of  African states, Australia, Brazil, China and the US. With some states, working 
groups in the fields of  metallurgy and the mining sector have been established, and there 
are also some agreements on cooperation in the transfer of  technology.
Hazards for India’s mining sector
For any industry, the going cannot be always smooth and the same is true of  India’s mining 
sector, which faces various societal, political, financial, and technological hazards. While 
the mining sector caters to the demands of  a wide range of  industries, there are some 
peculiar needs of  the defence industry which need to be satisfied. It is therefore to be 
expected that both industries find ways to ensure that these routine hazards do not impact 
the need for strategic materials by the defence industry. 
The environmental impact of  mining is a universal problem, to which there is no 
immediate direct solution. The available options are a mix of  best practices accepted and 
implemented at global level, some of  which would require local geography-based actions. 
Depending on the nature of  the site and activity undertaken, mining operations can leave 
a temporary or permanent impact on the surrounding environment, including water 
pollution, damage to flora and fauna, adverse effects on agriculture (e.g. infertile soil), air 
pollution leading to respiratory diseases in humans, and impacting the survival of  wildlife. 
The environmental challenges bring various other issues to the fore as well, such as the 
management, rehabilitation, and legislation on environmental protection and biodiversity 
conservation, issues related to human rights violations, and controls on excessive use of 
water in various mining activities. 
All these issues are applicable in some form or another to India, which currently has a 
huge cache of  mineral resources and a very active mining industry. There is a significant 
amount of  private and some foreign investment into this sector, and successive Indian 
governments have kept the industry thriving, as the growth of  the country is heavily 
dependent upon its performance. 
India has a significant amount of  open pit mining, a method in which extraction of  a 
mineral is done near the surface, creating large open pits. The primary reason for using 
this mining methodology is its relatively low cost-extraction ratio. Unlike underground 
mining methods, opencast mining does not require costly structural supports and 
extraction technologies, and it is comparatively safer, meaning that companies save on 
the cost of  expensive insurance premiums. However, it does present huge social and 
environmental challenges. Removal of  earth contributes to soil erosion, land degradation 
and the destruction of  natural habitats, while the chemicals used in extraction mix 
with water during the rainy season and end up polluting underground water reserves. 
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Contaminants mixed into the soil lead to land degradation, and the dust generated by the 
chemicals used in the mining lead to chronic human health issues, and a lasting impact 
on biodiversity.
Another hazard associated with mining is illegal mining, which has been a global pheno-
menon for many decades, and is prevalent around the world, including in India, where 
it mostly takes place in low-grade areas of  mining sites. Normally, it is expected that the 
material which gets mined here cannot be strategic material, and from a defence industry 
point of  view, such activity may not have any significant impact. 
The threat from Naxalism could be considered as one of  the major dangers for India’s 
mining industry. Naxalism is a violent movement based on Maoist ideology, which since 
1967 has been one of  the most significant internal threats faced by the Indian State. For 
some years, there have been mineral-rich areas are under the control of  the Naxalites, 
which is impacting on the growth of  the mining industry in some parts of  India. 
The map in Figure 12.2 gives a broad indication of  the regions where the problem is 
prevalent and shows that various deposits of  strategic materials are found in Naxal-
affected areas. The Indian state needs to decide their policies regarding the excavation of 
minerals like tungsten and manganese, factoring in the threat from Naxalism.
FIGURE 12.2 Naxal-prone areas, superimposed on areas with rich mineral and resource deposits
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Rare Earth Elements and India 
Rare Earth Elements (REEs) or Rare Earth Materials (REMs) are normally discussed as a 
separate category to strategic materials, owing to their specific qualities and importance 
for the defence industry. Rare earths are a set of  17 elements at the bottom of  the periodic 
table used in a variety of  renewable energy and defence applications, including precision-
guided munitions, wind turbines, unmanned aerial vehicles, hybrid vehicles and tactical 
wheeled vehicles (Snow, Pelletier & Eddy, 2012). REEs exhibit a range of  special properties 
which are used in many modern and ‘green’ technologies. The International Union of 
Pure and Applied Chemistry defines the Rare Earth Elements as the 15 lanthanides 
together with yttrium and scandium (Department of  Natural Resources and Mines, 2014).
REEs generally fall into one of  two categories: Light Rare Earth Elements (LREEs) and 
Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREEs), with varying degrees of  use and demand. REE 
mineral deposits are usually rich in either LREEs or HREEs, but rarely contain both 
in significant quantities. The Heavy Rare Earths are Europium (Eu), Gadolinium (Gd), 
Terbium (Tb), Dysprosium (Dy), Holmium (Ho), Erbium (Er), Thulium (Tm), 
Ytterbium (Yb), Lutetium (Lu) and Yttrium (Y). The Light Rare Earths are Lanthanum (La), 
Cerium (Ce), Praseodymium (Pr), Neodymium (Nd) and Samarium (Sm).
Interestingly, India was one of  the early investors in the area of  REE, establishing Indian 
Rare Earths Ltd. in 1950, immediately after independence from British colonial rule. This 
profit-making organisation has four production plants, but due to the limited natural 
availability of  REEs, India has not achieved much in this field. Similarly, a cost benefit 
analysis indicated that it would be better to import these materials from China than to 
produce them, which has also been the approach of  a number of  other states, which 
found that making investments to extract these materials from the earth was very costly. 
This has made China the sole leader for doing business in REEs. 
During the last few decades, with the increasing impact of  industrialisation and the 
growth of  the domestic defence industry, India has started realising the necessity of  REEs 
and is making investments accordingly. However, some believe that India’s policies are 
not favourable for doing business. Significant rare earths minerals found in India include 
ilmenite, sillimanite, garnet, zircon, monazite and rutile, collectively called Beach Sand 
Minerals (BSM), and India has almost 35% of  the world’s total BSM deposits. Their 
importance lies in their unique electronic, optical and magnetic characteristics, which 
cannot be matched by any other metal or synthetic substitute. From 1998 to 2006, India 
took these minerals off  the prescribed substances list, but recently added them again. The 
following diagram provides details about REE deposits in India. 
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FIGURE 12.3 Rare Metal and Rare Earth deposits in India
Conclusion 
India is emerging as one of  the major economies of  the world and sees industrialisation 
as key for growth. Numerous industries are included in this, one of  which is the defence 
industry, while various scientific laboratories that operate in India require a range of 
resources for their activities. Apart from energy and water resources, the resources of 
critical importance are materials/minerals. 
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In recent times, India’s need for strategic materials has been growing, owing to its 
investments in the nuclear, aerospace, and defence sectors, and various assessments 
indicate that cobalt, germanium, molybdenum and tungsten could be the strategic 
minerals in higher risk brackets for India. It is not only important for India to ensure the 
requisite and timely supplies of  such materials, but there is also a need to look for suitable 
alternatives. For this purpose, studies could be undertaken to explore the possibilities of 
devising specific material substitution strategies.
Every Indian industry and research, development and innovation structure demand 
different types of  minerals. With the introduction of  programmes like ‘Make in India’, 
India allowing 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) in the defence sector, and foreign 
suppliers offering technology development as part of  an ‘offset’ strategy, the demand for 
materials by the strategic industry is expected to grow significantly in the future. However, 
even today there is a significant import-dependence for procurement of  these materials, 
and there is a need to find ways to reduce this dependence. 
India needs to develop a mechanism to undertake improvements in existing mineral 
processing and extraction methods, and needs to make substantial investments for such 
purposes, keeping the long-term interests of  the country in mind. Unfortunately, India 
is not able to get free access to the mineral deposits within its own country, owing to 
domestic factors like the Naxal issue, meaning that innovative solutions are required to 
ensure that deposits within the country are fully exploited. Within the country, there is a 
need to encourage research institutions to innovate new minerals, and to find correct and 
cost-effective alternatives to existing materials. It is also necessary to establish a dedicated 
facility for strategic mineral research, including finding efficient methods for recycling. 
With nature being more favourable to them, some states are in advantageous positions 
with regards to ownership of  strategic materials, which has led to dominance by interest 
groups, and some hoarding. The REE-dependency of  various states on China has been 
one of  the most hotly discussed subjects globally, and considering the on-off  nature of  the 
India-China relationship, it is important for India to find alternative strategies to decrease 
their dependence on China. This could be regarded as both a challenge and an opportunity. 
India many not be as blessed as China in terms of  natural deposits of  REE, but there 
is a possibility for India to make appropriate investments in this sector, particularly by 
undertaking deep sea mining.
India also needs to attract more significant private industry, and this requires a simple and 
transparent mechanism with clear and enforceable timelines to grant mining permissions 
and/or other related activities. In this, the state needs to enable the private industry to do 
business in various strategic fields. 
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Strategic materials are key components of  resource geopolitics. India needs to develop a 
multipronged approach to cater for their requirements in terms of  strategic materials, and 
should invest in finding correct substitutions, recycling strategic materials, researching 
new materials, and finding innovative solutions to reduce the dependence on specific 
strategic materials.
Notes
1 The Carter Doctrine was a policy proclaimed by US President Carter in his State of  the Union 
Address on 23 January 1980, which stated that the US would use military force, if  necessary, to 
defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf  region. The doctrine was a response to the threat 
posed by Soviet troops in Afghanistan to the free movement of  Middle East oil.
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Beyond deliberate ambiguity? 
Shrikant Paranjpe
Framework 
A national security policy that seeks to protect a nation’s interests presents an interplay 
between two sets of  issues: the technical and political issues, and capability and intent issues. 
The technical dimension covers material sources of  national power that span geopolitical, 
economic, technological and other aspects, including the domestic and international 
linkages that each of  these issues would have. The political issues work at three levels: 
the domestic political environment, its linkage with the international scenario, and the 
overall international situation. The political component is based on the principle of  the 
‘primacy of  the political’. This principle suggests that: (a) political order has primacy over 
all other societal associations in the sense that ordered patterns of  relationships between 
social forms depend upon the political order, and is function is therefore to preserve social 
order; and (b) the performance of  this political function presupposes that the good which 
the political order aims at cannot be identified with any specific interest, but rather with 
the good of  the whole. 
The non‑material sources of  national power are factored into the political dimension of 
the state. While the technical dimensions of  security would determine the capability of 
a state, it is the political dimension that determines intent. Policy is thus an interplay 
between capability and intent, a product of  matching the two with a goal that seeks to 
address the national interests of  the state. The movement from policy to strategy is from 
a predominantly political to an executive domain. Policy is primarily a political statement, 
while strategy seeks its implementation in real terms, with the most efficient use of 
available means to accomplish the chosen ends. Such a strategy may or may not be spelt 
out in detail; it is the overall policy that would provide the road map for understanding 
the strategy of  that state. On the other hand, doctrine is the nuts and bolts of  strategy, 
targeting specific sectors (like nuclear, space, internal security, etc.) to provide a road map 
for the execution of  strategy. 
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National interest is defined within the context of  the core values of  a nation, as identified 
by the Constitution: as being a product of  history (civilisation); the value systems of  the 
polity and economy; and the society and culture. The aspects which determine the core 
values are the geography, geopolitics, and the political, economic and socio‑cultural context.
The origins of  the concept of  national security can be found in the historical formulations 
of  national interest. As Walter Lippmann put it, ‘a nation has security when it does not 
have to sacrifice its legitimate national interests to avoid a war, and is able, if  challenged 
to maintain them by war’ (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008:229). Arnold Wolfers argues that 
‘security, in an objective sense measures the absence of  threats to acquired values, in a 
subjective sense, the absence of  fear that such values will be attacked’ (Baylis, Smith & 
Owens, 2008:229), and this was the dominant theme of  national security through most of 
the Cold War years. The term ‘security’ was deemed to belong to the armed forces, which 
were entrusted with protecting the national interests of  a state. National interest was 
also closely linked to security, defined as defence of  a nation’s borders. As an organising 
concept in international relations, national security provides us with several advantages. 
It helps us to focus on common elements and uniformities in the external policies of  all 
nations, and is in a sense the base on which foreign policies of  nations are structured. 
Secondly, it helps us to focus on the underlying unity of  internal and external activities 
of  the state. It recognises that external behaviour of  states is an integral part of  the total 
behaviour of  the state, and that internal and external security are essentially interlinked. 
India 
The Estimates Committee of  the Indian Parliament, in its 19th Report on the Ministry 
of  Defence, raised some crucial questions about India’s defence policy. In its statement 
to the Committee, the Ministry of  Defence explained that India’s defence policy has 
essentially been to defend the territory, sovereignty, and freedom of  the country, while the 
Estimates Committee considered this an oversimplification. It felt that India should have a 
national security doctrine which not only takes a long‑term view of  the country’s security 
requirements but also looks into problems of  internal security (Estimates Committee, 
1992). Although the Indian National Security Council (NSC) was established in 1999, the 
Indian government has not yet presented an official document that spells out a National 
Security Strategy for India. Amongst the various reasons given for such a failure is a possible 
lack of  political consensus on national security issues. It has been argued that there are 
differing perceptions of  the threats India faces from its neighbours; ideological differences; 
different world views held by political parties regarding the current global situation; and 
equally complex and conflicting arguments about various internal security challenges. 
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However, the stand taken by the political establishment regarding articulation of  a 
national security strategy has, in a sense, been consistent. In a reply to the Standing 
Committee on Defence (1995‑96) in the Tenth Lok Sabha, the Defence Secretary argued 
that (Kanwal, 2017:2‑3): 
… there is a policy; the only thing is that it is not written down as a separate 
document and published as such … As a matter of  policy we have not published 
such a document and the Government has not been in favour of  publishing a 
separate document … Non‑publication of  the document does not mean in any 
way non‑existence of  policy. 
Replying to the debate on the Demands for Grants of  the Ministry of  Defence on 
10 May 1995, Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao, who was also the Defence Minister, 
stated (Kanwal, 2017:2‑3): 
We do not have a document called India’s National Defence Policy. But we have 
got several guidelines which are followed, strictly followed and observed … This 
policy is not merely rigid in the sense that it has been written down, but these are 
the guidelines, these are the objectives, these are the matters which are always kept 
in view while conducting our defence policy.
Similarly, the Ministry of  External Affairs (MEA), in its Annual Report for 1998‑99, stated: 
India’s external relations were guided by well‑established principles. These have 
formed the basis of  our foreign policy for decades. They enjoy a broad national 
consensus, thus providing a strong foundation of  stability and continuity. We 
view foreign policy as an integral part of  the larger effort of  building the nation’s 
capabilities: through economic development, strengthening social well‑being and 
the quality of  life and of  protecting India’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
security, not only in its defence and economic aspects, but in the widest strategic 
sense of  the term. 
In April 2018, the government formed a new integrated institutional mechanism called the 
Defence Planning Committee (DPC), under the chairmanship of  the National Security 
Advisor. This committee would consist of  the Chairman Chiefs of  Staff  Committee, the 
three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Secretary (Expenditure) 
Finance Ministry. There would be subcommittees on Policy and Strategy, Plans and 
Capability Development, Defence Diplomacy, and Defence manufacturing Ecosystem. 
The integration of  defence, foreign policy and finance would ensure an integrated approach 
to dealing with issues of  national security. The DPC is expected to prepare a draft national 
security strategy, along with undertaking a strategic defence review (Behera, 2018). 
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A national security strategy for India would be based on India’s core values, its principles, 
a clear assessment of  its interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that the 
country could face. An understanding of  world affairs, internal security, and territorial 
integrity have always been over‑riding priorities in India’s strategic perspectives and these, 
along with its approach to peace and development, constitute the ‘governing image’ 
of  India’s policies. However, Indian security thinking has long been criticised for being 
abstract, rather than concrete. 
Consequently, there is no spelling out of  a national security strategy in terms of  specific 
threats and possible ways to address them. It has been argued that a national security 
strategy normally provides a statement of  objectives, an appreciation of  the global, 
regional and domestic security environment, an assessment of  the country’s capabilities, 
and the approach to be taken at various levels to address these issues. It is true that 
there has been a distinct reluctance by India to present a clear‑cut strategic doctrine and 
articulate the same in terms of  policy. However, as was argued by the then Prime Minister, 
India has several guidelines which are followed and observed. 
These goals and objectives have been clearly spelt out in the Indian Constitution.1 Various 
statements made by the government at different times, as well as the annual reports of  the 
concerned ministries, provide an appreciation of  the security environment, an assessment 
of  capabilities, and the approaches to be taken to address any issues. This article argues 
that the distinct reluctance on the part of  India to present a clear‑cut strategic doctrine 
and articulate the same in terms of  policy stems from a belief  in the utility of  a deliberate 
ambiguity, and not from a lack of  strategic culture, as George Tanham would have us 
believe (1992). 
It is in this context that this article seeks to present an understanding of  India’s security 
strategy as it has evolved over the years, the challenges and issues faced, and the methods 
applied to address them. 
Goals 
To understand Indian security strategy, it is necessary to examine the sources that 
contributed to the evolution of  India’s strategic culture. India started its focus on history 
in the age of  Indian nationalism in the 19th century. It was the first systematic effort to 
identify the concept of  ‘India’ and seek historical references to present the country as an 
entity. One can flag three periods of  history in which India was an entity with relatively 
defined territories within the geopolitical frontiers of  modern‑day South Asia. The first 
was the period of  Ashoka (273‑232 BCE), the second was the Mughal Empire during the 
reign of  Akbar (1556‑1605 CE) and the third the Maratha Peshwa empire (1798 CE). This 
South Asia lies between Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east, south of  the 
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Himalayas, covering the Indo‑Gangetic plains in the north and the Deccan plateau of 
Central India with a peninsular coastline. 
The Peace dimension of  Hinduism was presented in the tenets of  Kshma (forbearance) and 
Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is but one family), while Indian nationalists accept both 
Ashoka and Akbar as symbols of  tolerance and as ‘Indian’. Alongside this comes another 
Hindu tenet: Sarva Dharma Samabhava (peaceful coexistence amongst all religions).2 The 
ancient Indian cultural legacy has been used as a base for a peace discourse in India. 
The vision that the freedom struggle and post‑independence India sought to project through 
the Nehru years (1947‑1964) rested on ideological precepts such as anti‑imperialism, liberal 
internationalism, and Gandhism (Power, 1969:22). At a theoretical level, the Indian stand 
was closer to the liberal institutionalists who accepted the key assumptions of  realism, like 
the utility of  military power, but at the same time insisted upon the utility of  institutions 
as a framework for cooperation (Baylis, 1997:200‑202). The anti‑imperialist stance was 
a direct product of  the colonial experience and the need to formulate an independent 
world view, while liberal internationalism drew from those who were at the core of  the 
freedom struggle. In the Cold War years, neutralism represented India’s desire to build 
a peaceful and prosperous society that was based on justice and equality and fostered 
all‑round development. During the colonial period, it manifested itself  in the desire to 
keep away from extra‑regional hegemonic aspirations. 
The fundamental question which India asks herself  is not how to maintain security in a 
state of  anarchy in international relations. Rather, the question is: how is peace maintained 
in a society of  nation‑states? The Indian approach, therefore, takes a global/international 
perspective of  security, instead of  a national perspective focusing on the problem of  survival 
of  the nation‑state. It revolves around two fundamental principles/dimensions: one, the 
recognition that in any conflict situation, the roots of  conflict need to be tackled; and two, 
conflict needs to be resolved without recourse to violence (Appadorai, 1969:111‑117). The 
first is a long‑term perspective and includes the social, political, and economic aspects 
of  any conflict. It presumes that conflicts are the product of  tensions arising from social, 
political, and economic issues that ultimately escalate into military and armed conflict. 
The latter is a more short‑term view that looks at the pacific settlement of  disputes. 
The trend of  revisionism emanates from a strong cultural tradition that called for a better 
world order and the innate ability of  the Indian civilisation to bring about this change 
in society. The belief  that the current world order is hegemonic and needs to change to 
provide welfare for the masses lead India to take a revisionist position in world affairs. 
This position has manifested itself  in a variety of  ways in terms of  political policy in 
independent India. 
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A study of  India’s security strategy would have to focus on the following areas: 
1. Military‑security and strategic compulsions, looking at conventional and new security 
threats to India emanating from a changing strategic environment; 
2. Politico‑diplomatic issues; 
3. Changes in science and technology the use of  nuclear, space, and electronics 
technologies; 
4. The economics of  defence; and 
5. Internal security, as the balance between external and internal security concerns is key 
to a national security policy. 
The Cold War years 
During the early years of  Independence, India’s security strategy followed two main trends: 
the first represented India’s urge to retain newly won independence while upholding its 
peace policy; the second reflected the application of  these principles in the context of 
building regional solidarity and the spread of  regionalism. However, regionalism never 
became a fundamental concern of  Asian states. Rather, interstate conflicts caused by 
unsettled boundaries, the existence of  large groups of  minorities, clashes between elites, 
and the onset of  the Cold War in Asia with the Korean War (1950‑1953) were some of  the 
more serious obstacles. 
From the Bandung Conference (1955) onwards, there was a slow shift towards a development 
of  a neutralist policy that addressed the global concerns of  the Cold War conflict, and the 
fundamental tenets of  peace and independence were to become the foundations of  the 
new non‑aligned policy. The security dimensions of  the non‑aligned approach drew on 
these basic tenets and ensured that countries focused on the fundamentals of  national 
interest, as defined by the notions of  peace and independence, thereby structuring security 
strategies to achieve these goals. Such a perspective of  non‑alignment viewed the Cold War 
as the context within which definitions of  interest had to be articulated (Subrahmanyam, 
1988:250), ensuring the continued validity of  non‑alignment as a security strategy in the 
days of  the Cold War and the period of  détente. However, the post‑Soviet scenario has 
raised new questions about this approach that need to be discussed further. 
Until the India‑China border war in 1962, there was very little debate on a national security 
strategy in India. This was mainly because of  an apparent lack of  expertise, and the success 
of  Nehru’s non‑aligned policy. However, unlike during the Nehru phase, the post‑Nehru 
debates appeared to focus more on power approaches to security policy. These debates 
were to remain within the broad parameters of  international relations, except when they 
discussed defence matters in a technical sense or reflected on the experiences of  the 1962 
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and 1965 wars (Rana & Subrahmanyam, 1988; Kavic, 1960; Khera; 1968; Thomas, 1978; 
Rao, 1970; Smith, 1994). It must be noted, however, that the focus of  most of  the debates 
remained issue‑based or sectoral in nature, and rarely covered overall security policy. 
Rana describes the discussion on security policy in India as mainly ‘debating literature’ 
(1988:31). However, it is necessary to note some diverse perspectives on defence policy. 
Unlike Thomas (1978), who identifies political factors as determinants of  policy, Kavic 
(1960) tends to include the armed forces as a strong influence on policymaking. 
One can identify five distinct phases in the development of  Indian strategic thinking on its 
security policies (see also Table 13.1). The first is the period from independence until the 
1962 conflict with China, when the dominant trend was ‘defence through diplomacy’. 
The second began with a re‑armament programme and the recognition that defence 
through military preparedness would be necessary for national security. This phase saw 
the eventual crystallisation of  a South Asian‑centric perception of  India’s power status, 
as well as a shift towards problems of  internal security. The third phase began with the 
disintegration of  the Soviet Union, and it was in this period that the overt ideological 
rationale of  revisionism started to give way, leading to a more realist frame of  reference 
with a willingness to strike up a security dialogue with the United States (US). The fourth 
phase was a continuation of  the post‑1991 framework that saw further application of  the 
‘realist’ posture that had come to dominate India’s understanding of  its national interest. 
This manifested in the decision to begin developing nuclear weapons capability in 1998, 
and the signing of  the Indo‑US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (2008). The fifth 
phase also saw efforts at diversifying and expanding India’s security footprint. 
Indian security strategy during the Nehru years rested on his model of  development, 
and the policy of  defence through development. In essence, this approach accepted the 
logic of  defence through diplomacy, and developed a security framework that had its 
roots in politico‑diplomatic activities and the process of  modernisation through industrial 
development. Thus, the key to security was seen as a long‑term strategy of  self‑reliance 
through development. However, it was the 1962 war that brought about a change in these 
perceptions, with a direct linkage being sought between defence capability and politics. 
The post‑1962 Reports of  the Ministry of  Defence reflected this change, acknowledging 
the need for a long‑term view of  defence planning to tackle tensions across the border, 
although the Indian commitment to peace and non‑aggression was affirmed, along 
with the objective of  building a social order by democratic means in which social, 
economic, and political justice would permeate all institutions of  national life (Ministry 
of  Defence, 1964:2). 
The late 1960s brought about several changes. The first was that Pakistan sought to reassert 
itself, both by moving closer to China, and through conflict with India, first in the Rann of 
Kutch and later in Kashmir in 1965. The late 1960s also saw several initiatives taken by the 
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US and the Soviet Union that were of  significance to India. Richard Nixon’s ‘Guam doctrine’ 
and Henry Kissinger’s ‘Four Power Balance doctrine’ spelt out the American position 
vis‑à‑vis India, while the Soviet Union developed the Brezhnev Plan for Collective Security 
in Asia, the Kosygin Plan for Economic Co‑operation, and a series of  treaty initiatives, 
one of  which culminated in the Indo‑Soviet treaty of  Peace, Friendship and Co‑operation 
of  1971. While the ‘Four Power Balance Doctrine included the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China and Japan as the four powers that would be responsible for order in Asia, 
implicitly excluding India; the Brezhnev Plan sought to exclude China from the proposed 
security cooperation thus creating an impression that it sought to encircle China. 
This period also saw the beginning of  Soviet arms aid to India. Traditionally, India had 
depended on the West, particularly the United Kingdom (UK), for armaments, but this 
changed with the signing of  the MiG deal with the Soviet Union in 1962 (Chari, 1979). 
The deal included provision for production, although MiGs were only delivered after 
the Chinese war was over. This was followed by the purchase of  Petya class frigates and 
submarines in the mid‑1960s (Thakur & Thayer, 1993), and Su‑7B fighters, DT‑76 and 
T‑54 main battle tanks, and other equipment in later years (Smith, 1994). Over the years, 
Indian dependence on the Soviet Union grew, and it became the most important defence 
supplier to India. 
The post‑Bangladesh era (from 1971) saw a growing level of  credibility about India’s 
position in South Asia, with some serious efforts being made to develop Indian military 
capability, as both consolidation and modernisation of  the armed forces were undertaken. 
India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, demonstrating its ability to produce a nuclear 
weapon. This was also the phase that saw India seeking to assert itself  as a regional 
power in South Asia. The ‘Indira Doctrine’, as it has been called, represented a tough and 
uncompromising approach towards other South Asian countries (Cohen, 2001:137). 
The 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a significant year for India, and it saw a 
renewed US military interest in South Asia, with arms pouring into Pakistan in support of 
the Afghanistan Mujahedeen. The 1980s also saw a significant shift in patterns of  conflict, 
as conventional border‑type wars ceased to be major threats, and the focus shifted more to 
problems of  internal security. Low‑intensity conflicts, militancy, and insurgency emerged 
as key concerns of  the decade, and these called for new approaches and strategies, resulting 
in the growth of  paramilitary forces and changes in strategic doctrines. Nuclear and space 
science received increasing focus, and enhanced nuclear capability and the development 
of  missile systems were the other marked features of  this period. 
The 1980s saw a more active security strategy being pursued by India, as it started to 
intervene in the Sri Lankan crisis to provide support to the Tamil minority population 
in the North and North Eastern regions of  the country. This support eventually led to 
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the 1987 Indo‑Sri Lanka accord, which provided for the entry of  Indian peacekeeping 
forces into the conflict zone. Along with this, India undertook a military operation in the 
Maldives to defeat a coup attempt in 1988, which was the first such operation that India 
was involved in outside of  the South Asian region. 
India also undertook a massive military exercise along the IndoPakistan border, ‘Operation 
Brass‑tacks’, that led to a rise in bilateral tensions, as well as ‘Operation Checkerboard’ in 
the North East, to tackle covert Chinese intervention in Indian territory (Cohen, 2001:146). 
However, it was during the Kargil Crisis of  1999 that India was able to match its diplomacy 
with military strategy to ensure that Pakistan withdrew from the territory it had occupied 
across the Line of  Control in the Kargil sector of  Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s covert 
support to Jihadi activities across the border was exposed, and the US put pressure on 
Pakistan to withdraw back across the Indian border (Riedel, 2002).
In stark contrast to the importance that the Indian army has been given in the planning 
for defence, Indian maritime forces were given a low priority until the 1970s. Pleas for 
an active maritime policy, as articulated by K.M. Pannikar (1945), went unheard in a 
land‑bound defence perspective, as India’s security strategy has long been dominated by 
considerations of  the defence of  land frontiers. This is partly a product of  the long history 
of  aggression and migration along land routes, either from the North West or from the 
North and North Eastern regions of  India. It is also a product of  the equally long history 
of  a ‘secure’ Indian Ocean, due to the British presence and the relatively small coastal navy 
of  Indian rulers. Consequently, much of  the work on Indian security strategy has focused 
on its land forces. 
The unique geopolitical position of  India in terms of  its peninsular presence, along with 
its growing military capability, present an opportunity for the country to emerge as a key 
player in maintaining order in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian navy’s first Maritime 
Vision was expressed in the Naval Plans Paper of  1948Indian navy was to consist of  cruisers 
and destroyers, structured around small aircraft carriers, with the objective of  protecting 
India’s sea lanes of  communication (Ministry of  Defence, 2007). Although the first conflict 
with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1947‑48 did not see any naval activity, the rationale was one 
of  ‘territorial defence’, a view that continued to dominate Indian strategic perspectives 
for over two decades. During the 1965 conflict, the role of  the navy was restricted to the 
protection of  trade. It was only in the 1971 conflict that the navy played a significant role, 
where the primary tactical success came from the use of  missile attacks in the Arabian Sea. 
The detonation of  the Chinese nuclear device in 1964 set the Indian nuclear agenda in 
motion, and Indian nuclear policy in the early years revolved around two principles: 
the promotion of  research and development for harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, and the attainment of  self‑sufficiency in the nuclear programme. Prime Minister 
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Shastri admitted to parliament that he was willing to consider the use of  nuclear blasts for 
peaceful purposes (Lok Sabha, 1964), and is reported to have authorised the Indian Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) to go ahead with designing a nuclear device and preparation 
of  the non‑nuclear component so that the lead‑time required to build an explosive could 
be reduced from 18 to six months (Wholstetter, 1977:109). However, these decisions were 
followed by a protracted debate on the Nuclear Non‑proliferation Treaty (NPT). The early 
years of  Indira Gandhi as prime minister saw much political uncertainty in India, but it 
was the rejection of  the NPT that confirmed the end of  the uncertainty of  the 1960s. By 
the early 1970s, the Indian nuclear agenda began to take a definitive direction. 
At the Fourth Atoms for Peace Conference in September 1971, the Chairman of  the Indian 
AEC announced that India had been working in the field of  nuclear explosive engineering 
for peaceful purposes on a top‑priority basis (Chandrashekar Rao, 1974:210). In her replies 
to Parliament in November 1972 and again in November 1973, Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi made it clear that the AEC was constantly reviewing the progress of  underground 
nuclear explosion technology from both the theoretical and experimental angle. However, 
she denied that there was any schedule fixed for a nuclear explosion (Lok Sabha, 1972; 
Rajya Sabha, 1973). 
It was after the nuclear implosion in 1974 that India finally developed a coherent nuclear 
doctrine to suit the changed circumstances. The test demonstrated that India was capable 
of  producing a nuclear explosion, but what remained in question was its intent. At the 
policy level, the earlier Shastri position of  peaceful use of  nuclear energy with a focus on 
research in Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) was now further expanded, although the 
new approach was based on the same geopolitical constructs of  national security that had 
governed the earlier line. However, the test did not alter India’s nuclear disarmament and 
peace policy. In her statement to the Indian parliament, Gandhi went to great lengths to 
stress that the test was part of  the research and development work that the AEC had been 
carrying out in line with the national objective of  harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (Lok Sabha, 1974). At the diplomatic level, the effort to create a deterrent 
capability threatened to translate into weapons intent, which helped India to retain the 
diplomatic advantage of  being a non‑nuclear power and continue its disarmament and 
peace agenda, and this deliberately ambiguous nuclear posture was to remain the basis of 
Indian nuclear policy for a long time. 
On 11 and 13 May 1998, 24 years after having detonated its first nuclear device at Pokharan 
in 1974, India conducted a series of  nuclear tests. Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that 
the tests were conducted with a fission device, a low‑yield device and a thermonuclear 
device, adding that the measured yields were in line with the expected values (The Times 
of  India, 1998). Expanding on the statement, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister 
stated that the tests had established India’s capability for a weaponised nuclear programme. 
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The dichotomy between defence and development has been a recurrent theme in debates 
on India’s security strategy and is interrelated with the debate on arms production. 
One important impact of  the 1962 war was the attention it generated on planning for 
defence. The following tasks were identified: (i) expansion and modernisation of  the 
army; (ii) modernisation of  the air force; (iii) creation of  an adequate production base; 
(iv) improvement and expansion of  the means of  communication and transport; and 
(v) replacement of  old ships so as to make the navy a balanced force (Ministry of  Defence, 
1964:2‑3). The Defence Plan prepared in 1964 identified as its main objective the need to 
build up adequate defences to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity (Ministry of 
Defence, 1968:4).
Internal security threats have become significant since the 1980s, resulting in a rise in 
paramilitary and related expenditures, and this was reflected in the budget allocation made 
for paramilitary and police in the Home Ministry budget. The Internal Security Division 
of  the Ministry of  Home Affairs deals with matters relating to internal security and 
law, order, including anti‑national and subversive activities of  various groups/extremist 
organisations, terrorist financing, policy and operational issues on terrorism, security 
clearances, monitoring of  ISI activities, etc. The Annual Report 2015‑16 of  the Ministry 
includes the following as areas of  concern in the context of  internal security: terrorism in 
the hinterland of  the country, cross‑border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency 
in the North Eastern States, and left wing extremism in certain areas (Ministry of  Home 
Affairs, 2017:4). 
Post-Soviet era 
The global order began to change with the Gorbachev initiatives of  Perestroika and 
Glasnost, and his ‘New Thinking’ in foreign policy was followed by the East European 
transformation of  1989, the Kuwait crisis and the first Iraq war, and the disintegration 
of  the Soviet Union. It was in the aftermath of  the Soviet Union collapse that economics 
and technology started to displace the military as the key determinants of  power, and 
terrorism started to take a new form as it moved away from a state‑centric phenomenon 
to one based on abstract religious ideology. Transnational issues, like human rights and 
environmentalism, started to gain ascendancy, while social networking grew as a new tool 
of  communication. 
The post‑Cold War era saw four transformative events in India’s strategic perspective that 
had far‑reaching implications: 
1. The economic watershed in 1991 when India launched an economic liberalisation and 
reform process because of  its economically parlous situation; 
2. The enunciation of  the ‘Look East’ policy in 1993, followed by the ‘Act East’ policy in 
2014, which indicated a shift from a West‑Asian focus to one on the Indo‑Pacific region; 
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3. The foreign and security policy watershed when India conducted a series of  tests at 
Pokhran in 1998 and declared itself  a nuclear weapon power; and
4. The transformation in India’s world view when Indo‑US relations moved from 
estrangement to engagement and, in the post‑9/11 context, towards a mutually 
beneficial strategic partnership. The Indo‑US nuclear deal for cooperation in civilian 
nuclear technology in 2005 symbolised this shift. 
The Indian economic reform programme led to a sustained average annual growth of 
8%, meaning that India was able to ride through the recession that hit the Western world 
in the early part of  the 1990s decade. India emerged as an attractive ‘strategic partner’ 
to countries in the European Union (EU), the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the US. From a country dependent on the Aid India Consortium and food 
aid from the US, India today gives financial and technical assistance to a large number 
of  developing countries, and its food self‑sufficiency has made it a major interlocutor on 
issues of  food security. Economic diplomacy has now emerged as an important tool in the 
Indian armoury vis‑à‑vis both the developed and the developing world, while a stable and 
growing economy at home enabled India to play an active role in global negotiations at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), BRICS and G‑20 meetings. 
India’s Look East Policy evolved during the early 1990s, primarily in the areas of  economics 
and trade, and was targeted towards Southeast and East Asia (Ministry of  External Affairs, 
2007:ii, v). The Indian economic reform process generated a new‑found confidence that 
encouraged the growth of  India’s economic engagement with East Asia, and India became 
a Sectoral Dialogue Partner (1992) and then a Full Dialogue Partner of  ASEAN (1995). 
In 1996, India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
Parallel to its ASEAN linkages, the Bay of  Bengal Initiative for Multi‑sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was created in 1997 to include countries in 
South and Southeast Asia. The aim was to create an enabling environment for rapid 
economic development, accelerate social progress in the subregion, and promote active 
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of  common interest. In 2014, India went 
a step further to shift from a Look East to an Act East policy, and India’s relationship 
with ASEAN was the foundation of  this. The policy, which was originally conceived as 
an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic and cultural dimensions, including 
establishment of  institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation (Ministry of 
External Affairs, 2017).
The NPT regime, with its multifarious components such as the Nuclear Suppliers group, 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Fissile Material Cut‑off Treaty (FMCT), 
amongst others, had sought to place the P‑5 (the five nuclear powers – China, Russia, the US, 
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the UK, and France) in a monopolistic managerial framework. This caused tension with 
other countries, which was compounded by the restraints placed on dual use technologies. 
The first symbolic defiance of  this restraint came in the form of  the 1974 nuclear test at 
Pokhran. The 1974 test had a limited agenda, an act of  revisionist defiance highlighting the 
technological competence of  a Third World country. However, the May 1998 nuclear tests 
represented this defiance at a time when the nuclear regime had become more stringent. 
It is against the backdrop of  this nuclear non‑proliferation and technology‑denial regime 
that one must assess the India‑US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed in 2008. 
India has argued that it is a responsible nuclear weapon state, conscious of  its obligations 
to the international community on the control of  weapons of  mass destruction (WMDs). 
India also reiterated its commitment to global nuclear disarmament and argued that it 
has always been critical of  clandestine activities with respect to WMDs, seeking to be a 
partner and not a target for the global nuclear disarmament (Saran, 2005). The passing 
of  this deal through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), as well as acceptance by the US Congress, symbolise the success 
of  India in breaking through the denial regime and gaining legitimacy for its stand as a 
nuclear‑capable power. Today, India has become a member of  the Wassenar Agreement 
and the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime and is seeking to 
join the NSG. These efforts would help to strengthen India’s position as a member of  the 
international community and enhance its credibility as a supplier of  military products 
(Grevatt, 2018). 
The Draft outline of  the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, released on 17 August 1999, argued for 
autonomy in decision‑making about security for India (National Security Advisory Board, 
1999). The key features of  the nuclear doctrine, as announced by the Cabinet Committee 
on Security, are (Basrur, 2006):
i. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; 
ii. A policy of  ‘No First Use’, where nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation 
against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; 
iii. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable 
damage; 
iv. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership 
through the Nuclear Command Authority; 
v. Non‑use of  nuclear weapons against non‑nuclear weapon states; 
vi. In the event of  a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological 
or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of  retaliating with nuclear weapons; 
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vii. A continuance of  strict controls on export of  nuclear and missile related materials 
and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff  Treaty negotiations, and 
continued observance of  the moratorium on nuclear tests; 
viii. Continued commitment to the goal of  a nuclear weapon free world, through global, 
verifiable and non‑discriminatory nuclear disarmament. 
The elaborate nuclear decision‑making apparatus formalised by the government revolved 
around the National Security Council, as well as a nuclear command and control system 
and the National Command Authority. The Strategic Forces Command was established 
to control, deploy and use nuclear weapons, to structure strategic nuclear forces, and to 
plan for nuclear operations and nuclear contingencies. The Strategic Policy group in the 
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) was set up to liaise with the government and 
the military and contribute to overall policy and plans. The Strategic Forces Command 
drew up a strategic targeting list, identified appropriate sites for storing nuclear cores and 
weapons systems and the emplacement of  vectors, and worked on nuclear weapon use 
plans to respond to certain scenarios. 
Bharat Karnad concludes that India’s nuclear policy has given up the baggage of  self‑
abnegation and denial, in that the Indian nuclear deterrent is finding its strategic bearings, 
while Strategic Forces Command finds its feet and the conventional military establishment 
outlines a role for nuclear weapons as a shield against limited conventional wars (2008:97‑106). 
The changes in the Indian position could lead one to question whether India has moved 
away from its ‘revisionist’ position to one more aligned with the status quo. 
The Defence Production Policy announced by the Ministry of  Defence in January 2011 
reiterated the vision of  self‑sufficiency (Ministry of  Defence, 2011). Initially, the defence 
manufacturing sector was reserved for the public sector only but in 2011, the Central 
Government opened it to participation by the private sector, too. The government also 
planned to involve academia, research and development institutions, and technical and 
scientific organisations to achieve self‑sufficiency. The government announced increases 
in defence exports and industry licences, promoted defence partnerships, introduced a 
defence innovation fund for the promotion of  indigenous technologies, and introduced a 
technology‑funding scheme for the private sector (Grevatt, 2017a, b, c). 
However, it has been pointed out that financial constraints, bureaucratic delays and internal 
organisational shortcomings have delayed the modernisation of  the armed forces in India, 
and these problems extend to limitations of  the Defence Research and Development 
Organization and the Ordinance Factories to deliver the necessary services (Bedi, 2018). 
A Committee of  Experts (CoE) was constituted by the Ministry of  Defence to recommend 
measures to enhance combat capability and rebalance the defence expenditure of  the 
armed forces. The committee submitted its report in December 2016, and the government 
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informed parliament that the report was taken up by the Ministry of  Defence to frame key 
action points and establish a roadmap for implementation (Ministry of  Defence, 2018a). 
In the Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap 2018, Defence Ministry seeks 
to guide the private sector industry in planning or initiating technology development, 
partnerships and production arrangements, with an emphasis on ‘Made in India’ (Ministry 
of  Defence, 2018b).
The Indian navy’s Maritime Strategy today speaks of  the need to project power as a means 
of  supporting foreign policy objectives (Ministry of  Defence, 2007). The areas of  primary 
interest that have been identified as needing attention include: (a) The Arabian Sea and 
the Bay of  Bengal, which largely encompass India’s Exclusive Economic Zone, Island 
Territories, and their littoral reaches; (b) The choke points leading to and from the Indian 
Ocean, i.e. the Strait of  Malacca, Strait of  Hormuz, Strait of  Bab‑el‑Mandeb, and the Cape 
of  Good Hope; (c) the island countries; (d) the Persian Gulf  as a source of  oil supply; and 
(e) principal international sea lanes that cross the Indian Ocean Region. The secondary 
areas of  interest include: (a) The Southern Indian Ocean Region; (b) The Red Sea; (c) The 
South China Sea; and (d) The East Pacific Region. The likely scenarios in a use of  military 
force by the Indian Navy have been outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine as follows 
(Ministry of  Defence, 2007): 
1. Conflict with a state in our immediate neighbourhood, or clash of interest with an 
extra‑regional power; 
2. Operations in the extended and or strategic neighbourhood in response to a request 
for assistance from a friendly nation; 
3. Anti‑terrorist operations conducted multilaterally or unilaterally; 
4. Actions to fulfil international bilateral strategic partnership obligations; 
5. Ensure good order at sea, which includes Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMO) 
to combat asymmetric warfare, poaching, piracy, and trafficking in arms/drugs; 
6. Ensuring safety and security of International Sea Lanes through the Indian Ocean; 
7. Actions to assist the Indian Diaspora and Indian interests abroad; and
8. Peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations, independently or as 
part of a multinational force. 
South Asia is central to Indian strategic thinking. The 1970s saw a distinct stress on 
India’s role as a regional power in the South Asian region, and the implicit aspect of  a 
hegemonic position was sought to be softened by subsequent governments. The Janata 
Party government suggested ‘mutually‑beneficial bilateralism’, while the Gujral doctrine 
talked of  non‑reciprocity with small powers, non‑intervention, and peaceful bilateral 
negotiations for resolution of  disputes (Gujral, 1997). 
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India has long maintained that it plays a key role in any consideration on the issue of  peace, 
stability, order and security in the South Asian regional state system, which has recently 
seen a re‑emergence of  traditional sources of  conflict along with non‑traditional threats. 
Some of  the traditional issues that South Asia is confronted with include the spill‑over 
of  the Afghan conflict, imperfect borders with China and Pakistan that have seen border 
skirmishes and tensions, growing competition in the Indian Ocean area, and a re‑assertive 
China with its initiation of  the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the One Belt One 
Road proposal. 
Along with this, the changing nature of  terrorism is now visible in its impact on South 
Asia. Earlier forms of  terrorism were state‑centric in that the agenda of  the terrorist was 
located in a particular people in a particular geopolitical region, but the terrorism that 
is taking shape in the post‑9/11 era is not located in any state‑centric formulation. It is 
a clash of  ideas, often religious, which the terrorists fight through the use of  force or 
violence if  necessary. The tensions with Pakistan have the added dimension of  terrorism 
from non‑state actors. 
In October 2000, President Putin visited India and the countries signed the Declaration 
of  Strategic Partnership (2000), which declared that relations would be ‘based on mutual 
understanding and long‑term confidence in each other, this envisages the elevation 
of  their multifaceted ties to an even higher and qualitatively new level’. The strategic 
partnership entailed cooperation in the following areas: Political, Trade and Economic, 
Defence, Science and Technology, and Culture. The provision in the first agreement of 
regular summit‑level meetings between the two countries has helped to continue the 
mutual dialogue. Military‑technical cooperation between the two countries includes 
joint research, development, and the production of  advanced defence technologies and 
systems, such as the development of  the BrahMos Missile System, and the production 
of  SU‑30 aircraft and T‑90 tanks in India. The two countries also hold annual training 
exercises between their armed forces (Embassy of  India in Moscow, 2018).
The post‑Cold War years have altered the security considerations between India and the 
US. There had already been a serious effort to evolve a strategic dialogue with the US, 
with the first attempt to structure approaches to defence cooperation between the two 
countries was made in the 1990s by reciprocal exchange of  information and personnel 
under what became known as the Kickleighter Proposals (Kumar, 1997:783). In 1995, the 
two countries signed the Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation, covering service‑to 
service and civilian‑to‑civilian cooperation, as well as cooperation in defence production 
and research (Sboto, 2008). However, the Indian nuclear tests of  1998 broke the early 
momentum of  the bilateral relationship and were followed by a prolonged dialogue 
between the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and the American Under Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott, seeking to re‑establish the broken links between the two countries. 
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From an Indian perspective, it was an attempt to get the US to understand the Indian 
decision to strive for nuclear weapons capability, but it was only after September 2001 that 
Indo‑US security ties gained real momentum, as both countries came to acknowledge a 
desire for greater bilateral interaction on security issues. The Defence Policy Group was 
revived, and the new key word was ‘inter‑operability’ (Embassy of  the United States of 
America, 2005). It signified the mutual desire of  the countries to work more closely in the 
area of  military cooperation, and highlighted the possibility of  sharing strategic doctrines 
and operations in the future to tackle new challenges. 
Bilateral interactions continued to gather momentum through the early 2000s. In January 
2004, the two countries agreed to expand their cooperation in three specific areas: civilian 
nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, and high‑technology trade, as well as expand 
their dialogue on missile defence. These areas of  cooperation were designed to progress 
through a series of  reciprocal steps that built on each other and were the first phase of 
the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership between the US and India (NSSP) (Embassy of 
India, 2008). In July 2005, the US State Department announced the successful completion 
of  the NSSP, providing for expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation and 
removal or revision of  some US export licenses for certain dual‑use technologies (Embassy 
of  India, 2008). 
This Joint Statement, along with the June 2005 US India Defence Framework Agreement, 
constituted a step forward on all four issues of  the NSSP. It was also the first step towards 
a far more ambitious agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation that came to be signed 
in July 2005 eventually put into place in 2008. In 2009, President Obama reaffirmed the 
global strategic partnership between India and the US (Embassy of  India, 2010), while 
Secretary of  State Hillary Clinton and the Indian External Affairs Minister established a 
‘Strategic Dialogue’ during Clinton’s visit to India in July 2009 (Embassy of  India, 2010). 
The countries also signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of  Agreement under 
which the militaries of  India and the US share each other’s military assets and facilities for 
repair, maintenance and supplies (Annual Defence Report, 2016). 
Over the past few years, the present government of  Narendra Modi has sought to expand 
security cooperation with other countries, including through reaffirming its close relations 
with the US and Russia, and efforts to build a dialogue with China. Other such efforts 
include the inter‑governmental agreement with France for Dassult Rafale fighters, defence 
collaboration with Japan with terms of  purchase and production in India, co‑development 
of  defence products with Israel, and participation in aerospace operational and naval 
exercises with Australia. Indian efforts at expanding its security footprint began with the 
establishment of  the Fakhor Air Base in Tajikistan, and it now plans to build its first naval 
base in the Indian Ocean region as a joint project with the Seychelles government on 
Assumption Island (The Hindu, 2016). 
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Along with this, in 2018 Prime Minister Modi took several concrete security steps in 
Southeast Asia. These included an agreement with Indonesia to develop a port in the city 
of  Sabang that would overlook the western entrance to the Strait of  Malacca; a pact with 
Singapore on logistical support for naval ships, submarines and military aircraft during 
visits; a visit to Malaysia; and a promise to ASEAN to promote a rules‑based order in the 
Indo‑Pacific region (The New Indian Express, 2018). 
TABLE 13.1 Survey of security perceptions and strategies
Year Security perceptions Security strategies and the context of power
1947‑1962   Conventional threat from neighbours.
  Focus is on Pakistan.
1. Defence through diplomacy. 
2. Strategy evolved as an alternative to the bipolar military 
options of the Cold War. 
3. Regionalism is key outlook (Asian and Afro-Asian). 
4. The context of power is primarily military. 
5. Revisionist agenda.
1962‑1972   Conventional threat manifests itself. 
  Focus is on Pakistan and China.
1. Limits of diplomacy exposed in 1962. 
2. Development of military capability is accepted as the 
means of achieving national security. 
3. Bilateralism in the context of South Asia emerges as the 
key focus. 
4. The context of power is primarily military and economic. 
5. Revisionist agenda continues. 
1972‑1991   Conventional threat continues. 
  Internal security problems start to 
manifest in the latter period in the 
context of low-intensity conflict and 
insurgency (Kashmir).
1. Military capability continues to be the focus. 
2. Defence through a politico-military strategy. 
3. Dual use technology emerges as important factor. 
4. India evolves a South Asia-centric approach. Considers 
itself a regional power. 
5. The context of power is mainly economic and 
technological capabilities. 
6. Revisionist agenda continues. 
1991‑1998   Threats now more global. 
  Issues like economic and trade, 
technology start to be raised. 
1. The economic liberalisation (1991) and nuclear tests 
(1998) are watersheds. 
2. Economic and political stability, technological growth 
in face of sanctions makes India demand space in the 
decision-making circles of the world. 
3. Defence through an Economic technological – military 
strategy. 
4. Global world view, not South Asia centric. 
5. Look East policy. 
6. Technology is seen as main source of power. 
7. Moving away from revisionism?
1998 to date Focus on threats in areas of 
technology and trade; growing concern 
about assertive China
1. Indian nuclear test of 1998. 
2. Indo-US Nuclear Deal. 
3. Act East Policy. 
4. Use of public diplomacy. 
5. Stress on defence modernisation along with indigenous 
production. 
6. Moving away from revisionism? 
SOURCE: Prepared by the author
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Security strategy 
Rodney Jones labels Indian strategic culture as ‘omniscient patrician’, arguing that 
philosophical and mythological factors form the foundation of  this culture ( Jones, 2006). 
He identifies the origins of  Indian‑ness that give mythological and metaphysical significance 
to the subcontinent as a territorial expression, and argues that the Indian thought process 
is ahistorical and generally resists being event‑driven or trapped in deadlines, such that 
India is perceived as an ageless civilisation having a natural claim to greatness. Writings on 
India’s foreign and security policy have traditionally sought to locate history and culture 
as a key component to an unwritten ethos, such as the Mahabharata and the Bhagwat 
Gita, which present a picture of  the necessity of  the use of  force and at the same time 
the need for peace. The primary duty of  the government was to enforce social order, and 
its coercive authority was recognised as it alone made life, property, morality or virtue 
possible (Prasad, 1968; Appadorai, 1992). If  the fundamental task of  any strategy is the 
efficient use of  the available means to accomplish policy goals, then any debate on India’s 
security strategy would have to balance its available soft‑ and hard‑power resources. It is 
these aspects that enable one to understand the Indian reluctance to spell out a concrete 
strategic doctrine, retaining a deliberate ambiguity about national security strategy. 
The first aspect relates to the geopolitical context that impinges on India’s strategic 
mindset. The second is the contrast between the identity of  India as it has been presented 
through the ages, versus the historical realities. The second flows from the first in that it 
focuses on the conceptual debate about the legitimacy of  the use of  force in international 
relations. In the context of  nuclear weapons capability, this has a direct bearing on the 
position on minimal nuclear deterrence in a nuclear doctrine that also asserts the need 
for global nuclear disarmament. The debate regarding India being a revisionist power as 
opposed to one supporting the status quo is also a part of  this debate on security strategy. 
The geopolitics of  South Asia resulted in the military orientation of  ancient Indian 
civilisations being more defensive and non‑expansionist in nature. India battled several 
incursions from the North West frontier areas, yet the strategic perspectives of  Indian 
rulers in the subcontinent remained defensive. One important reason was the natural 
geopolitical isolation of  the subcontinent. The Indian subcontinent lies along the southern 
fringe of  the Eurasian landmass and is virtually cut off  from the rest of  the world by the 
Himalayas, which constitute a formidable northern boundary against the Tibetan plateau. 
Towards the western end lie the Karakoram and the Hindukush ranges that, along with the 
Sulaiman and the Kirthar ranges, eventually meet the sea. The traditional passes to enter 
the subcontinent were through the Hindukush along the Kabul valley into the northern 
part of  the Indus valley, or from central Afghanistan into western Punjab. In the east, the 
southern Himalayas eventually branch off  to become Naga Hills and the Manipur plateau, 
and various hill lines follow south demarcating the border with Myanmar. There have 
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been very few invasions from the east. It is noteworthy that none of  the Indian empires, 
including those of  Ashoka, the Mughals or the Marathas (Peshwa), whether indigenous or 
created by outsiders, expanded beyond these geopolitical boundaries. 
Indian identity in terms of  its strategic perceptions were spelt out in the initial years of 
independence, focusing around the concepts of  independence and peace. The former 
had an external dimension of  ‘staying away from politics of  groups aligned against one 
another’ (Nehru, 1971:2) and an internal dimension of  self‑reliance. The source of  the 
peace tradition was the assimilative cultural tradition and came to be articulated as an 
approach seeking conflict resolution. This is a product of  India’s history and culture 
spanning over several centuries, and it is this image that clashes with the question of 
whether the use of  force is legitimate. 
The debates in India about its strategic policy are state‑centric, maintaining a belief  that 
the post‑Soviet era has not altered the hierarchal structure of  the world order. These 
debates therefore tend to be located around the following issues: The first debate has 
a politico‑military frame of  reference. Given the tradition of  peace that was central to 
India’s world view, the newly independent country had to address the issue of  military 
power in its strategic perspectives. Referring to the influence of  Gandhi on what Nehru 
called a Cold War mentality, Nehru spelt out his views on the utility of  force in terms of 
state policy (Singh, 1994). He understood the need of  a country to maintain its military 
strength to avoid or conduct a war if  necessary. However, there is always a need for 
keeping the option for compromise open, not necessarily on fundamentals but on areas 
where dialogue is possible. It was therefore necessary to make a distinction between 
appeasement and weakness. Nehru did not expect a person to be a pacifist, arguing that 
each one must maintain his strength, but also asked, ‘why shout it out? Why talk about it? 
Why threaten the other at all the time’ (Mende, 1958:126). 
India has since moved away from the Nehruvian position of  underplaying the use of  force. 
The first time that India gave any indication that it was willing to seek options other than 
those within the peace approach was in 1971, when prime minister Indira Gandhi talked 
of  ‘other solutions to this problem’ in response to Pakistan’s actions in East Pakistan and 
the resultant influx of  almost 10 million refugees into India (Kak, 2012:91). Today, there 
is a willingness to accept the utility of  force as an option, even if  done with restraint. 
India had also conducted a putative strike against Pakistan, shelling Pakistani installations 
across the Line of  Control in Kashmir after the terrorist strike on the Jammu and Kashmir 
State Legislature in 2001 (Ladwig, 2010:1168). 
In 2015, India conducted surgical strikes against terrorist camps along the Indo‑Myanmar 
border, and in 2016, against terrorist launch pads in Pakistan‑occupied Kashmir 
(Indiatimes, 2015; MEA & MoD, 2016). The Defence Minister stated that the armed forces 
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in Kashmir had been given full authority to conduct operations against Pakistan’s attempts 
to abet cross‑border terrorism, as well as dealing with militancy in the Valley. He added that 
in war‑like zones, military solutions were to be provided by military officers, not through 
the comments of  politicians ( In the case of  China, the Doklam crisis that erupted in 2017, 
where the Chinese attempted to reshape the boundary and the security matrix with India 
at the India‑China‑Bhutan trijunction, was resolved to Indian satisfaction. India was able 
to achieve three tasks: hold the Chinese road‑building efforts and prepare for a military 
retaliation by China; maintain Bhutan’s interests and territorial integrity; and brave the 
inevitable Chinese pressure (Bagchi, 2017). 
Revisionism has been a dominant theme in the Indian approach to international issues. 
The debate on revisionism has for a long time centred on the hegemonic status quo 
dominance that was the feature of  the hierarchal world order. However, during the 70s, 
there was a subtle shift in the revisionist posture. India’s own emergence as a hegemonic 
power in South Asia led it to take a different perspective towards South Asia on the one 
hand, and towards the world at large. The Indian position in the region came to be viewed 
in terms of  its role in the regional state system of  South Asia as a hegemonic power, and 
hence a power that had to take on the responsibility of  maintaining peace and order in 
the region. 
The traditional anti‑status quo posture that India had espoused through the Cold War years 
has undergone a change, and the challenges that were posed to the nuclear club through 
the 1974 test had become obsolete by 1998. While India may continue to argue in favour 
of  its role in global decision‑making circles through a demonstration of  its technological 
capability via the nuclear and space route, thus seeking a ‘revisionist’ position, the crossing 
of  the nuclear threshold has blunted India’s demands. This is especially so because of 
the ambiguity in the Indian position about the nuclear status of  Pakistan and Iran, as 
India refuses to grant the same revisionist logic to either of  these countries. Similarly, the 
rhetoric of  the New International Economic Order of  the 70s now has to confront Indian 
economic diplomacy at the WTO, BRICS and the G‑20 forums, where India is emerging 
as one of  the key actors. Thus, the dilemma is whether revisionism, as one of  the key 
ingredients of  an Indian world view, is more rhetoric than a critical component of  policy. 
India appears to have quietly abandoned the classical form of  non‑alignment that put it in 
the bracket of  the Afro‑Asian developing world. Today, while India may still identify itself 
as a Third World developing country, it considers itself  a prominent actor seeking to lead 
the region in the global economic and other forums, and the limitations of  revisionism are 
being recognised. The old ideological rhetoric of  non‑alignment has come to be replaced 
with a far more realist world view that seeks to remove the ideological blinkers. The 
exploration into the possibility of  a strategic partnership with the US, France, Japan and 
Australia is a product of  this new‑found realism in foreign policy. 
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India’s new security strategy, with a geopolitical focus on India’s strategic concerns, can 
be spelt out as follows.
Basic principles 
At the domestic level, there is an emphasis on the Indian success at establishing a pluralist 
representative system of  governance based on the framework of  unity in diversity. 
Meanwhile, At the international level, the focus is on India’s principled commitment to 
peace policy and independent understanding of  world affairs. India asserts its commitment 
to national security, and hence the legitimacy of  the use of  force and need for nuclear 
weapons capability, and at the same time reiterates its commitment to non‑proliferation 
of  nuclear weapons and pursuit of  global nuclear disarmament. In this context, there is 
an emphasis on developing a peaceful uses programme in the nuclear area, and the use of 
advance technology for peaceful (developmental) purposes. This is especially applicable 
to technologies relating to nuclear, space, and electronics, which are dual use technologies. 
Regional level 
The utility of  nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan remains unclear. In the short 
term, one would have to make a distinction between security considerations, which include 
border conflicts and internal security, and nuclear strategies. Conceivably, one can argue 
for a ‘no first use’ agreement and to not attack one another’s nuclear installations. India 
can also argue that the critical Indian security concerns stem from China, not Pakistan. 
Here, Indian nuclear preparedness gains a different meaning, as the country can use its 
nuclear capability to strike up a new level of  dialogue with China on politico‑security 
issues. The Indian army ended their 71‑day August to September 2017 stand‑off  over a 
Chinese road‑building project in Doklam, and it is likely that this was possible because the 
PLA simply lacked the military ability to push the Indians out. Chinese resolve to ‘take all 
measures to uphold its territorial integrity’ is likely to be a product of  this stalemate, but 
Doklam also provided a clear template for other countries to use in the face of  incessant 
small‑scale land grabbing ( Joshi, 2017). 
Global level 
India faces a hard choice at the global level. International interaction has moved away 
from traditional methodologies of  formal or informal negotiation to tacit bargaining 
(Agrawal, 1996:46), in which one state attempts to influence the policy decisions of  the 
other through ‘countervailing actions’, rather than negotiation. These actions consist of 
threats, postures, deliberate delays, and building allies both within and outside of  the 
countries. Tacit bargaining is likely to work on economic and technology transfer issues 
in the context of  India, as the issue of  modern technologies is a central security concern 
today. Here, the bargain may hinge on the degree to which the nuclear weapon powers 
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accept India’s emergent status. Advanced technologies of  the day may continue to be under 
denial regimes or be so costly as to make them unaffordable, while other technologies 
may either be of  no real use or be created indigenously. It is here that Indian reluctance to 
present a clear‑cut statement of  its strategic doctrine has its utility, as it would give India 
the space to negotiate and take care of  its national interests. 
Notes
1 Directive Principles of  India’s Constitution, Art. 51 of  the Indian Constitution, calls for the promotion 
of  international peace and security, maintaining just and honourable relations between nations, 
fostering respect for international law and treaty obligations, etc.
2 Ashoka’s conversion to Buddhism and his preference for cooperative practices in relations with other 
states is the core of  India’s Panchsheel philosophy. Ashoka’s Empire lasted from 273 to 232 BCE. 
Two concepts of  Akbar (Mughal Empire [Akbar] 1556‑1605) need to be mentioned: Deen‑e‑Ilahi 
(Divine Faith) and Suleh Kul (Peace to All). The former was an attempt to create a new religious 
world view that attempted a synthesis of  the then contemporary religions; the latter became a policy 
that sought to integrate the Hindu society in governance.
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An astute observer of  international politics, in following global events unfolding over the 
past 50 years, remarked not so much tongue-in-cheek that the fallacy of  a unipolar world 
was evident for decades including during the Cold War, and the phenomenon is becoming 
more evident day by day. He suggests that ‘the process of  globalisation to the extent that 
it exists … has been proven to be far from linear. Some general trends may be observed 
by some, but there are visible signs of  deglobalisation in various areas such as political-
military and economic spheres’.1 His statement reminds one of  an argument once posed 
by the sociologist, Anthony Giddens, cautioning theorists that the globalisation of  (social) 
life also implies fragmentation and alienation on various socio- and political levels, which 
is likely to invite conflict rather than peaceful existence.
This collected volume through various contributions touches on how the post-1945, 
post-decolonisation and post-Cold War era transformed power, diplomatic and strategic 
relations and defence diplomacy in the “Global South”. As the assassination of  an Iranian 
general in Iraq by a US drone attack in January 2020 illustrates, the space of  global politics 
remains tense, if  not explosive. If  not for Iranian restraint, this thoughtless act of  aggression 
outside the parameters of  international law could have led to some conflict of  magnitude. 
One may argue that the then Cold War divide made conflict more containable and perhaps 
predictable. The consequences of  the Cold War conflicts in the “Third World”, however, 
were enormous in human and material terms be it through so-called proxy wars or direct 
intervention by powers that perceived themselves as Gladiator-World Saviours (for example, 
the US involvement in Vietnam and US involvement in enforced regime changes in Latin-
America). Despite a brief  moment of  (perhaps delusional) optimism following the end 
of  the Cold War, the present context remains one of  tension, increasing fragmentation 
and fragile relations that can change in a moment through one single un-reflected-upon 
military act.
The United Nations and the Security Council 
On 1 January 2020, the estimated total of  the world population was 7,763,035,303 persons. 
About 36 percent of  these live in China and India. Twelve countries, the United States, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, the Russian Federation, Mexico, Japan, 
Ethiopia, The Philippines, and Egypt in descending order have each more than 100 million 
inhabitants.2 Only three of  these 14 countries have a permanent seat in the UN Security 
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Council. By far the most strategic institution of  the United Nations, it does not reflect 
the real economic, political, economic, military, demographic and the power potential of 
its member states. Especially, the permanent seat of  Great Britain and that of  France are 
remarkable, given the fact that India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, the entire Middle East 
and the entire Latin America and Caribbean region are not represented. Of  the block of 
the five BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, only three have 
a permanent seat. To manage global conflict, it is perhaps fitting to mention that large 
scale reform around the UN Security Council in terms of  representation is necessary. For 
example, should Brexit become a reality, one can rightly ask whether the UK should still 
have a seat in the Security Council? This would even be more pertinent if  Scotland in their 
next referendum choose to break away from the UK. The Security Council should also 
be extended to include other influential states from the South. Such a step would allow 
for a more inclusive balance of  power and broader consultation on conflict and defence 
matters in the Security Council.
Latin America and the Caribbean
In Latin America, the Cold War represented a period in which military coups became 
institutionalised. The first institutional coup was that of  1962 in Peru. Brazil followed 
in 1964; a coup planned after explicit consultation with both the national elites and US 
government representatives. The Brazilian example gave rise to a succession of  Latin 
American dictatorships, subsequently known as ‘national security regimes’, established 
by right-wing military leaders, in which the appointment of  cabinet members in the 
successive military or civil-military governments went hand in glove with internal 
promotions in one or other branch of  the armed forces. In almost all of  Latin America, 
Peru as exception (1968-1980), national security or ultra-right repressive regimes came to 
power. Even in the first years of  the democratic transitions at the end of  the Cold War, 
there were countries with military-approved governments or co-governments, for instance 
in Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. The late 1980s and 1990s saw transition 
to democracy, notably in Argentina and Chile. The era of  transition from authoritarian 
rule to democracy was not to last forever in all Latin-American states. In Honduras (2009) 
and Bolivia (2019), the armed forces were ‘invited’ or ‘co-invited’ to stage coups. Are we 
potentially seeing a regression of  democratic politics in Latin America? This is a question 
worth contemplation.
In post-Cold War Latin America, dictatorial military regimes had been succeeded by 
elected civilian governments. Democratic transitions considerably diminished the political 
influence of  the armed forces. Sometimes outgoing military governments arranged 
their own transition pacts with the incoming civilian government implying a kind of 
co-governance in the shadows of  power. Arguably, however, military influence in civil 
politics has been substantially diminished. 
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Whatever efforts the outgoing military could mobilise, the final outcome was a significant 
reduction of  political influence, accompanied with sharp cutback of  budget, personnel and 
equipment which occurred in most Latin American countries. This generic transition to 
democracy implied significant change for the once powerful and centralised authoritarian 
regimes, the loss of  the de facto monopoly on intelligence matters and direct influence 
of, or control of  government. In general, it was a process of  gradual but controlled 
conversion. Especially after the Central American peace agreements in the 1990s and 
the electoral defeat of  the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the reduction in military 
spending was dramatic: in cases standing armies of  55,000 to 280,000 officers and troops 
became “miniature” armies of  10,000 to 15,000.
Over the entire region, the armed forces decreased: at present, the armed forces in the 
largest countries and with the largest population, are relatively small: 334,000 in Brazil 
whose population is 212 million; 268,000 in Colombia with a population of  nearly 
50 million; 265,000 in Mexico with a much larger population of  128 million; and 195,000 
in Venezuela with a population of  31 million. The exception seems to be Colombia. The 
bloated armed force of  Colombia is partially explained by its warfare against two guerrilla 
movements (the ERP and until 2016 the FARC) and more than 50 organised private armies 
of  criminal gangs, not counting local militias along the entire Pacific coast.
Predictably, military expenditure is the highest in Brazil. Brazil spends nearly 45 percent 
of  all Latin American and Caribbean national defence spending. Second, third and fourth 
places are held by Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. The long-term percentage of  the 
military budget of  the GDP between 2006 and 2017 is around three percent in the case of 
Colombia and 1,5 percent in the case of  Brazil and Honduras. All other countries spent 
considerably less.3
Only Brazil has a significant military industrial complex and a space programme. Chile’s 
military budget until 2020 was guaranteed by the ten percent of  the copper revenues. This 
new ‘strategic contingence fund’ fuelling the military budget will be administered by the 
Central Bank in Chile, the erstwhile dictatorship of  the Pinochet brutal military rule. 
There was always suspicion about the establishment of  American territorial bases in the 
years of  the Pink Tide of  nationalist-leftists government (c.2000–c.2015). But in May 2017, 
it was announced that American forces will lead an unprecedented joint exercise with 
the armies of  Brazil, Colombia and Peru. The returning military influence in the region 
goes together with an enormous commercial, economic and development assistance 
programme by China. It seems that some balance between East and West is maintained 
in terms of  cooperation, with Chinese investment and commercial cooperation likely to 
increase in the region.
The once important ALBA-country system is diminishing in political influence due to 
falling oil revenues of  Venezuela and the withdrawal of  Ecuador (2018) and Bolivia (2019). 
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In the three remaining larger countries, namely Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the armed 
forces maintain an “osmosis type” of  relation with the political system and the economy.
During the last two decades of  civilian rule, problems of  persistent inequality, corruption, 
institutional fragility and high levels of  violence (not so much political as criminal) and 
insecurity continued and may open a leeway to military institutions to once again expand 
their influence if  not well managed. Brazil’s new civilian government with a retired army 
captain as president who with nostalgia speaks of  the good years of  dictatorship as does 
his vice-president, a retired general, is an example.
Relations between Latin American countries and the USA remain hovering between 
acceptance and hostility and in cases are contradictory or opaque. The Trump fundament-
al ism and xenophobia against people entering the USA via Mexico remains a bone of 
contention and most likely tensions will rise in magnitude as the US (apartheid-like) 
Wall is erected.
Future developments in the economy play a large role. Any decline in the economy of 
the USA may impact on Latin America and there seem to be indications that an economic 
decline in the USA will not be easily arrested. Capitalism on a credit card has become 
expensive – even untenable. Then there is the uneasy truth to be kept in mind: Major or 
hegemonic powers in (economic) decline, frequently tend to become more aggressive in 
military posture as their own feelings of  insecurity increase. The US is no exception here. 
Developments here are to be carefully monitored and analysed as there is no crystal ball 
to read the future in the region.
Africa
Africa’s history ever since Muslim expansion and Western colonialism has seen many 
torturous events and historical permutations. From an era of  liberation struggles, some of 
them extremely brutal and dislocating such as Algeria and Zimbabwe, many African states 
after independence became autocracies or one party states. Some were more successfully 
run than others. Compare the stable rule of  Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia 
under Kenneth Kaunda with brutal rule in Uganda and Somalia. Africa became vulnerable 
to the coup syndrome with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Burkina Faso as examples. 
Some military regimes were stable and reflected a fairly good human rights record such as 
Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara, a visionary leader. Sankara, however, was not pliant 
to the West (especially France). His outspoken dream of  a Burkina Faso detached from 
French neocolonial economic rule led to a coup d’état and his death, bringing a more 
pliable leader to power who remained in the French sphere of  neocolonial influence. In 
Uganda, under the brutal rule of  the dictator Idi Amin Dada thousands perished until 
Amin was overthrown through the intervention of  Julius Nyerere (Mwalimu) of  Tanzania. 
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In many states, corruption became endemic after independence with Zaire under Mobutu 
and the Central African Republic under Bokassa as examples. There were some success 
stories too. Zambia became independent from Britain without an armed struggle but 
rather a “negotiated independence” after civil resistance and labour strikes. In Botswana, 
under Sir Seretse Khama, the same occurred. Botswana reflects a constitutional state with 
stable rule, little corruption and a good economic growth rate. That corruption on the 
continent is far from defeated can be seen in Nigeria and in southern Africa, South Africa 
under the rule of  Jacob Zuma is an example.
The case studies on Africa included in this volume are all from southern Africa. After 
an anti-colonial struggle that started in 1894 against the German colonisers, Namibia’s 
struggle for liberation continued during the rule of  the Union of  South Africa (1915-1947). 
Sporadic revolts such in northern Namibia by Herero and Ovambo people as well as 
the Bondelswarts rebellion of  1921 in the south of  Namibia were supressed, amongst 
others by using the newly established South African Air Force. When the South West 
African People’s Organization (SWAPO) started their armed struggle in earnest in 1966, 
conflict escalated in the region. The Cold War myopia played no small role in this. South 
Africa, now under minority apartheid rule, was feverishly anti-communist and viewed 
itself  as a Western ally. The “black danger” (Afrikaans: swart gevaar) and a deep dislike for 
communism, the “red danger” (Afrikaans: Rooi Gevaar), conflated into an ideology-driven 
South Africa mobilised to uphold the white state. The struggle by SWAPO and its People’s 
Liberation Army of  Namibia (PLAN) was interpreted as part of  the red danger and total 
communist onslaught (Afrikaans: Totale Aanslag). Others interpreted it as a proxy war. The 
Cold War mania came as manna from heaven for the apartheid government that declared 
itself  as an ally of  the West fighting a communist/Marxist-Leninist threat spearheaded 
by Moscow.
South Africa’s invasion in Angola (1975), with the knowledge of  the USA, was to set the 
scene for further bloodletting. The Republic of  Cuba became involved to support the 
Angolan government. In Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of  Angola 
(MPLA) came to power in November 1975 following the hasty departure of  the colonialist 
Portuguese forces after a bloodless coup against the dictatorship of  Caetano. South Africa’s 
alliance with anti-Luanda forces with covert support by the West for Jonas Savimbi’s rebel 
movement increased the turmoil in Angola. The Soviet Union was forced largely through 
Castro’s commitment to Africa to support the government in Luanda. The military 
support for the MPLA heightened tensions. South African forces claimed that their fight 
against SWAPO guerrillas necessitated strong action. In countering the SWAPO threat, 
South Africa’s involvement was to escalate. SWAPO in turn infiltrated northern Namibia 
relentlessly. South African involvement with covert Western support (i.e. Reagan’s policy 
of  “constructive engagement”) led to economic instability and large scale social dislocation 
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in Angola, the consequences still lasting today. The South African military had a more 
or less permanent presence in Angola through some large-scale operations and perhaps 
hundreds of  smaller ones. Savimbi’s Union for the Total Independence of  Angola (Unita) 
became a favourite proxy of  South Africa and apartheid’s tacit supporters. 
Between 1966 and 1988 South African forces embarked on numerous large scale (semi-) 
conventional operations against SWAPO that also led to military conflicts with MPLA’s 
armed forces (or FAPLA). Especially with Botha in power, the war in Angola gained in 
importance and the State Security Council decided that Pretoria will take all measures, 
diplomatic, economic and especially military to dislodge Swapo and weaken the MPLA 
government. Post 1979, numerous large-scale operations that were undertaken included, 
amongst others, Operation Sceptic (“Smokeshell”), Operation Protea (hundreds of  Swapo 
and Fapla soldiers killed), Operation Daisy (1981), Operations Super, Meebos, Phoenix and 
Boswilger (between 1982 and 1985). The battles at Cuito Cuanavale, Lomba and Tumpo 
of  1987 and 1988 finally brought about a stalemate, perhaps describable as a technical 
defeat to apartheid forces, though at high costs to the Angolan forces. Namibia finally 
became independent after a century of  struggle against colonialism. In accordance with 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 435, Namibia became independent in March 1990 
having seen its first free elections in 1989. Peace could have been achieved earlier, but the 
USA’s policy of  constructive engagement was to lengthen the suffering. 
One of  the historic ironies (if  not a tragedy) of  the Namibian struggle for independence 
is that if  apartheid had relinquished their hold on the mandate for South West Africa in 
die 1970s as demanded by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the debilitating 
conflict that spilled over numerous borders could have been terminated. Instead, against 
the wishes of  the Namibian people themselves, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Pretoria virtually colonised Namibia as a perceived “fifth province”. The UN 
Security Council remained divided, which prolonged an unnecessary war. In the end, 
Pretoria made a fatal strategic misjudgement. The South African state was not fighting 
“terrorists”, “Marxists” or dupes of  Moscow, but a determined Namibian people intent on 
independence after nearly a century of  struggle. Ironically, the authoritarian government 
and the security establishment of  South Africa became proxies for the US during this period.
Today, Namibia like Botswana, its neighbouring country, is a stable constitutional state. 
It is a dominant party system with SWAPO holding on to power that seems to be slowly 
eroding. In terms of  foreign and defence diplomacy, Namibia is following an independent 
pathway. Managing foreign relations tends to be pragmatic rather than ideological. The 
country maintains relations and exchanges with countries in the EU (especially Germany), 
Russia, China and even North Korea setting an example of  independent thinking on the 
continent. Despite challenges such as poverty, economic growth, and some corruption 
(not comparable with its neighbouring state South Africa), Namibia seems to hold. The 
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Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is small and the purpose is national defence. The country 
faces no external enemies and forms part of  the Southern African Security architecture. 
The next case study, South Africa, as one of  the so-called large states in Africa, followed 
a somewhat different trajectory. Colonial conquest first by the Dutch and then British 
determined its future political development. Indigenous black resistance was subdued 
by military force, whether it came from the Zulu, Xhosa or other people. Even the 
Boer Republics that stubbornly held onto their independence became a target after the 
discovery of  gold in the Transvaal (today Gauteng Province). The Anglo-Boer War (South 
African War) broke out in October 1899 and lasted three torturous years until 1902. The 
extended guerrilla face of  the war was marked by a scorched earth policy by the British 
with thousands of  white and black people dying in concentration camps. What some 
termed the last of  the gentleman’s wars and others the first of  the total wars (but was 
in fact a resource war) again had a major influence on the future. Peace was concluded 
in 1902. The end of  the Anglo-Boer War saw a country marked by struggle between 
white indigenous people (Afrikaners) and the British. The “land of  Boer against Brit” now 
became the land of  Boer and Brit (even if  the relationships between the two races were 
strained and somewhat uneasy). The Union of  South Africa came into being in 1910. 
Despite protest and initially liberal resistance by black people against lack of  citizenship, 
the white controlled government of  Smuts and later the National Party with its policy 
of  racial segregation (apartheid) was not to give way. This was not made easier by the 
rise of  Afrikaner Nationalism that led to the creation of  a state where apartheid as a 
comprehensive project of  social engineering was implemented from 1948 onwards. The 
rights and land of  black people were whittled away with the comprehensive and notorious 
land acts of  1913 and 1936. Despite black people taking part as contingents in both the 
First and Second World Wars together with South African soldiers, no compromise was 
made and right to equal citizenship did not materialise. Passive resistance that marked the 
1950s was to turn into an armed struggle and underground mobilisation by the 1960s. 
Further, despite dozens of  UNGA Resolutions, Pretoria doggedly clung to the apartheid-
ideology and Namibia. The armed struggle, mass mobilisation and underground organi-
sation of  the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress were repressed 
through a barrage of  security laws frequently justified as necessary to suppress “terrorists”, 
Marxist/Leninist types and dupes of  Moscow. The rising Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM) from 1976 onwards, was likewise severely repressed. Under the motto of  Total 
Onslaught and a total national security strategy, the white state moved from resemblances 
of  a police state to a highly militarised state ensconced in a garrison mentality between 
1963 and 1989. Only in 1990 after decades of  struggle, international pressure (a lot of  it 
initially spearheaded by African countries and the Non-Aligned Movement) led to the 
mould being broken. Thousands of  detentions, the torture and killing of  prisoners, and 
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covert operations by shady security forces against activists could not beat the combination 
of  international sanctions, an arms embargo, and boycotts of  South African products, 
diplomatic isolation, disinvestment, mass protest and a limited armed struggle. Things 
were falling apart; the centre could not hold.
Under manifold pressures and a declining economy in South Africa, the liberation 
movements were unbanned in 1990 and a lengthy, tension ridden (and sometimes 
violence filled) period started. The ANC committed itself  to negotiations. South Africa 
saw a negotiated transition to a constitutional state between 1992 and 1996 when the new 
constitution was accepted. South Africa was finally “free” from colonialism and apartheid, 
the latter sometimes described as colonialism of  a special type. The legacy in terms of 
human development and education was horrendous and social challenges abounded. The 
dominant party, the African National Congress, was in government, now facing immense 
challenges on numerous levels. Thanks to a statesman like President Nelson Mandela, 
South Africa returned and was welcomed into the international community. Likewise 
held for Africa, though some states (such as Nigeria and Angola) had some reservations 
about the new kid on the block.
As pointed out in the chapter on South Africa, various experiments with the economy 
on a spectrum from (radical) social democratic and liberal capitalism were undertaken. 
The role and posture of  the security and military forces changed to that of  a force in a 
democracy and some levels of  civil control over the military were instituted. Whereas 
under President Mandela’s foreign policy was aimed at re-entering the global world and 
gaining recognition in Africa, foreign policy under President Thabo Mbeki became more 
directed towards Africa. Mbeki’s ideal of  an African Renaissance and an African Peer 
Review Mechanism was welcomed by some and viewed with scepticism by others on the 
continent. Under the disastrous rule of  Zuma, foreign policy got less attention because of 
internal squabbles, protest against service delivery and expanding corruption; the latter 
phenomenon to such an extent that some talk about state capture. After the fall of  Zuma, 
President Cyril Ramaphosa indeed inherited a precarious state and society. 
South Africa’s defence diplomacy remains mainly value driven (conflict resolution and 
re-construction oriented), favouring negotiation and diplomacy before military force.
The South African Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review 
mandate stemming from the 1990s direct the functions of  the Department of  Defence 
and Military Veterans (DDMV) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). 
Promoting security includes regional security through defence cooperation with the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and to provide capacity for regional 
and international peace-support operations.
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As much as foreign policy and defence diplomacy are closely intertwined, so is the notion 
of  creating conditions for peace. Peace diplomacy is not a common concept but related 
to defence diplomacy. Peace diplomacy can be seen as the activities associated with 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Arguably, South Africa’s current military 
diplomatic approaches fall within the ambit of  peace diplomacy. 
Keeping the above in mind, bi- and multilateral involvement by South Africa in peace-
making, governance, development and post-conflict reconstruction processes is taking 
place in at least 18 countries on the continent. Since 2010, South Africa has participated 
in several peace-support operations while the philosophy is to maintain a mission-based 
force. Operational commitments outside the country reflect international and regional 
cooperation aims and peace support operations. 
In discussing South Africa, the African Standby Force (ASF) needs to be mentioned. The 
greatest obstacle in establishing and maintaining such a force remains finances, followed 
by coordination and leadership. Streamlining coordination between the militaries of 
states, regional organisations and the African Union (AU) in terms of  dedicated mission-
orientated operations will need continuous attention. The challenge is to deliver 
effectively on expectations without overstretch. This means a long-term national security 
strategy for South Africa and continuous close alignment with its defence diplomacy to 
facilitate interaction with partner states. Simultaneously, time frames need to be planned, 
closely coordinated and adhered to in efforts undertaken in, or by, SADC and the AU/ASF. 
Within the financial and budgetary constraints and aware of  the asymmetric nature of 
contributing states, a block-by-block approach is necessary, together with a commonly 
accepted strategy derived from an agreed-upon vision. The military leadership of  forces 
to be deployed for peace missions and/or socio-economic reconstruction or policing need 
more say on entrée/exit dates and strategies.
Since 2000, Africa has seen roughly 50 peacekeeping operations in 18 countries. Partnership 
peacekeeping rose in prominence. Peace operations took place both as attempts at conflict 
resolution and retro-actively after conflict broke out or escalated.
These peace operations were conducted by the UN, AU, EU and the Economic Community 
of  West Africa States (ECOWAS), with the UN as the dominant player. Since the AU 
increased its involvement in 2003, it has deployed 40,000 peacekeepers in multipartnership 
or hybrid peacekeeping missions. At any given stage, South Africa contributed close to 
3,000 members to peace operations on the continent, thus around ten percent. The reality 
is that future success will depend on: well-coordinated, planned and executed operations 
that are cost effective within a definite time frame; to what degree asymmetrical states can 
contribute to each mission; the effectiveness of  civil oversight; and to what extent military 
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leaders have input in deployment strategies, time frames (both ‘in’ and ‘out’) versus 
available funding, material capacity and skilled resources. Most importantly, success will 
depend on future multistate cooperation within the current budgetary constraints.
To conclude: the transition to a constitutional democracy allowed South Africa to re-enter 
African and world politics. Between 1990 and 2020 South Africa transformed from a 
hegemon to benevolent partner on the continent. This new diplomatic posture resulted 
in a context where the defence diplomacy of  South Africa in following foreign policy 
complemented the country’s role as peacemaker and potential agent for change. South 
Africa’s involvement in the region and Africa has carved out a role for the country as a 
potential peace multiplier. 
In terms of  the military, the defence posture changed from one of  apartheid aggression 
to a peaceful defence posture. Defence in a democracy was the guideline for the 
re-professionalisation and reform of  the military. Previous liberation movements 
(non-statutory forces), the militaries from the “independent” homelands and the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) were integrated while simultaneously demobilisation 
and rationalisation took place. A Defence Review Process (DRP) was undertaken 
during 1997/1998 which included civil participation. Since then a second defence review 
process was undertaken during 2014/2015. Unfortunately, little of  the latter review’s 
recommendations were implemented. The arms deal that took place to replace obsolete 
arms between 1994 and 1999 (navy and air force especially) was controversial. Some 
suggested that the new arms were far too expensive and more suitable for a military that 
was threatened by conventional foreign aggression and South Africa had no enemies and 
hence faced no immediate or conventional threat. The arms deal was also marked by 
corruption, which marred the process and the image of  the military.
It has to be mentioned though that despite severe budget cuts in defence spending, the 
South African government delivers on its obligations to peacekeeping on the continent. 
In this sense, as well as involvement with regular military operations with neighbouring 
states and naval exercises with navies from Western countries, Latin-America and China, 
South Africa maintains an outward peace-orientated military diplomacy and forms a 
noticeable part of  the southern African and African security architecture.
In terms of  foreign diplomacy, South Africa seems to have a balanced approach in keeping bi- 
and multilateral relations with both East and West as well as African states. Trade relations 
include the UK, Germany, The Netherlands, France, and Spain as well as India, China and 
numerous other states in the East. In BRICS, South Africa keeps its contacts including 
bilateral agreements with Latin-America. In terms of  previous “comrades in arms”, South 
Africa maintains strong relations with Cuba and fully supports the Palestinian people’s 
right to self-determination and attaining its freedom from Israeli repression and domination.
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The third case study on southern Africa remains both interesting and complex, if  not 
somewhat tragic. Zimbabwe (previously Rhodesia) gained independence in 1980 after a 
long and brutal liberation struggle (Chimurenga) against the minority government of  Ian 
Smith. The country had much potential regarding agriculture and the economy, though 
small in measure of  scale when compared to South Africa. The first Prime Minister, 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe, was well educated and committed to socialism and preached 
reconciliation. However, when Mugabe became President he ruled increasingly as a 
dictator, despite initial promises of  reconciliation with former enemies. Josiah Nkomo, 
an erstwhile partner, was sidelined and eventually ousted in a process that included the 
killing of  thousands of  people in western Zimbabwe. Opposition parties were severely 
restricted. Mugabe’s brutal rule received much criticism from the West as well as some 
African states. Mugabe craved and clung to power until he was removed and replaced by 
a new ruler, a previous military ally, now turned president. It is clear, however, that the 
coup-like removal of  Mugabe did not open much space for democracy. For the people 
of  Zimbabwe it remains a case of  democracy deferred. Some argue that it was not such 
much Mugabe’s economic policy (a mixed economy complemented with socialist jargon) 
but Mugabe’s disastrous personal style, corruption and blatant cronyism that led to the 
implosion of  the Zimbabwean economy. Belated land-reform was implemented without 
planning and education/training of  the incumbent farmers. Land reform was also marked 
by corruption and cronyism. Senile and intolerant, Mugabe’s rule undermined governance 
and social equality as well as economic growth while he doggedly centralised power and 
eventually even alienated the military, his strongest support base. Zimbabwe’s struggle 
may have been won for independence, but it is clear the end of  a liberation struggle did 
not mean entrenching democracy. Zimbabwe still faces huge challenges, which some say 
will hardly be corrected by a new president, an ex-military general who is facing sporadic 
protest. In terms of  our case studies, Zimbabwe remains the “weakest link”.
Zimbabwe after the fall of  President Mugabe is not yet in a period of  transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. The “resignation” of  President Mugabe under pressure 
from the military, the latter stopping short of  a coup, does not imply the achievement of 
a stable or sustainable democracy in the near future. What evolved was a change-within-
government and not a regime change. Democratic transition implies a change from an 
authoritarian regime to a (more) democratic regime including a change of  the previous 
ruling party (or incumbent political elite) to new incumbents. The notion of  transition 
implies that civil society, following elite-differences within the ruling party, moves with 
a significant extent into the public space at the moment of  transition. In the political 
stalemate in Zimbabwe, civil society/the public/the civil community went to the streets 
but were not the main dynamo of  the change. The civil community seemed to have been 
merely supporting the military in their attempt to force Mugabe out of  Zimbabwe’s 
power politics. A transition to democracy under current conditions remains remote. 
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To achieve economic sustainability and democracy remains a major challenge; in short, 
democracy has been deferred. Space for citizen politics may open up, but it remains to 
be seen whether the “new”/“old” elite that arose from recent internal differences will 
allow significant change. Any possible transition to democracy was clearly arrested. The 
advent of  real political transition is marked by deep differences between and within the 
ruling elite and a relatively ineffectual opposition. Zimbabwe’s future is full of  both risks 
and possibilities. Unfortunately, the role of  the military which in training and competence 
is quite professional has been tarnished by Mugabe’s rule. In terms of  peace operations 
and the Security Organ for Peace in southern Africa, Zimbabwe remains a factor, albeit 
not strong.
It seems that southern Africa does however reflect a certain level of  stability. One trusts 
that this will remain so and spread to other African regions less fortunate and plagued 
by conflict.
In terms of  the future, a lot remains to be done in enhancing the African Union’s ideals and 
in arresting intra-state wars. Some of  these conflicts are worsened by wars of  greed, wars 
for scarce resources and interstate rivalry. In some cases, foreign intervention worsens the 
situation, such as France in West-Africa and US attacks through drones in Somalia. Other 
states have seen more stability and this will hopefully increase. Much will depend on how 
political leadership deals with these tensions and takes ownership of  peacemaking and 
peacebuilding on the continent while distancing themselves from those core countries 
that intervene in African affairs (in the case of  France, numerous examples exist over the 
past decades).
“The East”
There are some continuing regional and global issues that are likely to dominate the 
politics of  Asia in the years to come. The election of  American President Donald Trump 
forced Asia to confront a new reality. The ‘America First’ doctrine along with Trump’s 
policies towards Iran and North Korea, his efforts to redefine America’s role in NATO 
and the Indo-Pacific region and the trade war with China brought in new uncertainties. 
America’s role in Syria and Iran has had spillover effects on the order in the West Asian 
region. Secondly, several of  the large Asian economies have felt the impact of  the global 
slowdown. This slowdown has been compounded with the US-China trade war. In 
some cases, like India, it would have an adverse impact on the process of  government’s 
reform agenda. 
Third, is the increasingly assertive posture that China has started to take in the South China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean region. It is making efforts to create a footprint in the littoral 
states of  the Indian Ocean with the Belt and Road initiative and close ties with Pakistan in 
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the form of  China Pakistan Economic Corridor. On one hand, the Chinese investments in 
infrastructure development have been welcomed; however, on the other hand, the Asian 
countries have started to realise the implications of  their inability to repay the loans. In 
the case of  Sri Lanka, for example, the agreement with state-owned China Merchants 
Port Holdings to lease 70 percent stake of  the strategically-located Hambantota port may 
plunge Sri Lanka further into the Chinese debt trap with Colombo turning to Beijing 
for fresh loans. In Myanmar, opposition to Chinese-backed projects is mounting due to 
a feeling that China is only interested in exploiting their natural resources. Myanmar has 
already suspended the Myitsone dam development in northern Myanmar.
Terrorism continues to dominate the discourse on peace and stability. The dimension of 
Islamic State in its various manifestations, especially the intrusive cross-border nature of 
Islamic terror continues to be a source of  concern. This is seen in the context of  Pakistan’s 
policies in Kashmir and India’s refusal to negotiate with the separatist elements in the 
state. The complex battles in Syria that has witnessed several countries participating in the 
struggle, either for or against the Assad government or fight against the Islamic State are 
a part of  this complexity. In Afghanistan, the Taliban continues to dominate the discourse 
on approach to peace and stability in the war-torn country. 
While climate change has been on the global agenda, there is little sympathy for the 
Western activists who have promoted this agenda. These Asian economies are still in the 
process of  industrialisation and need the use of  natural resources like coal and oil. In 
terms of  the BRICS forum, BRICS is growing slowly and has seen some radical changes 
in Brazil and India and much depends on how these modes of  cooperation will evolve. 
There is little doubt that a growing BRICS can contribute to a better future for many on 
the globe. However, managing broader BRICS cooperation and increasing its influence 
will require wise and prudent leadership in the years to come. One may speculate that 
with Russia taking over the Chairmanship, more activity may arise and it will depend on 
how such interaction evolves.
What would be the drivers that dominate the regional scene in Asia in the years to come? 
At the regional level, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is likely to dominate the 
security agenda in the years to come. The aspirations of  Iran to be recognised as a major 
actor in the region have brought it in direct confrontation with the traditional balance of 
forces dominated by Saudi Arabia. Iran’s skirmishes through its non-state allies in Lebanon, 
Yemen and Iraq and the counter moves by the US and Saudi Arabia are likely to continue 
over a period of  time. In South Asia, India’s concerns regarding cross-border terrorism 
from Pakistan are now being tackled by it in a more aggressive military posture. The 
continuing dominance of  the military establishment in the new government of  Pakistan 
means that this issue will fester in the coming years. This Indian assertive policy is also 
seen against Chinese intrusions along the border. Sri Lankan politics is yet to settle down. 
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The elections in Sri Lanka have thrown up new challenges of  reconciliation between the 
Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. The Rohingya issue in Myanmar has seen a 
clash between the idea of  national interest as interpreted by Myanmar’s establishment and 
the proponents of  human rights. American reluctance to play a dominant role in the Indo-
Pacific region and a growing concern about China means that the regional powers are 
likely to enter into new security arrangements. Japan and Australia, actors that previously 
avoided active participation in the politics of  Asia, are now shifting their priorities. The 
years to come promise a turbulent time for Asia.
Conclusion
Current global developments are interconnected. Some powers rise while others decline. 
During the last three American presidential terms, especially that of  Trump, relations 
within the NATO military treaty seem to have become one of  increasingly strange 
bedfellows (‘global partners’), one may argue. Is Trump’s defence policy altering the 
entire world system of  alignments, treaties and military and diplomatic conventions? 
Some would argue that under Trump the US is becoming more predictable, namely one 
can foresee an increasingly aggressive posture willing to export violence thousands of 
kilometres outside the US. Others may argue that the US has become more unpredictable. 
The same may, however, apply to a host of  other international actors.
Will other NATO countries continue to tolerate Trump’s one-sided actions and his 
paternalistic approach to the “smaller” NATO partners? Future developments here may 
be interesting as it is clear that relations are growing rather tense as different interests 
and views of  a peaceful world amongst NATO members seem to diverge. An increasing 
aggressive policy by the USA, partly driven by the insecurities around its economic 
decline, may alienate other European partners that more and more seem to work on other 
constructive means to temper international conflicts.
Other powers are rising, some alliances slip away and new ones are formed. What will 
evolve on the global defence terrain with increasingly important international actors such 
as Brasilia, India, China, North Korea, Turkey and Iran? While one hegemon declines, 
other states may play a role in a multipolar world or a new hegemon may arise.
Is this the end of  the beginning or the beginning of  the end? Indeed, we face a tense 
future and a problematic if  not potentially dangerous/disastrous changing world order 
as globalisation and de-globalisation seem to become intertwined phenomena. Only time 
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